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ýRntarak§ita, the 8th century Indian M5dhyamika considered by Tibetan doxographers as 
the founder of what is presently known as the Yogacdm-Svdtantrika-Madhyamaka 
synthesis, set out his philosophy in the MadhyamakalaqiAora. This text is examined 
together with his more detailed TattvasaTgraha and in the light of its most extensive 
Tibetan commentary, the db U ma rgyan gyi mam bshad Yam dbyangs bla ma dgyes pa'i 
zhal lung by Mi pham 'jam dbyangs main rgyal rgya mtsho (1846-1912). ýdntar*ita's 
ideas are shown in historical context to be a structured and doxographically clear 
expression of philosophical ideas and trends already extant separately in the tradition. The 
significance of his work lies in the way he brings together three main streams of thought: 
1) the syllogistic method and epistemological analysis of the Buddhist logicians; 2) the 
analysis of cognition and of the gradual stages of the soteriological. path developed by 
Yogdc5ra; and 3) the establishment of ultimate and relative truths (don dam Men pa, kun 
rdzob Men pa) according to Madhyamaka. 
The circularity of ýAntarakýita's refutation of 'true existence' is shown to rest on a 
definition of existence that precludes permanence from the outset. Unlike other philo- 
sophers, he does not examine the relationship between parts and wholes but refutes the 
possibility of both. It is argued that he establishes the reflexivity of consciousness without 
metaphysical entailment. The coherence of the Two Truths framework is shown to rely on 
kntarakýita's theory of the discursive ultimate (rnam grangs pa 7 don dam) accepted by 
rNying ma pas since Mi pham, from which viewpoint alone the distinction between 
ultimate and relative can be made. Many dGe lugs pa doxographical definitions of 
YogZicdra-Sviitantrika-Madhyamaka-with regard to 091aya, the reflexivity of conscious- 
ness, and the relative existence of phenomena by way of their characteristics---are found 
not to apply to ýdiitar*ita. Mi pham's own views are strongly influenced by those of 
kntar*ita, illustrating the latter's influence on recent formulations of rNying ma 
doctrine. 
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CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION 
Ll Introduction 
ýdntarakýita lived in India in the 8th century C. E. (c. 700-785). ' He was a Buddhist pro- 
ponent of Madhyamaka, the philosophy of the Middle Way, and the treatises he com- 
posed represent the last phase of Madhyamaka development in India. 2 In his later life he 
lived in bSarn yas monastery, Tibet, where he died. He is credited by Tibetan historians 
with establishing Buddhism in that country with the assistance of the king Khri srong sde 
brtsan and the yogi Padmasambhava. 3 His life and influence therefore uniquely span both 
India and Tibet. Not only did his thought influence views held during the early dissemi- 
nation of Buddhism in Tibet, but even many centuries later, in the second dissemination, 
they continued to be taught and commented upon. In particular, Tibetan doxography 
recognizes him as the founder of what is currently called the Yogdc5ra-SvRantrika- 
Madhyamaka school of Buddhismý Still today, his works are studied in Tibetan dGe lugs 
pa colleges in exile as part of the curriculum on Sviitantrika-Madhyamaka and as a pri- 
mary source for Sautrdntika views. 5 
Surprisingly little has been published on gdntarakýita by Westem scholars and the 
research that has been completed is very selective. Almost all the published studies con- 
'Most sources do not provide a date for his birth, although Tarthang Tulku (1977: 161) says that he was 
born about 700 C. E. but does not cite his sources for this date. Neither is there a precise date for his death, 
but according to an early document (Dun Huang IOL 689/2), he died soon after the construction of the 
bSam yas temple, which was probably around 779 C. E. See The Great Perfection by Samten G. Karmay, 
EJ. Brill, Leiden, 1988, pp. 76ff. 
2Ruegg (1981: 85); Lopez (1987: 19). 
3See Chapter 11 below. 
41be earliest instance of his being called the founder of a school is in Ye shes sde, in Ruegg (1981 a). See 
also Lopez (1987: 20). This point is discussed below in Chapter III. 
5See Klein (1998: 109). Bransford Wilson (1984: 21,49) explains that in sGo mang College and most other 
dGe lugs pa colleges, the curriculum presents (1) the ilaya-vijUna from the CittamRtra point of view; (2) 
the PrajUpdrmnitil from the Yogae5ra-Svdtantrika point of view, using mainly Haribhadra! s work, and (3) 
the abhidharma from the Vaibh5sika and Sautr5ntika points of view, using Vasubandhifs Abhidharmakoda. 
But many dGe lugs scholars wouid learn about Svatantrika by studying presentations of tenets (grub 'mtha) 
rather than reading original Sanskrit texts even in translation (Lopez: 19$7: 23). 
cern the TattvasaTgraha (TS) while ýdntarakýita's other works are largely unexplored. In 
addition, research has often focused on logical and epistemological questions leaving 
aside the broader aspects of his doctrinal view relating to metaphysics and soteriology. 
The present study aims to contribute towards a more comprehensive understanding of his 
significance as a Buddhist author by examining his MadhyamakdIaq? kjra (MAL), con- 
sidered to be the founding text of the Yogacara-Svdtantrika-Madhyamaka school of 
Mahayana Buddhism and the work in which he presents his own personal standpointý 
Tibetans count the MAL as one of the three chief works illuminating Svdtantrika (rang 
rgyud shar gsum), along with Ridnagarblia's Satyadvayavibhafiga and Kamalagillas 
7 
Madhyamakdloka. 
For several decades in the 20th century, one of the decisive factors accounting for the 
academic neglect of ýdntar*ita was probably his inaccessibility! Most of his works are 
no longer extant in Sanskrit, and it appears that none were ever translated into Chinese. 
Until relatively recently, few Buddhologists read Tibetan, the language in which they are 
extant. And when Tibetan Buddhism became a field of study in its own right, from the 
late 1970s, the Tibetan preference for Msafigika-Madhyamaka was understandably 
reflected by a relative lack of academic curiosity in Svdtantrika. Furthermore, the text is 
considered difficult because it is so condensed, and assumes prior knowledge of the many 
debates to which it alludes. 
There are signs that the tide is now turning, and several theses on ýdntar*ita are at 
present in preparation: Sara McClintock, working at Harvard University, USA, has very 
recently submitted a Ph. D. thesis on the concept of omniscience in kntarakýita and 
Kamalagila, focussing on the TS; James Blumenthal, at Oregon State University, USA, 
6Ruegg (1981-. 90); Ichig6 (1985: LX); Lipman (1979: 11). 
7Eckel (1987: 15); Lopez (1987: 21). 
Tor discussions accounting for the neglect of the MAL amongst Western scholars see Lipman (1979: 
1-11) and Lopez (1987: 20ff). 
has just completed a thesis on 8antarak§ita addressing dGe lugs pa interpretations of 
8antarak§ita's thought, with special reference to the MAL; and Jundo Nagashima, at 
Bristol University, UK, is researching late Madhyamaka doxography which, although not 
exclusively concerned with 8antar*ita, will help to place him in a more precise 
doctrinal context. Finally, Marie-Louise Friquegnon, studying at William Paterson Uni- 
versity, New Jersey, published a booklet in 2001 on 8dntarak§ita in the Wadsworth Philo- 
sophers Series which also reflects that interest in him is broadening. She is currently 
working on a study of his Tattvasiddhi, exploring the connections between his philosophy 
in the TS and MAL and Vajray5na. Furthermore, it should be acknowledged that a 
number of studies have been undertaken by Japanese scholars in recent years, only some 
of which are available in English translation. In particular, Ichig6's critical edition of the 
MAL is a milestone in our knowledge of this text. 
The present study can therefore be seen as a complementary element in this new wave of 
interest in ýdntarakýita, specifically contributing a philosophical appraisal of the rNying 
ma pa interpretation of the MAL embodied in Mi pham's commentary on the text. In a 
sense, one might anticipate the interest of this study to be a better understanding of the 
Yogacdm-Madhyamaka synthesis, and of how kntarakýita succeeds in bringing together 
these two Mali5yana doctrines whose proponents, for centuries before him, had some- 
times been bitter rivals. One is tempted to wonder whether these two schools are really 
compatible, and whether the doctrinal synthesis that kntar*ita attempts is anything 
more than an artificial feat of rhetoric. But we will not be constrained by these questions, 
which tie us to examining his work in the light of its doxographical classification rather 
than as a piece of philosophy in its own right. As is often the case, philosophers do not 
exactly fit the classifications made of them. The approach we will take here is to appraise 
his view philosophically especially in the light of Mi pham's interpretation of his thought. 
We will provide evidence showing that the most artificial feature of kntarakýita's work is 
the doxographical label it bears. One point that emerges is the way certain dGe lugs pa 
characterizations of his work are less accurate than their rNying ma equivalents. 
1.2 The approach taken by the present study 
Despite kntarakýita's importance as the founder of a school of Madhyamaka, Indian and 
Tibetan Madhyamaka literature reveals relatively few details about him. There are few 
detailed commentaries on the MAL in either Sanskrit or Tibetan, and he has no written 
biography. To account for this neglect, one must consider that Prdsafigika views were 
dominant in Tibet from the 13th century onwards? However recent research has un- 
covered more commentarial sources than hitherto known in Western scholarship, so 
that the most up-to-date recension of the commentaries on the MAL that are available to 
us is given as follows: 10 
Sanskrit commentaries on the MAL" 
" Autocommentary: Madhyamakdlathkdraiýrtti, P. [101] (5285) ja 52bl-84b7) 
" Kamalani a: MadhyamakdIathkdrqpafijikd, P. [1011 (5286) aa 84b7-143b2. 
" Mimaki (1982a) and Tillemans (1984) cite a lost Sanskrit commentary on the MAL 
by Dharmamitra, said by Bu ston (ii. 161) and Tdrandtha (fol. 99B) to be the disciple 
of Guiýaprabha. 
Tibetan commentaries on the MAL 
Phyabachoskyisengge(1109-1169): dbumargyangyigrelpa(Tohoku3887) 
Tsong kha pa (1357-1419): dbu ma rgyan gyi brjed byang 
Tsongkhapa(1357-1419): dbumargyangyizinbris 
Shesbyak-un rig (1367-1449): 12 dbu ma rgyan gyi rnam bshad 
0 Phyogslasmamrgyal(1376-1451): dbumargyangyimambshad 
" Mi pharn: dbu ma rgyan gyi rnam bshad jam dbyangs bla ma dgyes pai zhal lung 
" Mdo sngags chos kyi rgya mtsho (1903-1957): dbu ma rgyan gyi gzhung 'grel rig pa 7 
lam gyi snang ba 
" Mdo sngags chos kyi rgya tsho (1903-1957): dbu ma rgyan gyi mchan 'grel nyung 
ngu and dbu ma rgyan gyi mchan 'grel nyung ngu Ita ba ngan pa gcod pa 7 ral gri 
9LoPez (1987: 21-23). 
1OFor more details see the Tibetan Buddhist Resource Center website. Lipman, writing in 1979, cites far 
fewer commentaries than this. 
"Despite their titles, the MadhyamakAlwnkara-vriti-madhyamaka-pratipadLi-siddhi-nama (P. [114] (5573) 
and Madhyamak-aIamkara-qpadefa by ýintipd, 
ýso known as Ratn5karagAnti or gAntipida, are not on 
9Intar*ita! s MAL. 
12Shes bya kun rig was a Sa skya teacher, and is given as one of the teachers of Sa skya mChog Idan (1428- 
1509). 
Further research is therefore needed to examine the wide variety of commentaries 
available, covering Sa skya, dGe lugs and rNying ma views. The present study must 
therefore be seen in perspective as a modest beginning to this process. So why has 
Mi pham's commentary been chosen from amongst these as the lens through which this 
thesis views ýRntar*ita's thought? 
In the mid 19th century, when several lamas of the ecumenical ris med movement 13 in 
Tibet attempted to gather together all extant Buddhist teachings in the country in an effort 
to preserve them for posterity, 14 the nation's debt to ýantaraksita was explicitly acknow- 
ledged byJam dbyangs mkhyen brtse dbang po15 (1820-1892), who asked 16 the rNying 
ma pa scholar Mi phamjam dbyangs marn. rgyal rgya mtsho (1846-1912) to compose a 
comprehensive commentary on the MAL, prefaced by a short biography. The aim was to 
fill the gap left by centuries of neglect. In using this commentary by Mi pham as a vehicle 
to explore the philosophical views expressed in the MAL, the approach taken here is 
therefore new in two respects. Firstly, until now, all published research on the TS and the 
MAL has employed the respective commentaries to these works written by Kamalagila. 
Only Kennard Lipman studied the MAL with reference to Mi pham's commentary in a 
ground-breaking thesis that remains unpublished. 17 And yet Mi pharifs commentary is of 
great interest for a number of reasons. Although it was written almost a thousand years 
13See The Rimi (ris med) Movement ofJamgon Kongtrul the Great by Ringu Tulku, paper presented to the 
7th conference of the International Association for Tibetan Studies, June, 1995. Unpublished. 
14This monumental gathering together of Buddhist works was deemed necessary because many lineages and 
practices were thought to be on the verge of extinction. 
15For more on his life and his role in the Ris med movement, see Masters ofMiditation and Miracles by 
Tulku Thondup, Shambhala, Boston and London, 1996, pp. 215-221. 
16This accounts for the title of Mi phanfs commentary: An exposition on the treatise [entitled] 71e Orna- 
ment of the Middle Way'that will delight the lama [who is like] Manjuiti (dbu ma rgyan gyi mam bshad 
jam dbyangs bla ma dgyes pai zhal lung). The lama who will be delighted by this work refers to 'Jain 
dbyangs; rnkhyen brtse dbang po. 
17A Study ofSdntarak4ita's Madhyamakalaýnkdra, thesis submitted by Kennard Lipman to the University of 
Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, Canada, in 1979 and unpublished. The copy consulted is on microfilm. More 
recently, Lipman has alluded to Mi phams commentary on the MAL in a paper entitled Vhat is Buddhist 
Logic? 'published in nbetan Buddhism: Reason and Revelation, ed. S. Goodman and R. M. Davidson, 
SUNY, 1992. 
after that of Kamalas-11a, it is a valuable tool for understanding the MAL from the point of 
view of the history of philosophy, not least because it is able to take into account the 
various doctrinal debates and controversies that took place in the intervening period. 
Furthermore, Mi pham's exegesis of thq MAL is made from the perspective of the Great 
Madhyamaka (dbu ma chen po), a late Tibetan development which was particularly 
strong in the 19th and 20th centuries, and which assimilated the characteristically Yoga- 
cam doctrine of tathdgatagarbha into Madhyamaka philosophy. 
18 The mutually support- 
ive relationship between the Great Madhyamaka and 
kntarakýita's view is of interest in 
determining 85ntaralqýita's long-term doctrinal influence. The second aspect of this study 
that is new concerns the fact it is based on a rNying ma commentary. Until now, dGe lugs 
pa doxographical writings have provided modem scholars with their main-if not only- 
sources of knowledge of the Svatantrika school. 
19 Mi pham's approach is more sympa- 
thetic to 8dntarakýita than that which is characteristic of dGe lugs pa writers, 20 notleast 
because his own view is so close to that of his predecessor. 
Of significance, too, in determining the choice of Mi phams commentary is the issue of 
the influence of gantarakýita7s doctrine on that of the rNying ma school of Tibetan 
Buddhism, and this is explicitly stated as a secondary topic in the title of this thesis. We 
will see later that Mi pham himself was profoundly influenced by ýdntaraksita, and since 
Mi pham. has become one of the leading authorities of rNying ma doctrine, his commen- 
tary on the MAL can be seen as one of the most important texts linking 95ntarakýita with 
the rNying ma school as a whole. 
181be term'Yoglic5ra-Madhyamaka! is sometimes used by rNying ma pas to describe this movement, and 
should not be confused with 95ntaraksita! s'YogReara-Sviitantrika-Madhyamaka!. 
19For example, Donald Lopez bases his characterization of SvItantrika on the Presentation of Tenets of the 
dGe lugs pa scholar lCang skya rol pa'i rdo rje (1717-1786) and other dGe lugs pa sources. 
201n the second chapter of his ground-breaking study, Donald Lopez (1987: 55-81) illustrates how dGe lugs 
scholars focus on the differences between Svdtantrika and Pr5sahgika, whereas Mi pharn is more concerned 
with their common ground. 
Mi pharn considered the MAL to be especiaRy important because of the way it integrates 
the two major trends of Mah5yana philosophy, Yogacara and Madhyamaka. 21 He also 
valued its emphasis on establishing the conceptual ultimate (parydyaparamartha; rnam 
grangs pa 7 don dam). While the dGe lugs pa distinction between Svdtantrikas and PrA- 
safigikas is drawn primarily from their different uses of logical method, Mi pham's 
interest in SvAtantrika has more to do with its approach to the Two Truths. 22 He explores 
this chiefly in his commentary on the MAL which is one of his earliest works since he 
makes reference to it in the commentary he wrote on Bodhicarydvatara IX. 2 in 1878-73 
Later on, he developed the same themes in works such as his Nges shes rin po che 7 sgron 
me, the mKhas jug and db U ma 7 Ita khrid zab mo bzhugs so24, showing how foundational 
the MAL proved to be to the development of Mi pham's own thought. 
Mi pham's main tenet is that ýdntarakýita's unique contribution to the development of 
Mahaydna doctrine lies in the subtle way he approaches the Two Truths. 25 He follows 
Cittamatra analysis in relative truth (kun rdzob bden pa, saýnvrlisatya) and in ultimate 
truth (don dam Men pa, paramarthasatya) he proposes a two-step approach: first an 
ultimate reality that cannot be expressed in words (rnam grangs min pa7 don dam), and 
secondly an ultimate reality that can be expressed in words (rnam grangs pai don dam). 
The first of these is realized during meditation, and the second comes in the phase after 
the realization of the ultimate in meditation, in what can be called the post-meditation 
period (sometimes termed 'meditational aftermath'). By comparison, PrdsaAgika scholars 
do not accept that the ultimate can ever be expressed in words, and place more emphasis 
on the indivisibility of the Two Truths. 
21pettit (1998: 57). See also Chapters H and VII below. 
22pettit (1998: 109). 
23Lipman (1979: 2). This part of Mi pharres commentary on the Bodhicaryjvatara is translated in Lipman 
(1979: 165). The dating of Mi phams commentary on the MAL can only be done comparatively to other 
works by him since there is no date given in the colophon. 
24The Tibetan text and English translation is found in Calm and Clear by Lama Mipham, Tibetan Nyingma 
Meditation Center, Berkeley, 1973, under the title "Instructions on Vision in the Middle Way". 
25 Cf. Tarthang Tulku, Crystal Mirror V. pp. 162-3. Tarthang Tulku is a contemporary rNying ma lama. 
However, according to Mi pham, the MAL encompasses the Prasafigika view, and he pre- 
sents the Yogac5ra-Madhyamaka viewpoint as a bridge that enables the reader to cross 
over to the further shore of Prdsafigika which he himself acknowledges to be the highest 
view. In summary, therefore, he argues that the fundamental intent of these two Madhya- 
maka schools is the same and the difference between them is just a matter of emphasis. 
Our approach is to take Mi phams commentary on the MAL as an important way of illu- 
minating the meaning of the text and, in a second phase, to critique 
ýantar*ita's philo- 
sophy so described from the point of view of a philosopher. The main body of this study 
is in three parts. Taken together they address what are arguably the most important and 
characteristic features of kntarakjiWs work. The first part contextualizes the MAL both 
historically (Chapter 11) and philosophically (Chapter RD, identifying the main topics that 
were current in his time. The second part analyses verses 1-62 of the MAL in detail. First, 
in Chapter V, it explores some of the philosophical questions raised by ýRntaralqita! s use 
of the 'neither one nor many argument' (ekdnekaviyogahetu; gcig du bral gyi gtan tshigs). 
Then it analyses his application of this argument to a number of issues: God, cessation, 
persons and universals (Chapter VI), the existence of the external world (Chapter VH), 
and the mind and cognition (Chapter V-HI). The third part considers 
9ýmtarakýita's 
approach to the Two Truths in verses 63-97 of the MAL (Chapter IX). 
L3 Sources used 
1.3.1 Written sources 
Only fragments of the MAL are now extant in Sanskrit, and the standard text is the 
Tibetan translation found in the bstan gyur. The 1957-81 Peking edition26 of the bstan 
gyur was used in this study and references to it are prefaced 'P. '. Masamichi Ichig627 has 
26 Tibetan Tripitaka, Peking Edition, ed. D. T. Suzuki, Tibetan Tripitaka Research Institute, Tokyo, 1957-81. 
27Madhyamak4la? Wra of gantaraksita with his own commentary orqui and with the subcommentary or 
pafijika of Kamalafila, ed. Masarnichi Ichig6, Kyoto Sangyo University, Kyoto, 1985. 
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published a critical edition of the MAL along with an edition of ýZintarakýita's iýrtti 
28 and 
of the pan-Vika written by Kamalasila. Ichig6 has also published an English translation of 
the MAL verses in the same volume. A few years later, Ichig6 co-published with Luis 
G6mez 29 a revised translation of the MAL verses and a revised commentary on them. As 
for Mi pham's commentary on the MAL, it is published in dpe cha format by rGyal ba 
Kar ma pa in Sikkim, northern India; and it was published as a modem bound book by the 
Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies, Varanasi, India in 1999 (here named the 
Varanasi edition, abbreviated 'V. '), and by Si khron mi rigs dpe skrun khang Publishers, 
Chengdu, China in 1992 (here named the Chengdu edition, abbreviated 'C. '). In addition, 
it has also been published by Zhe chen Monastery in Baudhnath, Nepal, although that 
edition was not consulted for the present study. It is of incidental interest to note that the 
significant number of editions of Mi pham's commentary published by rNying ma institu- 
tions reflect the interest in the MAL in contemporary rNying ma studies and also, it has to 
be said, the great esteem in which Mi pham himself is held. 
The translations included in this study, as well as those in the Appendices, are my own 
unless otherwise stated. Transliteration of the Tibetan follows the Wylie system, except 
for the names of contemporary Tibetan scholars who publish under a Romanised name, 
where the Romanised name has been used. 
1.3.2 Oral sources 
In addition, several oral sources of infonnation have been referred to in the course of this 
study. Tibetan historians in the medieval period based their written accounts partly on 
28In Tsong kha pa! s view, the yrtti and the so-called root verses were written at the same time, as alternating 
sections of poetry and prose. fie auto-commentary was not composed after the main text, as is often the 
case. Thequi should therefore be regarded as an integral part of the MAL. This is reported by lCang skya 
in Lopez (1987: 250-1). 
2IStudies in theUterature of the Great Vehicle: three Mahayana Buddhist texts, ed. Luis 0. G6mez and 
Jonathan A. Silk, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1989, pp. 151-225. 
oral sources. Mi pham. himself relied partly on oral sources for his biographical presenta- 
tion of gantarak0ta. And in the present day, this research has benefitted from two direct 
sources of oral information. The first is a series of talks on the MAL given by mKhan 
chen Pad ma shes rab3o at the Centre d'6tudes de Chanteloube in Saint-Uon-sur-Vftýre, 
France, in June 2000 and May 2001. The second source includes a number of conversa- 
tions held with Tibetan lamas and mkhan pos of several schools, on various occasions 
when the present author asked questions pertaining to this thesis. Details of these are to be 
found in the footnotes. In particular, the Sa skya pa scholar'Jam dbyangs mkhyen brtse 
rdzong gsar rin po, che, and the rNying ma pa scholar Dzi gar Kong sprul rin po, che, were 
especially helpful. 
M Hermeneutical issues 
Since the use of oral information can be considered problematic, it is necessary to outline 
the approach adopted here before proceeding. How does one assess the validity and 
reliability of oral information in religious studies? And in which sense can oral informa- 
tion contribute to knowledge? 
The type of oral information that applies in this case relates to objects that can be known 
by other forms of cognition. It includes, for example, the testimony of Tibetan historians 
(which is, in part, itself based on the testimony of others). It is considered legitimate to 
accept such accounts as contributions to knowledge if, and only if, the information they 
contain agrees with what is already known about the subject through other sources of evi- 
dence? ' Whenever oral sources cannot be verified by these means, they are taken to be 
3Me abbot responsible for the Study College (shes grwa) in the rNying ma monastery of Theg chog mam 
drol shes drub dar gye gling near Mysore, south India. He was born in Khams, south-eastern Tibet, and 
studied the MAL with Dil ingo mkhyen brtse rin po che, and studied Mi pharns commentary to it with 
mKhan po bsTson'grus. Dil mgo mkhyen brtse's main teacher was Zhe chen rgyal tsab, who in turn was the 
main disciple of Mi pham. Such lineages of learning are considered important by Tibetan masters. 
31WS legitimacy can be justified in two distinct ways. On the one hand, these are the criteria used tradi- 
tionally for assessing the validity of oral teachings in the MahAyAna, which must never contradict the 
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either mistaken or inconclusive. 
Another form of oral information relevant to this study concerns what J. N. Mohanty 
(1992: 249-259) calls 'supersensible' objects. These are objects that can be apprehen- 
ded by faculties other than the five senses. Examples include various claims made by Mi 
pham about kntarak§ita's spiritual accomplishment but, more importantly, the topic of 
ultimate truth (paramirthasalya) itself. This category of material is problematic because 
it brings to light significant differences between the academic philosophical reading of a 
text and what is understood by textual reading within the Buddhist tradition. From the 
academic point of view, for instance, the reader can accept that certain people assert that 
'je is the case without needing to know whether or not Y actually is the case. 32 Specifi- 
cally, here, the reader might accept kntarakýita's assertion that there is an ultimate truth 
and that this truth can be realized by human beings, and yet in his evaluation of knta- 
rakýita's viewpoint, the reader does not commit him or herself to any belief that this is 
actually the case. Engagement with the text is intellectual and conceptual. This contrasts 
with the 'emic' approach whereby it is not considered that a text is read by a disembodied 
mind, rather reading is a complex encounter between the person taken as a whole and a 
rich body of knowledge, and leads not only to understanding but to personal experience. 
Indeed, the avowed purpose of reading-and writing-is soteriological. For example, 
ý5ntarakýita describes his aim in writing the MAL as follows: 
If someone who sets out independently to establish tile welfare of self and others, 
understands that everything that is enjoyed merely through a lack of examination 
ofparticular existents does not truly exist ultimately, like a reflection in a mirror 
and so on, then his various emotional and intellectual obscurations will be 33 
eliminated 
written teachings (point made by 'Jain dbyangs mkhyen brtse rdzong gsar rin po che). On the other hand, 
the American philosopher Ernest Sosa also adopts these criteria to assess valid testimony. See his entry 
under'testimony'in A Companion to Epistemology, Blackwell, Oxford, 1992. So does J. N. Mohanty in 
Reason and Tradition in Indian Thought, pp. 249-259. 
32Path to the Middle: the spoken scholarship of Kensur Feshey Tupden by Anne C Klein, State University 
of New York Press, 1994, pp. 1-28. 
33MALV on verse 1; Ichig6 (1985: 14). bdag dang gzhan gyi don phun sum tshogs pa bsgrub par ci la'ang 
ma rag par chas pa/ dngos po'i mam pa ma brtags gcig pu na dga! ba ma lus pa gzugs brnyan la sogs pa Ita 
II 
There is a significant difference, then, between the academic and traditional understand- 
ings of reader involvement, and this is connected with the complex intertwining of written 
knowledge and orality within Buddhism that has been extensively discussed by Anne 
Klein. 34 The distinction between approaches is important here because if, as all Madhya- 
mikas would agree, the ultimate truth (pararnirthasatya) is beyond words and non- 
conceptual, then how is the academic reader to understand the meaning of the term from a 
purely conceptual or logical standpoint, without himself successfully engaging in the 
meditation practices that are said to lead to non-conceptual and ultimate understanding? 
And how, more specifically, is one to assess the idea of discursive and non-discursive 
modes of ultimate truth? 
Such hermeneutical questions are addressed by the four reliances or refuges (prati- 
sara.! za), one of the most commonly cited frameworks in Buddhist hermeneutics set out in 
the Catuýpratisara-ýasiltra- 35 The last two reliances are relevant here: to rely on the 
definitive meaning (nuartha) not on the interpretable meaning (neyartha), and to rely on 
wisdom UiOna) not on ordinary consciousness (vijildna). The Buddhist truths are the 
object of a threefold wisdoM36 (prajfid) arising from listening (frutimayr), reflection 
(cintdmayf) or meditation ffihdvandmayr) and since the first two are considered worldly 
and defiled, leading only to an understanding of the interpretable meaning (neyirtha), the 
third is the only wisdom that offers direct comprehension of the definitive meaning 
(nrtdrtha). Within the terms of Buddhist doctrine, therefore, only a reader who has 
developed this third wisdom (jildna) is able to fully understand what is meant by the term 
paramdrthasalya. This implies that the academic approach necessarily means not merely 
bur/ yang dag par na rang bzhin med par rtogs na nyon mongs pa dang/ shes bya3 sgrib pa mtha! dag spong 
bar'gyur te/ 
340p. Cit. 
35SCe The Assessment of Textual Interpretation in Buddhism! by Etienne Lamotte, in Buddhist Herme- 
neutics ed. Donald S. Lopez, Jr., Kuroda Institute, Hawaii, 1988, p. 1 I ff. 
360ne of the scriptural sources for this distinction is Cbapter 8 of the SarhAinir? nocana Satra (Dharma Pub- 
lishing edition, 1995, pp. 182-3). 
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that the reader is not bound to accept that Y actually is the case, but that he or she is in 
fact unable to determine whether'je is the case or not. 
It is precisely because all ordinary human beings, and not just the ubiquitous academic, 
fall into this category that textual interpretation is difficult. As Donald Lopez (1988: 51) 
puts it, "How is the unenlightened exegete to know the enlightened mind of the Buddha? " 
One option is to rely on Buddha's own instructions on textual interpretation, such as the 
four reliances already mentioned. Another is to rely on the process of understanding that 
unfolds during the course of a textual commentary (gzhung khrid) given orally by a 
master. Such occasions (Klein, 1994: 1-28) combine reference to textual commentaries; 
ritual oral elements such as chanting, praying, reciting from memory, and scriptural 
transmission (lung; dgama); the listener's non-verbal interiority of concentration and 
visualisation; and the transformative power of the master's speech, which stems above all 
from his kindness. 37 All these factors coalesce to give 'reading' a very different meaning 
from the one it has in modem academia, and are said to facilitate the reader's access to 
non-conceptual understandings unknown by him or her hitherto. 
370n this Klein (1994: 7, n. 24) refers to the rNying ma scholar kLong chen rab byarns, and his man ngag tin 
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CHAPTER TWO THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
OFSUNTARAKýITA 
U. 1 Introduction 
If one is to have as complete an understanding as possible of kntarak§ita's philosophy, 
and in particular an appreciation of why certain questions were important to him, then it is 
relevant to begin by reviewing the context within which he was working. This has been 
separated into two parts to facilitate the presentation. In this Chapter, his socio-historical 
context will be considered, including elements of his biography. Then Chapter III will 
review his philosophical context, that is, kntarakýita's place within the history of the 
philosophy of ideas in India. Taken together, these two Chapters set the scene for sub- 
sequent discussion of his views. 
The principal reason for engaging in contextual questions here is that so little has been 
published on gdntarakýita and his period that it is important to fill this gap in our know- 
ledge. What has been published is widely scattered between different works, and for the 
most part embedded in studies that are not focused on him. The value of these two 
Chapters is arguably that they gather together material that is dispersed in such a way as 
to constitute the beginnings of a monograph on kntarakýita, and to lay the foundation for 
further academic research. 
The exercise of situating ýdntarakýita within his historical context should in no way be 
seen as indicating a materialist approach to ideas or to people. It is not to say that ýdnta- 
rakýita's views were determined by socio-political factors. ' However, it does reflect the 
idea that historical events were factors amongst others, all of which came together to pro- 
duce kntarakýita the person and the thinker. This is entirely compatible with the prin- 
'This view was expressed by Marx and Engels. "In every historical epoch, the prevailing mode of economic 
production and exchange, and the social organisation necessarily following from it, form the basis upon 
which is built up, and from which alone can be explained, the political and intellectual history of that 
epoch". Manifesto of the Communist Party, in 77te Essential Left (Allen and Unwin, 1960: 12). 
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ciple of interdependent origination (pratTtyasamutpdda) according to which events arise 
as a result of the dynamic convergence of many different and complex factors. A con- 
textual approach is also necessary when it comes to reading an 8th century text through 
the lens of subsequent commentaries. As we will find in Chapter 111, some differences 
between commentarial interpretations result from the historico-philosophical contexts 
relative to each commentary. Only by establishing an understanding of the context in 
which the MAL was written will we be able to identify which points in the commentaries 
relate to topics that were issues for the commentator but not for ýdntarakjita himself. 
11.2 The socio-eco omic background 
The biographical information available on ýdntarakýita, such as it iS, 2 associates him with 
northeastern India, since he was bom in the region of Bengal and became abbot of 
Nalanda. A few centuries before him, under the Gupta empirC3 that lasted from 320 C. E. 
to 500 C. E. and extended over the entire span of northern India, from east to west, there 
was a flourishing of Hindu Sanskrit literature and even a revival of the Vedic horse sacri- 
fice. 4 By comparison, then, Buddhism underwent a relative weakening in that period, and 
financial support of the monasteries was more dependent on rich citizens than on royal 
patronage. Gupta dominance was brought to an end by the Huns, and although they did 
not rule for long they left a far-reaching legacy. They effectively destroyed the Gupta 
empire in the northwest, including the cities and trading centres where classical culture 
was eradicated. In particular, the Buddhist monasteries in the Hun territory (this included 
Punjab, Kashmir, Rajasthan and western parts of modem Uttar Pradesh) were severely 
affected and never recovered. The sixth century therefore witnessed the first significant 
assault on Buddhist institutions in northern India. 
2See later in this Chapter. 
Tor the historical background, this study is particularly indebted to Kulke and Rothennund (1986.1990, 
1998), chapters 2 and 3. 
4ibid., p. 82. 
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The ancient period 5 ended with the break-up of the vast Indian empires and the esta- 
blishment of regional kingdoms in northeast, north, central and south India. These were 
characteristic of early medieval India, when there was a relatively peaceful balance of 
power between these main regions until the 12th century. In the north, King Harýa 
(known as ýrl Harýadeva; 606-647) re-established an empire almost as great as that of the 
Guptas, and under him the royal court once again bestowed patronage to both Hindu and 
Buddhist institutions. Then, in about 711, the first attempts at Arab invasion began in the 
northwest, and Lalitad7itya of Kashmir is reputed to have successfully repelled them from 
Sind and parts of the Punjab at that time. Generally, the regional balance of power fos- 
tered political stability within India itself, and cultural life developed on a regional basis. 
In northeastern India, for example, where ýdntarakýita was born, the P51a dynasty (770- 
1120)6 played an important role in strengthening Buddhist institutions weakened by 
several centuries of Hindu dominance. It is in this region that many Buddhist holy sites 
are located, as well as Ndlandd university itself, so Pdla support was particularly effective 
for the development of Buddhism. It was under Dharmapala (c. 790-821) that the monas- 
tery of Vikramagild was founded. Ndlandd flourished as a study centre especially for 
monks from southeast Asia, while Vilkramagila attracted Tibetan monks who translated 
Sanskrit texts in collaboration with Indian scholars. 7 The style of early Tibetan Buddhist 
art, notably thang ka painting, shows signs of Pala influence 8 and may be considered cir- 
cumstantial evidence to support the claim that AZintar*ita was from northeastern India. 
51bere are several different ways of classifying the periods in Indian history. Here, we defte the ancient 
pcriod as that which began with the Aryan invasions and ended with the collapse of the Gupta empire. This 
is followed by the medieval period (so gAntarak§ita lived in the middle of the medieval period) which 
ends when the Mughal empire rises. That marks the beginning of the modem period. 
61be dates of Gopala, the dynasty's founder, and his successor DharmapMa, vary from source to source. 
Sumpa, cited by Chattopadyaya (1967,1996: 230), gives Gopala's year of succession as 750, and that of 
DharmapMa as 770. 
7Kulke and Rothermund, op. cit., p. 1 12. 
Tarly Tibetan art, that is, the art that developed in the period of the first diffusion, evolved primarily ftom 
two sources: the PWa kingdom of eastern India, including the art of neighbouring Nepal, and the Kashmiri 
region to the west. Most examples were destroyed during the decade of China's cultural revolution in the 
1960s and early 1970s, although evidence remains at Sha lu and Dra thang monasteries. See Art of Tibet by 
Robert E. Fisher, Thames and Hudson, London, 1997, pp. 127-30. 
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T5randtha (fol. 105a) asserts that ýantarakýita clearly lived sometime between king 
Gopdla and king Dharmapala. He was reportedly already a scholar under Gopala, which 
may mean that the reigns of these kings specifically span his adulthood. If, as this 
reference suggests, his years of activity coincided with the beginnings of the Pdla dynasty, 
this indicates that ýdntaraksita studied, debated, taught and wrote at a time when 
Buddhism was unequivocally supported by the kings. One can infer from this that the 
material circumstances in which he found himself, both personally as a member of the 
royal family of Zahor, and more generally, would have been conducive to the pursuit of a 
scholarly and contemplative life on the part of a Buddhist follower. Generally, he would 
not have encountered institutional opposition. 
Hinduism had been flourishing widely in the period immediately before the PAlas, and in 
the 7th and 8th centuries it continued to flourish especially in south India. This period saw 
the magnificent Hindu rock temples to ýiva carved out at Badami, Mahabalipuram and 
Kanchipurain thanks to the patronage of the PaRava dynasty. ýdntarakýita would therefore 
have found that there were many Hindu scholars around him who were worthy opponents 
in debate. In the northeastern region, in particular, they would surely not have relin- 
quished their favoured position without contest. Such was the situation, then, that overall 
both Hindu and Buddhist traditions were still strong and their respective views were hotly 
debated, such debates being the intellectual and cultural mirror of the surrounding 
changes in political influence. kntarakýita's reputation for excelling in debating skills 
would consequently have been a very significant strength in this context. 
Despite these many favourable circumstances, however, his was not reaUy a 'golden age' 
in the sense that the first signs were already evident that the Buddhist era in India was 
coming to an end. The break-up of the great early empires that heralded the early medi- 
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eval period in around 500 was the first sign of weakness. The invasions by the Huns and 
then by the Muslims were shortlived, and in kntarakýita's lifetime may not have seemed 
significant, but with hindsight we know, of course, that repeated Muslim invasions over 
the following centuries were to contribute to the disappearance of Buddhism altogether in 
its homeland. So although there may have been relative peace and stability in ýdnta- 
rakýita's time, the 8th century could be seen as a tuming point: the beginning of the end of 
medieval culture. In fact, it is on account of later political developments in India that the 
Sanskrit texts of authors after gdntarakýita and Kamalag'fla are for the most part no longer 
extant. 
Having said this, it is important to differentiate between what was happening in the north/ 
northwest, and the situation prevailing in the northeast. In the 8di century, the northeast 
did not suffer from any foreign invasions. In the area governed by the Pala kings, 
Buddhism continued to expand and develop, as the building of major new monasteries 
like Vikrainalagild shows. For §Antarakýita and his contemporaries, this particular period 
would have been a time of confidence and optimism. But in the broader picture of things, 
even in the northeast, the fortunes of Buddhism were tied to the monarchies. 9 
That the atmosphere under the P51as was confident and optimistic for Buddhists is consis- 
tent with the encyclopaedic nature of gdntarakýita's Tattvasaýn raha. Works as detailed .9 
and as large as this take time to compose, which generally presupposes a stable environ- 
ment. Ile nature of this work also assumes a broad and lively context of debates and 
interaction between scholars, for which we have separate evidence. 10 Furthermore, the TS 
is testimony that Buddhist scholars took their opponents seriously, arguing the minutiae 
9Reat (1994: 77). 
"Taran7itha, for instancc, rcports storics of many dcbatcs in this pciiod. 
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of different topics as well as representing their opponents' views fairly. 
' 1 This is consis- 
tent with the general picture of a subcontinent where both Hindus and Buddhists enjoyed 
political protection in equal measure at different times and in different places. There were 
no clear favourites. The situation was conducive to mutual respect. 
Finally, as mentioned above, the 8th century marked in certain respects the beginning of 
the end for Buddhism in India. kntarakýita came in the last period 
12 of the development 
of Indian Buddhism, and the Yogac5ra-Madhyamaka synthesis he elaborated was the 
final doctrinal development of Indian Mahayana. 13 He was able to build on a legacy of 
around 1,200 years of Buddhist thought and religious practice. Even more important was 
the fact that, as far as we are aware, most schools of Indian Buddhism 14 were still actively 
followed by adherents in his lifetime. So although historical presentations of Indian 
Buddhism speak variously of 'the early schools' and later developments according to their 
respective dates of origin, if one takes a synchronic slice of Buddhist life in the 8th cen- 
tury one finds these traditions present simultaneously. 15 This means that the philosophical 
questions that gdntarakýita addressed were live ones, and not merely of academic interest 
as they came to be in Tibet. 71be proponents of other views with whom he debated 
actually believed in those views and did not adopt positions merely for the sake of debate. 
Now, if one considers briefly the broader context of the 8th century Buddhist world, 
"Nakamura (1983: 221). "The theories of other schools which are presented in it [the TS] are so rich in 
variety and accurate in their descriptions that it is a valuable source material for the research on the history 
of Indian thought. " 
12In A Short History of Buddhism, Conze divides the history of Buddhism in India into three 500-year 
periods, the last of which is from 500-1000 CE. Noble Ross Reat (1994), on the other hand, divides periods 
differently: first the period to Moka, the ascendency of Buddhism from 250 BCE to 250 CE. the classical 
age from 250 to 500 CE, and the medieval period from 500 to 1000 CE. However the history is analysed, 
ýantarak§ita always falls in the last period before Buddhisrrf s decline. 
13"In the history of the Madhyamaka school the last quarter of the first millennium was-the period of the 
great development and glory of the Yogic7tra-Madhyamaka synthesis. " Ruegg (1981: 85). 
"Sec Andri Bareau (1955), Les sectes bouddhiques du petit Whicule; and Etienne Larmue (1958), Histoire 
du bouddhisme indien. 
"Conze, for example, in his Buddhist Thought in India speaks of'archaic Buddhisrif which can be miscon- 
strued as Buddhism belonging exclusively to an early period. 
that is the entire area to which Mahayana Buddhism had spread inside and outside the 
Indian subcontinent, once again it is clear that this was a time of enormous change. knta- 
rak0ta. and KamalaMa belong to the last generation of Indian Buddhists who were in con- 
tact with their Chinese counterparts. After them, Chinese and Indian Buddhism diverged 
and no more Sanskrit works were translated into Chinese (apart from Tantric texts). 16 
Indeed, neither the TS nor the MAL were ever translated into Chinese. In 845 Buddhism 
was severely repressed by the Chinese authorities, and this is commonly regarded as the 
beginning of Buddhism's decline in that country. 17 One of the factors behind the cessation 
of communication between China and India after the 8th century was the situation pre- 
vailing in Central Asia, where Hsuan-tsang'8 reports that by the 7th century many 
Buddhist monasteries in Sogdiana, Bactria and Gandhara were in ruins. Western Turks in 
the Takla Makan area were converted to Islam by the n-dd-8th century, and thereafter 
cultural contacts overland between India and China came to an end. 19 By contrast, Tibet 
had become a major Central Asian power, and had become interested in Buddhism as a 
result of conquering the surrounding Buddhist lands of Kucha, Khotan, and the Takla 
Makan. During the reign of Khri srong Ide brtsan (742-798) Tibetan dominance was at its 
hcight-that is, of course, during the lifetime of gdntarakýita. So the overall picture that 
presented itself to gdntarakýita must have been that Buddhism was on the wane in India, 
China and Central Asia, but (possibly) on the rise in Tibet. If one sets ýdntarakýita's 
achievements against this backdrop, and considers the role he probably played in Tibet, 
one might imagine that he was singularly far-sighted. 
16Nakamura (1983: 257). 
""Buddhism in China! by Erik Zarcher in Rcat (1987: 143-44). 
"Buddhist Records of the Western World transl. Samuel Beal, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1994, pp. 98,222- 
223. 
19SneUgrove (1987: 328). 
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111.3 Afintarak5ita's lifesLory 
Mi pharn begins his commentary on the MAL with a brief biography of 
tdntarakýita. 
The interest of Mi phaas account stems largely from the fact that no comprehensive 
accounts of his life existed prior to this. Historical facts concerning his life are poorly 
documented, and as a result the information pointing to his place within the history of 
Buddhist ideas is circumstantial. More can be learned from studying his works than from 
looking at his biography. Nevertheless, as an attempt at gathering together the written and 
oral sources on týmtarakýita that existed in the 19th century, Mi pham's biography affords 
an opportunity to take a critical look at traditional accounts of his lifestory, and to assess 
the differing views regarding the role kntarakýita played in establishing Buddhism in 
Tibet. 
11.3.1 Accounts of ýdntaraksita in Tibetan hiqory 
As mentioned in Chapter I, 85ntarakýita presents something of a paradox. On the one 
hand, he was honoured by Tibetan historians such as Bu ston (1290-1364), 
20 the Sa skya 
pa'Gos lo tsa ba (1392-1481) 
21 and the Jo nang pa Taranatha (1575-? )22 as one of 
the founding fathers of Buddhism in their country. Furthermore, his doctrinal achieve- 
ment is acknowledged in Tibetan doxographies 
23 as particularly significant, since he is 
recognized as the founder of the Yogiicam-Sviitantrika-Madhyamaka (rnal 'byor spyod 
pa'i dbu ma rang rgyud pa) school. In contrast to this prominence, studies on his work in 
the Indo-Tibetan commentarial literature are relatively scant, and T5ran5tha, whose 
history (rgya gar chos 'byung) benefited in part from written Indian sources, tells us 
217'he History of Buddhism in India and Tibet (chosbyung by Bu ston) translated by E. Obermiller, Institut 
fUr Buddhismus-Kundc, Heidclbcrg, 1931-2. 
2177te Blue Annals (deb ther sngon po by 'Gos lo tsa ba) translated by George N. Roerich, Motilal Banar- 
sidass, Delhi, 1949, reprinted 1996. 
22History of Buddhism in India (rgya gar chosbyung by Tkanitha) translated by Lama Chimpa and Alaka 
Chattopadyaya. Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi. 1970, reprinted 1997. 
21See, for example, Cutting Through Appearances: practice and theory of Tibetan Buddhism by Gcshe 
Lhundrup Sopa and Jeffrey Hopkins, Snow Lion, New York. 1989, p283-4; D. S. Ruegg, Autour du 
lTa bai khyadpar de Ye shes sde, JA Tome CCLX1X, 1981, p217; and blogsal grub mtha' translated by 
K. Mimaki, UniversM de Kyoto, 1982, Chap. = fol. 1000, pp. 172-3. 
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extremely little about his life. 24 
kntarakýita is not unique, of course, in having some importance within the history of 
Buddhism and yet being little understood in terms of his lifestory. Migarjuna. is a prime 
example of this. In the specific case of kntarakýita, the difficulty one faces in trying to 
unravel some of the connections stems largely from the fact that most of our sources on 
him date from many centuries after his death, and contemporaneous evidence to corro- 
borate them, where extantý is largely unresearched. It has to be said that Karmay, 
Kvaerne, Houston, Ruegg, Snellgrove, Tucci and other scholars have, in recent times, 
each made invaluable contributions to this area of research. For example, Snellgrove25 has 
shown how the Indian traditions of Buddhism, primarily represented in early Tibet by 
ýdntarakýita, were only one of several sources of influence that converged to form the 
Buddhism of Tibet. Karmay 26 , Houston 
27, Demi6vffle28, Ruegg29 and TuCCi30 have each 
translated contemporaneous documents from Tibetan or Chinese, which throw light on 
the doctrinal views of the period, including those around the bSarn yas debates. Karma 
Kvaerne 32, Snellgrove 33 and Tucc ?4 have also undertaken extensive studies of the reli- 
gious practices that pre-existed the establishment of Buddhism in Tibet. 
24Ta-ran5tha (fol. 139A) gives as his key Indian sources the magadha! ipa, ý4ita sa dbang bzangpo (14ernen- 
drabhadra of Magadha), the Buddhqpurdýa coniposcd by Indradatta. (dbang pos byin), and a historical 
chronology by the Hindu scholar Bhajaghao. 
2'Indo-Tibetan Buddhism: Indian Buddhists and their Tibetan successors by David Sne. 11grove, Shambhala, 
Boston, 1987. 
2'The Great Perfection by Samten Gyaltsen Karmay, EJ. Brill, Leiden, 1988. 
z7Sourcesfor a History of the bSam yas Debate by G. W. Houston, Monumenta Tibetica. Historica 1.2, VGH 
Wissenschaftsverlag, Sankt Augustin, 1980. 
"Le Concile de Lhasa by Paul Den-d6ville, Institut des Hautes Etudes Chinoises, Paris, 1952, reprinted 1987 
2'Autour du ITa bai khyadpar de Ye shes sde, by D. Seyfort Ruegg, in JA CCLXIX, 198 1, pp. 207-229. 
30Minor Buddhist Texts 11. the debate at bSam yas according to Tibetan sources, by G. Tucci, ISMEO, 
Rome, 1958. Also Deb ther dmarpo 8sar ma: Tibetan Chronicles, translated by G. Tucci, ISMEO, Rome, 
1971. 
3'The Treasury of Good Sayings: a Tibetan history ofBon, edited and translated by Sarnten G. Karmay, 
Oxford University Press, London, 1972. 
32The 'Great Perfection'in the Tradition o the Bonpos by Per K. Kvaeme, in Early Chan in China and f 
Tibet, ed. Lai, Whalen and Lewis R. Lancaster. Asian Humanities Press, Berkeley, 1983, pp. 367-92. 137'he Nine Ways ofBon: excerptsfrom gZi brjid, by David L. Snellgrove, London Oriental Series, 18, 
Oxford University Press, London, 1967. 
34The Religions of Tibet by G. Tucci, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1980; University of California 
Press, Berkeley, 1980. 
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Concern about the lack of evidence to corroborate the histories has meant that most 
scholars have avoided the topic of 
ýdntarakýita's lifestory. One study on kntarak§ita, the 
thesis by Kennard Lipman written in 1979, examines the MAL but does not provide any 
historical background on ýdntar*ita himself. Similarly, A Study of Svdtantrika by 
Donald Lopez Jr. examines various aspects of ýdntarak§ita`s doctrine but does not deal 
with historical questions. The main exception to this is the account given by Alaka 
Chattopadhyaya in Chapter 25 of AtTfa and Tibet. 35 This is the most comprehensive 
account in Western literature to date and attempts to make a coherent and broadly 
chronological narrative of tdntarakýi&s life on the basis of Tibetan histories. Unfortuna- 
tely, as some scholarS36 have noted, the author is not critical of her sources and takes 
many assertions at face-value. The result is a fair summary of the picture painted by 
Tibetan historians of the 13th century onwards, but it does not examine the relationship 
between these 'histories' and events in the 8th century, by way, for example, of a com- 
parison of the histories and contemporary Indian, Tibetan or Chinese documents. Other 
scholars have, in turn, accepted Chattopadhyaya's account at face-value, and it serves as 
the basis for the entry under tintarak§ita' in Eliade's Encyclopedia of Religions. 
Let us cite two passages from Chattopadhyaya to illustrate the type of problem that occurs 
for the modem scholar. In the opening paragraph of this chapter, she cites the accounts 
of Tibetan historians which say that ýdntaralqita's "preaching of Buddhism there [in 
Tibet] stirred up great resistance: the devils and demi-gods of the country were in rcvoIL" 
This has the flavour of a legendary account, and does not provide us with a critical picture 
of what actually happened. In the context, it can be taken as the popular interpretation 
given to the epidemics, flooding and lightning that struck the country at this time, but it 
35FirSt published by Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, in 1967, reprinted in 1996. 
16Scc for cxample SncUgrovc's commcnt (Sncllgmvc, 1987: 479 n. 2): "Alaka Chattopadhyaya! s Atria and 
Tibet may provide much useful information for the general reader, but the scope of this book extends un- 
happily beyond the competence of its well-intentioned compiler, who has not always sought the right 
advice. " 
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does not explain why people should wish to see kntarakýita's actions in an unfavourable 
light in the first place. Chattopadhyaya (1967: 234) continues: "kntarak§ita's teachings 
must have provoked the first real resistance to Buddhism in Tibet". The italics are my own 
and aim to emphasize the speculative nature of her analysis which does not, at any point, 
refer to historical documents explaining the complex political and religious relationship 
between Buddhism and the pre-Buddhist religious establishment in Tibet. Nor does it 
acknowledge extant historical evidence of documented events, such as the fact that 
Buddhism had been banned in Tibet under Khri srong Ide brtsan's father. 37 So Chattopa- 
dhyaya's account fails to enlighten us as to the nature, form or extent of the opposition 
that kntarakýita encountered. A second passage in this same chapter (pp. 242-243) 
attempts to substantiate the claim that kntarakýita established the first Buddhist mona- 
stery in Tibet "in the real sense of the terrW' (what does this mean? ) and was "the first 
Buddhistdodrya in the classical sense of the term who worked effectively for the pro- 
pagation of Buddhism in Tibet". In support of this claim, Chattopadhyaya quotes in full 
the related passage from'Gos Io tsa ba which, she says, contains a "realistic" account of 
the history of Tibetan religion between the 6th and 8th centuries C. E. Ibe passage cited 
starts by asserting that Srong btsan sgam po was a Buddhist practitioner, a claim that is 
questioned by modem scholars for lack of evidence. Finally, it is quite unclear what 
criteria she is using to accept the Tibetan histories as "realistic", especially as many of the 
details on which they are based-such as the falling of the Buddhist scriptures from 
heaven on to the roof of the royal palace at the time of Tho tho ri gnyan btsan-are far 
from being realistic in our own cultural terms. The resulting narrative is peppered with 
unsubstantiated claims, and sits uncomfortably between the fantastical and the historical, 
blurring uncritically the limits of each. 
The most recent book to appear on ýdntarakýita is that by Marie-Louise Friquegnon 
37 Snellgrove (1987.410-411). 
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which devotes seven pages to "the life and lineage" of 
ýAntarakýita? g Her account is 
equally disappointing, based as it is on an uncritical re-telling of the classic Tibetan 
narrative with virtually no literary references. 
So why is it prudent to be wary of the Tibetan histories? Every historian operates within 
his or her own cultural or ideological perspective, whether consciously or unconsciously, 
so is Tibetan history fundamentally different from any other? In the specific case of Tibet, 
there are several reasons for caution. The first was mentioned above, and relates to his- 
torical circumstance. Tibet entered recorded history only in the 7th century C. E?, 
9 so little 
systematic written documentation existed for the period immediately prior to 
ýAnta- 
rakýita's arrival. It is therefore almost impossible to substantiate the claimed uniqueness 
of his contribution. Although written records were made in the 8th century, many were 
reportedly destroyed during the persecution period around gLang dar ma, in the 9th cen- 
tury, so were not available to historians in the medieval period. Indeed, as a result of 
recent textual discoveries such as those in Dun HuangP modem scholars may have more 
early documentation at their disposal than did their medieval Tibetan counterparts. On the 
other hand, it should be noted that modem scholars no longer have access to a great num- 
ber of documents previously held in monastic libraries in Tibet, and that were destroyed 
during the Chinese Cultural Revolution in the 1960s. Thus the general situation regarding 
documentary evidence is particularly difficult. 
in the case of Bu ston, for instance, ObermMer (1931-4-5) notes written source texts for 
most Parts of his History, but not for the eighth section which deals with the history of 
380n Shantarakshita by Marie-Louise Friquegnon, Wadsworth Philosophical Series, Thomson Learning, 
Belmont, California, 2001. 
39Sneligrovc (1987), p. 381. 
4OSee Bacot (1940, Ruegg (198 1). Houston (1980). Tucci (1958) et al. It should be noted that many of the 
Dun Huang discoveries have recently been found to be forgeries (reported in the Newsletter of the Inter. 
national Dun-huang Project (IDP). British Library. April 2002), although this problem appears only to con- 
cern Chinese and not Tibetan texts, so the authenticity of the texts cited here is not in doubt. 
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Buddhism in Tibet. This points to an account that is largely based on traditional oral 
stories. And in the case of Tarandtha, the written sources acknowledged by the authoiýl 
include "many fragmentary narrations as well as compilations of the history of the 
Doctrine" in Tibetan, but nothing he considers "chronologically complete", as well as the 
Indian sources mentioned above which include chronologies relating to kntarakýita's 
period. 'Gos lo tsa ba referred to a wide range of written material available in his time in- 
cluding Tibetan Royal Chronicles, Tibetan translations of Chinese annals, local monastic 
annals, the biographies (rnam thar) of Tibetan religious teachers, the Red Annals (deb 
ther &nar po), 42 and the Affirmation of sBa (sba bzhad) '43 a chronicle written 
in the 9th 
century. As a result his Blue Annals establish a chronology that is invaluable, and which 
has served as a source of reference for other histories including T5. randtWs. 
From the above, it is clear that Tibetans are far from being incompetent in the art of 
history. In fact, as Tucci44 argues, Tibetans followed Chinese rather than Indian tradition, 
and showed particular interest in recording facts, as testified by the annals discovered in 
Dun Huang. 45 Criticism of Tibetan history as "a simplification or rather rationalization,, 46 
of events therefore appears rather harsh. It may be more balanced to argue that Tibetans 
simply had a different notion of history to that of modem historians. Their objectives and 
concerns were religious, and explicitly so, as can be seen from the titles of the respective 
works, and this manifestly influenced their identification and selection of 'facts'. The 
modem concept of history as a record of socio-politico-economic facts and events was 
unfamiliar to them. 
410p. Cit., pp. 350-1. See note 24 above. 
42Deb ther &nar po gsar ma: Tibetan Chronicles, transl G. Tucci, ISMEO, Romc, 197 1. 
43Passages of this document are quoted in Snellgrove (1987). 
44Tibetan Painted Scrolls by G. Tucci, La Libreria dello Stato, Rome, 1949. Reprinted by Rinsen Book Co. 
Ltd., Kyoto, 1980. Vol. 1, pp. 139-150. 
45Documents de Touen houang relatifs a Mistoire du Tibet: Annales 650-747. transl. J. Bacot, F. W. Ibomas 
and Ch. Toussaint, Paul Geuthner, Paris, 1940-46. 
46SnelIgrove (1987: 427). 
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In other words, Bu ston's concern, and that of all Tibetan historians, was to write a 
religious history of religion. John Powers (1995: 121-2) makes the point that Tibetans 
actually saw the history of their country as a history of religion, "as a record of the 
gradual triumph of Buddhist dharma over the indigenous forces opposing it". Any attempt 
to unravel "historical truth" from these accounts will inevitably meet with frustration. 
Powers adopts what is arguably one of the best approaches in the circumstances, namely 
valuing the Tibetan histories for informing us about "what Tibetans believe about their 
history and how these beliefs reflect and influence their world view". Herbert Guenther is 
far less accommodating, and adopts an extreme view about these beliefs, seeing them as 
antithetical to reason. 
Historians of Tibet (like many historians) were absolutefalsifiers offacts. Having 
a biasfor their particular point of view, they wrote Tibetan history in awaywhich 
makes Tibet appear as uncouth and savage, and the continued saying that there 6 
was no civilization in Tibet before Buddhism came. 4T 
The difficulty with this view is knowing exactly what is meant by'a face. John Powers' 
solution is based on the idea that there are different sorts of 'truths, and Tibetan historians 
reveal a great deal about the 'trutlf of how they view their own history. In this sense, the 
views of Powers and Guenther are compatible. However, this leaves us with a relativism 
that is unsatisfactory. Is it not unnecessarily restrictive to assert that Tibetan historians 
reveal only a Tibetan cultural view of developments? In other words, that what we learn 
about are the characteristics of the Tibetan cultural lens rather than the events that are 
being viewed? Whatever its deficiencies, Tibetan history is no more relative than any 
other, and interweaves references to substantiated historical events with the religious and 
cultural beliefs of its peopleý8 
47Early Forms of Tibetan Buddhism by Herbert Guenther, in Crystal Mirror UL Dharma Publishing, 
Bcrk, clcy, 1974, pp. 80-92. 
481ndeed, this is also the case for the history of Buddhism in India. S e, for example. efo Bu a enUef ddh as 
legend and history by Edward J. Thomas, Motilal Banarsidass, Dclhi, 1993. European medieval histories, 
too, reflect strongly the worldview of the time. 
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It is ironical that although history was seen by Tibetans as being about religion, and as 
being mainly for the purpose of reinforcing religious belief, at the same time it was not 
considered of significant value in the body of Tibetan literature as a wholeý9 This is 
because it is not credited with soteriological value, and, as has been noted by several 
scholars, for Buddhists the true purpose of all knowledge is to bring liberation. 50 So the 
weakness of history's soteriological value can perhaps help to account for the Tibetans' 
relaxed attitude towards historical (in)accuracy. 
For all these reasons, the approach taken here is a phenomenological one. This is not to be 
understood in the Husserlian sense of stripping away cultural and other presuppositions so 
as to describe the bare phenomena of lived experience prior to reflection. Rather, it means 
that what is being investigated is what appears to us when we perceive the 'world' of 
Tibetan history rather than the world that so appearsýl 
11.3.2 ýantaraksita and the legend of Padmasambhava 
It is relevant to acknowledge briefly here the link between the biography of kntarakýita 
and the lifestory of Padmasambhava. This link raises many issues for modem scholars, 
who tend to consider that the legend of Padmasambhava was constructed by rNying ma 
pas especially from the 13th century onwards as a means of countering the dominance of 
52 the New Translation (gSar ma) schools. In other words, Padmasarnbhava's lifestory is 
seen as self-conscious myth, not as history-not even as history in a Tibetan sense. This 
issue is significant insofar as it can be claimed that the role of ýRntarakýita himself was 
constructed as part of this myth. 
4'For example, history plays very little part in the monastic curriculum. 
"'Klcin (19 86: 1); Radhakrishnan (1923,1996: ' 24ff). It is important to notc that this docs not imply that 
soteriological concerns are absent from European thinking. Philosophers like Saint Ansclm, Thomas 
Aquinas and Descartes pursued philosophy and knowledge as a way of understanding God. The relationship 
between knowledge and liberation lies at the heart of many religions. 
5'See S. Guttenplan, A Companion to the Philosopky ofMind (1994: 47 1). 
52Snellgrove (1987: 397). 
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ILLUSTRATION I 
I Siintarals§ita and the legend of Padmasambhava 
Still today, the rNying ma school in exile maintains the tradition of a sac-red dance re- 
enacting the conversion of Tibet by Padmasambhava. and depicting him in his 'eight 
manifestations'. The photograph above shows an image of Padmasambhava in the centre, 
flanked to his right by Khri srong Ide brstan and to his left by gdntarak. yita. Both tile 
latter are represented by lamas wearing masks and elaborate costumes who will take part 
in the dance. Dordogne, France, summer 1998. 
Photo: RaphaclIc Ok-mandre. 
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This question in fact shows that Tibetan history is not straightforwardly about how 
Tibetans view events, because Tibetans themselves hold differing views about their own 
history. Scepticism concerning the extent of Padmasambhava's role in introducing 
Buddhism to Tibet is a view held by some dGe lugs pas, while rNying ma pas hold the 
view that he was central to the process. Similarly, scepticism concerning the authenticity 
of gter ma 'treasure texts' in general, and those that relate Padmasambhava's lifestory in 
particular, is shared by some dGe lugs pas, but rNying ma pas have no doubts about the 
principle of gter ma texts. 
Snellgrove has argued the opposite-that the dGe lugs pa view is itself based on a self- 
conscious attempt to emphasize Tibet's connections with Indian Buddhism to the detri- 
ment of Central Asian and Chinese influences and, in this process, to diminish the role 
played by Padmasambhava. 
The less coherent accounts as preserved by the later rNying ma and Bon com- 
pilers of supposedly ancient traditions, give a truer impression of that earlier 
period than the more simplified version, which came to be generally accepted by 
Tibetan historical writers.. of the new schools, established as part of the second 
diffusion of Buddhism, when the whole bias was infavor of teachings imported 
direct from India. 53 
It is beyond the scope of this study to examine in detail the arguments in this debate. But 
it is important to note that scepticism concerning Padmasambhava existed in Tibet itself 
and is not a modem academic invention; indeed, it is possible that the doubts of modem 
scholars have been influenced by certain dGe lugs pa mentors. Be that as it may, this 
study is concerned with a rNying ma commentary on ýdntarakýita and therefore, while 
remaining critically aware of the divergent views within Tibetan Buddhism itself, and 
within the community of scholars, we will proceed on the assumption that the rNying ma 
school presents an authentic understanding of Buddhism. 
5'Snellgrove (1987: 402). 
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][1.4 Mi Pham's biography of 95ntarak5ita 
The first quarter of Mi phams commentary consists of a preliminary introduction to the 
fV topic 54 MAL, divided into Ies (yan tag Inga), namely: 1) the author, 2) for whom the 
text is composed, 3) what category of teaching it belongs to, 4) its condensed meaning, 
and 5) the purpose of the text. The first topic, then, is devoted to 
tantaraksita himself. 
This in turn is subdivided into five sections: his learned or scholarly life, his monastic 
vows, his spiritual accomplishments, his human qualities, and his activity. Apparently, 
Mi pham, aims to provide us with as complete a picture of 
t5ntaraklita as he was able to 
paint given the lack of historical substantiation, and he concludes with his own appraisal 
of the author's historical and doctrinal importance. 
Mi pham uses a variety of sources for his accounL He quotes passages from the Afafijtdrr- 
mala Tantra, the Lankdvatira Siltra and the Samddhirija Satra to show that prophecies 
were made about ýRntarak§ita in both siftras and tantras. He does not explicitly rcfer to 
the histories as sources in the main narrative, but a little detective work enables one to 
trace many details back to Bu ston, Tarandtha, 'Gos lo, tsa ba and the Red Annals. 
55 
According to mKhan chen Pad ma shes rab, Mi pham also relied on histories of the 
rNying ma school, including the rnam thar of Padmasambhava, and on traditional oral 
accounts! 6 
From the structure of this lifestory it is evident that Mi pharn did not attempt to compose 
a mam thar, not even a brief one. rNam thar57 are recognized as a literary form in their 
own right, and f6flow a characteristic structure in three parts: outcr, inner and secret. The 
54There were two main traditions for introducing a text. The tradition of NAlandl was to present it in terms 
of Fivc Pcrfections, and the tradition of Vikramagill, followcd hcrc, was to cxplain it in tcrms of Fivc 
Topics. (mKhan chen Pad ma shes rab) 
55Tucci (197 1). 
560ral commentary given on Mi phanYs commentary to the MAL in Dordogne. France. June 2000. 
57See 77te life of Bu ston Rinpoche by D. Seyfort Rucgg, ISMEO Rome. no: 34,1966. Also 'On the nature of 
rnam thar. early dge lugs pa siddha biographies'by Janice D. Willis, in Soundings In Tibetan Civilisation, 
ed. Barbara Nimri Aziz and Matthew Kapstein, Manshar Publications, Delhi, 1985. pp. 304-319. 
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outer biography (phyN rnam thar) covers elements such as birth, schooling, specific 
teachers and so on. The inner biography (nang gi rnam thar) chronicles specific medita- 
tion practices, tantric initiations and so on. And the secret biography (gsang bai rnam 
thar) recounts activities and achievements from a magical viewpoint. Occasionally a 
rnam thar will focus on only one or two of these elements. Mi pham has not followed 
this structure in his commentary, although all three elements are present in his narrative. 
The main points about kntarakýita's life as recounted by Mi pham. will now be briefly 
presented following his five subsections in order. 58 
11.4.1 Introducto 
Mi pham's narrative begins as foHows. 
He [gantaraksital was born the son of the king of the eastern territory of Zahor. 59 
He received ks ordination vowsfrom Adnagarbha (Ye shes nying po), 60 the 
Sarvastivo9din abbot of Ndlandd, [when] he was given the name 'Bodhisattva 9dn- 
tarakfita'. He became very learned in every branch of knowledge, and ascended to 
the rank of abbot ofNalandd. 61 He refuted [various] scholars in debate [so that] 
his reputationfor erudition resoundedfar and wide like a lion's roar. 62 
Mi pham then provides anecdotal evidence of ý5ntar*ita's great learning, which may be 
based on the oral tradition. 
5g'Me biographical section translated and paraphrased in the following pages of this study ranges from 
pages 5 to 14 of the Varanasi edition, and pages 1.2 to 36 of the Chengdu edition. 
59T'his claim is not mentioned by Bu ston, T75ranitha or'Gos lo tsa ba, and there appears no tangible evi- 
dence to substantiate it. However, Chattopadhyaya quotes Surnpa! s dpag bsam ljon bzang (112), ed. S. C. 
Das, Calcutta, 1908, in support. There is circumstantial evidence linking gAntaraksita with Bengal (the 
Zahor area) since both his teacher Jfidnagarbha and the latter' s own teacher ýffgupta are said to have come 
from Bengal (Taran5tha, fol. 99B). The claim is also consistent with the assertion that gintaraksita's sister 
Mandaravd, a wife of Padmasambhava, was a princess of Zahor. Ibis is found, for example, in 
he Lotus- 
Born by Yeshe Tsogyal, Sharnbhala, 1993, p. 45, and Chattopadhyaya (op. cit. ) p. 235, but critics would con- 
tend that its inclusion within the rNying ma Padmasambhava rnam thar cycle does nothing to commend the 
claim. 
6OSupported by 'Gos lo tsa ba (Roerich, 04). 
6"Mc monastery of which he was abbot is not named by Bu ston, T-aranatha or'Gos lo tsa ba. On the basis 
of Sumpa (112) some scholars believe it was N51and7i, while John Powers (1995: 128) asserts it was Vikra- 
magild. However, in e-mail correspondence with the present author Powers was unable to trace his source(s) 
for this claim. Sceptics maintain that 95ntaraksita is linked with Naland! merely on account of its eminence. 
62de'ang slob dpon'di shar phyogs za hor rgyai po'i sras su 'khrungs nas na Ian drai thams cad yod smra'i ste 
pa'i rnkhan po ye shes snying po las rab tu byung zhing/ mtshan bo dhi sa tva sha nta ra kshi ta shes gsol/ 
rig pa1 gnas mtha! dag la mkhas par gyur te/ na len dra'i mkhan po mdzad cing rgol ba ngan pa mthadag 
tshar bcad de/ mkhas pa! i grags pa seng ge'i sgra chen pos sa'i steng thams cad khyab par gyur te/ V. p-5. 
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In South India at that time there lived a brahman who was learned in all the 
doctrinal tenets of the 7 -Whikas, and who had defeated lbothl Hindu and Buddhist 
scholars in debate. Nobody was able to contend with him. He developed the 
following plan: 'If I went to Ndlandd and vanquished the abbot gintaraksita in 
debate'l [he thoughtJ 7 would be considered unbeatable throughout the land. 
[Sol he journeyed to the place where gintara4ita lived, but when he got there 
[the brahmin] did not see the abbot but a seated likeness of Man-VuYrT, shining with 
the colour of refined go/1 He left the room and asked people where gintara4ita 
was. They replied he was in his room. He returned to the room and saw the abbot 
in place of what he had seen before. He then realized that nobody could defeat in 
debate [someone who] had so completely accomplished the supreme deity [i. e. 
Maiijuirr]. With tremendous faith, and abandoning all thought of disputation, with 
devotion he placed [9dntara4ita`s1 foot upon the crown of his head, and entered 
the wheel of the JBuddhistl teaching. This is just one example of how IS'dntarak- 
ýital was unparalleled and without a rival. 
When he arrived in Tibet 19intarabital said to the king, 'If any Buddhist or non- 
Buddhist wishes to contend, if the contest is to be one of magical powers there is 
nobody in the world greater than Padmasambhava. Let them contend with him. 
But if the contest is one of debate, let them debate with me. For at the moment, in 
all the world, there is no one more learned than myself Having reduced opposi- 
tion, we will establish the Buddha's doctrine and the king's wish will befulfilled. ' 
Such were the words of this learned authority. 63 
This story shows how ýdntarakýita was respected and appreciated by his peers, who were 
great scholars in their own righL In addition, the last passage illustrates the unshakcable 
confidence he had in his own learning, implicitly acknowledged through his willingness 
to debate. Mi phani concludes this introduction by noting: 
63V. p. 6-7. de'i tshe Iho phyogs nas bram, ze mu stegs sogs kyi rig bycd mthadag la rnkhas pa zhig gis phyi 
nang gnyis kai rgol ba mams pharn par byas te sus kyanggran n-d bzod pa na/ da ni na len drar song la 
nikhan po, zhi batsho pharn par byas na sa steng na'gran pai z1a med par'gyur ro snyarn du sems shing/ 
rnkhan po'i bzhugs sar rim gyisongs te bltas pas mkhan po, mi snang zhingjam pa'i dbyangs kyi sku gser 
btsho maI mdog Itarbar ba zhig bzhugs par mthong ste phyirongs nas gzhan la. dris pas mkhan po, de nyid 
na bzhugs yod zer/ slar log nas bltas pas sngar gyis. de na rnkhan po bzhugs par mthong bas/ Ihag paI Uia 
dngos su grub pas sus kyang tsod pas mi thub par shes nas shin tu dad par gyur te rtsod pai bsam, pa dor nas 
gus pas zhabs spyi bor blangs te bstan pai skor zhugs par gyur pa de Ita bu la sogs mkhas pai marn par thar 
pa'gran pa! i z1a, thams cad dang bral zhing/ bod du byon pai tshe'ang btsad po, lal gal te sangs rgyas pa'arn 
gzhan par gyur ba su zhig'gran z1a chol ba nal rdzu'phrul ni'dzam bu'i gling na pad ma sam bha va nyid 
las che ba su yang med pas de dang'gran du gzhug la/ gtan. tshigs ni bdag dang zhags su bkye ba na da Ita 
ai steng na kho bo, las mkhas pa med pas rgol ba thams cad tshar bcad nas sangs rgyas kyi bstan pa tshugs 
shing btsad po'i dgongs pa 'grub ces mkhas par bdag nyid kyis kyang zhal gyis bzhcs so/ 
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In this way, this master established the chariot of Yogicdra-Madhyamaka. 
64 0 all 
the pandita-s of this tradition, he was like the crest-jeivel on a victory banner: 
clear, 
ýublime 
and noble. Here are, in brief, [some details] about the life of [this] 
scholar. 65 
11.4.2 Schol "rshi 
Mi pham notes that several other great scholars in India adopted the Yog5c5ra-Sv5tantrika 
point of view, including (in Mi pham's order) Haribhadra (Seng ge bzang po: late 8th cen- 
any), KamalasMa (8th century), Abhayaaragupta 66 (c. I 100 C. E. ), and Dharmamitra67 
(Chos kyi bshes gnyen: c. 800 C. E.? ). He implies that even amongst these, ýdntarakýita 
was the greatest exponent of that school, specifically in the sense that he was the first to 
expound this view clearly, stating the Yog5c5ra view in relative truth. Mi pham then 
names some of those who continued the YogAc5ra-SvRtantrika tradition in Tibet: rNgog lo 
chen po'68 Phya pa chos kyi seng ge '69 and Rong ston chos 
de. 70 de Tsong kha pa7l and 
his disciples also studied it, he says, and some wrote notes (zin brisý 2 on it. Furthermore, 
when Sa skya Paiý4ita (1182-125 1) taught Madhyamaka, he would comment on the MAL. 
By supplying these details, Mi pham is showing how long-standing was ýAntarakýita's 
doctrinal legacy to Tibet, since the heads of Sa skya pa and dGe lugs pa schools assimila- 
ted his works. He adds, however, that by the time he was writing, that is, at the end of the 
19th century, the tradition of studying and transmitting gantaralqita's teaching was rare, a 
64 See Chapter IX below. 
65dc Ita bu'i slob dpon'di nyid k-yis dbu ma mal'byor spyod pa'i shing rtai srol phycs shing/ pan di ta thams 
cad kyi nang na rgyal mtshan gyi itse rno'i tog Itar gsal bar bla naphags pa ni mkhas pa! i mam thar mdo 
tsam ste/ 
66See The Literature of the Madhyamaka School ofPhilosophy in India by D. Seyfort Ruegg, pp. 114-5. 
671bid., p. 95. See also TRran5tha (fol. 9913). 
68Ngog to chen po's dates are given as 1059-1109 in the Blue Annals (Roerich, i. 328). He was a great trans- 
lator, and abbot of Oat gsang phu monastery. 
69Referred to as'Phya pa! in the Blue Annals (Roerich, i. 332-333), where his dates are given as 1109-69. 
Like Ngog to, he was abbot of Neu thog (gsang phu) monastery. He composed many treatises including a 
commentary on the MAL. Ile was renowned as a logician, and on this see L. WJ. van der Kuip, 'Phya ba 
chos kyi seng ge's Impact on Tibetan Epistemological Theory', in JEP 5 (1977), pp. 355-69. 
7OPresumably Rong ston shes bya kun gzigs (1367-1449). See 71e Nyingma School ofribetan Buddhism by 0 Dudjom Rinpoche, p. 929. 
"Ibis is corroborated in the Presentation of Tenets (grub pai mthai mam par bzhag pa) by the dGe lugs pa 
scholar lCang skya rot pa! i rdo de, where he says that the MAL was studied widely in Tibet during the 
period of the first dissemination and at the time of Atiga, and that its study continued up to and including 
Tsong kha pa but was thereafter all but lost. See A Study ofSvatantrika by Donald Lopez, p. 368. 
72 For example, the dbu ma rgyan gyi zin bris of Tsong kha pa. 
ýP 
fact that is corroborated by other sourceS! 3 In conclusion Mi pham says: 
In brief, those who uphold without partiality the two traditions of Mah4yana, and 
in particular those Mjdhyamikas who are interested in logic (pramana; tshad ma), 
will experience a natural delight in entering the tradition of [Sdntarý4itaj the 
great charioteer. 74 
To appraise this initial biographical section we should note that the content is consistent 
with passages in several other extant sources. This, however, is a rather circular comment 
since Mi pham's account was based on these works; it indicates only that Mi pham was 
faithful to his sources. Ibe following is an example of the type of corroboration we find. 
Although they offer no direct evidence of his debating skills, the Blue Annals highlight 
ýRntarakýita's predilection for reasoning and logic. When the Tibetan ministers are sent to 
sound out ýdntarakýita before inviting him to Tibet, they ask him what his doctrine is. 
"My doctrine is to follow whatever was proved correct after examining it by reason, and 
to avoid all that does not agree with reason, " he is said to have replied! 5 In addition, 
there is evidence76 that debating was a common practice at this time which makes it likely 
that he was a debater, added to which his main disciple Kamala0a is known to have been 
regarded as an outstanding debater. By way of corroboration for his learning and scholar- 
ship, one should also note the composition of the TS itself, which is an exhaustive com- 
pendium of all the philosophical views in India at that time. 
There is one particular point in this part of Mi pham's account that has been questioned in 
other contexts, and that is the idea that ýdntaraksita's fame was widespread in India. The 
evidence does not seem to support this. The fact that references to him in Indian dastras 
are infrequent might indicate either that he was little known, or that his views were not 
73 See note 71 above. 
74 mdor na theg pa chcn po'i tshul gnyis ris su ma chad par'dzin cing / khyad par dbUma pa gang zhig tshad 
ma la thugs zhen che ba mams ni shing rta chen podi'i srol la ngang gis dga! shing'zhug par'gyur ba shig 
go/ V. P. 8. 
75Roerich, i. 42. 
76See Hattori (1968: 4). 
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held in high enough esteem to be commented upon. Moreover, the notion that he was 
invited to Tibet because he was one of the most eminent Indian pa? z4itas is open to doubt. 
The reverse might have been the case. It is conceivable that he was only available to go to 
Tibet because he had no other significant calls upon his time. 77 
Although it is the case that complete commentaries on his works are rare, there is evi- 
dence that ýdntarakýita's doctrinal importance was nevertheless acknowledged by his 
Indian peers, specifically by way of brief references to his position. In his unpublished 
doctoral thesis, Jundo Nagashima 78 has found that apart from Kamalagila's works there 
are at least four treatises (dastras) that mention ýdntarakýita by name in this way. In the 
Jfidnasdrasamuccayandmdnibandhana of Bodhibhadra79 (P. [95] (5252) tsha 5lb7-8) 80 
one reads: 
Those who do not deny [the external reality oJ7 appearance are scholars (slob 
dpon) [such as] Bhdvaviveka and others, and those who assert that things which 
appear are not as they are [i. e. external], but injact internal cognition appearing 
in various ways, are scholars [such as] gdntara4ita and others. 81 
One can also point to the passage from the Tattvadafakat, -W of Sahajavajra 82 (p. [681 
(3099); Derge ed. 2254 _wi 
164b5-6, v. 2a) which is often mentioned by Tibetan doxo- 
graphers to prove the existence of the S5kAra- and NirAdra-Yog5c5ra-Madhyamaka in 
India. 
The Sakdra Madhyamaka (mam pa dang bcas pa'i dbu ma) and the Nirjkdra 
Madhyamaka (mam pa med pa'i dbu ma) are [the two] main [schools] to be 
explained, Accordingll thefollowers of gintaraksita and others accept the 
Sdkdra Madhyamaka. 
771bese points have arisen in discussions with Professor Paul Williams. 
78See bibliography. 
79Tibctan: byang chub bzang po. 
wrhis passage is quoted in Ruegg (1981a: 58). 
8'snang ba la mijal ba ni slob dpon bha la sogs pa dang/ snang ba'i dngos po, ji Ita ba ma yin gyi nang gi 
shes pa khon sna tshogs su snang bar smra ba slob dpon zhi ba'tsho, la sogs pao/ 
82Tibctan: Man cig skyes pa 7 rdo rje. 
83zhes bya ba ni mam pa dang bcas pa7i dbu ma dang / marn pa med pa'i dbu ma gsal bya ba'i gtso bo'i di 
dac, go H gang gi phyir zhi ba'tsho'i zhal snga nas la sogs pas marn pa dang bcas pai dbu ma nyid khas len C, 
par byed de 
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The MarmakaumudTby Abhayakaragupta84 (p. [921 (5202), Da 27b2-3; Derge ed. 3805 
da 24al-2), who was mentioned above by Mi pham as a follower of ý5ntaraksita, also 
refers to him by name in the first chapter. 
Itfollows that Haribhadra and others whofollow kdrya gdntara4ita, who main- 
tains representation only as mental object (sgra don), hold the absence of duality 
(gnyis pa med) because there is no external [object] even conventionally, conven- 
tionally, blue and so forth are mental objects that have the nature of direct per- 
ception which is reflexive (rang rig pa'i mngon sum), land] they do not accept Ithe 
position oJ7 those who assert that ultimately there is absence of intrinsic existence 
(ngo bo nyid, svabhdva). 85 
Finally, in the RatnakaraýzOdghkta (P. [102] (5325) A 126a5-6; Derge ed. 3930,112b5- 
6) Atiga also refers to kntaraksita by name. 
Acdrya Bhavya, Buddhqpdlita, Devadarman, Avalokitavrata, gdntaraksita, 
Kamaladila and others wrote detailedworks on the Madhyamaka. 86 
All these passages refer to ýdntarakýita as a-if not the-representative of the Yogacara- 
Madhyamaka view. In addition, there are many other texts that cite a few lines from his 
works without mentioning his name, presumably on the understanding that the educated 
reader will recognize the source. Examples are found in Prajfidkaramati's pafijikd on 
Bodhicarydvatdra IX. 2, where the first verse of the MAL is cited verbatim, 87 and Atiga's 
Satyadvaydvatdra, the third verse of which cites verse 64 of the MAL-8'3 It is therefore a 
mistake to allege that kntaraklita was little known or respected in India. It can be argued 
that references to him were not very detailed because kntarakýita was so well known this 
was not necessary. Generally speaking, however, we have to admit that scholars have not 
commented on his works as a whole and discuss only specific issues arising from them. 
8fribetan: jigs medbyung gnas shas pa. 
ft"di nyid kyis na sgra don marn par rig par smra bai slob dpon zhi baVtsho dang dc'i'dod pa'i dcs su 'brang 
ba'i seng ge bzang po, la sogs pas kun rdzob tu yang phyi rol med pas gnyis pa med de/ kun rdzob tu sngon 
po la sogs pa ni rang rig pa! i mngon sum gyi bdag nyid can gyi sgra don la don dam par ni ngo, bo, nyid med 
ces pa'i'dod pa ni mi 'thad de/ 
86 slob dpon bha bya dang/ bu ddha paa li ta dang/ de ba shar ma dang/ spyan las gzigs brtul zhugs dang/ 
sha7a nta ra kzhi ta dang/ ka ma la shi'i la la sogs pas ni dbu mai gzhung rgyas par mdzad do 87See the citation in Lindtner (1981: 182). 
"Tibetan text and translation in Lindtner (1981: 190ff). 
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11.4.3 Monastic vows 
71be passage in Mi pham's commentary that deals with the way kntarakýita upheld his 
monastic vows is extremely brief. He is said to have been the most eminent representative 
of the monastic tradition in India, and quite incomparable in the perfect way he followed 
the monastic way of life. 
The mere fact that ýZintarakýita was indeed a monk is uncontested, and indeed it is 
supported by a number of details in the histories. As we have already seen, he received 
his monastic ordination from Ridnagafta, and is included in the ordination lineage cited 
by'Gos lo tsa ba (i. 34). Bu ston (1932: 190) mentions that the northern wall of the bSam. 
yas temple was painted with the Vinaya lineage masters which specifically include 
kntarakýita 
. 
89 Also, Tibetan iconography always depicts him as a monk. However, the 
claim that he was a perfect monk is impossible to substantiate. It may, of course, have 
been the case, but on the other hand it may be exaggerated by the devotion of those who 
consider him to be the founder of Tibetan monasticism and, in the case of rNying ma pas 
such as Mi pham, a master in their own continuing Vinaya lineage. 90 
11.4.4 Spiritual accomplishmen 
It is inherently difficult to assess someone else's spiritual accomplishment because the 
mind as such is not visible or perceptible. To illustrate what he considers to be ýdntarak- 
§ita's advanced accomplishment, Mi pham therefore gives examples of what he sees as 
tangible achievements which can be taken as signs of that accomplishmenL His first state- 
ment is arguably one of the most important he makes in the entire commentary. It sums 
up the main significance of ýdntarakýita for Mi pham. 
811t, appears that these frescoes are now destroyed, so it is unclear whether they were made in the 8-9th cen- 
turics or much later. See Fisher (1997: 130). 
9OFor a discussion of the status of ýIntar*ita's lineage today, see the section on his activity below. 
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The two charioteers Ii. e. Ndgdrjuna and Asafigal perfectly revealed the meaning 
of the Mahdyina doctrine, [and] he 19dwaraksital took birth deliberately in order 
to open a third chariol-way that uniles them. 
91' 
This assertion gives rise to one of the main themes developed by Mi pham. Briefly, he 
contends that ýantarakýiLa holds a uniquely significant place not only in the history or 
Tibet and the history of Buddhism in Tibet but much more broadly within what could be 
called the history of Buddhist philosophy. In other words, 
gdntarakýita's work is a land- 
mark in the evolution of Mahaydna doctrine as a whole. Just as Ndgarjuna established the 
first Mah5y5na chariot-way of Madhyamaka, and just as Asahga established the second 
MahRydna chariot-way of Yoglic5ra, so gdntarakýiw effectively established a diH Maha- 
y5na chariot-way that brings the former two together into a single path and a single view. 
Mi pham's appraisal of 95nwak§ita is important and will be evaluated in our concluding 
Chapter X. 
Almost in passing, Mi pharn mentions at this point the legend according to which tanta- 
rakýita was the reincarnation of one of the four sons of the Nepalese poultry woman who 
built one of the great stapas in BoudhnatO2 The sons vowed to be born together again in 
order to bring the Buddhist teaching to Tibet, and one tradition has it that three of these 
sons were later born as none other than gdntarakýka, Padmasarnbhava and Khri srong Ide 
brtsan. '* Mi pharn adds that Padmasambhava and ýdntarakýita were born early while Khri 
srong Ide brtsan was born late, so the first two had to wait nine hundred years for their 
friend to appear. To account for this, he says that they were blessed with the power of 
longevity which, in the context of this biography, must constitute in Mi pham's mind a 
91theg pa chcn poI bka! i dgongs pa shing rta gnyis kyis legs par phyes zin na! ang de dag dgongs pa gcig tu 
sgrub pa! i shing rtaI lam srol gsum pa phye ba! i don tu bsain bzhin tu sprul nas V. p. 8. 
921be full story of this legend can be found in The Legend of the Great Stupa and the Life Story of the Lotus 
Born Guru, translated by Keith Dowman, Dharma Publishing, Berkeley, 1973. This legend is special to the 
rNying ma tradition. 
93According to a different tradition, there were three brothers who were reborn as Khri srong Ide brtsan, 
gantar*ita and gSal snang of sBa!. This is recorded in The Clear Mirror by Sonam Gyaltscn, in the note 
on p. 292, and also in the Blue Annals (Rocrich, i. 38-9). 
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further indication of his subjecfs spiritual accomplishment. 
At this juncture, then, Mi phams account introduces material found in the rNying ma 
mam 11wr of Padmasambhava. As we mentioned above, some scholars 94 give no credence 
to this literature in terms of its historical value, the perception being that Padmasambhava 
was constructed as a legendary hero by rNying ma pas in the 13th century onwards as a 
defensive measure against the emerging new translation schools. We will therefore 
simply note the controversial context of Mi pham's remarks here, and the difficulty 
involved in the possibility that ýdiitar*ita himself was "constructed" as part of this 
legend. 
The purported length of kntarakýita's life is obviously questionable. Several histories 
concur with the legend cited by Mi pham, which means that on this point the histories are 
actually based on what we would call legend. The Blue Annals (i. 38-9), T5=5tha's 
History (fol. 105B) and bDudjoms rin po che's history of the rNying ma school95 are an 
based on the sBa bzhad, and maintain that kntarakýita lived for the length of nine reigns 
before meeting Khri srong Ide brtsan and Padmasambhava. 96 According to Tdrandtha's 
calculation this would mean that he would have been alive at the time of Asaiýga (4th cen- 
tury C. E. ) and Vasubandhu (4th-5th centuries C. E. ), and "that is quite incredible", T5m- 
natha (I 05B) observes. Ibe deb ther &nar po also mentions that "according to one report" 
(which is likely to refer to the sBa bzhad) kntarakýita entered nirvdýza at the age of one 
thousand years ý7 More rationally, however, Tdrandtha (I 05B) asserts that he "must have 
"For example, see Snellgrove (1987: 397). 
"The Nyingma School of Tibetan Buddhism by Dudjom Rinpochc, Wisdom Publications, London, 1991. 
96See also the Blue Annals (Roerich, i. 39) where ýdntarak§ita recounts the story to gSaI snang of sl3a. 
Roerich sources the story to Pad mai bka'thang, fol. 1 87a, 299b. In a subsequent passage (ibid., iA2-3) 
kntaralqita reminds the king of the story when they first meet, as Mi pharn says. 
97ibid. 
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lived sometime between king Gopala and king Dharrnapdla"ýg It is this latter chronology 
that is preferred by modem scholars. Even among Tibetan Buddhists, and even among 
present-day rNying ma pas, interpretations of this extraordinarily long lifcspan vary. 
Some, like Rin gu. sprul sku 99 , suggest that accounts like this are simply exaggerations 
while others like Dudjorn Rinpoche (1991: 889-890), reserve judgement. Mi pham appears 
to have accepted the claim. 
Mi pharn next proceeds to a third spiritual accomplishment, which he illustrates by way of 
an anecdote relating to the consecration of bSam yas monastery. He says that at the time 
of its consecration Khri srong Ide brtsan saw kntarakýita himself as MaRju9d in 
person. 100 Even ordinary people saw statues of the deities as being alive. This further 
external sign of his inner accomplishment is therefore that he could perform miracles. 
Finally, 8antar*ita achieved more than most other great bodhisativas in that he esta- 
blished Buddhism in Tibet where nobody had succeeded in doing so before. 101 
To conclude this section, it is necessary to make some appraisal of these extraordinary 
claims. This is not easy. 71bose who do not subscribe to a mystical approach to religion 
generally, or to the soteriology of Buddhism in particular, would have to conclude that 
anecdotal evidence of miracles and of a life lasting for a thousand years pertains not to 
historical fact-or even to the realms of possibility-but to unsubstantiated religious 
belief. They are signs not of the spiritual accomplishment of a religion's adepts but of the 
wishful thinking of its followers. 
"Given as 770-821 in A History ofIndia by H. Kulke and D. Rothermund, Routledge, London and New 
York, 1986.3rd edition 1998, p. 355. 
99A contemporary lama of the rNying ma and bKargyud schools (personal communication). 
Wnie date of the consecration was probably 779 C. E., the date of the king! s edict (bka'Stsigs) proclaiming 
its inauguration. SeeTbe First Chos-byung'by H. Richardson in The Tibet Journal, 1980, Vol. V. no: 3, 
pp. 62-73. 
'O'See Guenther (1974: 80-92) for a different view. 
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The inherent difficulty here lies in the way that the very notion of spiritual accomplish- 
ment in Mahayana Buddhism takes one beyond the limits of the rational mind, so it is not 
readily subject to purely rational scrutiny. It falls into Mohanty's category of testimonial 
evidence of a supersensible object that can be known by other means and which, in the 
context of modem scholarship, cannot be verified. 
For Mi pham, there was no conflict between ý5ntarakýita the logician and master of 
debate, and gantaraksita the yogin and performer of miracles. 102 They are seen by rNying 
ma pas merely as two different facets of enlightened activity, the one communicated con- 
ccptuaUy and the other directly. Moreover, it can be argued that the possibility of extra- 
ordinary actions defying the usual physical parameters of our experience, is logically 
accounted for in the various scriptural descriptions of the stages of advanced medita- 
tion. 103 If we accept such activity is possible, the real question is whether or not this 
spiritual accomplishment was present in ýZintarakýita's individual case. Some rNying ma 
pas and Sa skya pas definitely believe that it was. 104 The evidence is inconclusive. 
H. 4.5 Human qualities 
For Mi pham, ýdntaraksita's human qualities are those which enabled him to benefit 
sentient beings and contribute to the Buddhist teachings themselves. Mi pham infers that 
he was called Todhisattva' to reflect his compassionate and wise nature. 105 In summary, 
102A different source of testimony to gdntaraksita's magical powers is found in the Bon po histories. See The 
Treasury of Good Sayings: a Tibetan history ofBon, cd. and transl. by Sanitcn G. Karmay, Oxford Univcr- 
sity Press, London, 1972, pp. 88-89. 
103See, for example, the Abhidharmasamuccaya by Asafiga and Kamalaffla's Bhavandkrama. 
104Dudjorn Rinpoche (1991: 864) regards him as a treasure-revealer (gter ston), and the Sa skya pa historian 
bSod nams rgyal tsan refers to the miracles which have taken place around the stiipa containing 9&ntarak- 
sita's skull. See The Clear Mirror (rgyal rab gsal ba 7 me long) by Sonam. Gyaltsen, translated by McComas ýaylor and Lama Choedrak Yuthok, Snow Lion, Ithaca, 1996, p. 20. 
105Bu ston calls him "slob dpon Bodhisattva" (transl. Obermiller, 1931-2: 188) and so does TAranltha 
(Chanopadhyaya7s translation, p269). More significantly, we find him referred to under this name in very 
early documents. 'Gos lo tsa ba cites the sBa bzhad as a (roughly) contemporaneous source with this name 
(Roerich, i. 38-39). Also, text IOL 689/2 from Dun Huang (fol. 1 16b), listing the abbots of bSam yas 
monastery, begins: "The list of the lineage of teachers who were born in Tibet. As for the disciples of the 
Indian abbot, the Bodhisattva... ". See Karmay (1988: 76-80). 
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Mi pham says that gdntarakýita perfected the three main Dharma activities that are consi- 
dered the hallmark of a great Buddhist teacher, namely expounding the teachings, refuting 
wrong views through debate, and composing treatises. 
We have clear evidence that he composed treatises since several are contained in the 
bstan 'gyur, and are extant in either Sanskrit or Tibetan translation. The treatises in the 
bstan 'gyur which are generally accepted'06 as authored by ýdntarakjita arc listed by 
Tdrandtha. 107 They can be classified as follows: 
bsTod tshogs section 
gr1i Vajradhara sarpgýita bhagavati stotra tW (bcom Idan'das la bstod pa dpal 
rdo de'dzin gyi dbyangs kyi rgya cher bshad pa) 
(bstod 52) (P. 1461 (2052) Kal 270b5-277b3) 
No author given. '()g 
Aýja tathfigata stotra (de bshin gshegs pa brgyad pa la bstod pa) 
(bstod 55) (P. [461 (2055) kal 278b8-279b8) 
Author. Shi ba'i tsho. Translators: Not named. 
rGyyd 'grel section 
Hevajra udbhava kurukulld pafica rnahd upadda (kye'i rdo ýe las byung ba'i 
ku ru kulle'i man ngag chen po Inga) 
(rga xxii. 29) (P. [57] (2447) Za 122b3-123b3. 
Author: Shiba 'tsho. Translator: Danani a. 
Tattva siddhi Wima prakaraQa (de kho na, nyid grub pa shes bya ba'i rab tu byed 
pa) 
(rga lxxii-4) (P. [81] (4531) Nu 28a5-42bi. 
Author: Shi ba'i tsho. Translators: Mpamkara9rTjfi5na, Rinchen bzang po. 
Revised: Kumdrakalaga, kkya'od 
db U ma section 
Satya dvaya vibhafiga paiijikfi (bden pa gnyis marn par 13yed pa'i dW'grel)109 
(mdo xxviii. 3) (P. [100] (5283) Sa 1-48b7. 
Author: Shi ba tsho. Translators: Prajiidvarma, Jfidnagarbha, Ye shes sde. 
MadbyamakiladiUra kfirikii (dbu ma'i rgyan gyi tshig le'ur byas pa) 
(mdo xxviii. 4) (P. [101] (5284) Sa 48b7-52bl 
Author: Shi ba tsho. Translators: S-11endrabodhi, Ye shes sde 
106See Chattopadhyaya (1967: 228ff. ) for a discussion on authorship. 
tO7op. cit., Supplementary Notes, p. 415-6. 
108Tbe authorship of this is uncertain. and further research is needed to establish this. 
109Tsong kha pa has questioned kntaraksita's authorship of this work on the grounds that it upholds views 
that are incompatible with those of the 
MAL. See Eckel 0 987: 27-3 1). 
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Sems tsam section 
Samvara vUPS'aka vrtti (sdom pa Ai zhu pa'i'grel pa) 
(mdo Ixi. 13) ýP. [114] (5583) Ku 192b8-213a2) 
Translators: Vidy5karasirpha, Maiijugdvarman. 
Rig pa section 
Vdda ny5ya vrtti vipaiicitiirthii nima (rtsod pa'i rigs pa'i'grel Pa don marn par 
byed pa) 
MadhyamakfilmhUra vrtti (dbu ma'i rgyan gyi 'gel pa) 
(mdo xxviii. 5) (P. [1011 (5285) Sa 52bl-84b7) 
Author: Shi ba tsho. Translators: kendrabodhi, Ye shes sde. 
(mdo cviii. 2-c. xfi. 4) (P. [136] (5725) Tshe 2lb2-137a8) 
Translators: Kumaragr-ibhadra, 'Phags pa shes rab. 
Tattva saftgraha kfirikii (de kho na flid bsdus pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa) 
(mdo cxiii. 1) (P. [138] (5764) He 1-159a5) 
Translators: Gundkaragn-lbhadra, dPal Iha btsan pa, Shi baod. 
Danda hasta lekha T (rga lxxvi. 32) (not located in the Peking edition by the present author) 
We also have evidence that he expounded the teachings in India, where he had at least 
one disciple, namely Kamalagila, and in Tibet, too, he is said to have had several 
disciples! 10 The later histories also agree that he expounded the Buddhist doctrine in 
Tibet. 111 The evidence for his debating skiRs was discussed earlier. 
The remainder of Mi phanýs account of his human qualities contains the narrative of the 
main events of his life as found in 'Gos lo tsa ba-how he studied and taught in Nalandd, 
went to Tibet, met Khri srong Ide brtsan, taught basic Buddhist teachings, returned to 
Nepal on account of opposition, and went back later with Padmasambhava to consecrate 
bSam yas monastery. ' 12 There he had many scriptures translated and fmrdy established 
the Dharma. Mi pham has added another detail to this account which is not found in other 
110'Tbe Dun Huang document cited above in note I refers to the first abbots of bSam yas as kntarakýita's 
discipIcs. 
"'See Roerich (i. 43). Also see Bu ston (op. cit., p. 1 88) who reports specifically that "he expounded in the 
palace Lung tshug for four months the teaching of the ten virtues, of the eighteen component elements of 0 
the individual, and of the twelve-membered causal chain. " 
112SneUgrove dates this second arrival in Central Tibet to 767 CR See SneUgrove (1987: 440). 
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sources. He asserts that ýdntar*ita caused the Buddhist doctrine to spread in China. 
It is said that he successfidly spread the Buddhist teaching in China and so on. 113 
According to mKhan chen Pad ma shes rab, this information is not found in any known 
writings but is specific to the oral tradition. We will therefore assume that the oral tradi- 
tion was Mi phams source in this case. Again according to mKhan chen Pad ma shes rab, 
the period that ýdntarakýita spent in China (which he did not attempt to date) should be 
linked to the story we came across earlier, that ýdntarakýita was born many hundreds of 
years before Khri srong Ide brstan, and he travelled to China in the meantime. Corrobora- 
tion of this story would require research into Chinese sources. Nevertheless, it must be 
said that it would probably be impossible to identify an earlier figure travelling in China 
with the ýdntar*ita we know in 8th century India, not least because the written works 
that we know he authored belong only to this latter period. 
11.4,6 His activi1y 
Under this final heading, Mi pham lists many of the achievements with which we are 
familiar from the Tibetan histories. In particular, he mentions that ýdntaraksita established 
the Vinaya lineage in Tibet by ordaining the first seven Tibetans, that he trained trans- 
lators, caused both written and spoken Buddhist teachings to spread, and helped to defeat 
the bon pos. 
Probably the most disputed of these achievements is the f irst. Ile mere fact that he 
ordained the first seven monks (sad mi mi bdun) in Tibet is quite likely. 114 Plbe fact that 
he was the first abbot of bSam yas monastery is directly attested. ' 15 What is in doubt is 
113rgya nag la sogs par sangs rgyas kyi bstan pa leg par bskyangs par bshad la/ V. p. 9. 
'"Snellgrove has reason to question this traditional figure, although he does not cite his sourcc(s). See 
Snellgrove (1987), p. 430. The names of these monks vary from source to source. 
'IsDun Huang IOL 689/2 cited above. 
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whether the Vinaya lineage he established in the 8th century has continued into modem 
times, or whether it was broken during the years following the persecution of the monas- 
teries by gLang dar ma. The extent of ýdntarakýita's achievement in this domain is very 
different depending on which conclusion is reached. 
'Gos lo, tsa ba (i. 17a) asserts that in Tibet there were three lineages of ordination. The first 
was through Nagaýuna and so on, through ýdntarakýita and sBa ratna. This is known as 
the Lower Vinaya (smad Vul). The second lineage known as the Upper Vinaya (stod 
Vul) was through rGyal ba'i shes rab of Zhang zhung and an Indian scholar named 
Dharmapd1a. The third lineage also came from Ndg5duna, then through ýrl Dharmapala 
and so on through ýRkyagnlibhadra and Tsong kha pa. This was called the Middle Vinaya 
(bar Vul) but after the second lineage was discontinued, it became known as the Upper 
Vinaya. 'Gos lo tsa ba indicates that the second lineage was already broken in his time, 
i. e. in the 15th century, while the other two were continuing. Since he is known to have 
been a Sa skya pa scholar, he had no sectarian interest in asserting the continuation of the 
first lineage which is held mainly by rNying ma pas and dGe lugs pas. 
Some sources maintain that the Lower Vinaya introduced by gantarakýita came to an end 
in the 10th century when monks in Central Tibet were made to disrobe and disperse. 116 
The rNying ma pas, however, say that this is a misundertanding and claim that the lineage 
managed to survive those difficult times. 'Me sources they quote in support are the lists of 
names of the masters from whom the lineage has been passed down. ' 17 In addition, they 
explain that although monastic Buddhism did indeed disappear from Central Tibet during 
the persecution period, it was able to continue uninterrupted in Western Tibet. mKhan 
116 The Blue Annals (i. 53 and 60) can be interpreted this way. 
117Ibc lineage masters are, given by Tulku Thondup in his 11rcfacc; to Perfect Conduct: Ascertaining the 
77tree Vows by Dudjom Rinpoche, Wisdom Publications, Boston, 1996, p. xii. This list is included in a 
'lineage prayee. 
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chen Pad ma shes rab, who is himself a monk in this lineage, recounts a traditional story 
according to which one of gLang dar ma's queens informed him that despite all his efforts 
at stamping out Buddhism, there was still a Buddhist yogi in Western Tibct who had five 
hundred disciples. His name was Nub sang rgyas ye shes. gLang dar ma was furious and 
summoned the yogi to his court. gLang dar ma said to him, "You are supposed to have 
great powers, so prove it. " Nub sang rgyas ye shes pointed in the air, and instantly there 
appeared a scorpion as large as a yak. 7be king was terrified. Then the yogi pointed again 
in the air and there came lightning and thunder which split a huge rock outside Lha sa. On 
seeing this gLang dar ma said that he could continue teaching Buddhism in his region. 
This, says the tradition, is how the lineage and indeed the entire tradition, both monastic 
and tantric, came to be perfectly preserved. 
'Khrul zhig rin po che, "S another rNying ma pa lama and holder of the Lower Vinaya 
lineage, explains that the reason the continuation has been doubted is because three 
Chinese monks were involved in one of the ordination transmissions in Tibet in die I Oth 
century C. E. '19 It is argued that in view of this the Vinaya has not been transmitted 
correctly, even if the line of lineage masters mentioned above is accepted, because the 
Chinese monks were of a different lineage. According to 'Khrul zhig rin po che this is a 
misunderstanding, since the requirement is for five monks from the same lineage to be 
presentý while another three (making eight in all) should be present merely as witnesses. 
The Chinese monks were merely witnesses, and therefore the transmission took place 
correctly, he claims. 
It is difficult to see what other type of evidence can reasonably be sought in this case, 
"'Often known as Zhab de'u'Khrul zhig rin po che ngag dbang chos kyi blo gros, this rNying ma lama lives 
in Kathmandu, Ncpal, and is the forcmost disciplc of Dil mgo mkhycn brtsc rin po chc. 
"'Oral communication in answer to the question discussed here, given to the present author in France in 
May 2000. 
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since it is highly unlikely that the names and details of those present were written down at 
the time, or if they were, that those documents are still extant. The Vinaya holders them- 
selves consider the list of lineage masters to be authentic, yet'Gos lo tsa ba'20 found dis- 
crepancies between different recensions of other lineages, so errors cannot be ruled out. 
There is probably a case for saying that this is an account of what Tibetans believe about 
the lineage, and its factual accuracy is an open question. Linking this discussion back to 
the main topic, then, it is clear that some Tibetans believe not only that ý5ntarakýita intro- 
duced the monastic Vinaya to Tibet but also that his legacy in this respect has proved long 
lasting, and continues to the present-day in Tibet itself and within the Tibetan community 
in exile. 
As his final point on the scope of kntarakýita's activity, Mi pham states that ýdntarak§ita 
has 'personally' continued to protect the Dharma in Tibet over the centuries, through a 
series of incarnations (sprul sku). It is said in the rNying ma oral tradition that there is an 
emanation or incarnation of kntarakýita in each generation, and Atiga himself is con- 
sidered to have been one of them. 121 It follows that the scope of ýantarakýita's activity is 
utterly vast and as yet without end. Here, Mi pham has therefore included ýdntaraksita 
and his incamation-successors in the sprul sku system of recognized incarnate lamas that 
is characteristic of Tibet. 122 All the rNying ma pa lamas consulted for this study accepted 
23 
this claim as true. According to the scholar Thub bstan nyi mal 85ntarak§ita's current 
incarnation is Chos dbyings thub bstan rdo de, a rNying ma lama in the klong chen snying 
1201n Part 11 of the Blue Annals, he notes occasional discrepancies between different accounts of particular 
Vinaya lincagcs, although not spccifically in this casc. 
12IThis is one way of interpreting the first verse of 'Brom ston pa's 'bstodpa (stotra) addressed to D-ipaqi- 
kara, translated by Chattopadhyaya in Atria in Tibet, pp. 372-376. "I offer prayer to the feet of DI-parpkara- 
W, who was born in the noble j-iva-family of the kings of sa-hor of tri-sampanna Bengal, in the same line to 
which 95ntij-1va [95ntarakýitaj belonged. " The other way is, of course, to take this literally in the sense of 
genealogy. 
122For a brief explanation of this sytem, see A Handbook of Tibetan Culture, ed. Graham Coleman, Rider, 
1993, p. 405. 
123Currently a research fellow at Columbia University, New York. 
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thig tradition living in Ri kung, Amdo province, Tibet (China) and a teacher of rDo grub 
chen rin po che who now lives in Gangtok, Sikkim, northern India. 
Finally, we should add here that some rNying ma pas 
124 also consider that the 8th century 
historical figure of ýdntarakýita was an emanation of Vajrapdkii. 
125 VajrapdQi (Phyag na 
rdo rje) is a primary bodhisattva-deity of the rNying ma school, believed to protect and 
disseminate Mahdydna teachings and to have been instrumental in transmitting the tantric 
teachings to human beings. In order to evaluate this, and Mi phads claims on the nature 
and extent of ýZintarakýita's activity, one must refer to the discussion on spiritual accom- 
plishment above. Similar concerns apply here. 
H. 4.7 Mi pham's appraisal of gantaraksita 
The biographical section of Mi phams commentary ends with a verse passage summa- 
rising his main points on 95ntarakýita's doctrinal significance. The most relevant section 
is as follows: 
The teachings of [the Buddha] the supreme protector, were explained by Asanga's 
treatises with respect to vast activities, and by Nagarjuna with respect to the pro- 
found view. These two are therefore known as the two charioteers land] are as 
famous as the sun and moon. Learned bodhisativas [then] developed their 
approaches and propagated them in [two] streams, but theyWere unable to taste 
the great banquet of the Buddhist Mah4aydna in its entirety. But you 10 gintarak- 
#tal, in a single great draft assimilated through analysis and reasoning the 
[entire] ocean of both traditions (shing rta). You [beautify] the vast space of the 
sky with the clouds of all the Mahjydna teachings. Having reached the ultimate 
truth, the heart's peace, which is like the sky, [Candrakirtil hangs like the moon'2" 
glorious over the three worlds. DharmakFrti (Chos kyi grags pa) saw clearly and 
distinctly all conventional phenomena like a rainbow, hisfame hasfilled the 
124 Oral commentary by mKhan chen Pad ma shes rab. 
MVajrapini was a ccntral figurc in Indian Tantric Buddhism beforc 4th ccntury CX- Sec Nakamura (1987: 
315). 
126There is a play on words here, since 'canda is a Sanskrit term for'nioon'. 
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world. The commentaries of the learned scholars who elucidate their teachings 
are like a beautiful but unstable palanquin, which is not strong enough to encom- 
pass easily and at once the vastness of the two kinds of immaculate logic. But 
you have covered the whole domain of reasoning on the two truths through the 
three steps of rational analysis (mam dpyod gom pa). 127 You are an ornament [for 
the world] because you established all the various ways of reasoning. On account 
of this, the two traditions and this great tradition that unites the two are the three 
entrances into the Mahdydna doctrine, and there is no other besides these three. 
Since you are the one who brought all the Buddha's teachings together, in this text 
you [present a] synthesis of the Mahilyana [supported] by reasoning. 129 
In Mi pham's view, then, the MAL is a milestone in Mahayana treatises in the sense that it 
presents a reasoned synthesis of aU Mahdyana approaches in one succinct yet comprehen- 
sive document. Mi pham argues that the MAL is the work par excellence to introduce 
scholars to Buddhist Mah5yana. doctrine in general as well as to the variety of different 
views that Mahdydna encompasses. Indeed, it happens that ýZintarakýita, writing in the 8th 
century, had the historical advantage of being able to draw from all the main strands of 
Indian Mahayana known today, as we wiR see in the next chapter. FoHowing Mi pham, 
contemporary rNying ma scholars in India and Nepal do indeed use the MAL in their 
study colleges to introduce madhyaMaka. 129 
1271'he three steps are conventional valid reasoning, the reasoning pertaining to the approximate ultimate, 
and the ultimatc itsclf. 
128V. p. 13-14. rgyal ba skyab pa de yi legs gsung chosH rgya chen spyod pa'i bzhung bsang thogs med 
dang// zab mo Ita bai cha mams klus Ural bas// shing rta gnyis zhes nyi z1a Itar grags kyang// de tshul 
skyong ba'i blo Itan sems dpa'mamsfl legs bshad chu klung phyogs su bkram. mod kyi// da dung thub pa 
chen po'i theg mchog mtsho# rdzogs par myong ba'i dga' ston thob pa med// khyod kyis tshul gnyis shing 
rta'i rgya mtsho ni//mam dpyod rigs pa'i hub chen gcig gis'thung//de tshe khyo ni nammkha'ikhams 
bzhin tu// mtha'dga theg chen chos yangs sprin gyis mjos// don dam mkha'lhar zhi ba1 thugs brnyes pas// 
dpal Idan z1a bajig rten gsum na mjosH tha snyad 'ja7 Itar ma'drrs gsal gzigs pas# chos kyi grags pas sa 
chen'dir khyab kyangH de tshul gsal bar byed pa1 mkhyen mchog mamsfl gzhung lugs bzhon pa bzang po'i 
khyogs brien mod// dri med Lsad ma gnyis kyi gnas yangs po// bde blag dus gcig gzhal ba'i stobs shugs 
zhan// khyod kyi bdcn gnyis rigs pa1 sa chen'di// mam dpyod gom pA stabs chen gsum gyis bcad// de tsho 
khyod ni'dzin ma'i khyon bzhin tufl mtha7 dag rigs pai tshul mang bkod pas mJos// de phyir tshul gnyis 
shing rta'i lam srol dangfl de dag gcig tu bsgrubs pa7i srol chen tefl thub pa'i theg mchog bstan pa! ijug 
ngogs ]a// gsum rno'di las gzhan pai srol mi srid// rgyal kun bka'ye sdud po khyod yin phyiT// 'dir ni theg 
mchog rigs pai tshul gyis bstus// 
129For example, in the study colleges run by Chos kyi nyi ma rin po che in Kathmandu, Nepal, and by 
Pad nor rin po che in Bylakuppe, Mysore, south India. 
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Furthermore, Mi pharn places ýantar*ita on a par with Nggdýuna and AsaAga, in the 
sense that ýdntarakýita brought together the two traditions of Mahayana which his two 
predecessors had respectively set in motion. This is a tremendously bold contention and 
one of great significance within the context of Mahayana history. It shows just how 
important it is, especially for rNying ma pas, to see all Buddhist traditions as fundamen- 
H. 30 Th tally coherent and to appreciate the underlying understanding that unifies them a1e 
present study sets out to assess just how ýdntarakýita was able to unify the doctrinal 
approaches of Madhyamaka and Cittam5tra, and to evaluate Mi phams appraisal of his 
enterprise. But first, to complete this introductory section, we need to situate 95ntarak- 
Ota's work within the context of Indian philosophy as a whole. 
13OPettit (1999: 88-100). 
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CHAPTER THREE HIS PHILOSOPHICAL CONTEXT 
M. 1 What guestions was AantaraMita asking? 
In order to understand ýdntarakýita's school of thought, we could ask ourselves what pre- 
cise philosophical views he was aiming to refute. But this is not the root of the matter. A 
philosopher qua philosopher reflects on questions that interest him in their own right, and 
it is only when he finds that others before him have not answered them to his satisfaction 
that he then seeks to formulate his own solutions. The questions, then, are primary, and 
the various views that will be refuted in the process of defining a solution are secondary. 
So our chief concerns are the following: what were the outstanding philosophical pro- 
blems that ý5ntar*ita was moved to solve? What were his solutions? How did he arrive 
at those solutions? Are these coherent? What contribution do they make philosophically? 
As a result of this approach, a picture should emerge not merely of an ancient school of 
Indian thought, but also of the philosophical insight of a brilliant individual who inspired 
generations of scholars after him. Indeed, why not our own? 
In order to identify the philosophical questions that were "in the air" for ýZintarakýita, one 
has to look at his context, and from our present historical vantage point there are only a 
limited number of ways we can do this. We can refer to textual evidence, that is, survey 
the ideas that were debated by Buddhists and non-Buddhists in the preceding centuries. 
We can also take into account other forms of cultural evidence as instances of possible 
influence: developments in art or in the socio-political environment. All of these sources 
help to constitute a general history of ideas. We can also take positive advantage of hind- 
sight and consider the broader phases of philosophical and religious development; in the 
case of Mahdydna Buddhism, for instance, this would mean identifying the dominant 
questions that were being asked during its last phase in India, and the trends that were 
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shaping ýdntarakýita's own period. Finally, of course, and some might argue, morc pcrti- 
nently, we can look directly at 
tdntarakýita's text to see what questions it asks or implies. 
The approach proposed here willfirst examine the salient points of the MAL to infer the 
questions that ýRntarakýita was effectively addressing, since this is our direct evidence for 
his thought. ' Second, we will look at the philosophical and religious trends in his period 
as a form of evidence indicating what the dominant concerns were at the time; and third, 
in subsequent chapters, we will relate the questions or problems thus identified with any 
answers given by ýdntarakýita's predecessors by means of textual references, and attempt 
to identify why those answers may have appeared philosophically unsatisfactory to him. 
In other words, we will construct the main features of a philosophical situation in which 
tantar*ita effectively responded to some sort of need. 
Finally, it is useful to note that a further method of categorizing the approaches to prcsen- 
ting philosophical schools is to say that they can be made from two basic directions: back- 
wards and forwardsý The former involves interpreting a school by using subsequent com- 
mentaries on it, while the latter involves beginning before the school had even arisen and 
examining the antecedent conditions and potential influences that helped to bring it about, 
as a way of contextualizing its earliest stages. This study of the Yogacam-Madhyamaka 
school will, broadly speaking, adopt the latter approach first, and then adopt the former 
approach by referring to Mi pharn's commentarial interpretation. In this way, the picture 
of the school that emerges will be comprehensive. However, it is not always practical to 
segregate these two approaches entirely, primarily because this presentation will itself be 
'The TS is also, of course, a rich source of his thought, and indeed deals with many of the same topics in 
more detail than the MAL But the MAL is not merely a condensation of the TS, it situates kritaraklita's 
view doxographically. 
2Sec King (1998: 6). 
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a 21st century reading of the situation, which blurs the distinction between backward and 
forward approaches. 
IH. 2 Two interpretations of the AIAL: Kamalaglia and Mi pham 
Commentators differ in their understanding of the main topics addressed by the MAL. 
Specifically, the two most comprehensive commentaries, by Kamalaffla and Mi pham, 
offer differing interpretations of what the main subject-matter of the MAL actually is. 
Mi pham inserts a topical outline (sa bcad) into the body of his commentary, which is the 
Tibetan equivalent of a table of contents and traditionally seen as a summary of main 
topics. 3 According to Mi pham's sa bcad, the MAL is primarily about the Two Truths, 
and can be divided into two main parts. In the first part (verses 1-90) kntarakýita is con- 
cerned with establishing his own particular way of distinguishing between ultimate truth 
(don dam Men pa; paramirthasalya) and relative truth (kun rdzob Men pa, sa. ýnyrtisalya) 
and in the second part (verses 91-97) he concludes by praising this approach and empha- 
sizing its beneficial effects. The main body of the text, corresponding to Mi pham's first 
part, can itself be subdivided into three sections. The first examines the ultimate truth of 
things (verses 1-62), and the second section then shows how they exist on the relative 
level (verses 63-66). Finally, the third section (verses 67-90) attempts to refute all the 
objections which might conceivably be levelled against the approach presented in verses 
1-66. The main headings of the sa bcad can be summarised as follows: 
shes bya bden gfiis k-yi tshul gtan la dbab pa 
- bden gfiis kyi tshut ngos bzung ba 
- don dam par dngos po med par bstan pa 
- kun rdzob tu dngos po yod par bstan pa 
Me Tibetan text and translation of Mi pharn' s sa bcad can be found in Appendix 1. The sa bcad is em- 
bedded within the text of his commentary. However, the Cheng du edition of Mi pharn! s commentary has 
extracted the sa bcad and arranges it as a'table of contents' for ease of reference, and it is on this that 
Appendix I is based. 
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- de la rtsodpa spong ba 
bden gilis de 'dra ba 7 Ishul la bsnags pas don bsdu ba 
Establishing the basis of what is to be known: the way of [distinguishing 
the] Two Truths 
- Mastering the correct way [to distinguish] the Two Truths 
- Showing that entities do not exist on the ultimate level 
- Showing the existence of entities on the relative level 
- Eliminating all objections to that 
Summary praising this approach to the Two Truths 
Mi pharres understanding of what the MAL is about differs significantly from the 
readings of lchig6 and Kajiyama, which are both based on KamalaMa's commentary, 
despite the fact that Mi pharifs commentary as a whole follows theiýrtti and pafijikd very 
closely. These are the only major studies of the MAL in the English-language research 
literature. Ichig6 has drawn up a contents outline of the MAL based on tantaraks. ita's v. rlti 
and on Kamala! Ma's pafijikdý While it follows the same section blocks as Mi phanfs out- 
line, it employs quite different section headings. The main subject of the MAL is said to 
be that "dhannas have neither a unitary nor a multiple nature", as stated in the first verse. 
This is treated in two main sections. The first (verses 2-62) investigates this view logi- 
cally, using reasoning (rigs pa; yukti), while the second (verses 63-90) investigates it with 
reference to scripture (lung; dganza). In particular, the section on logic responds to 
objections accusing kntarakýita of the logical errors of asidd1w, Mrayasiddha and anya- 
tardsiddha. The concluding section (verses 91-97) is a summary of gantaraksita's philo- 
sophical and religious standpoint and a praise of the Buddha's teaching. Ilie main 
headings according to this interpretation arc: 
1. Main subject of the treatise: All dhar7na-s have neither a unitary nor a multipic 
nature 
H. Investigation according to reasoning (yuk-ti) 
A. Reply to the objection that the authoesthesis is based on the fallacy of 
an illegitimate logical mark (asiddha) 
"Pages CIV-CVM of the Kyoto edition, and pages 185-189 of Studies in lite Lileralure of The Grew 
Vehicle ed. Luis 0. G6rnez and Jonathan A. Silk, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan, 1989. 
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1. Reply to the objection that the author's thesis is based on the fallacy 
of a logical mark whose locus is unreal (afrayasiddha), and which is not 
admitted either by the opponent or the proponent (anyatardsiddha) 
2. Reply to the objection that the author's thesis is based on the fallacy 
of a doubtful logical mark (sathdigdhasiddha): The Buddha cognizes 
images. 
Ill. Investigation according to scripture (dgama) 
A. Examination of relative truth (saýnqtisatya) 
B. Examination of ultimate truth (paramarthasatya) 
C. Examination of liberation 
IV. Conclusion 
A. kntaraksita's philosophical and religious standpoint 
B. The amb; osia of the Tath5gata's teaching. 5 
Kajiyama (1978: 114-143) summarises the MAL along similar lines, emphasizing episte- 
mological issues as the main subject-matter. Ruegg's (1981: 90-93) summary of the text 
follows the same approach. He argues that the subject matter is the principle stated in the 
first verse, which is demonstrated first by reasoning (yukii, verses 2-62) and then with 
regard to the Two Truths following the philosophical tradition (agama, 63-97). 
An examination of the MAL itself makes it difficult to agree with Kamalaffla's reasoning 
(rigs pa; yukti) / scriptural authority (lung; Jgama) division without tighter definition. It 
will be shown in Chapter IV that logical reasoning is employed throughout the text and is 
not limited to the first 66 verses. 'Me division can only be justified on a strictly narrow 
interpretation of the term, so that reasoning (rigs pa; yuk-ti) refers exclusively to the 
'neither one nor many argumenf and not to reasoning in general. 
Since this logicalIscriptural distinction is not as clear-cut as Kamalagila's commentary 
implies, it is conceivable that he chose to make it deliberately in order to highlight the 
synthesis of approaches in the MAL. It makes the point that the MAL is firmly rooted in 
the logical tradition, while at the same time following authentic Mahdyana scriptures to 
5Ichig6 (1985: CIV-CVM). 
59 
establish its viewpoint. It also emphasizes that the MAL is not simply a polemical text, or 
merely a further contribution to debate, but a work that expresses all the profundity of the 
Buddha's teaching. It may therefore have gone some way in placating possible opponents 
from other Buddhist schools, in the line of Candrakirti for example, who might have 
objected to what could have been seen, at the time, as a controversial importation of logic 
into a Madhyamaka treatise. However, we have no evidence that Candrakirti's view on 
this was strongly advocated by any successors in kntar*ita's time, and consequently no 
evidence that kntaralqita's use of logic was in itself controversial in his own periodý If 
anything, the opposite is the case. There is no cvidence7 of a Sv5tantrika/Pr5sailgika 
opposition in India in the period between Candrakkti and kntarakýita, and no evidence 
that the use of inference was generally acknowledged to be an issue. Indeed tdntarakýita 
himself distinguishes the two types of proof with no indication that one is any more 
acceptable or controversial than the other, either to him or to other scholars. 
This can be either proof (bsgrub pa; sadhana) or proof by undesired consequence 
(thal ba; prasafiga), because there is no other type. 8 
Kamalani a does likewise, although he acknowledges a preference for syllogism. 
The object in question cannot be established through the proof of undesired con- 
sequence (thal ba; prasaAga), because such an undesired consequence is not proof. 
For [although] the opponent's position is invalidated by means of the proof of 
undesired consequence, this Itype ofproq/7 cannot establish one's own position, 
which requires another proposition to be extublishedfur both sides. 9 
The way Kamalani a argues his case in this passage seems to indicate that the two types of 
argument had not been clearly distinguished previously, and that Kamalag-ila himself may 
671be latest research by Jundo Nagashima (unpublished Ph. D. for Bristol University. UK) has not found any 
trace of an uninterrupted continuation of CandrakIrti's position in India. 
Wagashima, op. cit., p. 120. 
8SaOwdvqyavibhaAgqpafijikA 'di ni bsgrub, pa! am thal bar bsgrub pa zhig tu'gyur grang ste/ mam pa gzhan 
ni med pSi phyir ro// 
Wadhyarnakdloka (P. 5287 sa 147a5-6): thal bar bsgrubs pas kyang mngon par'dod pa! i don mi'grub ste/ de Ita bu'i thal ba nyid ma grub pa! i phyir ro// thal bar sgrub pa1 sgo nas ni gzhan gyi phyogs la gnod pa tsam du'gyur gyi/ rang gyi phyogs 'grub pa ni ma yin te/ de ni gni ga la grub pa1 gtan tshigs gzhan la bltos pa'i 
phyir ro// 
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have played a significant role in drawing out their differences. On this basis, there is no 
reason to suppose that the use of logic in the MAL was controversial when it waswritten. 
Criticism of this nature would be coloured by subsequent developments in Tibet. 
If this is so, then why did both ýAntarakýita and Kamalani a indicate that they considerrd 
the MAL's use of logic to be worthy of note? An alternative explanation is that the intro- 
duction of logic into the Madhyarnaka context was seen as significant, indeed, as innova- 
tive. The Japanese scholar Shiro Matsumoto maintains that the later Madhyamikas can in 
fact be defined as those who interpret Dharmaldrti's logic and epistemology in line with 
the Madhyamika view. 'c'Already in the 8th century, then, it is possible that the use of 
logic in the MAL was sensed to be a defining characteristic of kntarakýita's contribution, 
and it was therefore given prominence in those outlines. By contrast, for Mi pham, logic 
and Madhyamaka naturally went hand in hand since their relationship had become an 
accepted fact in Tibet, albeit a debated one. This theme did not therefore reflect the main 
doctrinal issues that were of interest in the 19th century, so he did not select it for his own 
outline. 
Further comparison of the two outlines will help highlight the features that are character- 
istic of each. So for instance, to say that the main subject of the MAL is the view that all 
dhanna-s have neither a unitary nor a multiple nature is to take the opening proposition 
presented in the first verse as being the literal and complete expression of all that follows. 
However, one can argue that if that were indeed all the MAL was about, it would amount 
to nothing more than one particular example of the general Madhyamaka argument that 
all dhanna-s are empty (danya; stong pa). Mi pham, however, contends that the scope of 
IOCited by Nagashima (op. cit., p. 147) with reference to %6ki-chdganha no Kfishiso'(lbe later Madhyan-dka 
view of emptiness), Riso, vol. 610. In Japanese. 
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the MAL is much greater than this. By identifying its subject-mattcr as the Two Truths, 
he lifts its import from being an instance of one particular Madhyamaka argument on 
emptiness to that of being a particular approach to the central Buddhist principle of the 
Two Truths. It follows that showing that all dharmas arc neither one nor many is simply 
the method chosen, not the purport of the work. Indeed, the chief distinction that can be 
made between Mi pham's understanding of the text and that of Ichig6, Kajiyama and 
Ruegg (following Kamalani a) is that the latter view it primarily in terms of logical and 
epistemological concerns, while the former directs the interest to metaphysical issues. 
Whether or not one chooses to give preference to Mi pham's interpretation will depend on 
how one understands the nature of scholastic distinctions. For example, is a particular use 
of logic and epistemology sufficient to characterize a Buddhist school? Can a school best 
be described in epistemological terms, or in metaphysical ones? This is a big and complex 
question, and one which cannot be fully answered in this study. What we will have occa- 
sion to see is the way rNying ma and dGe lugs views differ with regard to the definition 
of Yogacam-Sv5tantfika-Madhyamaka. We should note that the distinction between SvA- 
tantrika and Prdsafigika schools developed in Tibct rested primarily, as the terms imply, 
on differences of methodology, the one accepting the use of autonomous inference (sva- 
tantra anumana; rang rgyud rjes dpag), and the other showing undesired consequences 
for the opponent's position (prasafiga; thal `gyur). 11 On the other hand, the distinction 
between Yogdc5ra and Madhyamaka can be considered a metaphysical one based on their 
differing interpretations of danyatCL 12 It follows that on this preliminary level, it is simply 
a matter of which aspect of 8dntarakýita's thought one wishes to emphasize. 
"Lopez (1987: 56-7). Tillemans (1982) notes that PrAsafigikas are not restricted to prasahga argun-cnts in 
practice. 
12See Nagao (1991: 51-60; 189-200); Wiffiarns (1989: 82-6). 
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Mi pham's view is consistent with his contention that each philosophical school of 
Buddhism is characterized by a particular way of interpreting and approaching the Two 
Truths-not by logic or epistemology. In his commentary on the MAL, Mi pham. notes: 
"The way in which the Two Truths are understood by the mind, be it completely 
false, partially true or perfectly correct, gives rise to the many different tenet 
systems, [bolh] Buddhist and non-Buddhisi. 03 
Mi pham's view that Buddhist schools can be characterized by their respective approaches 
to the Two Truths is one that is current among some scholars today. 14 It derives its 
authority from Nagarjuna who emphasized the central importance of the Two Truths for 
Buddhist doctrine in the MMK (XXIV, 8-9): 
The doctrines taught by the Buddhas are based upon two truths: 
Worldly conventional truths and ultimate truth. 
Those who do not understand the distinction between these two truths 
Do not understand the profound nature o the Buddha's teaching. 15 !f 
Indeed, an experienced reader will know that around the Two Truths are clustered some 
of the great questions of Buddhist thought. 16 This includes epistemological problems, 
such as how to distinguish true understanding from erroneous understanding. It implies an 
exegetical dimension, since knowing how to distinguish the Two Truths means one will 
be capable of distinguishing the definitive meaning (nitdrtha) of the Buddha's words 
from their interpretative meaning (neydrtha). The Two Truths also have a moral and 
soteriological dimension, because fully understanding the ultimate is synonymous with 
enlightenment itself. And lastly, behind the Two Truths lie questions of ontology. In the 
words of Malcolm Eckel (1987: 26), "the Two Truths serve as a focal point on which the 
different dimensions of Buddhist thought converge". Mi pham's analysis of the MAL con- 
13don de gnyis la blosjal tshul phyin ci log dang/ phyogs tsarn dang/ yang dag par rtogs tshul gyis phyi 
nang so so'i grub mtha! sna tshogs byung ste/ V. p. 18. 
14 Guy Newland bases his book Appearance and Reality. the Two Truths in the Four Buddhist Tenet Systems 
(Snow Lion, Ithaca, 1999) on exactly this principle. 
""dve satye samupUritya buddhanAip dharmadegan5/ lokasarpvftisatyarp ca satyarp ca pararnarthata4H 
ye'nayorna vijdnanti vibhAgarp satyayordvayob/ te tattvarp na vijýdnanti garnbiffffarp buddhagAsane// 
16Eckel (1987: 26). 
63 
sequently places the work at the centre of the broad spectrum of Buddhist concerns. 
Since the difference between the two outlines is largely one of emphasis, one of the keys 
to unravelling it, as we have already seen, may relate to the respective contexts in which 
the commentaries were composed and to which they responded. The following section, 
which describes the contextual situation in which tdntarakýita composed the MAL, will 
therefore serve a number of purposes. It will help to elucidate some reasons for the 
difference between these outlines (sa bcad); it will set the stage for understanding the 
opponents ý5ntar*ita was attempting to refute; and it will contribute to an under- 
standing of the affiliations of the Yogac5ra-Mddhyamikas, our ignorance of which Conzc 
(1961: 239) once deplored. 
IH. 3 The guestions addressed by the MAL 
There are two levels of questioning within the MAL: the big, broad questions, and 
questions of detail that lie within the former broad categories. So for example, the broad 
question 'what is meant by ultimate and relative truthT spawns several questions of detail 
such as 'what is the nature of dhanna-sT (verses 2-15). Similarly, the broad question 
'what is the nature and process of perception? ' (verses 16-60) includes several detailed 
discussions such as'is perception endowed with aspects? And if so, how do they work? ' 
and so on. While ýdntar*ita does not ask direct questions in his text, so concise is it, his 
discussions imply certain questions. Drawing from Mi pham's commentary, we find thesc 
questions to be the fbHowing: 
1. To what categories of pulMrted existcnts does non-inhercnt existence (nil -jj-- 
bhava) apply? 
a) Refuting the existence of unconditioned dhanna-s (verses 2-8) 
b) Refuting the existence of the person or pudgala (vcrsc 9) 
c) Refuting the existence of conditioned dhanna-s, with particular refcrcnc 
e to the relationship between wholes and parts (verses 10-15,61-62) 
d) Refuting the existence of the mind. For this, he asks: 
- what is the nature of consciousness? (verses 16-19) 
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- do indivisible moments of consciousness exist? (verses 22-34,44-60) 
- how should we understand 'aspects' in perception? (verses 20-21) 
- how does consciousness relate to objects of perception? (verses 22-43, 
46-60) 
3. What is to be understood as relative and ultimate truth, and how do they relate 
to each other? (verses 63-97) 
4. What is the relationship between Yogdc5ra and Madhyamaka? (verses 83-97) 
What is their doctrinal common ground? What are the fundamental differences 
between them? How can they be classified in relation to each other? 
Many of these questions had been debated for centuries before kntarak§ita. Discussion of 
the existence of the pudgala, for example, in the written literature alone goes back at least 
to the Kathdvatthu, 17 that is, to approximately 200 B. C. E. Similarly, the status of uncon- 
ditioned dharmas was debated at an early stage between Vaibhdýikas and Sautrantikas, 
and was also examined by NAgRduna. 18 Other questions, whether of ancient origin or not, 
are known to have been five contemporary issues on account of the re-interpretation of 
the Abhidharma by the Yogdcara school. This category includes the discussions relating 
to consciousness and epistemology which had been studied just before ýantarakýita by 
both wings of the Yog5cAra school, and which had prompted a split within the Yogdc5ra 
Abhidharmikas around a century before him. 19 The question concerning the definition of 
the Two Truths was also current in his time, since the differing positions of Bhdvaviveka, 
Buddhap5lita, Candrak-uti, JRZinagarbha and so on had not found any clear resolution. 
Finally, the last main question, that of the relationship between Yog5cdra and Madhya- 
maka, had not previously been comprehensively and systematically addressed. 
Although it will become clear that a number of the refutations made by ýdntarak§ita are 
not new and show significant borrowing from his predecessors, nevertheless the striking 
feature of the MAL is the way all the refutations it makes, new and old, use just one 
'Wathavatthu, chapter 1. 
18MMK, chapters XV and XXV. 
19See section IIIA. 3 below. The two wings are that following Asanga and that following Dignaga and 
Dharma)drti. 
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single argument. The effect of using only one argument to refute all categories of existent 
is more than economical, and is more than literary unity. It shows an extraordinary confi- 
dence in the universal application of the M5dhyamika view, and it also rcflects the pro- 
found simplicity of the Mddhyamika view itself. NVhatevcr the philosophical antecedents 
of the MAL, ýdntarakýita's voice is exceptionally strong and quite unique. 
B14 9fintarah5ita's intellectual context 
IH. 4.1 The relevance of context 
There are several ways of conLextualizing the intellectual climate in which 
8antaraksita 
was working. For example, one can relate it to the historical sOcio-political situation pre- 
vailing in India at that time, and gauge the impact of this on his work. In fact, this route is 
rarely taken by Buddhologists. As Paul Williams (1983: 138) pointed out in 1983, "it does 
seem that too little attention is paid generally to the political/social context of Oriental 
philosophical ideas", 20 although it must be said that the work of Richard Gombrich has 
since gone some way to redress this imbalanceýl The notion nevertheless persists that 
historical context is irrelevant to philosophy itsclf. 
22 One can also try to situate tAntarak- 
ýita within the broad history of intellectual movements in India. This will enable us to see 
the key ideas that influenced his thought, as well as the role he himself played in shaping 
Indian and Buddhist thought. Another useful approach consists in focusing on the develop 
menL of specific topic areas, allowing us to identify 8RnLarAsitXs particular contribution 
to the doctrinal and philosophical debates that were current in his timc. Mis study takes 
all three approaches. The socio-political context was considered in Chapter 11. 
2OIn the course of discussion, Paul Williams has argued that context is crucial to our understanding of 
philosophies if we are to avoid naive comparisons between, say, Indian Buddhists and twentieth century 
thinkers. 
21See for example his Theravada Buddhism and his How Buddhism Began. 
22See Chatterjee (1962: vii-viii). "Not that such a chronological study is uninteresting or unimportant; it is 
simply that in a morphological analysis of any metaphysics, chronology of dates and events is absolutely 
beside the point. " 
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It can be objected that such an attempt to contextualize gantarak§ita's work runs counter 
to the Buddhist, or indeed Indian, tradition, and is therefore inappropriate. There is a view 
of philosophy which holds that it is an ahistorical inquiry into the nature of things as they 
are, and this was indeed the self-understanding of Indian thinkers as well as thinkers in 
ancient Greece. 2-1 The idea that a thinker's perspective is to some extent at least dependent 
on his situatedness is a modem one. Yet even in India thinking was not static, and al- 
though the tradition offered a stable framework for critical reflection, nevertheless there 
was room for differing interpretations of tradition. As Mohanty (ibid. ) puts it, the histori- 
city of thinking was never thematised, even though it was operative. What we are doing 
here, then, is bringing into self-awareness the historical and cultural specificity of §Rnta- 
rak§itaCs work. 
M. 4.2 ý5ntaraksita and the emereence of the dariana-s 
ýZintarakýita lived at a critical point in the general development of Indian philosophical 
schools, and indeed he himself played a significant role in their development. The usual 
Sanskrit term translated by 'philosophical school' is darfana. 24 Etymologically, the word 
derives from the root dri meaningto see. Darsana means 'sighV, 'vision' or'perspective'. 
From this generic meaning, it came to denote seeing the truth. The earliest use of the 
word as'true philosophical knowledge'has been traced to the Vailefika Satras (ix. ii. 13) 
which were probably written before 80 C. E. 25 But it was only in the 5th century C. E. that 
the term was used to denote what we might call self-consciously developed philosophical 
systems. The Jain scholar Haribhadra26 was the first to employ it in this way in his 
23MOhanty (1992: 276-7). 
2'Most authors writing on Indian philosophy consider the meaning of this term. The discussion here is based 
on the following sources: Dasgupta (1922: 1: 68,277); Radhakrishnan (1923: 43-44; Mohanty (1992: 8-10, 
170,227); Nakamura (1975: 76); King (1999: 33-40,44-45). The alternative term 4nv1-ksik-T refers more 
narrowly to philosophical systems based solely on reason. 
25Dasgupta (1922: 280). By contrast, Halbfass (1992: 69-70) is more circumspect about the dates of Kan-ada, 
the mythical author of the Vaife#kasiUra. 
26Richard King (1999: 45) has mistaken the 5th century Jain author of the Saddarianasamuccaya for the 8th 
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Saddarianasamuccaya, and soon after Bhavaviveka (c. 490-570) used it in this same sense 
in his Afadhyamakah!, dayakdrikd, which is the earliest extant Buddhist source reviewing 
the doctrines of several Indian schoolsý7 This sense of the term is now widely accepted 
on account of its use much later, in 1331, by the Hindu Madhava in his classic exposition 
of Indian philosophical schools, the Sarvadarianasaip raha. .9 
Although dariana can be translated as 'philosophical systerif, its meaning is more com- 
plex than the English rendering would suggest. As a result of its etymology, it denotes 
in 
the first instance a perception of truth, and following from that it denotes the systematic 
and logical elaboration of that truth that has already been graspee Furthermore, it has a 
third layer of meaning which includes the elaboration of the logical principles used to 
justify the cognitive claims that are being made. Mohanty (1992: 227) summariscs these 
three facets of dariana as follows: I 
A philosophical theory or darýana not only elaborates a view about the nature of 
things, but also backs up this account with a theory of evidence, rational justifica- 
tion, and critical appraisal. It not only uses such evidence, rational justifications, 
and critical appraisals, but also has a theory of these theoretical practices---that 
is to say, a theory of rationality. 
The key difference between this and what we understand nowadays to be philosophy 
could be that the Indian philosopher is not searching for truth, but expounding truth as he 
sees it. The perception of truth antedates its philosophical, discursive elaboration. In this 
century Buddhist M5dhyamika Haribhadra. 11iis mistake leads him to deduce an erroneous chronology for 
the early texts that use this meaning of dardana. 
27See Ruegg (1981: 62). 
28Mohanty (1992: 8): "Indian darfana is systematic elaboration of truth, or an aspect of it. which has already 
been grasped; it is not search for truth but exposition of it, intellectual vindication, conceptual fixation, and 
clarification of what has been received. " It is of interest to note that the Tibetan term for Unct! (grub mthal. 
siddhanta) as applied specifically to Buddhist systems has similar connotations. Guy Newland (1999: 12) 
explains that it means 'established conclusion' . "and thus a proponent of tenets is not a person who 
is merely 
sympathetic with a certain position; it is a person who knows it to be correct and intends not to give it up. " 
ibis is because "to qualify as a proponent of a particular system, it is necessary actually to realize the self- 
lessness taught by that system. " This discussion is particularly pertinent in gintarak4itis case, when one 
considers the significance of the highest ultimate which is non-conccptually realized, and the concordant 
ultimate which puts that realization as best as it can into words. All Dham-dc discourse, including fastras 
such as this one, pertains to the concordant ultimate. 
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important respect Wariana' is not exactly synonymous with 'philosophy'. But does this 
definition of dardana clarify the relationship between yogic perception and philosophical 
discourse, or only confuse it further? It is helpful in the sense that meditative perception 
could be called the basis of a philosophy, the fundamental view that is being expounded. 
However, one must be careful not to overextend this meaning of dardana. 
At the beginning of a dargana there is no intuitedfirst principle (the etymology of 
'seeing'here is misleading). There is, rather, a point of view as encapsulated in 
the texts. There are texts behind texts. 29 
Whatever the primary insight on which a darsana is based, it is not that of the so-called 
founder of the dardana, but an understanding expressed in the tradition's texts. The 
dardana is then a new interpretation of traditional texts, not a new point of departure. The 
assumption is that the tradition encapsulates a true perception, and the philosopher's task 
is to re-express it, elaborate on it or re-interpret it; this is the dynamic quality of tradition. 
Generally speaking, care is needed when assessing the doxographic situation in 8th 
century India in order not to impose later ideas and classifications uncritically, in pard- 
cular the classifications made by later Tibetan writers. For example, it has been shown 
that the terms 'Prdsafigikaand 'Svdtantrika'are unknown in the Indian literature of the 
8th century. 30 If we consider the incidence of these terms within the actual body of 
Buddhist commentarial works the appellation rang rgyudpa (Sviitantrika) is first attested 
in the Madhyamakavatdrap-M of Jaydnanda3l in the second half of the 1 lth century, while 
the appellation 'thal 'gyur ba'(Pr5safigika) is not attested until Tsong kha pa (1357- 
32 33 1419): That is, the terms date from a later period. As for the term'Madhyamaka' itself, 
referring to a distinct philosophical school, it is not attested within the body of Indian 
29ibid., p. 296. 
3OMimaki (1982: 44-5); Ruegg (1981: 58). 
31jt should however be noted that the Sanskrit of this work is lost, so this is not evidence of the actual term 
in Sanskrit. 
32See Yotsuya (1999: xi-xii); Mimaki (1982: 45-7). In his Lam rim chen mo, Tsong kha pa organises his dis- 0 
cussion on the methods employed in Madhyamaka in terms of two branches, Svatantrika and Prdsafigika. 
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works (as distinct from their titles) until Candrakirti's Prasannapadd Afadhyamakayritili 
in the 7th century. 34 The distinct existence of the school by this time is corroborated by 
testimonial evidence, since according to I-ching's report from India, dated to 691C. E., 
Mah5yRna was then divided into two schools: Yog5ciird and Madhyamaka? 
5 So it appears 
that in tdntarakýita's time, the idea of Madhyamaka as a distinct philosophical school was 
relatively recent but certainly accepted, and although there were doctrinal differences 
between individual M5dhyamikas the idea of separate subschools had not emerged since 
we find no terms for such. The situation was therefore much more open than subsequent 
appellations would suggest. 
If we turn now to references in the doxographical literature, we see that the emergence of 
the darfana-s as self-consciously distinct schools of thought and practice was slow and 
somewhat confused. The first extant Buddhist work to review a number of different 
schools under one cover was Bh5vaviveka's Madhyamakah! -dayakdrikas (MHK) with his 
autocommentary the Tarkqjvd1, d in the 6th century. He distinguishes the 
triavakas, Yoga- 
cara, Saipkhya, Vaigqika, Ved5nta and Mimdrpsd, and also expounds his own (Madhya- 
maka) views, giving a scheme of six Indian schools, three of which are Buddhist. This 
work seems to contain the earliest known reference to the term ved'antj36 indicating that 
the non-Buddhist schools, too, were still in formation. Chronologically, the next major 
Buddhist work to follow BhRvaviveka's model was tRntarakýita's own TS in the 81h ccn- 
tury. The TS, however, is organised along thematic lines, possibly because this is more 
useful for debating purposes. It distinguishes six non-Buddhist schools: the Ny5ya- 
See also The Great Treatise on the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment by Tsong kha pa, vol. l. Snow Lion. 
Ithaca, 2000, p. 21. 
33jundo, Nagashimaýs recent research on the Doxography of the late Indian Madhyamaka (see bibliography) 
has not uncovered any evidence that would put this conclusion in doubt. 
uSee Ruegg (198 1: l. n. 7 1). 
350ted by Nagao (1991: xi). 
36See Ruegg (1981: 62n), and V. V. Cokhale and H. Nakamura 1112 (1958: 165-89). 
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Vaigqika, M-imdrpsd, Sdqikhya, Jaina, Advaita, and Lokayata materialists, showing that 
significant progress had been made over the 7th and 8th centuries in clarifying the 
respective positions of each school as they grew self-consciously distinct. 
It is only immediately after ýdntarakýita that one finds the first doxographic acknow- 
ledgement of two distinct Madhyamaka schools in the ITa ba 7 k-hyad par composed by 
the scholar and translator Ye shes sde around 800 C. E. 37 This is the first extant Tibetan 
work of the gmb mtha'type 38 to continue the tradition of philosophical compendia that 
began in India with the Jain Haribhadra. and Bhdvaviveka. Ye shes sde. -l" distinguishes 
between Sautrdntika-Madhyamaka (mdo sde pa7 dbu ma and mdo sde spyodpa7 dbu ma) 
and Yogiicam-Madhyamaka (mal 'byor spyod pa 7 dbu ma) which he relates respectively 
with the names of Bh5vaviveka and ýdntarakýita. 4() A similar distinction is also made in 
another early work, the 1Ta ba 7 rim pa 7 yi man ngag snang ba bcu bdun by Val brtsegs 
(780-820). 41 The criterion used to justify the difference is whether the existence of an 
external object (bdhyartha; phyi rot gyi don yodpa) is maintained or rejected on the 
relative level (salryrd, kun rdzob). 42 
From this evidence, then, it would seem that for scholars in the 8th/9th centuries, the 
MA]Lý3 was recognized as the work that so clearly set out the Yog5c5ra view of the non- 
37Ms date is given by Ruegg (1981: 59). Ye shes sde was a disciple of gdntarakýita. 
31See Ruegg (1981: 211); Mimaki (1982: 40). 
39Ruegg (1981: 59) and Ruegg (1981b: 215ff). In this second work, Ruegg presents a detailed analysis of 
the work by Ye shes sde. The relevant passage is cited by Mimaki (1982: 40n). a tsa rya Bha byas mdzad 
pa la ni mdo sde spyodpa7 dbu ma zhes btagsld tsa rya 9d nta ra 4i tas mdzadpa la ni mal'byor spyod 
pa7 dbu ma zhes btags sol "We call Sautrantika-Madhyamaka that which is established by the acarya 
Bhavya, [and] we call Yogliciira-Madhyamaka that which is established by the acarya gantaraklita. " 
4OMatsumoto (1981) interprets these Tibetan terms as references to the Prajildp4ramita Satra and the Yogd- 
cara-Wo-ni respectively, but both Mimaki and Ruegg follow the traditional Tibetan interpretation. See 
Mimaki (1982: 41n). 
4'Ruegg (1981: 59); Mimaki (1982: 41-2). There are two identical works in the bsTan'gyur under different 
titles: the ITa ba7 tim pa bzhadpa (P. [144] (5843) ngo 139b7-142a4) and the ITa ba7 rim pa7 man ngag 
snang ba bcu bdun. 
42Ye shes sde's treatise begins with a section on schools that accept the existence of an external object. See 
Ruegg (1981b: 215). See also Ruegg (1981: 59). 
431bis work is specifically referred to by title in Ye shes sde's treatise. See Ruegg (1981b: 217). 
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existence of external objects on the relative level as to necessitate a demarcation from 
Bhdvaviveka's interpretation of Madhyamaka. So, very soon after it was written the MAL 
was considered a text that expressed a new but comprehensive view of how things are. 
Publication and translation of the MAL therefore constitute the point from which two dis- 
tinct subschools of Madhyarnaka became identified as such. 'Me pivotal role played by 
the MAL in this context is noted by Mi pham. 
"In this text [i. e. the Madhyamakdlamkdml, relative phenomena are posited 
in accordance with the Cittamdtrin 
iviewl and [thus this text] inauguratesfor the 
first time the vehicle of Yogdcdra-Madhyamaka. " 44 
Mimaki (1982: 27-54) has shown how Tibetan doxographers varied in the way they chose 
to divide up the different Madhyamaka theories into separate schools. No scholar has a 
more uncertain position than Rianagarbha, 
45 tdntaraksita's teacher, which arguably shows 
that his work reflects a tradition in transition. Alternatively, JB? inagarbha may have deli- 
bcrately adopted different viewpoints for different audicnccsý6 The position of 
tanta- 
rakýita himself is more stable since he is consistently associated with the Yogacdra- 
Madhyamikas- As for his classification according to the Pr5saAgika/SvAtantrika distinc- 
tion, this is not so clear. Ye shes sde made no such distinction at all. dBus pa blo gsal 
does make a separate such distinction on the basis of the logical methods used, but does 
not cite knLarakýiLa as an exponent of either. It appears that the Prdsahgika/Sv5LanLrika 
distinction was combined with the Yogdcdra/Sautr5ntika-Madhyamaka distinction only 
after Tsong kha pa. 47 So in order to characterize 
tdntarakýita's thought, it is important to 
44gzhung'dir ni tha snyad kyi'dod tshul scms tsam pa dang mthun par bzhed pas dbu ma mal 'byor spyod 
pa! i shing rtSi srol dang por phye bar n-Azad pa yin no/ V. p. 27: 1-3. 
45For example, Bu ston (1290-1364) and Go rams pa (1429-89) classify JftAnagarbha as a Yogicara- 
Madhyamika, while late dGe lugs pas like Se ra rje btsun pa chos kyi rgyal mtshan and'Jam, dbyangs bzhad 
pa classify him as a Sautrantika-MSdhyamika. dBus pa blo gsal (14th century) includes him arriongst the jig 
rten grags sde spyodpa7 dbu ma pa-s alongside CandraUrti. 
46He is said to have written the SDV from the SvItantrika point of view, and his commentary on the 
SaipAinirmocana satra from the YogIcAra point of view. Ruegg (1981: 68-9) and Eckel (1987: 314) see the 
texts as philosophically conflicting and suggest they may have different authors. But John Powers (1998: 3- 
6) suggests that the same author wrote the texts for different audiences. Whatever the case, JAInagafta is 
difficult to classify doxographicafly. 
47Mimaki (1982: 45-7). 
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acknowledge that he himself was not aware of any doctrinally significant difference 
between Svatantrika and Pr5safigika features. Yet it is quite clear that what he definitely 
did have in mind, and expressed explicitly in the MAL, was the distinction between 
Madhyamaka and Yogac5ra. 
111.4.3 Relationship with Yog5cara 
The Yog5c5ra school is far less well known to Western scholarsý" In his comprehensive 
review of Yogacara scholarship, Dan Lusthaue" notes that this may be set to change since 
several Tibetologists So have shown interest in Yogacdra sources. In particular, and of 
interest to the present study since Mi pham. was a rNying ma pa, he adds that recent 
developments in Tibetan studies are significant in this respect. 
Now that Western scholars are beginning to look beyond the minority dGe lugs pa 
school towards otherfonns of Tibetan Buddhism, such as rNying ma and rDzogs 
chen - in which Yogacdra and Chinese Yogicira influence is more prevalent - we 
may expect an increase in interest in Yogdcdra. 51 
For the purposes of this study, it is unnecessary to explore the early development of the 
school since it was recognized at least by the 6th century-that is, some two hundred 
years before ýIintarakýita-when it was presented by BhAvaviveka in his MHK. The 
classic formulation and hence the 'foundation' of Yog5cdra is ascribed to Asafiga (3 10- 
12 90? ) and Vasubandhu, said to be his younger brother. Thereafter the school's history is 
recounted in different ways according to whether one follows the East Asian or Tibetan 
tradition. According to the former, M after Vasubandhu the school developed in two 
48Paul Williams (1989: 83). 
49'A Brief Retrospective of Western Yogacara Scholarship in the 200' Century, paper presented to the II th 
International Conference on Chinese Philosophy, Cliengchi University, Taipei, Taiwan, July 26-31,1999. 
Published under the same title in Chinese Philosophy Beyond the Twentieth Century, eds. Vincent Shen and 
Wen-Shen Wang, Wu-Nan Cultural Enterprise, Taipei, 2001. 
5OFor example Wayman (1984), Tatz (1986), Guenther (1975), Sparham (1993) and Hopkins (1999). 
s'Lusthaus, op. cit. 
52For a discussion on Vasubandhu's dates, and the question of two Vasubandhus, see Anacker (1984: 7-13). 
53Both are mentioned by Dan LusthaLis in What is and Isn't YnOrara, www. human. toyogakuen-u. ac. jp/ 
acmuller/yogacara/mtro-uni. htni. This article has also been published under the subject title of 'YogAcRra! in 
the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 1998. 
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&rma, 3u%-. tradItIon, exemplified by Dignaga, DharmakIrti, 
gAntaraksita and Ratnakirti; and an Abhidharmic psychology exemplified by Sthiramati, 
Dharmapala, Hsuan-tsang and Viiii-tadeva. Tibetans tended to view the logico-cpistcmo- 
logical tradition as distinct from Yog5cara proper and closer to the SautrAntika school; for 
them, the Yogadira. school consisted of only the second of these two directions: 
'" This 
second approach will be followed here. It follows that if Tibetan doxographcrs regarded 
ýZintarakýita as a proponent of Yogacam-Madhyamaka, as mentioned, this must mean that 
they did not see his Yogdc5xa affliliation in terms of his use of logic, but in his approach 
to psychology and the nature of the mind. Whichever tradition one follows, it is acknow- 
ledgcd" that after AsaAga and Vasubandhu two subschools emerged, and both are 
addressed by ý5. ntarakýita in the MAL: the SA5ravqdins and the NiraUravAdins, that is, 
those who assert that thc'aspects' (mam pa; dkdra) that appear in perception are truly 
existent, and those who do not. The fact that 
tiintarak§ita addressed this issue in some 
detail (verses 22-60) indicates that he was offering a solution to a thorny issue that was 
very live in his time. 
Of relevance to this study is the distinction made by a number of contemporary scholars 
between the 'original' Yogdcdra doctrine found in the scriptures, and later philosophical 
theories developed by Sthiramati, Dharmapala and others. For example, Richard King 
(1994: 659-683) and Janice Willis (1982: 21) argue that the theoretical positions of the late 
philosophers on such questions as the existence of the mind were quite different from 
those of Asahga, MaitreydnAtha and Vasubandhu. At the root of this critique lies a 
reading of YogZicdra which holds that the concerns of the 'original'tcxts were epistcmo- 
logical, and were (mis-)interpreted by later commentators as ontologieaLý Insofar as 
UThe Tibetan categorization of the Yogkka and logical schools as being distinct may reflect the situation 
that prevailed in India from the 8th century onwards. The Chinese categorization. by contrast, is based on 
the way things were two or three centuries earlier. 
55Williams (1989: 94). 
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Madhyamikas criticise Yogdc5ra precisely on the grounds of their ontology, 57 these 
scholars maintain that the Madhyamika critique of Yog5c5ra is based on a fundamental 
misunderstanding of its enterprise. Lusthaus puts it this way: 
Yogicira doctrine is summarised in the term vijfiapfim5tra, `nothing but cogni- 
tion'... which has sometimes been interpreted as indicating a type of metaphysical 
idealism, i. e. the claim that mind alone is real and that everything else is created 
by mind. However, the Yogacdra writings themselves argue something very 
different. Consciousness (vijfidna) is not the ultimate reality or solution, but rather 
the root problem. This problem emerges in ordinary mental operations, and it can 
only be solved by bringing those operations to an end. 
Yogdcdra tends to be misinterpreted as aform of metaphysical idealism pri- 
marily because its teachings are taken for ontological propositions rather than as 
epistemological warnings about karmic problems. The Yogdcdrafocus on cogni- 
tion and consciousness grew out of its analysis of karma, and notfor the sake of 
metaphysical speculation. 58 
The idea here is that certain later Yogac5rawriters mistook Asafiga's words for meta- 
physical statements rather than phenomenological descriptions of the process of unen- 
lightened cognition. And as soon as this shift to metaphysics occurs, Yogac5xa assertions 
become unacceptable to Mddhyamikas. This is highly significant, for it is precisely 
because kntarakýita was not a victim of this misunderstanding that he was able to appre- 
ciate Yog5c5ra on the relative level, as the best available phenomenological description of 
the cognition process known to him, while at the same time leaving the metaphysical 
domain to Madhyamaka. So in this regard, 8antarakýita pre-empLed the recent re- 
evaluation of Yogacara, and developed its implications further than contemporary 
scholars have done thus far: 59 From the discussion here, one can see just how brilliant was 
85ntarakýita's intuition of accepting Yogacara in relative truth and Madhyamaka in ulti- 
56The debate on how to interpret Yogk5ra is still open, and other scholars such as Paul Williams do not 
share this view. Williams (2000: 154ff) argues that Yog5c5ra has always been concerned with ontology. 
Curiously, if such an epistemology/ontology distinction is indeed justified within Yog5c5ra, it was never 
byTibetan doxographers, let alone by early Western scholars or by Mi pham. 
5W=ually tAntaraksita's key argument in verse 92 of the MAL: although he advocates Yog5c5ra 
r 
theories of the mind in rel; tive truth, he does not hold that mind exists ultimately-implying that Yogi- 
cArins do. 
58What is and isn't Yogdcara, op. cit. 
59Indeed, Paul Williams believes that this contemporary school of Yog5c5ra interpretation is itself based on 
a Midhyan-dka perspective, dissolving any fundamental differences between the schools, and aligning itself 
as a result with the Yog5c5ra-Sv5tantrika-Madhyamaka point of view. See Williams (2000: 263, n. 25). 
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mate truth, and equally one can appreciate how important such an understanding is for 
Indian Mahayana Buddhism as a whole. 
Mi pham's characterization of the Cittamatra (sems tsam) school follows the Madhyamak-a 
analysis: 
Asfor the Cittamitrins, [they regard] the non-existent and merely imputed 
appearances of subject and object as relative. 71e basis (snang gzhi) of these 
[appearances] is the dependent nature (gzhan dbang) which ultimately is pure 
consciousness, self-knowing and self-illuminating. IThey regard] as ultimate the 
'utterly existent nature'(yongs grub) which is Ithe mind] empty ofperceived extra- 
mental object and perceiving subject. 17hey think that] if there is no consciousness 
[to act] as the basis (snang gzhi) for the phenomenal appearances of sarpsAra and 
nirviina, [the latterwould be as] non-existent as a sky-lotus. 7hey [therefore] 
regarý [the pure self-knowing] mind alone as an ultimate reality. 60 
111.4.4 The Yosý5cdra-Madhyamaka synthesis 
In his review of Indian Madhyamaka literature, David Scyfort-Rucgg (1981: 87) places 
ýdntarakýita in the last period of development of the Indian Madhyamaka school, and 
notes that he is often regarded as the founder and leading exponent of a philosophical 
school which synthesised Yog5cdra and Madhyamaka. Indeed, a general feature of Indian 
Mahaydna in the 7th, 8th and 9th centuries was its tendency for synthesis with other tradi- 
tions. Several Buddhist masters brought together Madhyamaka and Vajrayfina, for 
example, and in fact ý5ntaraksita and Kamalagi-la were both Vajrayanists in addition to 
being M5dhyamikas! l Furthermore, Rucgg notes a doctrinal synthesis of Madhyamaka 
and the Prajh5p5ramitA teaching as found especially in the tradition of the Abhi- 
sanjayjlaýnkdra. He traces this back to Axya Vimuktisena in the 6th century. One of the 
most important proponents of this synthesis was Haribhadra, said by Tdran5tha (108A) to 
60sems tsam pa ni/ gzangdzin gnyis su snang ba'di med bzhin kun tu btags pa tsarn yin pa! i kun rdzob/ de 
dag gi snang gzhi gzhan dbang gi rnam shes mthar thug pa shcs pa rang rig rang gsal tsaml phyi rol gzung 
ba dang derdzin pas stong pa ni yongs grub ste don dam pa yin Ia/ 'khordas gnyis kyi snang cha'di mams 
la snang gzhi mam shes zhig kyang med na narn mkhSi me tog Itar 'gyur ro snyarn du marn rig tsarn don 
dam du smra! o/ V p. 23. 
6'Ruegg (1981: 106). It should be remembered that kntarak§ita is given as the author of a Tantric work in 
the bstan 'gyur (see Chapter 11 above). 
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be a disciple of ýdntarakýita. It follows, then, that two of these syntheses already existed 
in ýdntarakýita's lifetime and were known to him; and arguably even the Yogdc5ra- 
Madhyamaka synthesis had also begun before him. 
From these various strands of evidence, it seems that two opposite trends were taking 
place in the 7th and 8th centuries. On the one hand, a clearer doxographic demarcation 
was gradually being made between the various dardana-s in India, both Buddhist and non 
Buddhist, while on the other hand efforts were made to bring distinct traditions together. 
This may reflect two deeper currents that run through Indian philosophy as a whole: the 
practical need for doxographIc labelling, especially for the sake of clarity in the context of 
public debates, and the tendency to consider with great tolerance that different views are 
just so many facets of an abiding truth. 62 One should note, however, that the evidence 
suggests that tdntarakýita's interpretation of Yog5c5xa is a subsequent development, and 
not a reflection of Asafiga or Vasubandhu's intentions, as the modem American stress on 
tolerance implies. 
The case of the two schools of Yogacara and Madhyamaka illustrates this point when we 
consider the pivotal role played by Bhdvaviveka. For many centuries these two traditions 
were not adversaries but, on the contrary, were intimately linked . 
63 For example, some of 
the earliest commentaries on Ndgdduna were by important Yogacarins such as Asafiga, 
Sthiramati and Guiýamati, implying that Mgojjuna's works were considered fundamental 
to the Mahdydna as a whole and not only to one particular school. 64 The idea of emptiness 
(Mnyatd) was inherited by the Yogdc5irins from Ndg,; Iijuna and formed a basis of their 
62Tbe Indian tradition has been associated with a'healthy relativism [in] their perception of the truth', 
'genuine doctrinal tolerance', and an 'assimilative' approach to religious tolerance. See Lipner (1994: 188-9). 
63This point is emphasized by Nagao (1991) and King (1994). For more detailed discussion see The 
Continuity of Madyamaka and Yogacara in Indian Mahayana Buddhism by Ian Harris, E. J. Brill, 1991. 
64Ruegg (1981: 49). Gutiamati's commentary is no longer extant. 
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theories, even though their interpretation of emptiness carried many features peculiar to 
their own school. '6'5 Also, the'sixLeen kinds of emptiness' that were originally elaborated 
in the Prajildparamitd Satras were developed in detail by the Yogacanns66 in the 
AIadhydntavibh, 5gabhds5, a. Conversely, the Mddhyamika Bhdvaviveka was strongly 
influenced by the logical and epistemological theories of the Yogac5rin Dignaga! 7 These 
are examples of the openness and flexibility of doctrinal affliliation. Despite this, there is 
evidence that by the 6th century doctrinal disagreement between the two schools had 
become acute! 8 In particular, BhdvaviveWs view on the Two Truths was attacked by 
Sthiramati and Dharmap5la and, in turn, Bhdvaviveka criticized the Yogacara theory of 
the paratantra or dependent nature in his Jewel in hand treatise (Chang chen lun, Taish6 
1578) . 
69 As a result, Yogiicara developed in China self-consciously opposed to Madhya- 
maka doctrines. Nagao, (1991: 219) writes: 
In the Sino-Japanese Buddhism of old, the AfCzdhyamika school, represented by 
San-lun-tsung, and the Vijildnavida, represented by the Fa-hsiang-tsung, are 
assumed to be mutually antagonistic to each other in that theformer advocates the 
teaching of non-being or gfinyatk while the latter, the teaching of being or 
existence. Such an assumption is apparently a misunderstanding, or at least an 
over simplification of the tenets of these two schools. 
At a time when doctrines were being more clearly distinguished from one another, and 
when public debates grew in importance, it may have appeared more significant to 
emphasize the differences between schools rather than their common ground. 
Unfortunately, for present-day scholars of Indo-Tibetan Buddhism, the status of Yog5c5ra 
65Nagao (1991: 51-2). For example, the Tattvartha chapter of AsafigA Bodhisattvabham! on IjInyata 
(Willis, 1979). 
66Nagao (1991: 239 n. 3) and the section on the sixteen types of danyata in Sthiramati's Madhydntavibhaga- 
gM (Friedmann, 1937: 70-80). 
6"Commentators disagree about whether Dignaga was a Sautrintika or a YogAcAdn. See Dreyfus (1997: 49). 
68Ruegg (1981: 65). This contrasts with Conze's view (Conze, 1961: 25 1) that the existence of such a power- 
ful school as that of the MAdhyan-dka-Yog5cArins proves that the two schools could co-exist in harmony. 
Conze himself acknowledges that at the time he was writing, Western knowledge of Yogkira was poor. 
69Ruegg (1981: 63). 
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has been coloured by Tibetan doxologies all of which place the Madhyarnaka school 
above Yogdcdra. 70 But it is not at all evident that this was the perception in ýdntarakýita's 
time, or in the centuries immediately preceding him. The famous seven-year debate 
between Candraldrti and the Yogacarin Candragorn7l, reported by Tarandtha (fol. 69B; 
77A-B), ended in deadlock with no clear winner. There is no reason not to assume that in 
the Sth century Yogadira and Madhyamaka were viewed as distinct but equally respect- 
able Mahdydna schools, as the respect shown by Candrakirti to Candragom-1 shows they 
were earlier. 
ýdntar*ita's work marks a turning point in the history of Yogdcdra in at least three 
respects. First, in India the Abbidharma wing of the school atrophied by the end of the 8th 
century as a result of centuries of entrenched critique7l and the Yogac5ra-Madhyamaka 
synthesis propounded by ýZintarakýita emerged in its place, alongside the synthesis com- 
bining Yog5c5ra with Tathdgatagarbha thought propounded by Kamalaglia, Dharmamitra 
and AbhaydkaragupLa. 72 Second, it is probably on account of the way that 95nLarak§ita 
brought Yog5cara and Madhyamaka together that Tibetan doxography placed Madhya- 
maka above Yog5cara, thereby changing the perceived relationship between the two 
schools for over a millennium. And third, 85ntarakýita effectively brought together the 
two divergent streams of the Yogficara school-the Abhidharmic and logico-epistemo- 
logical-into one comprehensive system. 
Within this historical context, then, it becomes clear that 95ntarakýita rejected the radical 
segregation of Mahdydna schools and subschools, a trend which had evO*ived in the two 
centuries before him, and aimed to establish a strong sense of doctrinal unity. The nature 
7OMimaki (1992: 8). All gSar ma doxologies give Madhyamaka the highest place amongst Buddhist schools. 
However, rNying ma and Bon po doxologies place the higher Tantric schools above Madhyamaka. 
7'Lusthaus: What is and isn't Yog&dra (op-cit. ). 
72ibid.; Ruegg (1981: 95; 102-3). 
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of the synthesis he developed is thus comparable to those of Madhyamaka-Vajrayana, 
Madhyamaka-Prajii5pammitA and Madhyamaka-Tath? igatagarbha, that wovc togcthcr 
threads which had been connected previously, if only unsystcmaticallyýn Nevcrthclcss, 
ýdntarakýita did add to the tradition, he was not mcrcly putting the clock back to some 
harmonious golden age. For the first time, he presented the relationship bctwccn Mah5- 
yana schools in the context of systematic doxographic description, arguing his case by 
way of logic and reasoning, and making the doctrinal situation clcarcr than it had cvcr 
been previously. 
111.4.5 Madhyamaka and logic 
Some scholars believe74 that one of tRntarak§ita`s innovations in the MAL was his 
systematic introduction of logic into a Madhyamaka cnvironrncnt, but what is the evi- 
dence for this? For Mi pham, in particular, this is one of the ground-brcaking features of 
the MAL. 
... since the synthesis of the two approaches 
[i. e. Afadhyamaka and Cittamitral 
established by reasoning is notfound in texts other than this one, this text is highly 
praiseJ. - 
75 
However, Malcolm Eckel (1987: 51-58) has argued that tAntaraksita's own teacher, Riana- 
garbha, had in fact already begun the process of introducing Dhannakirti's logic and epi- 
stemology into Madhyamaka in his Satyadvayavibhajiga (SDV). Indeed, the influence of 
the logicians on Madhyamaka was particularly pronounced in the 8th century generally, 
but can be traced back to BhZivavivcka. It takes two forms: the use of formal logical 
argument in Madhyamaka treatises, such as the independent inference (svatantra 
73See Ruegg (1981). 
74 Verbal comment by rDzong gsar mkhyen brtse rin po che, who claims that for the Sa skya school this is 
seen as gAntarakýita! s chief contribution to Buddhist thought. 
75tshul gnyis gcig tu sbyor zhing rigs pas gtan la dbab ba'i gzhungdi Ita bu las gzhan ma byung bis/ 'os njcd 
kyi rigs pas gzhungdi che thang, du bsngags par grub bo/ V p. 54: 18-20. 
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anumana) used by Bhdvaviveka; and a shift from ontological concerns to epistemological 
ones. Thus the terin paramartha is defined by Bh5vaviveka in the Tarkajvdld as follows: 
In the word paramartha, the word artha means an object of knowledge Offeya). It 
refers to the object that is to be investigated and understood. The word parama 
means 'supreme. The compound paramartha [as a karmadharaya compound] can 
mean ultimate object, in the sense that it is both ultimate and an object, or [as a 
tatpuruýa compound] it can mean the object of the ultimate, in the sense that it is 
the object of non-conceptual knowledge, which is the ultimate. Or [as a bahuvrihi 
compound] it can mean [the cognition] that is consistent with the ultimate 
object. 
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Jiidnagarbha takes the term simply as a kannadharaya compound in his own definition, 
emphasizing its epistemological aspect: 
"Thus a cognition produced by a three-fold logical mark- (lifiga; rtags) is ultimate 
(paramdaha; don dam), because it is the ultimate (parama; dam) meaning (artha; 
don). The ultimate can also be the object (artha; don) that is determined by that 
[cognition], just as a perception (pratyakýa; mgnon sum) [can be either a 
cognition or an object]. 77 
Whatever the differences between their views, bothwriters understand the term as 
referring to a cognition. As a result, Eckel (1987: 52) argues that "for both philosophers, 
discussion of the Two Truths is primarily a discussion of different epistemological per- 
spectives". This approach can be contrasted with that of Ndgdrjuna, for example, whose 
dedicatory verses to the MMK, and indeed the MMK as a whole, proclaiming the ultimate 
truth are closer to ontology than to epistemology. 
"[Whatever is dependently arisen is] unceasing, unborn, not non-existent, not 
permanent, not coming, not going, without distinction, without identity, andfree 
from cunceplual consiruclion. " 78 
Although Eckel does not consider the complexities of Ridnagafta's interpretation, the 
epistemological interest is clear. This shift from ontology to epistemology was not unique 
76See Eckel (1987: 114). and lida (1980:. 82-3) for the Tibetan text: 
77SDVV 4ab. See Eckel (1987: 71). dei phyir tshul gsum pai rtags kyls. bskyed pai rtogs. pa, gang yin pa de 
ni darn pa yang, yin la/ don yang yin pas don dain pao// des gtan la phab pai don kyang don dam pa ste 
mgnon sum la, sogs pa bzhin du brjod do// Tibetan text in Eckel (1987: 156). 
78anirodhamanutp5damanucchedamgdsvatam/ anekdnhamandnarthamanRgamamanirgamanV/ Sanskrit text 
in Inada (1993: 38). 
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to Buddhist thought, and can be found in non-Buddhist schools too, indicating that it was 
a trend of the time! 9 If we take the characterization of Veddaa, for example, one notable 
difference8o between that given by Bhavavivcka in his MHK and Tarkaftild, and that of 
ýRntarakýita in the TS, is that the latter ascribes the cognitive function to the atman while 
the former does not. 81 
In his study of the SDV, Eckel in fact argues that many of the features hcld to be charac- 
teristic of Yogac5ra-Madhyamaka can be found in the works of Managafta. The impli- 
cation, of course, is that although 
tdntarakýita is considered the founder of the school, he 
himself did not innovate as much as we might imagine. It is important for us to look cri- 
tically at the connections between Ridnagafta and 
tantaraksiw in order to evaluate the 
role that the latter played in the development of Buddhist ideas. 
111.4.6 The case of Jfiana%zarbha 
HiRnagarbha is said by Tibetan sources to be the teacher of tRnLar*ita. 
82 He himself is 
said to have been taught by 
tdgupta. 83 The historical connection between JfiAnagarbha 
and ýdntarakýita is strengthened through circumstantial evidence provided by the Tibetan 
tradition of classifying the three chief works of Svdtantrika Madhyamaka together as the 
rang rgyud shar gsum: 
" the SatyadvqyavibhaAg2-' of Jfidnagarbha, tAntaraklita's 
"Even though the opposite trend has already been identified above, namely the move from epistemology to 
ontology within YogEkc7ua. If the modern American reading of YogAcAra is correct, both trends would have 
been active simultaneously, reflecting an unstable relationship between the two domains. In discussion, 
Paul Williams has pointed out that the unlikelihood of such a situation helps to corroborate his ontological 
reading of YogicAra. 
8OSee Nakamura (1983: 206-257). 
$ITS 329: Sr5hyalakjaqarpsayutkarji na kidhri4hiha nighate/ nijanapiraDarno'yarp tasm3t sarv4 samogyatcl 
Refuting the Advaita doctrine of LItman, the verse states: "There is nothing in this world which is cridowed 
with the character of apprehensibility; and all this is held to be the illusory modification of consciousness. " 
82Roerich (i. 34). 
83T-aranatha (99B). 
84Ruegg (1981: 68-9, n. 223); Powers (1998: 56, n. 6). This can be translated either as "the three [texts] illumi- 
nating SvAtantrika", or as "the three Eastern SvItantrikas", all thrce authors bcing linked with Bengal. 
95This text and its auto-commentary (iýrtti) are not found in the Peking Tripitaka, but in the Sdc dgc Wition. 
See Powers (ibid. ) and Ruegg (ibid. ). 
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MadhyamakdIaTkara, and Karnalas-11a's Afadhyamakdloka. So the influence of Ridna- 
garbha on ý5ntarakýiLa is attested in relation to a teacher-student relationship and by sub- 
sequent doxographical analysis. 
When we turn our attention to Ridnagarblia's work, we find a surprisingly large number of 
features in common with the work of knLarakýita. For example, they shared a strong 
interest in both Madhyamaka and Yogacara. Both authors wrote separate works on each 
of these schools: in the case of HiRriagarblia, the Arya maitreya kevala parivarta bhdýya 86 
is a commentary on the SaTdhininnocana satra, one of the main scriptural sources for the 
Yog5cdra school, while kntaraksita wrote the Samvara vimýaka VITU . 
87 Some of their 
respective Madhyamaka works have already been cited, notably the SDV and the MAL. 
Having said that, the two authors express very different views on Yogacara in the SDV 
and the MAL. While Ridnagarblia 88 rejects reflexive cognition (svasamvedana) kntarak-' 
ýitagQ accepts it. Rianagarblia's argument against svasaýnvedana is aimed at refuting the 
true existence of consciousness, which he feels svasamVedana entails, and kntaraksita, 
too, rejects the true existence of consciousness. 90 But kntarakýita's understanding of 
cognition and of the nature of reflexive cognition is significantly different from that of his 
master (discussed in Chapter VIII below). Furthermore, the Yogacdra concepts on which 
kntar*ita chooses to focus are not the same as those in the SDV. Ridnagarblia makes 
hardly any mention of the sdkdralhirikara debate which occupies so much of the MAL. 
86See JfiZnagarbha's Commentary on Just the Maitreya Chapterfrom the Samdhininnocanasr4tra: study, 
translation and Tibetan text by John Powers, Indian Council of Philosophicý Research, Delhi, 1998. Jfidna- 
garbha! s authorship of this work has been questioned by Ruegg (1981: 68-9) and Eckel (1987: 314) on the 
grounds that the viewpoints of YogAcdra and Madhyamaka are incompatible, and cannot therefore be 
coherently held simultaneously by any one person. For a discussion of this, see Powers (1998: 3-6). 
87See Chapter II, 1.3.3. d. 
88SDV 6c: "Because self-cognition is impossible. " rang rig rigs pa ma yin phyir// 
89MAL verse 16. See Chapter VH below. 
90MAL verses 91-2. 
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Just as important is Jfidnagarbha's immense debt to the logicians, Dign5ga and Dharma- 
1drti, whose ideas and methods he incorporated into the SDV, and in this domain also we 
find that although ýAntarakýi&s use of logic is widely acclaimed, it was not really new. 
Some passages in both the SDV and its v. riti directly address questions of logic, like verse 
19, for example, which upholds the value of infcrenceý' In addition, a number of terms 
used in the SDV indicate borrowing from Dharmakirti, in particular arthak-riyj (causal 
efficiency), yathddardana (consistent with appearances) and i7avaltdra (conventional 
usagc)ý2 He also uses avisaýnvdda (not to be contradicted) to derine the ulamateý 
3 But 
Ridnagarblia. interprets all these concepts from a Madhyamaka perspective, and the 
structure of the argument he uses to appropriate such terms could be seen as a dialectical" 
one of affirmation, denial and rc-appropriationý5 It is based on rejecting the ultimate truth 
of other schools as ultimate, and accepting it as relative by shifting the perspective. 
8&nta- 
rakýita applied the same model in verses 91-2 of the MAL, where he accepts Yog5cAra in 
relative truth and Madhyamaka in ultimate truth. Similarly, Ridnagarblia accepts artha- 
kriyd not in ultimate truth like Dharmak! rL? 
6 but in relative truth! 7 
Finally, we should mention another similarity between these two Madhyamikas, which 
relates back to our previous discussion on Mi phanfs theme of the Two Truths. And that 
is, that the principal Svdtantrika work with which Jfidnagarbha is associated is cntitled A 
91SDV 19: "When this happens, there is an inference. Otherwise, them is not. If logicians use such 
[inferences], who can refute them? " de tshe rjes su dpag pabyung/1 gang gi tshe na gzhan na mW/ de bas 
rigs pa smra ba mams// de skad smra la su zhig'gog// Eckel (1997: 173). 
92Sce Eckel (1987: 51-58). 
93SDV 4ab: "Since it cannot be contradicted, reason is ultimate. " slu ba med pas rigs pa ni// don dam yin tef 
Eckel (1987: 113 n. 11) points out that the use of avisajiv4da recalls PramdVavartfika 1.3: pmnullnarn 
avisamvadi jftdnam; "A means of knowledge is a cognition that cannot be contradicted% However, the term 
is alsý found in NR&junis RainavaIr (see Lindtner, 1981: 203). 
94AIthough the conclusion is not a synthesis in the sense of a combining of the previous two points. 
95EckeI (1997: 51-8). 
%Pramaýavartfika 2.3. 
97SDVV 8abc: Were things are capable of effective action (arthakfiy4samartha) that corresponds to 
appearances (yathadarfana)". dngos po tsarn gang yin pa ni ji Itar snang ba bzhin du don byed nus pa'i 
phyir ro// Tibetan text in Eckel (1987: 160). 
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Commentary on the Distinction between the Two Truths (Salyadvayavibhaliga). Ridna- 
garbha (SDV 1) begins his work by saying that neither his [Buddhist] predecessors nor 
other non-Buddhist scholars have understood how to [correctly] distinguish the Two 
Truths and this is why he intends to set the matter straight. His sentiments indicate that in 
the centuries before him, and significantly even in his own time, the Two Truths were 
acknowledged to be an issue of considerable debate. There is therefore some evidence 
that the theme of Mi pham's sa bcad does not merely reflect the concerns of his own day 
(i. e. the 19th century) but may also reflect those of ýRnLarakýita's time. 
In summary, one can show that other Madhyamikas prior to ýdntarakýita had brought 
together Madhyamaka with logic, as well as Yogac5ra and Madhyamaka ideas; and 
furthermore that an established way of integrating other Buddhist views with Madhya- 
maka was to accept them conventionally while denying them ultimately. Given the ante- 
cedents, tdntarakýita's thought must be understood within the context of a continuing 
tradition. However, it would be fair to say that nobody before ýdntarakýita had applied 
this model to the relationship of Yog5cara and Madhyamaka in general. He inherited 
some fundamental ideas and methodologies from his predecessors, particularly from 
Ridnagarbha, and the uniqueness of his innovation lies not only in the way he applied 
them to new domains and new issues, " but in the way he links these various elements 
together within the framework of a much bigger picture. In 95ntar*ita, the synthesis 
between Madhyamaka and Yogacara is not so much on the level of 'this detail' or 'that 
term', it is a sweeping and overarching union of the two as systems. 
98In SDVV 19, Jfidnagarbha quotes: "What is ultimate for one person is relative for another, just as one 
person's mother is another person's wife. " gzhan gyi don dam byas gang yin// de ni gzhan gyi kun rdzob 
ste// gzhan gyi mar'dod gang yin de// gzhan gyi chung mar'dod pa bzhin// gantarakýi&s commentary on 
this attributes the verse to NaOrjuna, and glosses it as referring respectively to Yogacarms and Madhya- 
rnikas. (Eckel 1987: 137 n. 101). We cannot infer that this was JfidnagarbhSs own understanding of the 
quotation, since it appears at the end of a section in which the SDV addresses questions of logic. 
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111.4.7 Vedanta 
ýanLarakýita's work also stands at a crossroads in relation to the development of Ved5nLa 
as an Indian philosophical school. Although the word'Vedantais very old and is found, 
for instance, in the Magavad GTtP where it undoubtedly referred to the Upaniýads, 100 
the oldest use of the term to denote a systematic school of thought is in Bh5vaviveka's 
MHK in which he devotes the eighth chapter to a refutation of that view. Vedanta is not 
mentioned by Buddhist scholars prior to this, and indeed there are no extant Vedanta 
works prior to Bhdvaviveka that could provide evidence of its earlier existence, although 
the school was flourishing in his time, that is, in the early part of the sixth century. '()' Ile 
Yogacarin scholar Dharmap5la, a contemporary of Bh5vaviveka, refutes the idea of a 
oneness of self which is prominent in VedZinta, but does not investigate Veddntic thought 
systematically. ' ()2 It is not until kntar*ita that a comprehensive refutation is found in 
the TS, and subsequently in Kamalasila's TSP. 1c" It is certainly significant that it was only 
after the publication of these two works that Buddhist refutations of Vedanta became 
frequent-in texts by AvalokitavraLa, Jfilinagn-lbhadra and Ratnakirti for example. 104 This 
reflects the fact that the influence of Vedanta greatly increased after tdntarakýita with the 
work of tafikara whose active period post-dated that of tdntarakýita probably by about 
forty years. 105 When ýAntarakýita refuted Vedanta, therefore, whether in the TS or in the 
MAL, he was referring primarily to the work of Gaudapdda, and not to that of 8aAkara. 
99Bhagavad GWI, 15.5: sarvasya cAham hrdi samnivisto mattah smrtir jfiAnam apohanaqi ca/ vedaig ca 
sarvair aham eva vedyo vedAntakTd ve&vid eva 
`cAham/ I dwell in the heart of everyone, memory, know- 
ledge and reason spring from me; I am known through the knowledge of all the Vedas, I make the Vedanta 
and I know the Veda. 
100J. A. B. van Buitenen (1981: 169 n5). 
IO'See A History of Early Vedanta Philosophy by H. Nakamura, 1983, pp. 214-217. 
102ibid., pp. 219-220. 
103See TS chapter VII. 
104See Nakamura (1983: 257-8) for details of these passages. 
1051he exact dates for 9&hkara are disputed. Nakamura examines in detail the dates of gahkara and his near 
contemporaries, and concludes that their respective active periods were as follows: gAntaraklita 680-740, 
Karnalas'lla 700-750, and ýafikara 700-750. 
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Given that the ideas explored by Vedanta scholars were characteristically prominent in 
ýdaarakýita's Lime and immediately afer him, and since the main themes of Veddnta are 
the notion of oneness and the ontological relationship between the one and the many, it 
may be no coincidence that ýdnLarakýita chose to use the neither one nor many argument 
in the MAL. After all, ýaftkara called his thought "the theory of non-difference" (abheda- 
dariana)106 and again "the denial of dualism" (dvaitavddapratiýedha) showing the per- 
ceived importance of the one and many theme. 107 Although the 'neither one nor many' 
argument was not in itself new in Buddhism, it may have seemed particularly apt for that 
time, and with hindsight its relevance in the context of Vedanta, and of ýafikara's Advaita 
Vedanta, is remarkable. 
IH. 5 Literary sourccs 
In accordance with our previous analysis, we will now review the main scriptural sources 
on which kntarakýita drew in composing the MAL. He does not refer to any text by 
name in this work, nor does he make any explicit quotations, yet the educated reader is 
able to make a number of connections. In this, we are assisted by quotations in the vrTti as 
well as in the pafijika and Mi pham's commentary. Ichig6 (1985: 341-347) has drawn up a 
table of the textual references relating to the MAL given in the vrtti and the paiijika; these 
include both scriptures and idstras. 
According to Ichig6's analysis, the scripture most frequently referred or alluded to is the 
Lafikdvatdra Satra (27 references). No other scripture is referred to with anything like 
this frequency. Other related sritric sources are: the Buddhiivatwhsaka Satra (1 reference); 
the Daiabhamika Satra (I reference); the Hastikaks . ya 
Satra (2 references); the Pitdputra- 
106Brahmasiitra, Vol. II, p. 209, line 10, cited in Nakamura (1983: 119). 
107Brahmasatra Voll., p. 279, line 8 in Nakamura (1983: 124, n. 41). 
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samagama Satra (4 references); the Ratndkara Siltra (I reference); the 
RaInameghasalra 
(4 references); the Suttanipita (1 reference); the Sigarandgaridjaparip! -cchd Satra (I 
reference); the Samadhiraja Satra (5 references); the Uddnavarga (I reference); and the 
Vajracchedika (2 references). In his commentary on the MAL, Mi pharn refers to several 
scriptures in order to elucidate the text: the Lajikdvatdra Satra, the Samadhir'dja Satra, 
the CandrapradTpa Satra, the Sarhdhininnocana Siltra, the Buddh4vatathsaka Si4ra, the 
Lalitavistara Utra, the Ratnamegha Satra, the Pitiputrasamdgama Siltra, the Prajild- 
pdramitd Satras, and the Akdayamatipariprcchd Satra. In summary, the two main scrip- 
tural sources that are directly relevant to the MAL are the Lafikdvatdra and Samddhirdja 
Satras, and Mi pharn makes the point that these represent authoritative scriptures of the 
Yogac5ra and Madhyamaka schools respectively, showing that 
tantaraks-ita was drawing 
from both traditions. 10' ' 
The MAL appears to be far more closely connected with the textual tradition of the 
dastras than with the scriptures themselves. Amongst these, there were clearly a number 
of masters whose works were seen as especially significant. Nagýuna, for example, is 
referred to many Limes through the MMK, the Yuktisagikd, the 
ganyatdsaptati and the 
Vigrahaiydvartanr. Dharmaldrti, too, is a conscious source with respect to his Pramj"- 
varttika (24 references are noted by Ichig6). Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakofa and bhdaa 
give rise to 18 references. We should also note that the MAL can be related to Axyadeva's 
Catuýdataka, Candraldrti's Prasannapadd, and Jfi5nagarbha's SDV andqui. Cross- 
references can also be made with the TS and TSP. 
IOBV p. 16. Considering the question of how the text should be classified, Mi pham notes that since there are 
only two kinds of satras, CittarnAtra and Madhyamaka Atras, and since the MAL refers to both, it is a 
conunentary on the entire Mah5yAna doctrine. mKhan po Pal Idan shes rab adds that the classification of a 
lastra depends on the kind of satra on which it is based. 
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In addition, several references to non-Buddhist authors are acknowledged. The main ones 
are the Md, ýdakyakdrikd by Gauqap5da (13 references), and the 91okavdrttika by 
Kumdrila Bhatta (10 references). The Vaiiefika Sfitra by Kakidda and its iýrtti by 
Candrdnanda are also attributed 4 references. Vy5sa's Yogabhds . ya 
is referred to once. 
For the literary sources mentioned above we are indebted to Ichig6's research, which has 
been supplemented by our own reading of Mi pham. However, this study does relate 
specific passages in the MAL with other works not mentioned here, and in particular to 
those of Asafiga, Bhdvaviveka, Sthiramati and Dharmap5la. Even though explicit mention 
may not be made of such authors by ý5ntarakýita or his commentators, it is understood 
that their works would have been part of ýZintarak§ita's own knowledge of his tradition, 
and that they therefore constitute legitimate doctrinal references. 
1H. 6 Summary 
ýantarakýita composed the MAL in northeastern India towards the end of the 8th century. 
He was heir to a rich corpus of philosophical thought developed by both Buddhist and 
non-Buddhist scholars for over one thousand years, and his own writings are both a 
reflection of this legacy and a contribution to the broad tradition. As a contribution to the 
Indian tradition of public debates, he followed the lead of Bh5vaviveka and the Jain Hari- 
bhadra, and substantially clarified the differences between the various philosophical 
views in India in his TS. Moreover, he was influenced by the 8th century tendency to 
bring together distinct Buddhist threads into new coherent systems. In the MAL, he 
followed the lead of his teacher Ridnagarblia in combining the two Mah5y? ina vehicles of 
Madhyamaka and Yog5cara, and at the same time he followed the lead of Bhavaviveka 
and Ridnagarblia. in assimilating logic and epistemology into Madhyamaka. If kaarak- 
ýita is recognized by Tibetan doxographers as the founder of the Yog5c5ra-SWitantrika- 
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Madhyamaka tenet system, it is not because he is considered to be the master who first 
expressed its ideas but the one who elaborated it into a fully fledged system. 
109 
The main questions that ýantarakýita addressed in the MAL represent the broad range of 
subjects with which Mahayana as a whole had been concerned since its inception. These 
include, in particular, questions debated between Mahayana and so-called Hinayana 
scholars (for instance, the theory of indivisible particles, the existence of self or pudgala), 
and between Mah5y5na scholars and non-Buddhists (the self or atman, the process of per- 
ception). Questions that had been discussed internally within the Mahayana were debated 
either within the Madhyamaka school (the meaning of Onyata, the Two Truths), within 
the Yogfic5ra school (the nature of perception, for example the dispute between sdkdra- 
vadins and nirakdravadins), or between the Madhyamaka and Yogacara schools (the 
meaning of Sanyatil, the existence and nature of consciousness). The MAL therefore pro- 
vides a comprehensive treatment of the entire range of key Buddhist topics. 
Before examining in detail the way that ýdntaraksita addresses his topics, it is necessary 
to look at the method he uses. Indeed, the MAL is well-known for its unprecedented use 
of the 'neither one nor many' argument (ekdnekaviyogahetu) to refute the entire range of 
topics addressed, and we have already noted the perceived importance of logic in the text. 
Studying the use of this argument in the MAL will serve as a good example of how tanta- 
rakýita took established features in Buddhist discourse, in this case a logical method 
developed by Mddhyamikas, and gave them new significance simply by deploying them 
in new ways. 
1091n fact Tibetans recognize that many of 9Intar*ita! s ideas were also expressed by Arya VimukLisena 
even though he is not credited with founding the school. A similar case applies to the relationship between 
BuddhapWita and Candraldrti. See Kangyur Rinpoche (2001: 326, n. 282). ]Further research is needed to 







CHAPTER FOUR THE PHILOSOPHICAL CONTEXT 
OF MI PHAM'S COMMENTARY 
TV. 1 Understanding Mi pham's cornmentarial lens 
Since we will use Mi pham's commentary to help us analyse ýdntarak§ita's text, it is 
important to be aware that Mi pham's own historical and philosophical context was quite 
different to that of ýdntar*ita. Mi pharn (1846-1912) lived in 19th-century Tibet, that is, 
in a culture other than that of India, and some one thousand years later than the author of 
the MAL. This Chapter will therefore briefly set out the main doctrinal influences which 
shaped Mi pham's thinking so that, in later Chapters, we are better able to appraise 
Mi pham's critical understanding of the MAL. As the main subject of this thesis is the 
philosophy of ýdntarakýita rather than that of Mi pham himself, this contextualisation can 
only be brief. 
IV. 2 IdentifMng the main doctrinal influences on Mi pham 
When Buddhism became firmly established in Tibet in the 8th century C. E., it reached 
that country from three primary source-areas. The main influence was that of Indian 
Buddhism, represented in the Tibetan histories by the work and contribution of tdntarak- 
Ota. The other two sources of Buddhism to be integrated at this early stage were from 
Central Asia and China respectively. ' This historically complex picture of early 
Buddhism is reflected in the key doctrines that came to characterize Tibetan Buddhism 
ffirough the centuries. Thus, in addition to the Indian traditions of pramdna (tshad ma), 
Madhyarnaka (dbU ma), Cittarnatra (sems tsam) and Abhidharina (clws mngon pa), 
Buddhism in Tibet incorporates the tantric scriptural corpus upon which Vajray5na or 
'Evidence for this is to be found amongst the Dun huang manuscripts. See Snellgrove (1987: 362 and 402). 
Dun Huang itself was a major centre of Chinese Buddhism. 
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Mantraydna is based. Indeed, one of the main objectives of all major Tibetan authors of 
both rNying ma and gSar ma schools - up to and including Mi pham - is, in one way or 
another, to situate the theory and practice of VajrayAna within dialectical and philo- 
sophical discourse, and vice versa. 2A further doctrinal influence in Tibet is that of the 
rDzogs chen or Great Perfection teachings, particularly important for rNying ma pas who 
consider them to be the essence of all Buddhist teachings, and the exprcssion of the 
highest truth? An additional objective of rNying ma pa authors such as kLong chenpa and 
Mi pharn is therefore to clarify the relation of rDzogs chen to the other yanas and philo- 
sophical systemsý 
Tibetan Buddhism evolved into four main schools - rNying ma, bKargyud, Sa skya and 
dGe lugs. There is a general tendency to emphasize the differences between these schools, 
yet they share an enormous amount in commoný For example, they all follow the Mdla- 
Sarv5stiv5da vinaya, they all share the same philosophical and liturgical corpus, and they 
all present a gradual path to enlightenment that incorporates practices of both s5tra and 
tantra systems. From a doctrinal point of view, it is particularly important to mention that 
all four schools agree that the mind is of the nature of clear light. Powers (1995: 316) 
notes: 
All posit various levels of mind that are differentiated in terms of relative coarse- 
ness or subtlety, and all agree that the most subtle and basic level of mind is of the 
nature ofpure luminosity and emptiness. 
Each school, however, has different terms for it and teaches different ways of realizing it. 
As the present Dalai Lama states: 
This innate fundamental mind of clear light is emphasized equally in the Highest 
Tettit (1999: 91). 
3For a discussion of the origins of rDzogs chen and its development in Met see Dudjom Rinpochc (1991: 
531-598); Karmay (1988), Powers (1995: 319-345) and Patit, (1999: 77-84). 
Tettit (1999.93). 
Towers (1995: 313). 
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Yoga Tantra systems of the New Translation Schools and in the Nying ma system 
of the Great Perfection, and is the proper place of comparison of the old and new 
schools. 6 
Of course, there are also important differences between the schools, and it is these that 
tended to emerge in the doctrinal debates between monastic colleges and in the commen- 
taries of Tibetan authors. These debates, and the issues they raised, set the agenda, as it 
were, for Buddhist thinking, and this was certainly the case for Mi pham. Not only did Mi 
pham. enjoy a privileged historical vantage point, being heir to around a thousand years of 
Tibetan scholastic exegesis as well as one a half thousand years of Buddhist thought in 
India, but in addition he was fully trained in the scholastic and meditational traditions of 
all four schools of Tibetan Buddhism. As a result, he was directly influenced by a broad 
spectrum of authors, and especially by Tsong kha pa (1357-1419) and his followers; by 
the Sa skya scholars Go ram pa bSod narns seng ge (1429-1489)7 and Sa skya mChog 
Man (1427-1508); and by his immediate rNying ma teachersJam mgon kong sprul blo 
gros mtha'yas (1813-1899) and 'Jam dbyangs mkhyen rtse dbang po (1820-1892). 
Both the latter teachers were leading figures in the Ecumenical or Non-Sectarian Move- 
ment (ris med) that flourished around sDe dge, in the eastern Tibetan region of Kham, in 
the 19th century. 8 Mi pham. was their student and colleague, and was himself engaged in 
this Non-Sectarian approach to Buddhist traditions. Also active in this movement were 
mChog 'gyur gling pa (1829-1870) and dPal sprul 0 rgyanjig med chos kyi dbang po 
(1808-1887). The activity of these scholars was prodigious. They compiled texts from 
disparate traditions in large collections in order to facilitate the preservation of rare 
6Kindness, Clarity and Insight, p. 208- 
Wthough Mi pham does not make any explicit mention of Go ram pa in his Nges shes rin po chei sgron 
me, Pettit (1999: 136) believes one can show several points of influence. 
BSee Pettit (1995: 97ff. ) and Ringu Tulku (1995). In the 19th century, rNying ma monasteries relied mainly 
on dGe lugs pa textbooks. 
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lineages that were in danger of being lost. They also wrote commentaries on major 
Buddhist works, and clarifications and explanations of many aspects of the Dharma. One 
of Mi pham's contributions to this effort was to write textbooks (yig cha) at the request of 
'Jam dbyangs mkhycn rste dbang po specifically for the rNying ma traditioný In fact his 
commentary on ýdntarakýita's MAL is one of these. The overall objective of Mi pham's 
mission was to elucidate the unique features of rNying ma doctrine and the Great Perfec- 
tion teachings, and to help prepare students for the Great Perfection which, for rNying ma 
pas, is the pinnacle of vehicles. 
In summary, then, the key difference between the influences affecting 
8antaraksita and 
those bearing upon Mi pham, is that when writing a treatise on Madhyamaka Mi pham set 
out to clarify, either explicitly or implicitly, the relation between Madhyamak-a, Vajraydna 
and rDzogs chen. This does not appear to have been the case for 
tantaraklita who was 
more concerned with showing the relation between Madhyamaka, Cittamatra and 
pramatta 
IV. 3 Doctrinal disputes 
As we mentioned above, the debates that had taken place between Tibetan scholars over 
the centuries effectively set the philosophical agenda for Mi pham insofar as he addressed 
issues of contention that had already been identified before him. Tsong kha pa's Eight 
Great Difficult Points (dka'bai gnad chen po brgyad) are an instance of this. In brief, 
these points are: 1) refutation of the relative existence of the d1qyavij'n-4na; 2) negation 
that things exist by way of their own characteristics; 3) acceptance of external objects; 
4) negation of syllogistic proof (svalantra; rang rgyud); 5) refutation of rcflcxivc aware- 
9Pettit (1999: 99). 
Q4 
ness (svasaýnvitti, rang rig); 6) affirmation that grAvakas and pratyekabuddhas fuUy 
realize both forms of selflessness; 7) the definition of the apprehension of true existence 
and its tendencies as emotional obscurations (kledavara? ta; nyon mongs kyi sgrib pa), and 
the tendencies of deluded dualistic perception as cognitive obscurations (jfieydvaraýza; 
shes byai sgrib pa); and 8) the explanation of how buddhas are aware of the mistaken 
perceptions of sentient beings without themselves being subject to them. 
From the following Chapters of this study, it will be apparent that Mi pham addresses a 
significant number of Tsong kha pa's Points in his commentary on the MAL. In particular, 
he examines the alayavijOna, the acceptance of external objects, the negation of syHogis- 
tic proof, the nature of rang rig, and the relation between emotional and cognitive ob- 
scurations. Given Mi pham's particular philosophical context, it is not unreasonable to 
infer that the reason that these issues are taken up by Mi pham has less to do with their 
perceived importance for ýdntarakýita, and rather more to do with their perceived impor- 
tance for him and his scholarly contemporaries. 
Furthermore, it is generally the case that many of the doctrinal disputes in Tibet stemmed 
from the different definitions given to ultimate reality by scholars of different schools, 
and, consequently, from the various ways they had of distinguishing between ultimate and 
relative truths. 10 The questions raised include: whether emptiness is the only definitive 
teaching or not; whether the logical character of emptiness, that is, emptiness understood 
as an absolute negation, is adequate; whether emptiness means 'emptiness of self 
(rang stong) or'emptiness of othee (gzhan stong); and whether the relative can be validly 
cognized. The importance of these questions to Tibetan scholars up to and including those 
IOSee. for example, Pettit (1999: 103). 
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who were Mi phanfs contemporaries, may help to explain why, in the sa bcad to his 
commentary on the MAL, Mi pham, chose to identify the main theme of the MAL as "The 
Way [of Distinguishing] the Two Truths" (bden gnyis kyi tshul). In this respect he broke 
from the commentarial tradition established in tdntarakýita'ssvli and in Kamala§I-Ws 
pahjika where the main theme is identified as the claim that "all dharma-s have neither a 
unitary nor a multiple nature". " Once again, it can be argued that Mi pham's choice was 
governed by his view of what was important in his own Tibetan context, while kntarak- 
ýita's and Kamalani a's immediate concerns were quite different. 
JV. 4 Mi pharn's position within the rNying. ma school 
It is a claim of this thesis that by exploring the interpretation of the MAL developed by 
Mi pham we are thereby establishing a connection between tdntarakýita and the rNying 
ma school as a whole. Such a statement requires clarification. 
The rNying ma pas or Ancient Ones trace the origins of their tradition back to 8th century 
Tibet and particularly to Padmasambhava, Vimalamitra and ýdntarakýita. 12 rNying ma pas 
share a common scriptural corpus, and in particular, in addition to the corpus common to 
other Tibetan schools, they accept a separate Tantric canon (mying ma 7 rgyud 'bum) 
compiled in the fifteenth century by Ratna Lingpa. Another characteristic of the rNying 
ma school is that it accepts the Great Perfection (rDzogs chen) teachings as its highcst 
teachings. According to rDzogs chen, reality (dltarmatd; chos nyid) is not an object of 
verbal expression or conceptual analysis; it is beyond conccptualisation of any kind. 
Reason has a soteriological role, but this role has limits in creating religious meaning. 
"See the detailed discussion of this point in Chapter 111.2 above. 
12See Dudjorn Rinpoche (1991: 5(flff. ); Powers (1995: 319-345); Snellgrove (1988); Pettit (1999: 74ff). 
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Being and knowing are not different in ultimate truth; indeed, reality and enlightenment 
are identical, that is to say that ultimate truth embraces the subjectivity of the one who 
realizes it. Furthermore, relative and ultimate truths are not ultimately separate; the 
highest realization is that of the coalescence or union (yuganaddha, zung jug) of relative 
and ultimate. 
However, John Pettit (1999: 98-100) argues that rNying ma scholars do not share a 
common doctrinal approach in terms of Madhyamaka analysis. For example, Rong zom 
Pajý4ita (I I th- 1 2th century) says that Yogac5ra Madhyamaka is the most important school 
of Madhyamaka (the other being that of Bh5vaviveka); 13 kLong chen pa does not appear 
to espouse the Yogacdra-Madhyamaka view 14 but Mi pham expresses sympathy for 
Yogac5ra-Madhyamaka in his commentary on the MAL. Likewise, rNying ma scholars 
are divided between those who are said to advocate the view of 'emptiness of other' 
(gzhan stong) and those who accept the 'emptiness of self (rang stong). It is therefore 
difficult to speak of "a rNying ma philosophy" or a "rNying ma view" as far as Madhya- 
maka is concerned. And in this respect at least, Mi pham's perspective on Madhyamaka, 
and on gdntarakýita in particular, cannot be considered to be representative of a common 
rNying ma ground. 
These arguments notwithstanding, it is undoubtedly correct to say that Mi pham's place in 
131n Rong zom's ITa ba7 bijed byang (1974: 209-210) it is stated that "the two Madhyamakas [i. e. mdo sde 
spyodpO dbu ma and mal 'byor spyodpO dbu ma] are dissimilar in their presentations of relative truth. 
With respect to [adequately presenting] the general systems of sfitra and tantra, the general method of logi- 
cal argument, and the writings of the root-MAdhyamikas NagArjuna and Aryadeva, the Yogicara Madhya- 
maka system seems to be more important". dbu ma mam pa gnyis kun rdzob kyi tshul mi mthun pa la/ lung 
dang rigs pa gang che ba ni rgyud dang mdo sde spyVi tshul dang/ rigs pa spyfi tshul dang/ dbu maI rnkhan 
po gzhung phyi mo mdzad pai slob dpon klu sgrub dang/ Arya de bai gzhung Itar na yang mal'byor spyod 
pa! i dbu ma! i gzhung don che bar snang ngo/ Cited by Pettit, op. cit., p. 90-91. 
14Most of kLong chen pa's writings on Madhyamaka are now lost, so our understanding of his view must be 
inconclusive. 
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the rNying ma school is today universally considered to be exceptionally authoritative. 
rNying ma pas have always given more importance to the tantric attainments of yogis and 
siddhas than they have to the niceties of intellectual debate, and it is the case that the 
rNying ma tradition has produced far fewer scholars of renown than other Tibetan 
schools. Accounts of the rNying ma school name just a small number of outstanding 
scholars: Rong zorn Paýi4ita, kLong chen pa, Lo chen Dharmagri (1654-1717), 'Jam mgon 
kong sprul, and Mi pham himself. Even amongst these luminaries Mi pham. is 
exceptional in that his scholarship is renowned in other traditions as well as his own. 15 So 
although it cannot be claimed that Mi pham's view is an instance of some 'orthodW 
rNying ma view on Madhyamaka, it is fair to say that his writings form the basis of study 
in contemporary rNying ma colleges, and that many of today's TNying ma masters con- 
sider Mi pharn to be one of the most brilliant and lucid authorities of their school to date. 
15Pettit (1999: 182). 
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PART TWO 
"NEITHER ONE NOR MANY" 
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CHAPTER FIVE THEWEITHER ONE 
NOR MANY'ARGUMENT 
V. 1 Introduction 
Having reviewed the context in which the Madlzyamakdlaýnkdra was composed, it is now 
time to turn to the text itself. Our examination falls into two main parts. In the present 
Chapter we analyse the first verse and by so doing uncover many philosophical principles 
that underlie the body of the treatise. Then in Chapters VINIII, we consider the way 
Adntarakýita refutes his various opponents by looking in detail at verses 2-63. Finally, in 
Chapter IX, we consider Adntarakýita's approach to the Two Truths. 
The first verse of the MAL is striking. It encapsulates the theme of the entire treatise. Not 
only that, it introduces what is the only fundamental argument used in the MAL, the 
argument on which the work is based. The first verse reads: 
Those entities asserted [as real] by ourselves [i. e. Buddhists] and others 
have in reality no intrinsic nature 
because they have neither a unitary nor a multiple nature 
like a reflection. 
bdag dang gzhan smrai dngos 'di dag11 yang dag tu na gcig pa dang11 
du mai rang bzhin bral bai phyirll rang bzhin med de gzugs bmyan bzhin11 
The argument in question is usually termed 'the neither one nor many' argument (gcig du 
bral gyi gtan tshigs; ekanekaviyogahetu). 1 It is just one of a range of logical arguments 
deployed by Mddhyamikas, and rests on the premiss that if an entity truly exists, it must 
be either unitary in nature, or it must have several parts, with no possible third alternative. 
By means of a systematic examination (in verses 2-60) of all the phenomena that are held 
to be truly existent either by Buddhists or non-Buddhists, the conclusion is reached that 
Me Sanskrit and Tibetan terms are given by Tillemans (1982: 103). 
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no entity can be found that has a unitary nature. The corollary (verses 61-62) is straight- 
forward: since multiplicity requires the existence of ones, if ones do not truly exist then 
multiple entities doet either. It follows that no entities cart be found that truly exist. 
This first verse has already received considerable attention from modem scholars. In 
particular, Tom Tillemans (1982: 103-128; 1983: 305-320; 1984: 357-388; and 1999: 247- 
284) has studied the classic dGe lugs pa interpretations of this argument in the MAL 
chiefly in relation to logical considerations. Lopez (1987: 167-191; 345-379) presents a 
broader analysis of the argument based largely on lCang skya's Presentation of Tenets, 
another dGe lugs pa interpretation. Eckel (1987: 15-23) has considered some of the prcce- 
dents for 85ntarakýita's use of the argument and placed it in the historical context of the 
development of Indian Madhyamaka. The studies by Ichig6 (1985,1989) and Kajiyama 
(1978: 114-143) also review the main features of the argument according to both the v. rvi 
and Kamalagila's paiijiW. And Lipman (1979: 4-8) provides a brief explication of the 
verse in terms of Pr5saýi ika and SWitantrika views on logic. .9 
The works of all these scholars are directly relevant to any study of tAntaraksita, and 
indeed they cannot be overlooked if one seeks a thorough understanding of him. Never- 
theless, the present chapter will not critically review them in detail for several reasons. 
First, the overall aim of this study is to explore Mi pham's commentary and associated 
rNying ma readings of kntar*ita, and these therefore have been given priority over 
dGe lugs pa sources and their related literature. Naturally, this basic principle does not 
preclude the inclusion of some of these debates at appropriate points of the discussion. 
Second, the emphasis of Mi pham's commentary is not so much on the logical aspects of 
the MAL but on its philosophical and soteriological aspects, so the present study will by 
led by his choice of topics. This approach is not as frequent among the dGc lugs pa 
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commentators whose treatises have given rise to contemporary research, and this may 
account for why the authors cited above are usually more concerned with logic than with 
metaphysics when they analyse the first verse of the MAL. The present chapter will com- 
plement the research previously carried out. The approach taken here in no way implies 
that logic is not important, or that the studies published hitherto have no interest; rather, it 
is building on, and benefiting from, the work already completed. 
It has not been widely acknowledged that there is a tension between the logical and meta- 
physical aspects of ýdntarakýita's use of this argument, so the choice of approach is not 
merely arbitrary. The tension arises from differences in the formulation of what it means 
to be a SvRantrika. Some criteria defining Svdtantrika-Madhyamaka in Tibetan doxology 
concern the particular use of logical methods, while other criteria relate to philosophical 
views, especially around the nature of liberation and buddhahood, the distinction between 
the Two Truths, and the meaning of 'true existence'. Some of these debates were presen- 
ted in Chapter 1. By exploring these themes, we will therefore be led to consider precisely 
in what way gdntarakýita can be considered a Svdtantrika. 
V. 2 Logical grounds for categorizing glintaraMita as a Syfitantrika 
For dGe lugs pa scholars, the primary criterion for characterizing any scholar as a SvA- 
tantrika is a logical one: Sviitantrika-Madhyamikas use autonomous syllogisms (svatantra 
prayoga) as a soteriologically necessary form of argument. Indeed, it is from this logical 
method that the name of the school is derived as was made clear in Chapter Ill. This 
aspect of the MAL has already been intensively studied. 2 It emerges that if logical 
grounds are the basis for the Sv5tantrika-Priisafigika distinction, then classification of the 
MAL as a Svdtantrika work is uncertain. This is because it is unclear whether the 'neither 
2See Tiflemans (1983); Lopez (1987: 55-81; 160-191). 
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one nor many' argument is used in the MAL as an autonomous syllogism (Svatantra pra- 
yoga; rang rgyud kyi sbyor ba) or as a consequence (prasajiga; thal `gyur). 
Prasafiga is defined by Mokýdkaragupta as a "reasoning for bringing out an absurd con- 
clusion which is undesirable to the opponent". 
' one illustration of which is "when we 
deduce the plurality of a universal, when it is admitted [by the opponent] that a single 
universal (sdindnya) abides in many individuals. "4 This method therefore points out 
absurdities in the opponenfs own argument without thereby putting forward any other 
viewpoint and requires that the opponent holds the assertion which is shown to be absurd. 
Svatantra prayoga is not a term used by MokýRkaragupta, writing in around II th century, 
who analyses various types of syllogism but does not consider any of thcm'autonomou! e. 
Its Tibetan equivalent (rang rgyud kyi sbyor ba) was coined subsequently by dGc lugs pa 
doxographers, and is a complex term denoting not only the logical aspects of syllogistic 
use but also the particular dGe lugs view of what is meant by relatives existence in the 
works of so-called Svdtantrika authors. This view lies behind mKon mchogjig med 
dbang po's definition of a SvAtantrika as "a proponent of non-entityness (ngo bo nyid med 
pa; niýsvabhjvatd) who asserts that phenomena exist by their own character convcn- 
tionally (tha snyad du)"ý From the logical point of view, the characteristic of a svatantra 
3Tarkabh4pi 48.11. Translation by Kajiyama (1989: 114). 
4ibid. 48.15; in Kajiyama (1989: 117). 
Me terms saMriisatya and kun rdwb bden pa have been translated in this study as 'relative truth follow- 
ing Lindtner, although Eda, Guenther, Matilal, Newland and others translate it asconvcntionar truth. The 
reason for this preference is that it then enables us to use the term 'convcntionar specifically to designate the 
truth of everyday transactions as seen by a buddha, and as used by a buddha in terms of communicating 
through language and so on. This must be distinguished from the truth of everyday transactions as it is seen 
by deluded beings afflicted with avidya, even if pramdýa is involved and even though there is prima facie 
agreement between the two. 
The English term'rclative does not unfortunately convey all the connotations of the Sanskrit and Tibetan 
words. Candraldrti (Prasannapada 493) suggests three possible meanings of the Sanskrit: (i) complete 
covering or the'screen' of ignorance which hides truth (this is the meaning taken over in the Tibetan term); 
(ii) existence or origination through dependence; (iii) worldly behaviour or speech behaviour involving 
designation and designatum. All three reflect different aspects of saýniýrti. See Matilal (1973: 57). 
There are many studies in the research literature on the Two Truths. For detailed analysis see for example: 
Lindtncr (1981); Sprung (1973); Newland (1992 and 1999); Cabcz6n (1992); Murti (1960: 228-255). 
6Sopa and Hopkins (1989: 282). 
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prayoga is that the logical subject is accepted by both sides of the debate, and not merely 
by the opponent! This implies that the Sv5tantrika expresses his/her own point of view as 
well as the opponent's; and, of course, this itself entails that the Sviitantrika has a point of 
view to express. This can be problematic on account of the principle upheld by Ndg'Rjuna 
that no authentic M5dhyamika can or should properly hold a truly existent view (tksp). 
8 
This is why PrAsafigikas prefer prasafiga arguments. 
There are two factors that determine the type of argument used in the MAL: the incidence 
of the phrase yang dag tu (meaning 'in ultimate reality') in the second line of the verse; 
and the issue of whether or not the opponent himself holds that the truly existent entity 
that he posits within his system is unitary. The former is held to be a defining characteris- 
tic of Svdtantrika-Madhyamaka. 
[Svdtantrikas] accept a qualifier (khyad par; vigeýaiýa) to the negative or aff-Irma- 
tive assertions (dam bca'; pratijfid) [they make] by means of the three independent 
reasons (rtags; hetu), of the three arguments (tshad ma; pram4a) and of the two 
consequences (thal ba; prasahga). 9 
The example of a Sv5tantrika qualifier given in the bLo gsal grub mtha'is "in ultimate 
truth (don dam par; paramarthatas)", and this is indeed the sense of the qualifier we find 
in verse 1 of the MAL. In this respect, then, the 'neither one nor many' argument is used 
in accordance with SvAtantrika practice. Treated as a syllogism the argument can be 
analysed as follows: 
7Ngag dbang dpal Idan's Annotations (mChan 'grel) on'Jarn dbyangs bzhad pa! s Grub mtha'chen mo. dbu 
27b. 5-28a. l. Cited by Lopez (1987: 75). 
8MMK XXVII. 30. "I bow to Gautama, who through compassion taught the true doctrine which leads to the 
relinquishing of all views. " sarvadrýoprah4aya yaý saddharmamadegayat/ anukamp5inupadaya tarp nama- 
syImi gautamarp// 
9bLo gsal grub mtha, XH-9. In Mimaki (1982: 174-5). rang rgyud rtags gsurn tshad ma, gnyis, // thal ba gnyis 
kyis dgag sgrub kyifl dam bca! la ni khyad par bzhed// 
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subJect (dhannin, chos can) dngosdi dag 
predicate (Whyadhanna; bsgrub bya7 chos) yang dag tu rang bzhin med'o 
reason (lifiga; rtags) gcig pa dang du ma7i rang bzhin 
bral ba7i phyir 
example (ikganta; dpe) gzugs brnyan bzhin 
The second issue is whether or not the opponent considers that the logical subject is 
unitary. " Kamalani a 12 , lCang skya 
13 and Mi pharn 14 all agree that if opponents do not 
assert this explicitly, they do so by implication. They therefore conclude it is acceptable 
to consider the 'neither one nor many' argument in the MAL as an instance of prasajiga. 
Both lCang skya15 and Mi pharn 16 find the best solution to this whole logical dilemma is 
to say that the argument in the MAL can be understood either as a valantra prayoga or 
as a prasajiga. This means that in terms of its use of logic, the MAL does not fit neatly 
into either the SvAtantrika or the Prasafigika school. Consequently, if the logical grounds 
for ýdntarak§ita's status as a Svdtantrika are inconclusive, his position with regard to the 
philosophical viewpoints ascribed to SvAtantrikas on the basis of their use of syllogism X -- 
IOIt is not clear grammatically whether yang dag tu qualifies the predicate or the reason or both. From the 
point of view of its meaning, I would argue that it must qualify both since if things do not inherently and 
ultimately exist it is because they are found not to be units ultimately and not to have ultimately existing 
parts. 
"This question raises the technical problem known as tUraydsiddha Cunestablished basis! ), where an argu- 
ment is judged invalid on the grounds that its subject (dharmin, chos can) is non-existent because it is 
asserted neither by the M5&yamika nor by his opponent. The issue is addressed by Nlgkjuna in his 
VigrahavyavartanrXII-XIII (in Johnston and Kunst, p. 13). See Tillemans (1984); also 'What can one 
Reasonably Say about Nonexistence? by Tom Tillemans and Donald S. Lopez, in Scripture, logic and 
Language by Tom Tillemans, Wisdom Publications, Boston, 1999, pp. 247-294. 
12In Lopez (1987: 360). 'Mese things asserted by ourselves and others... " in ýAntarakjita7s Afadhyarnaka- 
tal"ra may be taken either as a statement of refutation-a consequence (prasa4ga, thal `gyur)-or as a 
statement of proof-a syllogism (prayoga, sbyor ba). " Madhyarnakaloka. 
lylbe Svatantrika chapter of lCang skya! s Presentation of Tenets, in Lopez (1987: 360-1). 
14C p. 129. 
15 See Lopez (1987: 360). 
16C p. 129. rgya bod kyi mkhas pa la las gzhan stes brtags pa ma grags pa la thal bar sgrub pa dang/ grags pa! i 
ngo bo mams la gnyis ka Itar yang rung gsungs kyang/ dbu ma snang ba sogs las ba shad pa Itar khyad 
phye mi dgos par thal rang gang Itar bkod kyang rung ngo// "[Some] scholars of India and Tibet have ex. 
plained that the less important imputations of other schools [can be) established by means of consequences 
(thal bar), and that both arguments are appropriate for [establishing] the most important entities. Yet. as it is 
taught in the MadhyaniakiVoka and other [texts), no such distinction is necessary and both consequences 
(thal) and autonomous syllogisms (rang) arc appropriate. " Mi pham has argued that the first verse of the 
MAL is valid either as a prasaAga or as a syllogism, but adds that both types of argument are suitable for 
the purposes of refuting the entities selected in the MAL. One can therefore take them as either with no 
hidden soteriological implications. 
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becomes equally inconclusive. So any determining evidence for his philosophical views 
will have to be sought elsewhere. 
It can be argued that this very inconclusiveness militates in favour of a definition of Sv5- 
tantrika which does not insist that the use of a logical method necessarily entails a parti- 
cular soteriology and metaphysics. Given that 85ntarakýita must hold a particular philo- 
sophical view, and given the uncertain interpretation of the form of logic he employed, it 
follows that svatantra prayoga and prasahga cannot in themselves necessarily entail 
mutually exclusive view ints. If we recall that at the time of writing ýAntaraksita was PO 
unaware of any Sviitantrika-Pr5safigika distinction, the question about logical forms and 
their implications would not have occurred to him. This might help to corroborate Mi 
pham's understanding of SvAtantrika-Madhyamaka outlined in Chapter I, that its main 
characteristic is not its logic but its metaphysics and soteriology, without any necessary 
relation between the two. 
V. 3 Situatine the use of this ar2ument in the MAL 
V. 3.1 The locus classicus of the 'neither one nor many argmment' 
It has been said that the 'neither one nor many' argument finds its locus classicus in ýdnta- 
rakýita's Madhyamakdlqnkdra. 17 It is one of several forms of reasoning used by Madhya- 
mikas to establish emptiness (danyatd), that is, the non-inherent existence of persons 
(pudgalanairdtmya) and the non-inherent existence of other phenomena (dhar? na- 
nairdtmya). In general, there are six main types of reasoning which are: 18 the diamond 
slivers or splinters (rdo rje gzegs =7 gtan tshigs, vajrakaVahetu), the refutation of pro- 
duction according to the extremes of existence and non-existence (yod med skye 'gog gi 
17TWemans (1982: 103). 
18See Tillemans (1984: 361); Hopkins (1983: 131-196). The Tibetan commentarial literature has several 
different ways of classifying these reasonings, so their number varies according to the author from five 
(Sera Chos kyi rgyal mtshan) to six (lCang skya and'Jarn dbyangs bzhad pa). 
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gtan tshigs; sadasadutpidapratiýedhahetu), the refutation of production of the four alter-_, 
natives (mu bzhi skye '909 9i 8tan tshigs; catulkolyutpidapratifedliahetu), the fivefold 
(mam Inga 7 rigs pa) and sevenfold (mam bdun gyi rigs pa) reasonings, and the reasoning 
based on dependent arising (rien 'brel gyi gtan Ishigs; pratTlyasamutpjdahetu). 
19 As for 
the 'neither one nor many' argument itself, this is categorized by 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa 
and lCang skya under'the refutation of production of the four altcrnativcs'ýO whereas Sera 
Chos kyi rgyal mtshan reserves that category for Ridnagafta's version of the argument, 
and lists tdntarak§ita's use of it as a separate category. The difference between them he 
identifies as being that kntar*ita analyses the nature of phenomena whereas Rana- 
garbha analyses cause and effect. 
In so far as danyald is co-terminous with dependent arising (pratTiyasamutpdda) '21 
it is 
logical that these should be the two main and equally important approaches to csta- 
blishing danyatd through reasoning. Non-inherent existence and conditioned existence are 
two sides of the same coin. 22 This view of danyata follows the MMK where Nd&juna's 
chief refutation of inherent existence is his refutation of causation in Chapter I and his 
assertion in Chapter XXIV, 19- "We explain dependent arising as cmptincss. -M 
19The terms for these reasonings appeared in Indian sources, in particular in Karnalafflis Afadhyamakajoka 
and in Atigas BodhiMJrgqpra&pqpaqjik4. See Tillemans (1984: 371-2, n. 16) for detailed references. 
Neither text is extant in the original Sanskrit, so this observation is based on the Tibetan translations of 
these Sanskrit texts. 
wMe main Indian source for this refutation is verse 14 of Jainagarbha7s SDV, cited below. See Hopkins 
(1983: 154-160). 
211Cang skya asserts that this is the view held by Svitantrikas. 'Even those Madhyamikas [the Svitantrikas] 
who assert existence by way of its own character (svalak4aýa, rang mishan) conventionally do not in any 
way assert that phenomena are truly established. Therefore, they explain the synonymity of dependent 
arising and emptiness that was explained above [in the citation of MMK XXIV. 18-19J. " Translation in 
Lopez (1987: 278). 
22"According to Madhyamaka, emptiness is identical in principle with causal relativity (pratrryasamutp4da) 
because a thing that exists inherently cannot be subject to change or have any causal relationship with other 
things. Conversely, whatever exists dependently is empty, and vice versa. " Pcttit (1999: 5 1). See also 
Hopkins (1983: 220). 
23yaý prafftyasamutpSdaý 9dnyatAM tAM pracaklmahe/ 
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V. 3.2 The precedents for this argument 
Although the first verse of the MAL is cited as a classic example of the 'neither one nor 
many' argument, it had actually been formulated well before ýdntaraksita's time. In fact, 
we find a blueprint for kntarak§ita's entire MAL project as early as the third century C. E. 
in verse 344 of Aryadeva's Catuý. fataka: 
When different things are examined 
None of them are unitary. 
Because they are not unitary 
Things are not multiple either. 24 
It is probably on account of the fact that Axyadeva does not fully develop or apply this 
verse as an argument that Eckel (1992: 22) cites the first known instance of the ekilnekavi- 
yogahetu as that found in the Tattvdvatdra, where grigupta writes: 
In reality everything, both inside and out, is empty, because it is neither unitary 
nor multiple, like a reflection. 25 
8agupta's disciple, Jfidnagarbha, may well have been inspired by this26 when he wrote 
verse 14 of his Satyadvayavibhatigakdrika: 
Multiple entities do not produce unitary [entities], 
multiple [entities] do not produce [other] multiple [entitiesL 
unitary [entities] do notproduce multiple entities, 
and unitary [entities] do not produce [other] unitary [entities]. 27 
As kntarakýita was a disciple of Jfi5nagarbha, his decision to use the ekanekaviyogahetu 
as his chief argument in the MAL can be seen as a development within this master- 
disciple 'lineage'. And this 'lineage' of influence continued after ýdntar*ita in the works 
of his own disciples, namely in Kamalani a's Madhyamakdloka and Haribhadra's Abhi- 
2Adngos po gang gang yongs btags, pa// de dang de la gcig nyid med// gang gis gcig kyang yod min pa// des 
na du ma dag kyang med// www. asianclassics. orghextshengyurfID3 846M. ACT; 16a. 
25Derge Tripitaka Ha 39b (Tohoku 3892). P. (101) 5292 Sa, 44b2-49a5. phyi rol nang na gnasdi kun// 
yang dag tu ni rang bzhin med// gcig dang du maI rang bzhin nyid// bral ba! i phyir na gzugs brnyan bzhin// 
Ejima (1980) points out that the MAL closely resembles the 22 karika-s of gzlgupta! s TattvJvatdrav7td 
2'Eckel (1992: 22). 
27Tibetan text in Eckel (1987: 165). du mas dngos po gcig mi byed// du mas du ma byed ma yin// gcig gis 
du ma! i dngos n-d byed// gcig gis gcig byed pa yang min// 
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samaydlaýnkdrjndma prajilapiramitopadefalistraKrtti. 28 Howcvcr, not all thcsc scholars 
use the argument in the same way, and there is a case for following Sera Chos kyi rgyal 
mtshan and making a distinction between its application to causal relations (Jfianagarbha 
and Haribhadra) and its application to the nature of things (trigupta and tgntarakýita). In 
this case, the first verse of the MAL would be the locus classicus of just one type of 
ekanekaviyogahetu. 
In addition, it is important to note that despite what might be inferred from commentators 
like Kamalagila (see above in Chapter I), the ekdnekaviyogahetu is not the only form of 
argument used in the MAL. In the third section of the main text (verses 67-90) where the 
author counters possible objections to his presentation of the Two Truths, be employs 
other Madhyamaka arguments, notably various instances of syllogism which do not rely 
on the 'neither one nor many' framework! 9 He also uses prasafiga (thal 'gyur) arguments 
in support of the 'neither one nor many' argument in his opening sections. 30 So although 
the ekanekaviyogahetu is ýdntarakýita's chief argument, a broad range of logical methods 
is in fact deployed in the MAL as a whole. In addition to these, tantaralqita supports his 
view with direct and indirect allusions to scriptural and commentarial sources which can 
be traced throughout the MAL. 31 
28SpuWthd 94a: chos kyi rjes subrang ba mams kyang gcig dang du maI ngo bo nyid dang bral bai phyir 
zhes bya ba la sogs pai tshad mas gzhi dang lam dang main pa skye ba rried pa yongs su sties pa.. Ilbose 
who follow the Dharma, however. understand that the bases, paths and aspects do not (actually) arise. They 
understand by means of various pramdýa-s that they have neither the nature of oneness nor that of multi- 
Vicity. 
i 9 Verses 81 and 90. For example, verse 81 reads: rim gyis 'byung phyir blo, bur min// rtagbyung ma yin rta 
gma yin// de bas gomsdra de nyid phyirl/ dang po rang gi rigs las skyes// 
"Because they occur serially, [ideas] do not arise without cause, or from an ctemal [cause], nor are they 
themselves eternal. Therefore: [logical subject] the first [moment of mind) arises from (a preceding 
moment] of its own kind, [reason) because [ideas/appearances arise] [example] in the manner of being 
habituated to something. " 
"Verses 12,29,35,39,49,50,5 8. For instance. verse 50 reads: gal te sna tshogs de gcig na// narn mkha! i 
gos can lugs sam ci// sna tshogs gcig paI rang b7hin minfl rin chcn sna tshogs la sogsdra// "If [you con- 
sider] a multiple [entity] to be unitary, is your theory any different from that of the Jainas? Multiplicity can 
not have an intrinsic unitary nature, in the same way as various jewels [cannot be a single jewel]. and so forth. " 
3117or details see Chapter 1113 above. 
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VA The thematic structure of the MAL 
How does tdntarakýita's application of this argument relate to the structure of the MAL as 
a whole? According to Mi pham, the first part of the MAL sets out to identify and distin- 
guish the Two Truths, firstly ultimate truth (paramarthasatya; don dam bden pa; verses 
1-62) and then relative truth (saýniýHisatya; kun rdzob bden pa; verses 63-66). Beginning 
with ultimate truth, verse 1 presents a general statement of the argument refuting true 
existence, and this is subsequently applied to a broad spectrum of phenomena purported 
to have true existence. Specifically the targets of refutation are unconditioned entities: 32 
the pudgala, the pervasive (khyab pa), the non-pervasive, the coarse (particles), the subtle 
(instants of consciousness), aspects33 in perception, and the self-illuminating conscious- 
ness that is the subject of cognition. Each of these entities is postulated by a specific 
school and the range of views being refuted has been identified in the various structural 
outlines (Table 1). 
Having applied the general argument to each one of these entities in turn, and refuted true 
existence in each one of these non-Buddhist and Buddhist schools with respect to the uni- 
tary nature of entities, the corollary-refuting the true existence of entities with a multiple 
nature-is treated briefly in verses 61 and 62 without any need to apply it to examples. 
32The term Vus ma byas (Sanskrit asaýnskyfa) is usually translated by contemporary Tibetans as 'uncom- 
pounded', despite the fact that the common translation of the Sanskrit in the Abhidharma context is'uncon- 
ditioned'. Tibetans argue that they dislike 'unconditioned' because they consider the word to mean both 'un- 
caused! and 'unconditioned', and hesitate to give preference to the importance of conditions over that of 
causes. In Abhidharma, all dharma-s are considered simples and hence uncompounded, in the sense of not 
being constituted of parts, whereas some dharma-s are conditioned and others are unconditioned. However, 
from the Madhyamaka perspective nothing is uncompounded-everything is imputed to a combination of 
parts. While we have retained the translation 'unconditioned' throughout this study, the intricacies of these 
meanings should be borne in mind and applied to each contexL 
33We translate 4Wra (mwn pa) as 'aspects' even though this English word does not convey a very clear idea 
of what mwn pa means. Its advantage is that it does not have the philosophical connotations of a word like 
'image', nor its exclusively visual reference. Compare, for instance, the discussion of images and appear- 
ances in Perceiving: A Philosophical Study by R. M. Chisholm, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 
1957, p. 43ff. 
'Aspect' is understood to refer to 'that which appears to perception', whether that be caused by an external 
object or by an internal karmic latency. All the examples and images used in the Buddhist literature are 
based on visual perception, even though mam pa is understood to apply to the perception of all six senses. 
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This is because it is a straightforward logical int'Crcncc, sincc onencs-, and manyness are 
posited as mutually exclusive (phan Ishun spangs te Knas) with no other altemative 
(phung po gzhan). 34 This first section deals with the ultimate truth ofthings ([hiramirtha- 
satva; don dam Wen pa); stated another way. the 'neither one nor many I argument is a 
means of examining only the ultimate nature of entities (pararntirthasidilhi. tion dtim jxjr 
grub pa) not their relative existence (sat. nv. rtisat; kun rdzoh tu yod pa). In the second part 
of the text (verses 63-66) ýýntaraksita presents his vicw ofrclatiw truth. He thcn defends 
his view of the Two Truths in verses 67-90, and ends (verses 91-97) by praising the 
virtues of this approach. The detailed presentation of this analysis can be f0und in 
Mi pham's sa bcad in Appendix 1. 
V. 5 The soteriolopical structure of the NIAL 
This thematic structure is not only ot'philosophical interest-, it also has soteriological sig- 
nificance. Indeed, most of the comments Mi pham makes on the first verse ofthc MAL 
concern ýýintaraksita's sotefiology, inviting us to consider the significance ofthe way in 
which the'neither one nor many' argument is applied by ýantarak%ita. Verse 92 presents 
the most fundamental order which underpins the entire treatise: 
Based on Mind Only one must know that external entities do not I truly I exist. 
Based on this standpoint lof Madhyamaka I, one must know that there is no 
self at all even in that [which is Mind Only]. 
serns tsarn la ni brten nas su// phyl rol dngos med shcs par bya// 
tshul 'dir brten nas dc la yang// shin tu bdag med shcs par byal/ 
34 ýýmtarak. sita states in MAI. 62: There is no entity that is classified as other than unitary or multiple, , since 
these are mutually exclusive. gcig dang du ma ma gtogs par// rnam pa gzhan dang Idan pa yiJ/ dngo% po mi 
rung'di gnyis ni// phan tshun %pangs te gnas phyir ro// And Kamala. 0a also write% in MAHI 66b : As for 
oneness and manyness, they are characterized &% being mutually exclusive, and therefore free ofany other 
alternative. gcig pu'i hdag nyid dang du ma'i Wag nyid ni phan tsun spangs Ic gna% pa'i nitshan nyid yin pas 
phung po gzhan scl to/ 
In Tibetan textbooks on logic, two things are defined &% contradictory if they are observed to be different 
and ifthere is nothing which is both of them. There arc two type% ofcontradictorie% (vtrodha: 'gal ha): I 
mutual contradiction and 2) not abiding together in the wnw ofcxclu%ion and inclusion. Mutual contra- 
diction is divided into two: direct contradictories, or dichotomies. and indirect contradictorics. Dichotomies 
can be either explicitly or implicitly discordant. The 'neither one nor many argument' is an explicit dicho- 
tomy. See Lopez (1997: 196). 
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TABLE 1 
I The Views refuted by Sdntarakýita in the MAL according to Mi pham 
The numbers refer to verse numbers 










Vaibhlýika 3-8 10-13 14-15 16-21 















Siimkhya 14-15 38-39 
Vediinta 40 
In his autocommentary on this verse, ý5ntarakýita explains in more detail what is refuted 
from the standpoint of Mind Only. 
By relýving on Mind Only, things that are asserted to be external to the mind or 
inanijestations of'the mind, such as I anti mine, subject and object, and so forth, 
are effortlessly realized to be without a nature. 35 
lCang skya 30 interprets the above passage as indicating that for ýdntaraksita there are two 
'5senis Isarn gyi tshul la Men nas/ mtshungs par Idan pa dang bcas pa'i sems las phyi rol du'dod pa hdag 
dang bdag gi dang/ g/ung ba dang'dzin pa la sogs pa rang bzhin med par tshegs med pa kho nar rtogs so// 
IchigC) (1985: 294). MAIN P. 79a. 
',, See the Sv5tantrika chapter in lCang skya's Presentation of Tenets (translated in Lopez, 1987: 345-8). 
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steps to be taken. First, one ascertains the selflessness of persons, and then onc ascertains 
the suchness which is the emptiness of the duality of subject and object. In the next 
passage of the autocommentary, tantaraklita identifies a third and final step when one 
ascertains the emptiness of the mind itself. 
Regarding this approach, although one has realized that the mind is without a 
nature because it is not self-arisen, in order to realize the Middle Way which is an 
abandonment of all extremes, one thoroughly realizes that Ithe mind] has no 
[true] nature since it has neither a unitary nor a multiple nature. 37 
So lCang skya summarises ýdntarakýita's approach as a thrce-stcp proccss for asccrtaining 
danyatd: 1) ascertaining the selflessness of persons; 2) ascertaining the lack of duality of 
subject and object; and 3) ascertaining the non-true existence of the rnind. 
By relating this strategy back to the thematic structure of the MAL we can identify the 
salient principles as follows. First comes the refutation of the true existence of uncondi- 
tioned entities that are fabrications without a perceptual basis, for example a Creator- 
God and meditational states of cessation. The next broad category includes entities the 
existence of which is imputed to a perceptual basis such as persons, gross phenomena and 
the sense organs. And finally comes the refutation of the true existence of the mind which 
falls into two parts. Initially, the refutation concerns the consciousness which is the sub- 
ject of cognition, thus completing the refutation of both cognized object and cognizing 
subject, in other words the refutation of the duality of object and subject whether the 
object is considered external to the mind or mental in nature. Subsequently, the argument 
is applied to the non-intentional consciousness, that is, to that consciousness that has no 
object of apprehension and the arising of which does not depend either on itself or on any 
object of knowledge. The example here is the subtle mental continuum in Cittamatra, the 
37tshul'di ni rang byung ba med pas scrns de rang bzhin nwd par rtogs su zin kyang/ uAV dianis cad spangs 
pa dbu mal lam'di rtogs nal gcig dang du Irdi Tang bzhin dang bral bas rang bzin med par shin tu rtogs so// 
Ichig6 (1985: 294). MALV P. 79a. 
114 
self-illuminating mind. So let us summarise the order in which topics are refuted. 
1) unconditioned entities asserted by non-Buddhists 
2) unconditioned entities asserted by Buddhists 
3) persons 
4) gross phenomena 
5) the sense organs 
6) consciousness. 
To this, we must now add the order in which different philosophical standpoints are pre- 
sented. Kajiyarna (1978: 114-143) has identifed five stages in the epistemological pro- 
gression. 
(1) The SarviistivAda stage in which external realities are recognized as much as 
mental ones; 
(2) the Sauti-antika stage in which mental aspects are regarded as objects of cogni- 
tion and the external world is reduced to the imperceptible cause of cognition; 
(3) the Saty5k5rav5da-yogadira stage which replaces the external world with 
mental aspects, and asserts that aspects are as real as the illumination of mind; 
(4) the Ah-k5k5raviida-yogAc5ra stage, which admits the exclusive reality of the 
iRurnination of mind; and 
(5) the Madhyarnika view which denies even the true existence of the illumination 
of mind. 
VVhile the MAL itself and its autocommentary are concerned with philosophical view- 
points rather than religious practice, Kajiyama shows how the soteriological progression 
presented by Kamalag-ila in his first Bhdvanjkrama corresponds exactly to the epistemo- 
logical stages of the MAL, implying that both disciple and master shared the same view- 
point. This correspondence permits an interpretation of the MAL in terms of successive 
stages of realization, in addition to its obvious logical progression. One of the relevant 
passages from the Advanakrama is as foHows. 
Having ascended [the truth of] mind-[with aspects] only, the yogin should not 
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imagine external objects Ito be existentl; abiding in the ineditation having as its 
object suchness Jor illumination marked by the ahýsence of cognizer and coynituin 
partsI, lie ought to go heyond mind-lwith aspectsl only. Having thu. s gone beYond 
even mind-/with aspectsl only, lie should go aAo beyond Ithe illurninatioril with- 
out the manifestation lof the two parts]; abiding thus in the non-inanifestation lof 
the illumination without the two part-s/, the yogin intuits Ithe truth ()J7 the Great 
Vehicle. 39 
Kamalaglia explains these various viewrx)ints as different stages of meditation. Aban- 
doning the apprehension of objects as external. the meditator focuses on mental asNets: 
and once he realizes the emptiness ofthosc aspects. he abandons them and rcali/cs a 
mental state without aspects. Finally, he comes to realize that even that mind which is 
devoid of aspects and any intentional object whatsoever is also empty ofinherent 
existence (Table 2). In Table 2, the hierarchy of doctnnes is based on the fact that one has 
to realize the emptiness of one school's truly existent entity in order to progress to the 
next viewpoint, or to the next stage of meditation. Before we examine the philosophical 
and soteriological implications involved here, we must first clarifv what is meant by 'true 
existence'. 
V. 6 The meaning of 'true existence' 
Looking at the text another way, we could say that there is only one oýject ofrefutation in 
the MAL (and indeed in Madhyamaka generally) and that 's'truc cxistcncc' (satyasat; 
bden par yod pa or bden grub). ýýntarak,. ýita deploys the 'ne Ithcr one nor many I argument 
to show that no type of entity whatsoever has true cxistcncc. The reason hc sos out to do 
this is entirely soteriological: Sv5tantrikas assert 31) that the concept oftrue or ultimate 
existence (bden 'dzin) is the final root that binds bcings to cyclic cxisicnce (mirpsCira): that 
all phenomena lack true existence is what must bc rcall/cd in ordcr to attain buddhahtxx]. 
Although Miidhyamikas assert that true existence it%clt'does not, nor cvcr will cxi%t, the 
"Advandkrama 1, v. 256-7. Translation by Kajiyarna (1979). 
ý91-opez (1997: 134). 
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TABLE2 
Epistemological and soteriological structure of the MAL 
Buddhist school Held as truly existing Verse 
philosophically and in number 
meditation experience 
External phenomena 3-8 
Mental images produced 22-34 
by external phenomena 
Mental images produced 46-51 
by internal factors 
Self-illuminating mind 52-60 
No entity at all held to be 61-62 
truly existent 
concept of it certainly does and it is this concept that must be identified and eliminated. 
There are two methods for doing this, meditation and analysis, which work hand in 
hand . 
4" Both begin by identifying a referent object4 1 and proceed to show lack of true 
existence in relation to it. This procedure explains the thematic structure of the MAL. 
411-lopkins (1983: 9-10). 
41 BodhicaryJvatara, IX. 139. "When there is no perception of something falsely projected as existent, there 
is no understanding of the non-existence of that entity. For it follows that, if an entity is not real, the nega- 
tion of it is clearly not real. " Translated by Crosby and Skilton (1995: 129). In other words, it only makes 
sense to refute the true existence of an entity that is thought to truly exist and that is taken as real. Accor- 
ding to this view, refuting the general idea of true existence without relating it to any of its purported 
instances will have no soteriological effect. 
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So what does'true existence' (satyasat; bden par yodpa) mean? When it is used in 
Madhyamaka it denotes the idea that the existence of an entity is independent of the 
existence of anything else, including the perceiver, that it is eternal; that it is unchanging; 
and that it exists substantially. The meaning of 'true existence' evolved with the develop- 
ment of Buddhist thought. WiRiams (1989: 60-63) has pointed out that there was a shift in 
its meaning between Vaibhdýika and Theravdda Abhidharma on the one hand, and MAR- 
yana works derived from the Prajildpdramita literature on the other. In his paper entitled 
'On the Abhidharma Ontology' (Williams, 1981) he shows that Sarvdstivadins take true 
existence, self-existence (svabhdva) or essence to denote the defining characteristic of a 
dhanna. Dhamw-s are primary existents, and svablOva is an atemporal. determinant of 
primary existence which impermanent dizanna-s instantiate, it is that which distinguishes 
one thing from another. The etymological meaning of dIzamw isthat which holds or 
bears' (it is a gerundive of the verb dharati, to bear) its svabliava !2 Secondary existents, 
by contrast, are composed of parts and have no svabhdva. For Samghabhadra the distinc- 
tion between primary and secondary existents corresponds to that between ultimate and 
relative truth (paramdrtlw and saqiyrIisatya) !3 But the PrajhapdramiO satras taught that 
even dhanna-s are mental constructions; they are not unitary, and they have no SVabhjva. 
The term svabhava is nonetheless used in Madhyamaka, where it comes to denote inde- 
pendent real existence and its cognates. Although in Madhyamaka nothing has svabhdva, 
the term nonetheless is used to refer to those philosophical systems that do assert sva. 
bhdva, and to the svabhdva mistakenly imputed to entities through the ignorance of 
sarpsdric beings. 
dGe lugs pa Prdsafigikas analyse true existence further, asserting that it also denotes that 
42RMamoli includes a detailed review of the numerous meanings of dhamma in his notes to the Visu&U- 
magga, VII. n I, pp. 769-770. 
43Translated by Louis de la Vall6e Poussin in'Documents d'Abhidharma: La Controverse du Tcmps', 
Milanges Chinois et Bouddhiques 5.1937, pp. 25-128. 
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things are inherently existent (rang bzhin gyis grub pa); that they exist 'from their own 
side' (rang ngos nas grub pa) meaning that their existence does not depend on anyone 
apprehending it; and that their existence is established by way of their having an own 
character (rang gi mishan nyid kyis grub pa). 44 However, dGe lugs pas also hold that 
these three last definitions are not recognized by SvAtantrikas who, they claim, accept 
these types of existence conventionally. This debate will be considered in Chapter IX. 
True existence in Madhyamaka is distinguished from relative existence (saýnKrlisat, kun 
rdzob tu yodpa), conditioned existence (pratTtyasamutpida; rten 'byung), and imputed 
existence (prajilaptisat, btags yod). Another way of explaining true existence is to say 
that the term refers to the being of an entity; not to a kind of being but to being in its 
absoluteness, conceived as a fundamental ontological dimension sensed as 'reality'. A true 
existent is a real. When entities are said to have a 'self in expressions like 'the self of 
phenomena' (d/zar? ndtman; chos kyi bdag) and 'the self of persons' (pudgalatman; gang 
zag gi bdag), 'self refers to the true existence attributed to that entity, which can be under- 
stood as its essence. Mddhyamikas, of course, specialise in refuting the two selves and 
showing the selflessness of phenomena (dharmanairitmya; chos kyi bdag med) and the 
selflessness of persons (pudgalanairdtmya; gang zag gi bdag med). This is simply a way 
of talking about the idea that neither phenomena nor persons truly exist. Yet another way 
of putting the same idea is to say that phenomena and persons are empty (danya; stong 
pa) meaning empty of true existence, and for MAdhyamikas it is emptiness (danyata, 
stong pa nyid) of true existence that is the ultimate truth. 
This notion of true existence has both ontological and epistemological facets. Ontologi- 
cally, true existence denotes being in the sense that a thing not only exists as it appears, 
44See Hopkins (9-12; 36); Williams (1989: 60-63); Murti (1955: 86). 
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but it exists as an unchanging, independent essence. Explanations of how essence relates 
to existence will vary from one opponent's system to another. The epistemological 
interest lies in the issue of how the ontological dimension of true existence is known. To 
elucidate this, scholars of Madhyamaka ý5 distinguish between innate and acquired con- 
ceptions of inherent existence. Someone may acquire the concept through studying 
various philosophical systems, for example, and such a conception is termed artificial 
(parikalpita; kun btags). It is relatively easy to refute artificial conceptions of inherent 
existence because one can simply point out discrepancies or contradictions inherent in 
any given philosophical system. However, the innate conception of true existence is more 
subtle, and far more difficult to eliminate. We saw above that for Svdtantrikas the concept 
of true existence is the final root that binds beings to saýnsdra. Here, true existence is a 
concept that arises due to innate ignorance (ma rig pa Man skyes) and for Yogacara- 
Svdtantrikae6 this, together with its seeds, is a subtle obstruction to omniscience (shes 
bya'i sgrib pa). The Buddhist claim here is that all beings in samsdra, human and other- 
wise, perceive things as having inherent existence. As a result they grasp on to things as 
real and permanent, and crave permanent satisfaction from them. They suffer because 
they do not perceive things the way they are and this misunderstanding (ma rig pa) 
imprisons them in cyclic existence. 'True existence' does not exist in truth, it is effo- 
neously attributed to appearances, and the concept reflects the mentality of beings 
in saýnsdra rather than the nature of reality as such. But proponents of true existence mis- 
takenly take it as a truth that pertains to the object just as it is. 
FinaUy, one might wonder what true existence means in Yogdc5ra-SvZitantrika. What pre- 
cisely does ýdntarakýita consider he is refuting? This was a matter of controversy between 
45Williams (1989: 61). 
4'Lopez (1987: 116). 
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Tibetan scholars. According to dGe lugs pa doxographers, Svdtantrikas and PrZisafigikas 
are distinguished by their differing understandings of relative existence, and since true 
existence is defined in relation to relative existence, when each school comes to refute 
true existence they are not refuting exactly the same idea. Amongst the nexus of ideas 
associated with true existence, Prasafigikas include the idea that entities exist by way of 
their own character (svala4a? za, rang intshan) conventionally, 47 but on the dGe lugs pa 
view Svdtantrikas do not refute this. On the other hand, Sa skya ý8 scholars do not all 
agree that Svdtantrikas accept existence by way of its own character conventionaUy, and 
dispute the evidence put forward by Tsong kha pa which, incidentaHy, is based on his 
reading of Bhdvaviveka. As we will see in more detail in Chapter IX, Mi pham does 
admit that ýAntarakýita accepts the own character of things but only conventionally, 
without ultimate entailment. 
Secondly, we cannot ignore that kntarakýita's position was strongly influenced by Yogd- 
cara. This warrants separate consideration since the Yogac5ra school has its own unique 
definition of emptiness (Mnyatd) and hence of true existence. Sthiramati, for instance, 
defines Onyata as that which is free from subject and object (grAyagrahakas-varapara- 
hita), and that which is beyond dualism (advayd). 49 It follows that true existence is con- 
ceived by a dualistic mind which apprehends the world in terms of subject and object. 
That is to say, true existence is only conceived by intentional consciousnesses. The 
soteriological goal here is therefore to attain non-dual apprehension or understanding, 
however that is defined. In hisqui on the first verse ýdntarakýita, it will be recalled, 
explicitly mentioned the refutation of subject and object as an element in the soteriologi- 
cal. process towards buddhahood, so it is reasonable to associate this with his Yogacara 
47Lopez (1987: 68). 
48bsTan dar Iha ram pa, gCig du bral gyi mam gzhag legs bshad rgya mtsho las btus pa7 'khrul spong bdud 
rtsN gzegs ma, 428.3-4, cited by Lopez (1987: 68). 
4lMadhydntavibh, 7gqtlM, in Friedmann (1937: 10-11). 
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affiliations. It fits with the soteriological structure presented above, which concludes with - 
non-intentional awareness. However, if ýAntaraksita considers it is necessary to point out 
in verse 92 that even objectless awareness5o is empty too, this implies that once subject- - 
object dualism has been overcome there still remains a subtle sense of true existence ex- 
perienced by objectless awareness itself. 51 By identifying this subtlest of all concepts, of 
true existence and showing it, too, to be empty, Madhyamaka takes its refutation of true 
existence further than YogdcZim. 
V. 7 The logical subject of the argument 
Mi pharn's first points on verse 1 come under the subheading of 'the logical subject' 
(dharmin; chos can). The logical subject is stated in the first line of the verse: "those 
entities [postulated by] ourselves and others". Rather than engage in logical considera- 
tions on this point, as one might have expected, Mi pham identifies the interest here in 
terms of whether or not ýdntarakOta's use of the ekdnekaviyogahetu is soteriologically 
effective. He does not allude to the discussions on this topic that had taken place in India 
or Tibet, but the argument he presents can be taken as his implicit response to those dis- 
cussions. lCang skya, for instance, had asked himself the same question with respect to 
the MAL. 
These [reasonings] are the ways to refute the object of negation imputed by our 
own and other schools, but in order also to refute the object of the innate concep-': - 
tion of true existence, one must know well how damage is done by these 
reasonings. 
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The context of this question is that the ultimate purpose of all Madhyamika refutations of 
truly existing entities is to free deluded beings from the obscurations that bind them to 
saýnsdra. Accordingly, ýdntarakýita introduces his sOteriological goal in theyrith 
5OAccording to dGe lugs pa PrRsafigikas, following DharmaUni, objectless awareness is impossible. The 
term is used here to denote the self-illuminating mental continuum asserted by Cittam5tra. The issue is dis- 
cussed in detail in Chapter VIII. 
5'See citation from KamalaMa in section V. 5 above, note 38. 
52From the SvRtantrika chapter of his Presentation of Tenets. Translation by Lopez (1987: 370). 
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If someone who sets out independently to establish the welfare of selfand others, 
understands that everything that is enjoyed merely through a lack of examination 
ofparticular existents does not truly exist ultimately, like a reflection in a mirror 
and so on, then his various emotional and intellectual obscurations will be 
eliminated. 
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We saw above that ýZintar*ita is not concerned with soteriological. matters in detail in 
the MAL, but the overarching purpose of the work is explicitly soteriological. So the 
question is: since bringing about total liberation from saýnsdra is the stated goal of this 
text, does the argument work? The reason this question is so important is because it lies at 
the heart of three issues on which Prasapgikas and Sv5tantrikas are said to be divided. 
Lopez explains: 
[There is] disagreement between the Svdtantrikas and Prdsafigikas on three 
fiindamentat issues: the meaning of self and selflessness, the nature of the two 
obstructions, and the distinguishing feature of HTnaydna and Mahjydna. 54 
Now, in order to clarify the various definitions and arguments on both sides, and apply 
these to ýdntarakýita's work, it is crucial to remember that the SvRtantrika-PrTksap9ika dis- 
tinction was made retrospectively by Tibetans. Indian Midhyamikas were themselves 
unaware of it. The arguments, then, are a matter of interpretation from hindsight, and not 
a matter of relating a definitive and uncontested set of criteria to a particular text. In parti- 
cular, the rNying ma understanding of the Svatantrika-Prdsati ika distinction is not the .9 
same as that of the dGe lugs pa school, and this accounts for some of the disagreements 
we will note between Mi pham's interpretation of the MAL and that of certain dGe lug pa 
55 doxographers. 
53MALV P. 52b3ff, Ichig6 (1985: 14). bdag dang gzhan gyi don phun sum tshogs pa bsgrub par ci la'ang ma 
rag par chas pa/ dngos po'i mam pa ma brtags gcig pu na dga! ba ma lus pa gzugs bmyan la sogs pa Ita 
bur/ yang dag par na rang bzhin med par rtogs na nyon mongs pa dang/ shes byaI sgrib pa mtha! dag spong 
bar'gyur te/ This is the section before verse 1 of the body text, in which the author sets out the purpose for 
which the treatise was written. 
54Lopez (1987: 107ff. ) explores the debate between BhAvaviveka and BuddhapWita on these topics. 
5517or a rNying ma presentation of the two schools of Madhyamaka, see 'Appendix 8: The Madhyamaka 
School'in Treasury of Precious Qualities: A Commentary by Kangyur Rinpoche, Shambhala, Boston and 
London, 2001, pp. 323-339. This Appendix is based on material from Mi pharn's mKhas jug, from the 
commentaries by Khenpo Yonten Gyamtso onJig med gling pa! s Yon ten tin po chei mdzod, and from 
Dudjom Rinpoche's sdom gsum. 
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We can summarise 56 the issues at stake here as fbHows. Due to divergent interpretations 
of scripture, Bh5vaviveka defines the term 'self (dtman; bdag) taken in isolation (and not 
within expressions such as dharmanairitmya) as referring exclusively to an attribute 
falsely ascribed to the person (pudgala, gang zag); whereas Buddhapalita 57 takes it as a. 
term for entityness (svabhilva; ngo bo nyid) applicable to either persons or phenomena. 
Bhdvaviveka's definition of self is associated with his assertion that there is a difference 
in subtlety between the selflessness of persons (pudgalanairitmya; gang zag gi bdag 
med) and the selflessness of phenomena (dhartnanairdtmya; chos 44 bdag med) resultiýj 
in his claim that Irinaydna schools lead the adept only to the former, while Mahaydna 
schools lead adepts to complete buddhahood which is the realization of both types of self- 
lessness. By contrast, Buddhapdlita contends that the basis for the distinction between the 
two types of selflessness is not a difference in subtlety but merely a difference from the 
point of view of the bases that are selfless. Thus it is said that PrRsafigikas distinguish the 
two selflessnesses from the point of view of that which is selfless, while Svdtantrikas 
make the distinction from the point of view of how they are selflessýg Finally, Bh5va- 
viveka's assertion on the difference in subtlety stems from his particular understanding of 
the obscurations that are purified on the path. The conception of a self of persons (pud- 
galatman, gang zag gi bdag) constitutes the main afflictive obstruction (kiedavarana; 
nyon sgrib) that impedes liberation from cyclic existence, while that which obstructs the 
attainment of buddhahood, termed the main obstruction to omniscience (jileydvarana; 
shes sgrib) is the conception of true existence. It follows that for BhAvaviveka, 59 the dis- 
tinction between Irmaydna and Mah5y5na is one of wisdom, not simply one of method; 
5671he following analysis is drawn from Lopez (1987: 82-133), who bases his presentation on works by 
lCang skya and dKon mchog 'jigs med dbang po, in particular. For more detail, see Joe Bransford Wilson 
(1984: 781-802)-, J. Hopkins (1983: 175-196); Donald S. Lopez (1987: 104-133); Sopa and Hopkins (1989: 
285-297). 
57P 5252, vol. 95,91.3.6-91.4.1. 
5BGrub mtha'dang nang rig skor, no author given, Council for Tibetan Education, Dharamsala, India, 1970, 
p. 79. Cited in Lopez (1987: 108). 
59P 5253, vol. 95,187.4.4-187.5.6. 
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but for Prasafigikas it is based on method. 
Let us now consider how these questions and definitions can be interpreted in the MAL. 
Firstly, as ýantarakýita asserted in the citation from his lytti above, liberation depends on 
eliminating both the obscurations to knowledge (shes bya'i sgrib pa) and the afflictive 
emotions (nyon mongs sgrib pa). And this is brought about by realizing the lack of 
inherent existence of both self and phenomena. Now as we have seen, the MAL examines 
one by one the full range of phenomena that are held to have true existence; but what of 
the self? Will simply refuting the true existence of entities be sufficient to dissolve our 
attachment to self? Unlike the Madhyamakdvatara, for example, in which CandrakIrd 
devotes separate sections of the text to a refutation of the true existence of phenomena 
and that of the self, the MAL does not address the true existence of the self in a distinct 
way. This raises two problems. First, what does it tells us about tiintarakýita's view of the 
relationship between the two selflessnesses? And second, does it mean that the MAL is 
not comprehensive? If so, does it fail to meet its soteriological purpose? 
Before addressing these questions, it is necessary to explain what is meant by the asser- 
tion that ýdntarakýita does not refute persons in a distinct way. In verse 9 of the MAL 
(analysed below in Chapter VI), he refutes the Wts-iputriya theory of the pudgala (gang 
zag) which is, of course, a theory of persons. However, this verse only addresses the spe- 
cific theory of the V5ts71putrTya school, not the concept of a self of persons in general nor, 
indeed, the equivalent concepts in other Buddhist schools. In particular, it does not 
address the various Mahayana definitions of what is meant by the subtle and the coarse 
self of persons, a noted area of controversy between Bhavaviveka and Buddhapalita. 60 So 
in this sense, the MAL cannot be said to present a comprehensive refutation of the true 
6OLopez (1987: 114ff. ). For the SvAtantrikas, the coarse conception of a self of persons is the conception of a 
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existence of the self of persons. 
it is Mi pham's claim that despite this lacuna, the MAL does succeed in fulfilling its 
stated purpose, and in arguing his case he sets out his understanding on both the questions 
identified above. 
In this text, all phenomena asserted in Buddhist and non-Buddhist systems- 
permanent entities, unconditioned [entities], persons, pervasive [entities], gross 
and subtle [entities], consciousness and soforth--may be made the subject [of the 
syllogism in verse 11. This [same subject] includes all phenomena, both condi- 
tioned and unconditioned, all per7nanent and impermanent things, outer and 
inner, subject and object, pervading and non-pervading [entities], gross and 
subtle [things], the knowing mind and that which is known, etc. If, by this 
reasoning, one can show that none of these things truly exists, it will then be 
possible to eradicate the innate belief in the two kinds of self [that ofpersons and 
that ofphenomenal. 
Generally speaking, due to the power of the delusion that is innately present in 
their [mental] continuum, beings apprehend objects like vases as being really 
existent as such. Moreover, it is on the basis of the convention 'entity' that the 
concept 'non-entity'can be applied. Entities and non-entities are cognized and 
clung to as such. And thinking 7 am' in dependence on the five aggregates [that 
make up their] continua, in the absence of analytical investigation, the innate view,, 
of the transitory collection (Jig Ita) also arises. Phenomena and the person, 
entities which are each clung to as being truly existent in this way, do have a basis_ý 
of labelling: the aggregates and so on. 
Further7nore, owing to their incorrect reasoning, [ordinary] people engage with 
compound [entities such as] permanent entities, the self and so on, and attribute 
inherent existence to things that are not real even on the conventional level, and 
[thus] become entangled in the fetters that bind the childish. 
Whether the refutation of one of these selves [imputed or innate] entails the 
refutation of the other [may be considered asfollows]. 
permanent, single, independent self. The subtle conception is that of a substantially existent person in the 
sense of self-sufficiency. For the Pr5safigikas, the coarse conception of a self of persons is that of a subs- 
tantially existent person in the sense of self-sufficiency, and the subtle conception is that of the person as 
inherently existent. Iliese terms and definitions will be clarified below. 
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Whereas objects that are held to be permanent entities are refuted by arguments 
that disprove their existence, this [same strategy] cannot remove the innate appre- 
hension and grasping to the ego, since this [apprehension] does not arise in 
relation to such entities. But if it is understood that the basisfor this innate 
grasping [i. e. the aggregates] is not the self, [this] will demolish all theories up- 
holding [the existence of] a self that is a permanent, functioning [thing], and so 
forth. Just as when one realizes that there is no such thing as the child of a barren 
woman, one will be equally convinced that there is no such thing as the child's 
colour. 
If, therefore, it is established that persons and phenomena, whether conditioned 
or unconditioned, are without inherent existence because they have neither a 
unitary nor a multiple nature, there will be nofurther apprehension of the two 
kinds of self. This is because all objects of knowledge have been established to be 
without inherent existence. 61 
Mi pham. asserts that by refuting the true existence of every category of phenomena, both 
conditioned and unconditioned, one is capable of eradicating attachment to both types 
of self, that of persons and phenomena. I-Es argument is presented in terms of how dclu- 
sion arises, and specifically how attachment to self arises. The innate ignorance (ma rig 
pa than skyes) which afflicts all beings in saýnsdra by definition, causes them to appre- 
6IThe translation of this passage has benefited from the oral explanation of it given by mKhan chen Pad ma 
shes rab in May 2001. The Tibetan text is in V. p. 92-4 and C. p. 126-8. 
gzhung 'der rang gzhan gyi We pas 'dod pa rtag dngos/'dus ma byas/ gang zag/ khyab pa/ rags pa/ phra ba/ 
zhes pa mams chos can du bzung bas/ de mams su rtag mi rtag/ phyi dang nang/ yul yul can/ khyab ma 
khyab/ rags pa phra ba/ zhes bya dang zhes pa sogs'dus byas'dus ma byas kyi chos kun'du ba yin pas de 
mams rigs pas bden med du grub na, des bdag'dzin Ihan skyes gnyis po, drung nasbyin nus te/ 
spyir'gro ba mams kyi rgyud la lhan skyes kyi rmongs pai dbang gis bum sogs dngos po mams la de 
dang der grub par'dzin zhing/ dngos po la brten nas dngos med kyi tha snyad byed la/ dngos dang dngos 
med la de nyid du zhen pa dang/ rang rgyud kyi phung po Inga la brten nas nga'o snyam du ma brtags ma, 
dpyad par 'dzin paI 'jig Ita lhan skyes kyangbyung zhing/ de Itar chos dang gang zag grub grab Itar zhen 
pa! i ngo po de dag gi gdags gzhi ni phung sogs yin la/ 
gzhan yang tha snyad du med bzhin log p; Yi rgyu mtshan bzung ste rang blos nan gyis btags pa rtag dngos 
kyi bdag la sogs pa'du shes sna. tshogsjug cing zhen paI srad bus byis pa mams bcings par gyur to/ 
de la de mams gcig bkag pas gcig khegs pa dang mi khegs pa! i tshul ni/ 
rtag dngos su zhen pa! i yul mams de dang de'gog pai rigs pas bkag kyang/ de ngar'dzin lhan skyes kyi 
rten ma yin pas da rung ngar'dzin lhan skyes mi khegs kyang/ rang 'dzin lhan skyes gzung ba, Itar gyi yul 
bdag med par zhes nal bdag de rtag pa dang byed po, sogs su'dod paI kun btags thams cad khegs te/ mo 
gzham gyi bu med par zhes na de'i kha dog kyang med par thag chod pa, bzhin no/ 
de Itardir yang gang zag dang'dus byas'dus ma byas, kyi chos; thams, cad bden pa'i gcig du bral gyis 
rang bzhin med par grub na, bdag gnyis kyi'dzin pa ga la'byung ste/ shes bya thams cad rang bzhin med par 
gtan la phab grub pa! i phyir ro// 
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hend physical entities such as vases and so on in such a way that they appear to exist just 
as they are apprehended. In perceiving a vase, for example, deluded beings automatically 
think that what they perceive exists as such. Once this notion of being or true existence is 
established in their minds, the negative of non-existence or absence is logically derived 
from it and reified as well. The result is that on account of their innate ignorance (ma rig 
pa Man skyes) deluded beings believe that things either truly exist or that they are truly 
non-existent, and are attached to this way of understanding as being the true, correct way 
of understanding. 
Now, if the Buddhist contention is that such an understanding is incorrect and in fact 
deluded the question arises as to what exactly a deluded being perceives. In other words, 
what is the precise nature of the delusion? How is it that I see a vase and think it truly 
exists when it does not? Mi pham identifies three main characteristics of delusion. The 
first is that any perception under the influence of ma rig pa Man Skyes appears to be 
correct only because it is unanalysed. Analysis soon shows it to be fraught with contra- 
dictions and inconsistencies. The second characteristic is that such perception is rooted in 
the perceiver's belief that he or she truly exists, and this belief in turn rests on taking his/ 
her aggregates (phung po; skandhas) as the basis of his/her identity. The third charactcris- 
tic applies to those who assert the existence of phenomena that are not even apprehended 
in a conventional way. That is, they are not perceived, so there can be no consensus about 
their existence; and yet despite this some people assert them as a result of incorrect 
logical inference. Mi pharn argues that such assertions stem from an attachment to 
existence that has not been abandoned, and that therefore binds such proponents to 
saTsira. 
Turning specifically to the attachment to self, Mi pham distinguishes two types: the innate 
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(arising from ma rig pa Man skyes, innate ignorance) and the imputed (arising from ma 
rig pai kun brtags, the ignorance associated with imputation). He claims that a refutation 
of the innate self will invalidate the imputed self, while the reverse does not hold. This is 
because a refutation of the imputed self depends on a refutation of the basis of imputation 
(gdags gzhi) of that self, in this case of the aggregates (phung po), but since this is not the 
basis for the innate apprehension of self this latter win not have been eradicated. Mi pham 
argues that the method of refuting the innate apprehension of self is not related to the 
refutation of the imputed self; rather, it depends on the refutation of the true existence of 
objects of cognition. When such objects are shown to be empty of true existence, the 
innate self of the cognizer of those objects will thereby be understood as empty too. In 
other words, when bden grub is refuted then bden 'dzin is destroyed. Since kntarakýita 
refutes the true existence of all possible objects of cognition (shes bya thams cad), he 
thereby refutes attachment to the two 'selves'. 
Mi pham's argument distinguishes two fundamental types of delusion. Innate ignorance 
(ma rig pa 1han skyes) characterizes the mental continuum of every being in saMsdra. 
Any cognition that occurs under its influence is characteristically unanalysed. and unin- 
vestigated. In this sense, one can understand innate ignorance as pre-rational and acting 
almost as a mental reflex that underpins all deluded perception. Its effect is to lead us to 
believe that what appears to be a vase (e. g. round, blue, with a flowery pattern, and 
holding water) corresponds exactly to what a vase actually is, so that the way things 
appear corresponds to how they actuaUy are. We assume, for no good reason but with 
anthropocentric bias, that human perception holds a privileged position with regard to 
apprehending reality as it is. And yet all, beings in saýnsdra, in whatever realm, suffer 
from a similar process of delusion. Crucially, cognition under the influence of innate 
ignorance is also characterized by the cognizer's belief in his or her own existence, giving 
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rise to such thoughts as 'I can see a vase' and so on. 
One's belief in one's own existence is imputed on the basis of one's apprehension of the 
__ ., _ ý 
aggregates, which brings us to the second type of ignorance or delusion: ma rig pa7 kun 
brtags, or the ignorance associated with imputation. This second type of ignorance entails 
the action of naming what appears to perception, with the associated belief that the name 
actually designates an existent thing. It follows that names are held to refer to things that 
are imputedly existent and even that, for realist schools of thought, if a thing has a name it 
must exist. The most significant element of Mi phanfs argument at this point is that he 
claims that this dual process of ignorance operates similarly in relation to phenomena and 
to persons. So on the level of imputation, the self is imputed on the basis of the apprehen-, 
sion of its aggregates (phung po) in exactly the same way as a vase is imputed on the 
basis of the apprehension of the characteristics of a vase. And likewise, on the level of 
innate ignorance, the deluded consciousness is endowed with a pre-rational sense of the 
self s existence in exactly the same way as it has a pre-rational sense of the existence of 
any object of knowledge. 
We should note, then, that Mi pham's explanation follows the Pr5sajagika view that there 
is no difference in subtlety between realizing the emptiness of self and realizing the 
emptiness of phenomena. The difference between the two relates to the basis to which the 
view of emptiness is applied, and not to any difference in the nature of the emptiness that 
is realized. In addition, we should note that Mi pham assumes that the self of a person is 
predicated on the basis of the five aggregates (phung po), not on the mental consciousness 
as it is for the Sautriintika-Svdtantrika school of BhRvaviveka, 62 nor, indeed, on the con- 
tinuum of consciousness which is asserted to be the basis of imputation of the person for 
62See Lopez (1987: 110-111). Source text: P 5626, vol. 96,34.4.5-6. 
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Yogdcdra-Svatantrikas according to dKon mchog 'jigs med dbang po. 63 The result is a 
curious case of Mi pham making sense of 85ntarakýita's view partly in terms of what are 
generally taken to be Pr5safigika tenets, and partly in terms of what are acknowledged to 
be Svatantrika tenets. 
The problem with Mi pham's reasoning is the link he makes between refuting objects of 
cognition and the entailment that thereby the cognizer's innate self is refuted too. Does 
this follow? It certainly would not be correct to say that one's innate self is an object of 
cognition like any other, since it cannot be apprehended by others whereas objects such as 
vases can. So if we accept that a distinction must be made between the innate self and 
cognized objects, why does a refutation of the objects entail that of the self? This seems 
odd. If I come to realize that an object which I held to exist does not ultimately truly exist 
why should I call into question my own existence? It does not appear that Mi pham is 
saying that if one realizes the emptiness of phenomena one can, at will, switch one's focus 
to the person and realize this is empty as well. He is not claiming that the two realizations 
occur successively, the one bringing about the other. On the contrary, he seems to be 
asserting that the two occur simultaneously, within a single process. 
This discussion is significant for the characterization of ýdntarakýita's school of thought 
since it was generally recognized in Tibet that this simultaneity of process in the refuta- 
tion of dharmanairatinya (chos kyi bdag med) and pudgalanairdtmya (gang zag gi bdag 
med) is a special tenet of the Svdtantrika system. Lopez expresses this as follows: 
The Prdsarigikas assert that Bodhisattvas mustfirst abandon the obstructions to 
liberation-the afflictive obstructions--before beginning to work on the obstruc- 
tions to omniscience, but the Svdtantrikas assert that Bodhisattvas begin to 
abandon the two obstructions simultaneously. 64 
63Sopa and Hopkins (1989: 287). 
6'Lopez (1987: 117). See also Sopa and Hopkins (1976: 130). 
131 
Curiously, Mi pham does not argue the Pr5safigika case here-perhaps in deference to 
ýdntarakýita, or possibly because he himself agrees with 8antar*ita on this point. What- 
ever the reason, he acknowledges that in this regard ýdntarakýita conforms to doxographic 
descriptions of the YogZic5xa-Svdtantrika-Madhyamaka viewpoint. dKon mchog 'jigs med', 
dbang po clarifies the position thus: 
It is said that, through the nine steps of the path of meditation, the seeds of the 16 
afflictive emotions and the seeds of the 108 obstructions to omniscience-which ' 
are to be abandoned by the path of meditation-are gradually abandoned. Finally 
in dependence on the uninterrupted path at the end of the continuum [of existence 
as a sentient being] the innate afflictive emotions and the innate obstructions to, 
omniscience are simultaneously abandoned. In the next moment highest enlight- 
enment (bla na med pa'i byang chub; anutwasambuddha) is attained. 155 
For the Yogacara-Sviitantrika-Madhyamaka school, the process of purification and aban- 
donment of the obscurations due to the ignorance associated with imputation-including 
both afflictive obscurations and obscurations to omniscience-is a gradual one, and takes 
place on the fourth of the five paths, namely the path of meditation. At the conclusion of 
this path, what is left to be abandoned are all those obscurations due to innate ignorance, 
including both innate afflictive obscurations and innate obscurations to omniscience. 
These various innate obscurations are not abandoned gradually and successively, but 
simultaneously. At this point enlightenment is attained, and one enters the fifth path, the 
path of no more learning. 
The explanation given by dKon mchog 'jigs med dbang po accords with that of Mi pharn. ' 
It highlights the fact that Yogacara-Sviitantrikas, unlike their Sautr5ntika-Sviitantrika 
cousins, see the fundamental distinction as being between innate ignorance (ma rig pa 
Man skyes) and the ignorance associated with imputation (ma rig pa7 kun brtags), and not 
between afflictive obscurations (nyon mong pa7 sgrib pa) and obscurations to knowledge 
65Grub pa7 mtha'i mam par bzhag pa rin po che7 phreng ba, chapter on the Svatantrika school, translation 
by Sopa and Hopkins (1976: 295). 
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(shes bya sgrib pa). The soteriological process entails the abandonment of all obscura- 
tions due to ma rig pa7 kun brtags in a first stage, and in a second stage the abandonment 
of all obscurations due to ma rig pa 1han skyes. This clarification accounts for Mi pham's 
contention that the innate sense of self cannot be eliminated by means of a refutation of 
objects of cognition whose existence is imputed; it is eliminated in a second stage, simul- 
taneously with the elimination of the innate obscurations to omniscience. In conclusion, 
therefore, it can be admitted that the MAL fulfils its soteriological goal according to the 
tenets of the Yogdc5ra-Madhyamaka school, which do not entail any necessity to treat 
persons as a separate object of refutation. 
The logic of this argument appears coherent until one recalls the three stages of the MAL 
which kntarakýita himself outlined in hisv. rtti on the first verse. These stages were ex- 
plained by lCang skya. 66 as: 1) the ascertainment of the selflessness of persons; 2) the 
ascertainment of the lack of duality of subject and object; and 3) the ascertainment of the 
non-true existence of the mind. There is clearly a discrepancy between his interpretation 
and those of Mi pham and mKon mchogjig med dbang po. lCang skya's interpretation is 
in accord with the Sautriintika-Sv5tantrika view which holds that the refutation of the self 
of persons, being a coarser form of self, must be made first, and that of phenomena, being 
more subtle, made second. But is the Sautrantika-Sviitantrika model applicable to knta- 
rak§ita? Let us look again at what is said in the 1ýrtti: 
By relying on Mind Only, things that are asserted to be external to the mind or 
manifestations of the mind, such as I and mine, subject and object, and so forth, 
are effortlessly realized to be without a nature. 67 
It is not clear whether ýantarakýita is indicating a logical or soteriological order here, or 
66Lopez (1987: 345-8). See V. 5 above. 
67sems tsam gyi tshul la brten nas/ mtshungs par Man pa dang bcas pal sems las phyi rol du'dod pa bdag 
dang bdag gi dang/ gzung ba dang'dzin pa la sogs pa rang bzhin med par tshegs med pa kho nar rtogs so// 
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whether he is simply listing examples of what is to be refuted. Comparing this sentence to, 
the thematic structure of the MAL outlined above, there is no evident correspondence, 
between their respective order of topics. On the contrary, it is arguable that the refutation 
of the true existence 'of that which is mind only' in verse 92 is the final refutation of the 
self of persons, defined as a self mistakenly predicated to the non-intentional mental con-,,, 
tinuum. In fact the term'self (bdag) is actually used in this verse, and even if we take this 
to mean 'entityness', when referring to the non-intentional mind it is reasonable to supPOse 
that it refers to the entityness of persons rather than to that of phenomena. 
Based on the standpoint of Cittamfitra, one must know that external entities 
do not [truly] exist. Based on this standpoint [i. e. of the non-intrinsic nature 
of all dhanna-sll, one must know that there is no self at all even in that [which 
is Mind Only]. 
serns tsam la ni brten nas su// phyi rol dngos med shes par bya// 
tshul 'dir brten nas de la yang// shin tu bdag med shes par bya// - "! I 
Mi pham's interpretation therefore appears more acceptable, while lCang skya would 
seem to have painted kntarakýita unnecessarily with a Sautriintika-Sviitantrika brush. 
To conclude this section, let us summarise Mi pharif s analysis of the various features of 
ý5ntarakýita's viewpoint which fall respectively into the Prdsaýigika and Svdtantrika 
systems. ýdntarakýita is a Svdtantrika insofar as he asserts the simultaneity of abandon-,,.. 
ment of the various different types of obscurations resulting from innate ignorance. He is 
also a Svatantrika insofar as he accepts the existence of a self-cognizing, non-intentional, -,, - 
consciousness. But he shares with Prdsafigikas the view that there is no difference in 
subtlety between the selflessness of persons and the selflessness of phenomena. He 
apparently does not share the SvAtantrika tenet asserting that the basis of imputation of 
the person is the mental continuum (Yog5cdra-Svdtantrika) or the mental consciousness 
(Sautriintika-Svdtantrika) although it will become clear in Chapter VIII below that he 
accepts 1) Sautriintika and 2) Yogdc5ra views provisionally in terms of relative truth. 
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V. 8 Wholes and parts 
V. 8.1 Monadic and dyadic applications of the 'neither one nor many' arggment 
The final question that we shall address regarding the first verse of the MAL is what pre- 
cisely is meant by an entity being one (gcig) and being many (du ma). Tom Tillemans 68 
has applied the principles of modem set theory and logic to elucidate this. He distin- 
guishes between what he calls the argument's monadic (one place) and dyadic (two place) 
senses. According to the former, the question is whether a certain phenomenon is one 
thing or many different things, where these predicates show a quality. For instance, 
whether x is both green and square, and so on. But according to the latter, the question is 
about whether a certain phenomenon is one with-in the sense of identical with-another 
phenomenon, or different from it, as in the case of, say, the self and the aggregates. In this 
dyadic sense a relationship is involved, whereas in the monadic sense there is none. 
In his Tarkajvdld, Bh5vaviveka employs the argument in its dyadic form. He says: 
Even the Tathdgata does not ultimately exist because of not being observed to be 
69 the same as or differentfiom his body like self, sentient being, person, and so on. 
But which form applies in the MAL? Just as with the issue of svdtantra and prasafiga 
alternatives, the answer is not clear-cut. On the face of it, the argument in the MAL is of 
the monadic variety if we refer to Kamalagila's commentary: 70 
what we call oneness (or unitariness) is partlessness 
gcig pa zhes bya ba ni cha med pa nyid doll 
Oneness signifies partlessness, and partlessness is a quality that can be ascribed to an 
entity. We could say that 'God is partless', for example. It is on account of this that the 
translations 'unitariness'funitary' and 'multiplicity'fmultiple' have been preferred in this 
68 In particular see Tillemans (1983). 
69 Cited in Lopez (1987: 324). 
70 MALP Peking ed. 89a. Ichig6 (1985), p. 23 line 9. 
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study to 'oneness'fone' and 'manyness'f many'. Such as it is, the English connotation of the 
second set of terms is dyadic, whereas the connotation of the first set is monadic. Most, of 
the commentarial literature points to the monadic form of the argument, explaining the 
MAL in terms of an examination of whether the various entities under scrutiny have parts 
(cha bcas) or not (cha med). But Tillemans (1983) shows that Tsong kha pa" took the 
eMnakaviyogahetu in its dyadic sense, transposing the identity/difference relationship to 
a whole and its parts. Such a dyadic relationship posits wholes separately from their parts, 
and rests on Tsong kha pa's particular definition of wholes as actual conventional exist- 
ents, permanent but not eternal, that are not identifiable with parts. Tillemans cites this as 
an example of the rational reconstruction of kntarakýita's thought by Tibetans, reflecting 
the text of the MAL but taking the argument further than the author did himself. In 
summary, whether the 'neither one nor many' argument as used in the MAL is construed 
as being monadic or dyadic depends on whether one takes wholes to exist separately from 
their parts or not. 
V. 8.2 Mereological analysis 
The philosophical analysis of wholes and parts is a live topic in contemporary philosophy, 
I 
and sometimes draws on mereology which is the mathematical theory of parts, formal 
mereologies being axiomatic systems taking as primitive the part-whole relation and 
defining a proper part as a part not identical to the whole !2 Mereology is of interest to the 
present study insofar as it offers conceptual tools with which to question ýAntarakýita's 
assumptions about the whole-part relation, and can thereby lead to a more precise and 
71In his dbUma rgyan gyizin bris(P. 153 Nga7lb7-&4b8); Tillemans (1983: 308-9). Tsongkha pa's four- 
point analysis can be surnmarised as follows. I. All entities have parts. 2. If an entity is truly established, 
either the parts are 'essentially' identical with it, or different from it. 3a. If the parts are essentially identical 
with it, then either the part-holder is many or all the parts are the same. 3b. If the parts are essentially 
different from the part-holder, they would be unrelated to it. 4.7berefore, entities are not ultimately esta- 
blished. 
7-Trom What Collectives Are: Agency, Individualism and Legal 77teory by David Copp, in Dialogue XXRI, 
1984, pp. 249-69. 
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comprehensive evaluation of the philosophical implications of the MAL argument. How- 
ever, a number of philosophers, like E. J. Lowe, have a problem with mereology, finding it 
too restrictive. Taking account of these different positions we will proceed systematically, 
looking first at what type of whole tdntarakýita is addressing, and then considering his 
definition of what a part is. Next we will evaluate his principle that there is no third alter- 
native between having parts and not having parts. Finally, we will analyse his view of the 
whole-part relation, and conclude with an appraisal of the Mddhyamika approach to 
wholes and parts. 
V. 8.2. a) Types of wholes 
Various types of whole are defined in mereology, and while the precise use of terms 
varies from one philosopher to another, the main principles denoted are standard. The 
peculiarity of sets is that they are identical to the set of individual members or parts. In 
other words, if there are changes in the parts (e. g. one part more or less) the set itself 
changes. By contrast, aggregates, piles or blobs are looser groupings which boil down to 
quantifying plurally over individuals as for example with a pile of stones. The peculiarity 
of piles is that they do not have a fixed internal organisation or structure, so for example 
the stones could be moved and the pile change shape, and it would still be a pile. Thirdly, 
groups are wholes that can survive changes in their parts or members, as in the case of a 
nerve in which a particular cell dies or a new one appears. 
From the metaphysical point of view, these various types of whole can be categorized into 
two main types. 73 According to some philosophers, wholes have a substratum which is a 
bare particular with an identity independent of the properties with which it is found. Such 
a substratum can have no attributes itself or there is infinite regress. The relation between 
73Loux (1998: 92ff. ). 
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the attributes and the substratum is taken to be unanalysable and ontologically primitive, 
and explained informally in terms of their occurring together, or being present together. 
But the ontological glue which ensures that an entity is a unity cannot be clarified further. 
What is clear is that the substratum is ontologically primary and more fundamental than 
the attributes. Indeed attributes are related to the substratum only contingently, entailing 
that changes in attributes do not necessarily entail a numerically different particular. This 
contrasts with the second main type of whole asserted by metaphysicians, which is called 
a bundle or cluster. Bundles have no substratum; they are particulars constituted exclu- 
sively by the properties associated with them. Bundles are favoured by empiricists, who 
reject substrata on the grounds that having no attributes they cannot be apprehended. 
Bundle theorists hold a one-category ontology, since at the most basic level there are only 
attributes. These attributes are ascribed to the particular of necessity, so that a change in 
attributes entails a change in particular. Bundles are equivalent to mereological sets, while 
wholes with substrata may be comparable with mereological groups insofar as both assert 
the survival of the whole despite changes in its parts. 
So is Tillemans' choice of set theory to explicate the ekdnekaviyogahetu apposite or not? 
Does kntarak0ta's understanding of wholes correspond to the definition of a set? It does 
insofar as Buddhists maintain that wholes are constantly changing as their parts change! 4 
The Buddhist view is comparable to the perdurantist position which maintains that wholes 
are merely synchronic time-slices of continually changing collections of parts !5 But an 
important difference between sets and Buddhist wholes is that sets are abstract, and 
wholes are apprehended on the basis of sense perception. Ile latter evolve and change 
74Leaving aside the special case of Tsong kha pa! s view, which is not that of glntarakýita nor that of rNying 
ma pas such as Mi pharn. For a discussion of the differences between dGe lug pa and Sa skya pa views on 
wholes and parts, see Klein (1998: 94-88). For a discussion of dGc lugs pa and Sa skya interpretations of Dharmaldas understanding of wholes and parts, see Dreyfus (1997: 83ff. ). 
75LOUX (1998: 204 ff. ). 
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while paradoxically giving the perceiver an impression of uninterrupted continuity and 
numerical identity; but the same cannot be said of sets. Sets are simply what they are 
axiomatically defined to be, and nobody would contend that a change in their members or 
parts could be a cause of delusion for the mathematician. It would therefore be more 
fitting to say that wholes in Buddhism are not sets but bundles, that is, apprehendable 
particulars which are nothing more than the mereological sum of their parts. 
This difference is significant for the MAL. If ý5ntarakýita refutes the true existence of 
wholes it is because deluded beings erroneously think that wholes exist. Buddhist analysis 
explains that the concept of 'whole' is imputed by inference to that which is perceived by 
the senses. The senses apprehend things non-conceptually, and conceptuality enters into 
knowledge at a second stage when inferences are made on the basis of sense data. Which- 
ever type of whole ýdntaraksita has in mind, wholes only exist imputedly (prajn-aptisat). 
Now it can be argued that the Buddhist analysis confuses what are in fact two distinct 
things: the identity conditions for the whole, and its composition. 'Me Buddhist refutation 
of persons illustrated by the example of a chariot breaks the whole down into its consti- 
tuent parts and assumes that the whole is nothing other than the mereological sum of 
those parts. 76 Whether or not the idea of a whole includes both its constituents and the 
way they are organised is not considered, leaving open the possibility that wholes are 
simply aggregates. 77 The argument is concerned with showing that wholes can be 
reduced to their parts and do not exist separately or independently from them; in other 
words, using the terminology given above the argument in the Milindapailha is concerned 
with proving that wholes do not have substrata. But in the case of a chariot, it would be 
76MiHndapaftha, 1.1. 
77The constituents of a person are termed skandhas, meaning heaps, so it is possible that the aggregate 
meaning of whole was indeed envisaged. 
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possible to have a pile of the entire number of its constituent parts and yet nobody would 
claim that such a pile is a chariot. The analysis in the Milindapaiiha does not go far 
enough and its definition of wholes is inadequate. It is on this account that Candraldrd 
included'form'or'shape'in the seven-cornered reasoning used in Madhyamaka !8 The 
sixth of his seven-cornered reasonings is that a whole is not the shape of its parts. This 
idea could well include the notion of organisation since the shape of a thing is related to 
the way its parts are organised, so this argument would rule out wholes being taken as 
aggregates or piles. Yet even if we accept this, the fact that organisation and parts are 
addressed separately by two separate reasonings is still inadequate. A group consists of 
both parts and their organisation; so to refute the existence of a group, one must 
refute parts and organisation together. Madhyamika reasonings do not do this unless the 
seven-comered reasoning is taken as cumulative. 
So there are problems with identifying the Buddhist concept of wholes with either sets, 
aggregates or groups. The concept of bundles appears to be the closest since Buddhists 
definitely reject substrata. ýdntarakýita asserts that the refutation of substance or sub- 
strata (atman) is what distinguishes Buddhism from all other views! 9 Yet even with 
bundles there are metaphysical problems, since bundle theorists accept the ontological 
existence of attributes and Mddhyamikas do not. This distinguishes the M5dhyamika cri- 
tique of wholes and parts from the Abhidharma critique, since there certain dhanna-s are 
considered to have substantial existence (dravyasat) while this is not the case in 
Madhyamaka. This point is discussed in the next Chapter. 
7BCandraldutfs seven-cornered reasoning applied to a chariot is as follows. A chariot does not inherently 
exist because of not being its parts; because of not being Other than its parts; because of not being in its 
parts; because of not being that in which its parts exist; because of not possessing parts-, because of not 
being the shape of its parts; and because of not being the composite of its parts. 
79TS 3340. etac ca sugatasyestarn Rdau nairRtmyaldrtanat/ sarvatjfthakTtý tasmAt sthito mardhani tatha- 
gat*/ See also Murti (195i: 
*10). 
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Finally, we will consider the views of E. J. Lowe8O who finds mereology too restrictive for 
the definitions of wholes he wants to accept. He distinguishes between aggregates and 
integrates as follows. Aggregates, while consisting of the sums of their parts, are not to be 
identified with such sums because an additional constraint on their persistence conditions 
is set by the requirement of adhesion of parts. 81 That is to say, aggregates are not scatter- 
able. Integrates are composite particulars which are not identical with the sums of their 
parts nor with any aggregates consisting of any sum of their parts. 82 They can survive the 
destruction or removal of at least some of their parts. In addition, artefactual integrates 
like clocks are scatterable. By making these definitions, Lowe highlights two points. 
Firstly, he shows that mereology cannot offer an adequate account of wholes and parts 
because it does not take persistence conditions into account. The main difference between 
aggregates and integrates, in his terminology, concerns their respective persistence condi- 
tions. Secondly, he emphasizes the fact there are no adequate criteria for individuating a 
thing's parts, that is, parts have no clear identity criteria. Arguably, for instance, if a tree 
loses an atom it continues to be the same tree but if it loses a branch it does not. This con- 
sideration leads us to take a closer look at parts. 
V. &2. b) What is a part? 
It was shown earlier in this chapter that ýdntarakýita takes the concept of part (cha) in a 
broad sense, and includes within it both spatial parts and temporal parts. Spatial parts are 
characteristic of material objects while temporal parts apply to minds. Thus material 
objects are analysed into partless particles or atoms, 83 which are conceived as three- 
80Kinds ofBeing: A Study of Individuation, Identity and the Logic of Sortal Tenns, Blackwell, Oxford, 1989. 
81ibid., p. 88. 
82ibid., pp. 89-90. 
831bc terni'atord is derived from the Greek atomoi meaning 'unsplittable'. It is often used by philosophers 
who analysc matter into indivisible particles, in fact they are called atomists. In this study, however, the 
term'particle'has been preferred since nowadays the term atom has a more specific definition and we know 
that atoms are splittable. As there are smaller particles even than atoms, and as scientists have successively 
identified more and more subtle particles of matter during the 20th century, the word 'particle! is used here 
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dimensional, while minds are analysed into indivisible moments of consciousness. These 
categories are found in the Abhidhannakoia84 and the categories, if not their contents, are 
uncontroversial in Buddhist philosophy. gdntarakýita's innovation in this area lies in his 
application of the arguments on material particles to the existence of minds. In verse 49 
we read: 
If consciousness were admitted [to consist of as many parts] as the number of 
[its various] aspects, then it would be difficult to avoid the kind of criticism 
that is made regarding [the reality of] particles. 
ci ste rnam pa 7 grangs bzhin dull rnam par shes pa khas len nall 
de tshe rdul phran 'drar 'gyur ball dpyad pa 'di las bzlog par dka V/ 
The argument that holds that there are as many consciousnesses as there are aspects in 
perception (rnam pa)85 can be refuted in the same way as the existence of material parti- 
cles has been refuted (in verses 11-15). The latter are refuted on the grounds that they can 
not be unitary since they have directions and sides, and relate spatially with other proxi- 
mate particles. 86 So if we apply this reasoning to minds and mental aspects, it follows that 
aspects (rnam pa) cannot be unitary, since each one is related to others, and if they are not 
unitary they cannot be taken as truly existing with a numerical identity. Yet although 
ýdntarak§ita brings together material and mental, spatial and temporal criteria in this 
example, the similarity between them is in terms of the argument that refutes each; matter 
is not reduced to mind or vice versa, and space is not conflated with time or vice versa. 
Rather, we could interpret ýdntarakýita as implying that the way we talk about matter is' 
similar to the way we talk about minds. 
to denote whatever is identified by an opponent as being the smallest and subtlest element of matter. 84AK I. 13d and AK 1-44d. Matter is defined as impenetrable, resistant and always locatable. No two 
material things can occupy the same space, and the relationship between atoms is linked to proximity. Ile 
support of consciousness, on the other hand, is an immediately preceding consciousness. 
851be various theories concerning aspects in perception are discussed in Chapter VIII. 'Aspect' (main pa) is defined in this context as the mode of appearance of an object. 
86This refutation is examined in Chapter VII below. 
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Interestingly, although the spatial/material and temporal/mental divide is uncontroversial. 
in Buddhism, it would be seriously questioned by many Western philosophers, and in 
particular by proponents of endurantism and perdurantism. Endurantists 87 regard as in- 
comprehensible the notion that entities have temporal parts, and accept only that they 
have spatial parts. This applies to material objects, of course, but minds are not generally 
treated as a separate category. They assert that concrete particulars persist through time 
by existing wholly and completely at each of several different times. Persistence through 
time is construed as the numerical identity of a thing existing at tj with a thing existing at 
t2. Endurantists are typically presentists, meaning that they consider only what exists in 
the present time as real. This is why they can reject the idea of temporal parts. The 
endurantist is concerned that his philosophical theory validates prephilosophical concep- 
tions of the world that assert the identity of things through time and through change. This 
position leads to the more radical 'mereological essentialism' propounded by Chisholm, 
according to which a thing's parts are essentially and necessarily parts of it. 88 It is a posi- 
tion that claims coherence at the price of postulating certain primary ontological entities 
for which it is impossible to survive the loss of a part. Other things like desks and chairs 
are not primary wholes in the strict philosophical sense, only in the 'loose and popular' 
sense. Persons, however, he construes as wholes in the strict philosophical sense to 
account for the experience of unity of consciousness. It follows that mereological essen- 
tialism posits primary entities as building blocks of reality, and it is these that remain 
always whole and complete and cannot survive any loss or change of parts. This might 
account for the fact that endurantism has often gone hand in hand with Aristotelian sub- 
stance theories, or substrata. 
87Loux (1998: 203-232). 
88"Parts as essential to their wholes" by Roderick Chisholm, in Review ofMetaphysics, 1973. 
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Perdurantists, on the other hand, assert that material objects have both spatial and tem- 
poral parts. They view reality as four-dimensional. Temporal parts are not merely abstrac- 
tions, like a set theoretical entity; they are things that have properties in the way spatial 
parts do. Perdurantists reject pre-philosophical notions of diachronic: sameness, because 
there is no literal numerical identity through time and through change. Concrete parti- 
culars are like aggregates of their temporal parts. What exists at different times, termed 
the temporal slices or temporal parts of a particular, are things related to it as parts to a 
whole. Perdurantists have an etcrnalist view of time, refusing to privilege the present 
metaphysically. Four-dimensional reality or spacctime can be dissected in many different 
ways, and each chunk of spacetime is as real as another. Pcrdurantists assert that the tem- 
poral parts of concrete particulars enter into serial relations of spatiotemporal proximity, 
resulting in a spatiotemporal connectedness. Ilus the spatiotcmporally adjacent parts of a 
particular are very similar to each other so that the whole changes only gradually over , 
time. Moreover, temporal parts are causally responsible for the existence and character of 
the temporal parts that succeed them. 
Much more could be said of the different theories on space and time, as wen as wholes 
and parts, that have been put forward by Western philosophers. A full discussion of all the, 
issues, and a thorough evaluation of the various Buddhist views on them in the light of 
Western ideas, would merit a separate thesis of its own. Here, we can only briefly identify 
the key characteristics of 95ntar*ita's position. Matter is defined as the opposite of rnind 
entailing a commitment to two principles that are not reducible the one to the other, but 
neither of which exist ultimately. 89 kntarakýita is commited to the view that three- 
dimensional space is a specific characteristic of matter. The character of minds is that 
89MAL verse 16. "Consciousness is intrinsicallY opposed to L=nticnt matter. " marn shes bcrm rVi rang 
bzhin las// bzlog pa rab tu skye ba ste// 
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they are not three-dimensional or locatable, but are determined by time. It follows that the 
identity conditions of what counts as a part (cha) of a material object cannot be the same 
as those of what counts as a part (cha) of a consciousness. Material parts are defined as 
indivisible particles whereas mental parts are defined as moments of consciousness 
(Sautrantika) or aspects (Cittam5tra). Whatever their differences, both types of part play 
similar metaphysical roles within their respective domains and can therefore be talked 
about, and refuted, by the same argument. In this case, it is considered legitimate to apply 
the 'neither one nor many' argument to both spatial and temporal parts, and to both 
material and mental wholes, because the principles of unitariness and multiplicity apply to 
all of these albeit in ways that are generically particular. 
V. 8.2.0 Third alternatives 
kntarakýita takes it as given that an entity is either partless (cha med) or it has parts 
(cha dang bcas) with no third alternative, and the main thrust of his argument is that if an 
entity has parts then it cannot be ontologically real. 90 But in Western philosophy there 
have been several attempts at finding alternative solutions to the whole-part problem. It is 
necessary to consider how successful these are to determine whether kntarakýita's prin- 
ciple of no third alternative is justified. 
One of these solutions is termed substance theory (from the Greek ousia, derived from the 
Greek root for to be). 91 Based on Aristotle, this theory rejects the dichotomy between 
wholes and parts-entailing that a thing is either a whole or a part, with no third altema- 
tive-by asserting that every entity has a core or essence with which its Parts are in con- 
tingent relationship. The core or essence of a concrete particular cannot be identified with 
90MAL verse 62. See note 33 above. 
9'Loux (1998: 117 ff. ). 
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the thing itself, rather it is a more essential part of that entity than the other parts. It is also 
a necessary part of the entity whereas the other parts are contingent. An ontological dis- 
tinction is therefore made between different categories of part so that 'parf is no longer 
metaphysically univocal. The whole-part distinction becomes complex rather than binary. 
Arguably, this solution does not in fact solve the difficulty because Aristotelians displace 
the problem from whole-part relationships to the relationship between a thing and its 
kind. Kinds are not attributes, parts or constituents; they arewhat a thing is. Generiý kinds 
are considered irreducibly unified forms of being which can be multiply instantiated. For 
the kind 'human being' to be instantiated twice is for two human beings to exist. Therefore 
if ýýmtarak§ita were to refute this view by means of the 'neither one nor many' argument, 
all he would need to do is apply the argument to the relationship between kinds and the 
entities that instantiate them. How can a kind be a unified form of being, and yet be 
instantiated in a plural number of entities? From this viewpoint, the modification in 
whole-part relationships is no solution. 
Another potential solution is advanced by the theory of supervenience. Supervenience 92 is 
the thesis that one domain (D I) depends entirely on another (D2) even though there are 
no systematic links between them, and, in particular, even though there is no causal rela- 
tionship between D2 and Dl. It follows that DI is given by D2, and no change can take 
place in D1 without change in D2, but the converse does not hold. Supervenience rela- 
tionships usually have three characteristics. (1) Property covariation means that if two 
things are indiscernible in base properties, they must be indiscernible in supervenient pro- 
perties. (2) Dependence entails that supervenient properties are dependent on, or deter- 
92Sec the entry under 'supervenience'by Jaegwon Kim in A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, ed. 
Samuel Guttcnplan, Blackwell, Oxford, 1994, pp. 575 -5 83. 
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mined by, their subvenient bases. And (3) non-reducibility ensures that supervenient pro- 
perties are not reducible to base properties. The idea of supervenience has been used in 
philosophy of mind, especially in non-reductive physicalism which wants to assert that 
the mental depends on the physical without being reducible to it. It is applied in ethics to 
explain that the moral supervenes on the descriptive. More recently it has been extended 
to the social sciences to argue that groups or crowds supervene on their individual 
93 
members. And supervenience has also been applied in mereology. 
The adyantage of superyenience is that it allows for the determination of A by B without 
reduction of A to B. If we apply it to the domain of mereology, it postulates a relation- 
ship between wholes and parts that is one of asymetrical co-variation. For a whole to 
supervene on its parts means that for two wholes, x and y, if x and y are identical, then the 
properties of the parts of x (say Px) must be indiscernible from the properties of the parts 
of y (Py). For x and y to differ necessarily means there is a difference between Px and Py. 
A" lying the principle of indiscernibility to the properties of parts and wholes therefore Pp 
assumes the set theoretical idea of a whole, or the bundle theory of a whole, where wholes 
are the mereological sum of their parts, the parts determining and defining the whole 
without reduction of the one to the other. A change in parts necessarily entails a change in 
the whole, and the whole would not exist without its parts. 
Supervenience violates the principle held by A5ntarak§ita that there are only two possible 
types of relationship between entities: identity and causation. In supervenience, wholes 
are not identical with their parts in the sense of being reducible to them, and they are not 
caused by their parts. So what is the nature of the relationship between subvenient and 
93See The Ontological and Moral Status of Social Groups by Paul Sheehy, Ph. D. thesis submitted to King's 
College, University of London, 2000. Unpublished. 
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supervenient? It is explained in a variety of ways. For emergentists, higher-level proper- 
ties (e. g. mental properties) 'emerge' if and only if an appropriate set of basal (e. g. 
physical) conditions are present. In Buddhist terminology, this could be translated as 
saying that the basal properties are the conditions (pratyaya; rkyen) rather than the causes 
(hetu; rgyu) for the arising of higher-level properties. For reductionists using a nomo- 
logical model and espousing strong supervenience, where supervenience holds for indivi- 
duals across worlds, there must be a system of type-type coffelations between the sub- 
venient and the supervenient, for example between mental kinds and physical-neural 
kinds, entailing what are called 'bridge laws'. So, for example, bridge laws might account 
for the way a particular neural pattern correlates with a particular mental state. But it is 
not clear why such bridge laws would not count as laws of causality. The problem is 
-that 
the theory of supervenience does not entail a clear definition of what is meant by depen- 
dence. Its success in describing a relationship between two entities that is other than 
identity or causation is inconclusive. It can be argued that the third alternative it attempts 
to present assumes a metaphysical bias towards the primacy of the subvenient which is 
unjustified. 
V. 8.3 kntaraksita's view of wholes and parts 
kntarakýita does not engage in the debate on wholes and parts in this type of way. What, 
he does do is much more radical. He shows the impossibility of making logical sense of 
the whole-part relationship. He dismantles his opponents' concepts of what a whole is, 
and dismisses his opponents' ideas of what a part is. If parts do not truly exist, then 
wholes with parts cannot truly exist; and if unitary wholes do not truly exist either, then it 
does not make sense to speak of either wholes or of parts at all. It is therefore absurd to 
speculate on how wholes might be related to parts, or vice versa. 
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Discussions amongst contemporary philosophers invariably assume that something must 
(truly) exist, so their arguments are geared to determining which element(s) of the puzzle 
exist(s), and how. Can wholes exist independently of their parts or not? Do parts exist 
independently of their organisation into wholes or not? Do parts have primacy over 
wholes, or vice versa? And so on. These are some of the questions they address. ýanta- 
rak§ita shows that the notions involved here do not withstand rational analysis. And his 
assumption is that if things lack logical validity they lack validity tout court. The internal 
incoherence of a proposition entails its lack of truth in reality. 
This stance may undercut the metaphysical debate on wholes and parts, but it leaves an 
area of uncertainty. ýAntarakýita refutes the true existence of wholes and parts, that is, 
their ontologically independent existence, but not their empirical existence in the conven- 
tional world. He does not deny that persons and phenomena, wholes and parts, can be 
perceived and experienced in the empirical world. He argues that they only exist in rela- 
tive truth and not ultimately on the grounds that no relationship between wholes and parts 
can be established. Mereologists might wish to argue that it is the conventional world they 
are trying to explain, and in not explaining the conventional world ýdntarakýita is 
avoiding the issue. In his defence, though, ýAntarakýita would surely reply that-as we 
noted at the beginning of this Chapter-he uses the 'neither one nor many' argument 
exclusively to determine the ultimate truth of things, not to account for relative truth. 
Ultimate truth and relative truth must be approached separately and cannot be mixed in 
the same discourse. In fact, he might accuse mereologists of doing just that, since 
although they are ostensibly accounting for the conventional world, in the process they 
posit ontological reals (attributes, substrata, substances, and so on) thus going beyond the 
boundary of the relative into the ultimate. So ýdntarakýita's position depends heavily on 
whether we accept the Buddhist distinction between relative and ultimate truth, a distinc- 
tion that is foreign to Western philosophy. The issue is addressed in Chapter IX. 
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CHAPTER SIX GOD. CESSATION. 
PERSONS AND UNIVERSALS 
VIA What does 9iintaraMita refute? 
In Chapter 111.2 a summary was given of the main questions tAntaraksita discusses in the 
MAL. Unlike the TS, this work does not expound and debate a comprehensive selection 
of topics as discussed specifically by the various dardana-s in India, so we need to turn to 
the commentaries in order to identify which particular views 85ntarak§ita aims to refute 
on each point. In addition, we will also refer to relevant passages of the TS itself, in 
which ýantaraksita has set out his argument on given topics in more detail. Indeed, the 
MAL has to be read hand-in-hand with the TS if we are fully to comprehend the refuta- 
tions, it makes, not least because the TS was written before the MAL, and the MAL in a 
sense assumes the philosophical work accomplished by the TS as a basis for its own 
arguments. So, following the summary of questions given above, and also following the_ 
headings given in Mi phams outline (sa bcad), we will now examine the MAL in detail. 
so as to establish and document the various views with which kntarak0ta took issue. We 
will then be in a position to evaluate his own view on each point in turn, and to draw out 
the philosophical implications. 
V1.2 Examination of Wrvasive entities with a, unitarv nature 
VI. 2.1 Refuting the existence of pgrmanent unitary dha a-s asscrted by non-Buddhists: 
, 
the notion of a Creator-God 
kntarakýita begins his reasoning in support of the assertion made in verse I by refuting 
the true existence of unitary entities. These are classified into two categories: pervasive 
ISO 
(khyab pa) and non-pervasive (ma khyab pa). 
1 First ýZintarakýita considers pervasive 
entities, addressing the issues of 1) permanent entities asserted by non-Buddhists, 
2) permanent entities asserted by other Buddhist schools, 3) the existence of the person 
(pudgala, gang zag) as asserted by certain Buddhists, and 4) general pervasive entities. 
It is significant that the MAL starts by refuting the existence of permanent entities 
because the establishment of radical impermanence is the cornerstone of Buddhist philo- 
sophy. In his Introduction to the TS, ýdntarakýita pays homage to the Buddha as the 
teacher who taught the doctrine of pratftyasamutpada, the principle of dependent arising; 
in this he is following the example of NAg5xjuna's homage in the MMK. 
2 And, as Murti 
(1960: 7) has explained, the entire Madhyamaka system is a re-interpretation of this prin- 
ciple which is seen not in terms of temporal causal sequence, as it is in the Vaibhaýika 
and Sautrdntika schools, but rather in terms of the mutual dependence of things, that is, 
the unreality of all the separate elements (dharmanairdtmya) that come together when 
things arise. It should therefore come as no surprise that the opening argument in verse 2 
of the MAL concerns the principle of causation. 
gdntarakýita devotes Chapter VHI3 of the TS to a refutation of permanent entities, and in 
his commentary on it Kamalani a (TSP 350) points out that this refutation is the simplest 
and most efficient method for refuting all the various entities postulated by non-Buddhists 
in their totality. Instead of considering them one by one (as is done in Chapters I-VII of 
IMi pham explains that he chose to make this distinction following Tsong kha pa! s dka'grel, the Commen- 
tary on Difficult Points, where self, space and so on are classified as pervasives, and all impermanent con- 
ditioned entities are termed non-pervasives. 
2"1 pay homage to the Perfect Buddha, the supreme teacher who taught [the doctrine of] dependent arising 
(pratilyasamutpada), the blissful cessation of conceptual construction. " yaý pratayasamutpadaip prapafico- 
pasama7z fivam/deSayamasa sambuddhasataýn vande vadatam vara)? V1 
3Murti summarises the arguments presented in this chapter in The Central Philosophy ofBuddhism, pp. 70- 
73. 
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the TS) this refutation defeats them all at a stroke. No doubt thcre is both a soteriological 
justification for beginning with each subcategory separately, and an advantage from the 
point of view of dialectical debate, but nevertheless any refutation which successfully 
attacks topics by demolishing the coherence of their common generic category has to be 
more efficient. For this reason, the refutation of permanence is hailed in TSP 351 
4 as the 
culmination of the first seven chapters of the TS. Interestingly, the MAL begins with this 
very same point, and generally we will find that the structure of the MAL often parallels 
that of the TS. 
Since effects are produced in succession, permanent [causes] cannot have a, 
unitary nature. If effects [arise] at different points in time this contradicts the 
permanence of [the cause]. 
'bras bu rim can nyer sbyor basll rtag mams gcig pu 7 bdag nyid minll 
'bras bu re re tha dad nall de dag rtag las nyams par 'gyurll 
In verse 2, gdntarakýita is concerned with the general issue of refuting any claim that a 
permanent cause can produce successive effects. The context and the commentaries 
indicate that he is willing to apply this general principle to the idea of an unconditioned, 
permanent cause exemplified by non-Buddhist notions of Tivara, or a Creator Godý 
Mi pharn explains that the argument is presented in two stagesý The first half of the 
4Mia-sarvam evety5di/ yadi sarvarn ablastam sy5t tadS pratiniyatah gabdInho na prApnoti tata9ca ya kasya- 
cid arthaparih5rega grotuý kvacid arthe sabdAt pravTttiý si na prApnoti/ tasmat sarvarn ablilgarp ity etad 
ayutkarý 
5Roger Jackson (1985: 340) identifies the major differences between Indian concepts such as rdvara, 
brahman and purup, and the Christian concept of God. There are characteristics in common--pcrmanence. ' 
omniscience, independence, creatorship, compassion-but some significant differences too. The Christian 
God does not transform himself into the world like the brahman of most Vedintin schools, rather he creaum 
it ex nihilo and remains transcendent to it. The paramapuruja of the Yoga school neither creates the world 
nor orders it, nor relates to it in any way, whereas the Christian God does all ffirce. In the Nylya-Vaigesika 
school, Tivara does not create the eternal categories (padinhas) of existence but he does arrange the orýer 
of the cosmos. So although due caution must be exercised in using the tcrm'God in the context of the MAIL 
we shall nevertheless employ it here since the chief philosophical purpose of verse 2 is a refutation of 
theism, understood as any theory that attributes the creation and/or ordering of the universe to one source, 
be it personal or impersonal. 
6tshigs bcad kyi phyed snga mas rtag par'dod pa la gcig bdcn bkag/ phyed phyi mas Scig Tnin pa la rtag pa 
bkagpayinno/ Cp. 146- 
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stanza refutes the unitary nature of any truly existing cause, while the second half dis- 
misses the possibility of anything that is not unitary being permanent. He summarises the 
argument as follows. If it is accepted that results occur gradually or in succession (rim 
can) then their cause cannot be unitary. If it were, then it would be capable of producing 
all results at any time. Since we can observe that this is not the case, and that things come 
into being at different times rather than all at once, 7 we have to conclude that their cause 
is not unitary, either because it is not actually capable of producing all results at any given 
time-implying that the cause is therefore subject to change, being efficient in one 
moment and not efficient in another-or that it is dependent on impermanent contributory 
causal factors to effectively produce results, entailing the modification of the cause by the 
contributory factors. This is inconsistent, because conditions cannot function to change 
the permanent. Mi pham's conclusion here rests on the premise that anything of which 
two or more opposed characteristics are predicated cannot be unitary: one cannot say of 
the same entity that it is both efficient and non-efficient in relation to a particular effect. 
There are two distinct questions here which demand separate treatment. The first concerns 
the issue of whether causal action is possible in the case of permanent entities; and speci- 
fically, whether it is coherent to assert that a permanent God can act in time. This is 
central to Western theologians and philosophers too, for whom it is usually expressed as 
"Can God act? And if so, then in what way? " And the second question concerns the rela- 
tionship between unitariness and permanence, involving critical definitions of both terms. 
The second question needs to be addressed first since the terms have to be defined before 
In TS and TSP 413, the point is made that both Buddhists and non-Buddhists agree, on the strength of 
empirical evidence, that effects are not simultaneous but successive. There being no dispute on this, A 5nta- 
raksita is able to open his argument with this point without any further justification. 
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either is considered in relation to action. Indeed, whether or not permanent entities are of 
a unitary nature is crucial to their ability or inability to act. However, for ease of exposi- 
tion we will adopt Mi pham's order here by first outlining the basic argument, and then 
exploring the assumptions behind the argument, including the dcfinitions used, in order to 
evaluate it critically. 
Now, as we said earlier, ýdntaraksita is maintaining that the idea of permanent entities is 
not coherent with that of successive causal actions. And specifically, if God is to act in a 
temporal universe, then God himself must be temporal. 8 Some Indian darfana-s did, 
however, claim this was possible, in so far as they asserted that a permanent cause was 
indeed reliant on conditional factors for production, and they are tantar*ita's opponents 
in this case. The permanent principle of prakni in SAq1khya functions in such a way, since 
it evolves under the influence of puruýa to create the worW Similarly, the puruýa in 
Veddnta creates the world from its own essence, and is both its efficient and material 
cause. 10 And in Nydya-Vaigesika, the principle is applied twice: the itman is eternal yet it 
gives rise to consciousness when acted upon by sense objects; though eternal, it is des- 
cribed as an agent and an enjoyer. " And additionally, the lord 19vara is considered to 
create the world from the elements. 12 
In considering the opponents' views, Mi pham asks whcthcr the pcrmancnt entity remains 
the same, with and without its association to the conditional factors; if not, it is not per-, 
FIhis argument has been made by various Western thinkers in relation to the Judaw-Christian God. See, fDr 
example, God and Timelessness by Nelson Pike, Schocken, New York. 1970. 
9Radhakrishnan (19231.267). 
IoNakamura (1983: 240). 
'ITS 175; Mookerjee (1935: 140). 
12TS 46; Nakamura (1983: 240). 
154 
manent. And if it does remain identical, then the very same conditional factors must be 
present and associated with it all the time. But this possibility is not acceptable since it 
entails continual production of all effects, which we can observe empirically is not the 
case. So this argument apparently refutes the possibility that a permanent cause operates 
in association with conditional factors. But its validity depends on whether or not we can 
accept the Buddhist contention that no independently existing entity can ever be 
connected or in association with anything else, because that very association would render 
it dependent; in other words, any association necessarily entails a modification of the 
principal entity. And furthermore, it is based on the Buddhist assumption (which is not 
necessarily shared by opponents) that all action occurs in time, and as a result of the pre- 
sence of appropriate conditioning factors. That is to say, for instance, that the idea of 
spontaneous action is ruled out. 13 It would follow, of course, that proponents of the spon- 
taneity of divine action would have to remain agnostic when faced with the question as to 
why God chose to act today rather than yesterday. 14 
Neither Mi pham nor ýdntarakýita's TS15 appear to have anticipated the concerns ex- 
pressed by Aquinas about the legitimacy of using univocal language about God. 16 Uni- 
vocal language uses words in broadly the same sense in different situations. For example, 
13By spontaneous here we mean an action that cannot be rationally explained or accounted for, which notion 
is at least feasible with regard to God. 
14There are other views of causality that are not considered here: the Skpkhya view of satkaryavada, which 
holds that the effect exists as a potential in the cause; and the emanation model propounded by early 
Christian theologians, in which the creation is seen as an overflowing of the creative energy of God and an 
expression of his nature such that it does not require a conscious decision to create. The image used is that 
of the sun and the light of the sun. See Christian Theology. An Introduction by Alister E. McGrath, Black- 
well, Oxford, 1994, p. 272. 
15TS 85 is particularly striking in this regard. 8antar*ita argues that it is incoherent to assert that God 
'teaches' a doctrine to human beings, since he is not possessed of a mouth or, indeed, a body. 
16Summa Theologica, 1.13.5 in Philosophy ofReligion: a guide and anthology, ed. Brian Davis, OUP, 2000, 
pp. 156-167. "... words for bodies can only apply to an incorporeal God metaphorically ... all the words we are 
considering carry with them features characteristic of bodies: tense, for example, or concreteness, or other 
bodily conditions. So all these words apply to God metaphorically. " Also see Vardy (1995: 38-44). 
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I can say that my husband loves me, and that my niece loves me, where 'love' is being 
used in the same sense in both cases even though their love may differ. Aquinas argued 
that univocal language cannot be applied to God. If I then say "God loves me", the 
meaning of 'love' must be different because God is timeless and spaceless unlike human 
beings. If language is to be meaningful then univocal language is not an option when 
talking about God. Instead, Aquinas advocated what is technically termed 'analogical 
language', where there is some connection between the way words are used in different 
situations, but where their meanings are not identical. So if we say "Catherine is good" 
and "God is good", we are saying that Catherine is good in whatever way is appropriate 
for a person to be good, and God is good in whatever way it is appropriate for God to be 
good. 17 The only difficulty with analogical language about God is that we do not under- 
stand precisely what it means to say that "God is good". For Aquinas, who was a realist 
with respect to God's existence, we can know that God exists but we cannot know what 
God is. 
The problems that ý5ntarakýita has refuted only occur when language about the divine is 
used univocally and, in this case, the concept of action or activity is applied to God with 
the same meaning and connotations as it is to human beings. But this is unacceptable; 
God is not an individual, does not have a gender, does not have a physical body like us, 
and cannot act in the sense that we do. However, if we speak of divine action analogically 
-whether in relation to the Judaeo-Christian God or to the equivalent notions in Indian 
religions- it is possible that God could act in a timeless way. If words cannot adequately 
convey a full understanding of either the subject or predicate of the proposition 'God acts' 
then it cannot be contradictory. 
17Vardy (1995: 42). 
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Next, Mi pham considers the objection that permanence is not necessarily incompatible 
with change. The idea here is that a unitary whole may vary in time without losing its 
identity, just as ordinary people will say that a dancer who dons a variety of costumes is 
still the same person in the afternoon as he was in the morning. This broaches the issue of 
continuity, which had already been debated so extensively in Buddhist literature that no 
doubt for this reason Mi pham refutes it in just one phrase: "Whatever is not unitary and 
partless cannot reasonably be held to be permanent" . 
18 Significantly, he adds that conti- 
nuity is not being refuted as an imputation but only insofar as it is asserted to be truly 
existent. If results arise in succession, then, the cause must exist in different ways at 
different points in time to account for the variety of results, and this means that it is sub- 
ject to change (pratayasamutpida; rien 'byung) and that its continuity is merely imputed 
(prajn-jptisat, btags yod). The consequence of this for the MAL is that when we take any 
cause to be unitary, this unitariness is only inferred on our part; and since this inference 
does not withstand analysis, it cannot be deemed valid. Here again, it is appropriate to 
note the distinction made by Mi pham between refuting the existence of God as prajilapti- 
sat or btags pa, and refuting God's existence as satyasat or Men par yodpa (he uses the 
term don du); tdntaraksita is concerned only with the latter. 
Ichig6's outline indicates that ýdntarakýita specifically refutes the Vaigqika, view in this 
verse, rather than non-Buddhist views in general, although neither the auto-commentary 
nor Kamalani a's MALP explicitly say this. Mi pham's commentary does not mention this 
either. However, the relevant passages in the TS and TSP19 do explicitly refer to the 
Vaige§ika opponent Uddyotakara, and also to the characteristic Vaige§ika doctrine of 
'8gcig pu cha med pa min phan chad rtag pa mi'thad pas ... / C. p. 146. 29For example, TS and TSP 370-384. 
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inherence (samaviya). 20 Furthermore, kntaraksita's refutation of theism in chapter H of 
the TS is based on that previously made by Dharmaldrti2l, who explicitly attacked the 
views of Uddyotakara. More significantly, perhaps, from a philosophical standpoint, the 
TS asserts in verse 352 that Ny5ya followers do not regard anything at all as momentary, 
and rather than categorizing entities in terms of permanence and impermanence, they dis- 
tinguish them as created and uncreatcd. The Ny5ya and Vai9qika schools had merged 
well before kntarakýita, so it seems legitimate to consider verse 2 of the MAL as a refu- 
tation of the Vais'e0ka view. 
On the face of it, this refutation may not seem very convincing to the modem reader. In 
order to evaluate it, we need to look at its philosophical premisesP as well as the argu- 
ments actually used by the opponents. ýAntarakýita's assumptions can be identified from 
the arguments put forward in Chapter VIR of the TS. First, we win consider his definition 
of permanence and unitariness. 
Unlike NyRya scholars who classify phenomena into created and uncreated, and unlike 
the Vats7iputdyas who classify them into permanent (nitya, rtag pa) and impermanent 
(anitya, mi rtag pa), 23 most Buddhists distinguish between conditioned phenomena (sam- 
skrta-dharma, Vus byas kyi chos) and unconditioned phenomena (asaTskrta-dhartna, 
Vus ma byas kyi chos). Bhdvaviveka24 defines the difference in terms of causality: the 
20TS 418. 
211n the PramdCtwiddhi chapter of the Pramdpavdruika. See also "Dharmaldrtils refutation of theism" by 
Roger Jackson, PEW 36: 4, pp-315-348,1985. 
22In fact these same principles will be found to underpin several more of the arguments used by ýýtaraksita 
later in the text. 
23TS 352. 
24zhes bya ba la'dus byas kyi chos ni rgyu dang rkyen gyis bskyed pa mams so/Pdus ma byas kyi chos ni 
skye ba dang gnas pa dangjig pa dang bral ba mams so// That is, conditioned phenomena arise from [the 
coming together ofl causes and conditions. Unconditioned phenomena are free of arising, continuation and 
destruction. TJV 23c-d, Tibetan text in Eda (1969: 97). 
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former are involved in the causal process while the latter are not. 25 In the Buddhist 
framework, then, non-conditionality is primary and permanence is secondary, in the sense 
that the characteristic of permanence is generally considered to be a possible logical con- 
sequence of non-conditionality, so the latter has to be established first. This means that by 
definition, permanence is associated with a lack of involvement in the causal process, but 
the corollary does not apply. To illustrate that non-conditionality is not necessarily 
associated with permanence in Madhyamaka, we can refer to the sixteen kinds of empti- 
ness summarised by CandrakIrti in MAV 6: 181-218. The eighth kind is terined'the 
emptiness of the unconditioned' (verse 192) and Mi pharn comments on this as follows: 
Phenomena which in the beginning have no arising, in the middle have no conti- 
nuation and at the end have no cessation, are [called] unconditioned. The fact 
that they are 'empty of themselves'(de yis stong nyid) is called 'emptiness of the 
unconditioned'('dus ma byas stong nyid). This is designed to avert any clinging 
to emptiness [as evidenced by] the belief of the Vaibhd#kas and other 9rdvakas 
that nirvana as cessation really exists, and the belief that the unconditioned is * 26 permanent. 
The Vaib*ika view alluded to here will be examined in the next section. 
Now the explanation I have given above was controversial in Tibet, where different 
definitions were advanced by dGe lugs pa thinkers. 27 They did not consider that the cate- 
gory of permanent phenomena was concomitant with the category of non-existing 
phenomena, and held that some permanent phenomena (but not a Creator God) exist. 
Their view is tenable because they define 'permanent' not as 'eternal' but as 'non-momen- 
tary'(akýapika dhanna; skad cig ma ma yin pa7 chos). They consider, for example, that if 
25This definition is a basic Abhidharma one, and not exclusive to Madhyamaka. Vasubandhu expresses this 
view in AK H. 55c-d. "Conditioned things ... are results. The unconditioned has neither cause nor result. " 26chos gang la thog mar skye bar du bnas tha mar mi rtag gsurn po nyid/ de dag med pa'dus ma byas yin la 
'dus ma byas de ni de yis stong nyid gang yin pa de ni'dus ma byas stong nyid do/ stong nyid la zhen pa 
dang/ bye smra sogs nyan thos pa myang'das'gog pa rdzas grub dang/ 'dusmabyaslartagrdzinbzloggo/ 
Mi pharns commentary on verse 192 of the MAV. 
-'I See the discussion in Klein (1998: 46ff. ) 
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a phenomenon such as the emptiness of a table does not disintegrate from moment to 
moment, it is permanent. 28 However, it is not eternal, since it will disintegrate when the 
table ceases to exist. dGe lugs pa scholars further accord both wholes and parts an equal 
ontological status and unlike Abhidharma masters they assert that wholes such as tables 
and chairs exist and function, and are not merely imputed by thought (prajilaptisat, btags, 
yod). 29 It follows that they claim that entities endowed with parts exist and function. 
The dGe lugs pa view is based on that school's unique interpretation of Dharmaldrti, for 
example of the following passage in which Dharmaldrti defines objects of perception. 
Its (i. e. perception's) object is only the specifically characterized. The specifically, 
characterized is the [kind of object] whose nearness or remoteness [creates] a 
difference in the appearance to the cognition. That alone ultimately exists because 
it performs a function, the defining property of things. 30 
The debate centres around the interpretation of what is meant by "ultimately" in the 
phrase "what ultimately exists" (don dam par yod pa). According to the dGe lugs pa pre- 
sentation of Sautriintika perception is non-mistaken, and since composite objects such as 
tables and chairs appear to perception then such objects must exist in reality. Wholes are 
therefore understood as entities that perform a function in that they induce perception, and 
they must be accepted as ultimate since that perception is non-mistaken. It follows that 
composite wholes exist and function ultimately, and are not merely imputed by thought 
(prajn-aptisat, btags yod). 
Neither Sa skya nor rNying ma scholars follow this interpretation. They follow Vasu- 
bandhu, and assert that wholes appear to perception conventionally but not ultimately, 
28dGe lugs pas accept both emptiness and absence as phenomena. See note 35 below. 
29See Klein (1998: 49ff-, 84ff). 
30de'i yul ni rang gi mtshan nyid de/ don gang nye ba dang mi nye dag las shes pa la snang ba tha dad pa de 
ni rang rntshan nyid do/ de nyid don dam par yod pa ste dngos pdi rntshan nyid ni don byed nus pa kho na 
yin pa! i phyir ro/ DharmaUrti, Drop of Reasoning (Nyaya bindu prakarana), P. 5711,329. b. 7-8. Cited and discussed in Dreyfus (1997: 68-9) and Klein (1998: 72). 
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and that what is meant by the phenomena that appear "ultimately" are partless particles 
and indivisible moments of consciousness. Wholes are therefore imputed to thought, and 
only these ultimate existents are not. 31 
A critical evaluation of dGe lugs pa theories is outside of the scope of this study. Our 
purpose here is rather to acknowledge the intellectual context in which kntarakýita's own 
views are to be appreciated today. Although Mi pham was aware of these debates he did 
not engage in them at this point of his commentary, but the simplicity of his one-line 
refutation "Whatever is not unitary and partless cannot reasonably be held to be perma- 
nent" itself indicates his rejection of the dGe lugs pa view. 
The next principle we will consider follows directly from this: existence defined in terms 
of functionality. Following Dharmakini's lead, gdntarakýita (TS 416) writes: "The only 
[i. e. defining] characteristic of an existing entity is that it should have the capacity for 
effective action. 02 Interestingly, he omits the qualification "ultimately". According to this 
definition, then, gantarakýita (TS 392-4) claims that whatever exists must be momentary, 
with the corollary that anything permanent must be non-existent. 33 These arguments cor- 
respond to the second half of verse 2 of the MAL. 
This point is clarified later at TS 470 when ýZintarakýita asserts that momentariness does 
not apply to universals because universals have no function and are therefore non- 
31See Klein and Dreyfus, op. cit. 
12TS 416. asantokýý4 sarve gaktir yad vastulakWaml A similar definition is found in MAL 64 where ýZintarak#a characterizes the relative. See Chapter IX. 2.1-2 below. 
33Similarly, Aryadeva argues that anything that is causeless is non-existent. "Ibere is no functional thing 
without a cause, Nor anything permanent which has a cause. Thus the one who knows suchness said what 
has come about causelessly does not exist. " Catuý. fataka verse 203, transl. Ruth Sonam (1994). Tibetan 
text at www. asianclassics. orghextshengyurfID3846M. ACT@IOA, verse 204: rgyu med par ni dngos po 
med// rgyu Idan rtag pa yod min pa// des na rgyu med las grub ni// de nyid mkhyen pas grub min gsungs// 
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existent. Similarly, Mi phaM34 points out that the MAL does not refute unconditioned 
permanent entities as imputations, only as truly existing entities; and that it 
is on account 
of their not being truly existent that such entities cannot be permanent. 
35 In other words, 
the idea of God is not being refuted, only his or her objective existence. 
36 However, des- 
pite Mi pham's point, the first two lines of verse 2 of the MAL do imply that even 
if the 
idea of God is not refuted as such, the concept of a Creator God is considered to be 
illogical. That is, causal activity is seen to be incompatible with permanence and oneness. 
Thirdly, there is the principle that for Buddhists, there is no alternative to existence and 
non-existence 37 with respect to unconditioned entities; either they exist or they do not 
exist, there is no third possibility between these two. It is for this reason that the notion of 
latent potential is not accepted in this context. This also explains why Indian Buddhists 
refute the existence of non-existence, in other words, they refute the Vaisqika view that 
destruction (pradhvamsa) is itself an entity that acts as an external cause for the cessation 
of the existence of another entityý8 ýdntarakýita (TS 379 and 439-440) argues that when 
Buddhists refer to the annihilation of an entity, they are using a non-affirming negative 
(prasqjyqpratiýedha, med dgag); they are simply saying "it's not there" but not suggesting 
that anything else, such as the absence of that entity, exists in its place. 
34btagS pa! i gcig tsarn ni'dir dgag pa ma yin la/ de don du med pas rtag par bzhag tif ang med do/ 
Unitariness is not refuted here as a mere imputation, [but] since [unitary entities] are ultimately non-existent 
they should not be posited (bzhag) as permanent. C p. 146. 
35Two different definitions are operating here. According to the opponent, whatever is truly existent is per- 
manent. According to 9ýaitar*ita, whatever is permanent is non-existent. 
36This argument is obviously at odds with Anselm's ontological argument, in which he asserts that the very 
idea of God entails that He must exist in reality. 
37Ibis point is made by Uddyotakara when he characterizes the Buddhist view. TSP 370-372 quotes Nyaya- 
vandka 3.2.14 on this. 
38Tibetan Buddhists differed in their interpretation of how the disintegration of conditioned entities comes 
about. For Sa skya Pandita, for example, destruction or disintegration is a nonthing, and it therefore does 
not require a specific 
Luse. In other words, the very impermanent, conditioned nature of an entity is suffi- 
cient to entail its disintegration without the requirement of a specific cause. By contrast, for dGe lugs pa 
thinkers, the absence of a thing is considered positively as capable of being apprehended, and it is logically 
coherent then to infer that it requires a specific cause. See Dreyfus (1998: 64ff.; 244ff. ). 
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Finally, it is considered that causality requires a cause to be of the same nature as its 
effect. Like must produce like; an elephant cannot give birth to a kangaroo; otherwise 
anything could produce anything, and this would mean chaos. 39 This principle could be 
seen as the main one underlying kntarakýita's argument: that if a cause has the nature of 
permanence it cannot logically produce effects that are sequential and momentary because 
then their natures would be contradictory. Similarly, if a cause has a unitary nature, it can 
not logically produce effects that are multiple because their natures would be contra- 
dictory. Logically, a truly existent one cannot produce truly existent many. 
Once again, the coherence of this argument may not be apparent if one follows the dGe 
lugs pa view outlined above, since in that system causal efficacy can be applied to 
wholes. It might follow, then, that a potter could be considered to be the cause of a pot 
when the potter and the pot do not share the same characteristic natures. However, the 
coherence of ýdntarakýita's argument rests on the understanding that he does not interpret 
Dharmaldrti like the dGe lugs pas but follows the thinking presented in Vasubandhu's AK 
where the idea of a characteristic nature is applied only to dharma-s. 
How well has ý5ntarakýita understood his opponents' arguments, and how successful is 
his refutation of them? Of all the Indian dardana-s it was the Ny5ya-Vaigqika school that 
391n MAV 6: 14, Candrakirti refutes 'production from other' on this basis: that a causal process based on 
cause and effect being 'different' or 'other' implies chaos. gzhan la brten nas gal te gshan shig %yung bar 
gyur na ni/Vo na me Ice las kyang mun pa'thug porbyung'gyur shing// thams cad las kyang thams cad 
skye bargyur te gang gi phyir// skyed par byed pa ma yin na lus la yang gshan nyid mtshungs// 
The same principle is expressed in Axyadeva! s CS IX: 21 1. "How can that produced by a permanent thing be 
impermanent? Never are the two, cause and effect, seen to have incongruent characteristics. " In Ruth 
Sonam (1994: 208). Tibetan text at www. asianclassics. orghextshengyur/ID3846M. ACT verse 212: dngos 
po rtag pa las skyes pa// ci Ita bur na mi rtag'gyur// mam yang rgyu dang 'bras bu gnyis// mtshan nyid mi 
mthun mthong ma yin// 
In fact, this principle was accepted by Buddhists and non-Buddhists alike; see for example, Nyaya salras 
IV. L9 in Vidydbhuýana (1975: 109). 
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made a serious attempt to defend theism with logical proofsýo The classic Ny5ya state- 
ment on God as primary cause is found in Nydya satras IV. 1. verses 19-21.41 
It is considered that 11vara is the [sole] cause [offruits], because man's actions 
are loccasionallyfoundl not to bearfiruit. [Some object that this is not so] 
because in the absence of human action there is no production offruits. ISince 
fruits are awarded by God], [we] consider that [mans] actions are not the sole 
cause thereof. 
Vatsy5yana's commentary interprets this passage as saying that Tivara is the cause of all 
e xtsý2 ffe He defines Mara as being free of misapprehension, carelessness and so on, and 
endowed with merit, knowledge and the power of concentration. It is his merit that pro- 
duces merit and demerit in each person, and it is he who sets the elements in action. That 
is to say, he represents the principle that makes it possible for human action to bear results 
entailing that he is the principle underlying the very existence or possibility of causal 
relations. Furthermore, he is the prime mover of the universe. However, there is no 
reference at all to Tivara as creator of the universe. VdtsyZiyana goes on to define Tivara as 
belonging to the category (paddrtha) of substance (dravya), in which it is a special 
instance of self (atman), in control of both kannan and the material elements. 
Uddyotakara, who probably flourished in the period between DignAga and Dharmaldrti 
(i. e. late 6th or early 7th century) during which the NyRya. and Vaisesika schools merged, 
clarified the argument further. He asserted that Mara is the instrumental cause (nimiua- 
kdrapa) of things because he enables beings to reap the fruits of their actions. Moreover, , 
4OSee Jackson, op. cit., p. 318. It should be noted here that since gdntaraksita is concerned with the question - 
of God's action in the world, he effectively refutes theism and not deism, where God is distant from and un- 
involved in his Creation. 
41[19] lgvaraý kAranarp puruýakarmmdphalyadarganAt [201 na puru§akamun-abhAve phal5ni§patteý [211 tat- 
karitatvadahetub The NyCzya SiUras of Gotwna, transl. and ed. MahAmahop5dhyRya Satiga Chandra Vidhyi- 
bhuýana, Oriental Books Reprint Corporation, New Delhi, 1975, p. 1 12. The Sanskrit text, translation and 
commentary are taken from this edition. 
42Dated to around 450 C. E. This is considered by Chandra VidyRbhusana (1913) to be the greatest commen- 
tary on the Nydya satras. 
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he is a necessary adjunct to material results because all results must be preceded by con- 
scious action. Further, although Tivara is permanent, he can cause impermanent entities 
because we can observe that spun yam, though unmoving, is the cause of a movable gar- 
ment. 43 lfvara does not create the eternal atoms that make up the material world, but he 
arranges pre-existent material in an order that underpins the moral consequences of 
actions. Finally, the power and consciousness of Wara are etcmal, omnipresent and 
unlimited. 44 
We will now attempt to summarise the Vaigeýika view by considering its ontology in 
more depth. As we saw above, there are significant differences in the meaning ascribed to 
texistence' or 'being' by Buddhists and Vaiseýikas. The classic reference on this is the 
45 Vaiie#kasatra which defines bhdva as a universal, and sattj as the application of this 
universal principle to substances, qualities and motions (but not the other categories of 
reality)46 while being different from them (arthintara) . 
47 Vaigeýikas therefore accept 
bliava as a supreme over-arching universal which lies over and above the entities in 
which it occurs. The permanence of the universal reality of existence (bhdva) contrasts 
with the impermanence of its instantiation in specific particulars (satt#8 although Halb- 
fass (1992: 140) notes that these terms are sometimes used interchangeably and therefore 
43This argument is curious and inconclusive, since garments do not move by themselves and there does not 
appear to be a significant difference between the way persons can cause spun yam to move and the way 
they can cause garments to move. 
44Nyi7yavarttika IV, 1,19-21. See also Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies: Indian Metaphysics and Epis- 
temology: The Tradition of Nyaya-Vaigeýika up to GaAge9a, ed. Karl H. Potter, Princeton University Press, 
1977, pp. 331-333; and Jackson (1985). 
45VaiYefikasiztra, L 2: bhavah sdmanymn eva. See also On Being and What Viere Is. - Classical Vaifesika 
and the History of Indian Ontology by Wilhelm Halbfass, SUNY, 1992 for an in-depth analysis of thý topic. 
46The categories of reality posited by the Vaigeýika school are: substance (dravya), quality (guoa), concept 
(s&njnya), particularity (vi1efa), and inherence (samavaya). Motion or action is called karma. '"Ibe three 
common qualities of dravya, gu? ta and karma are that they are existent, non-eternal, substantive, effect, 
cause, and possess generality and particularity. " Dasgupta (1922,1999: 1.285-6). 
47sad iti yato dravyaguoakannasu dravyagunakarinabhyo'rthantarp sattV VS 1.2,7-8. Halbfass (1992: 140). 
48Halbfass (1992: n. 7, p. 160). 
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ambiguously. Prasastapada, who lived between Ndgdijuna and Dign5ga, refined the ideas 
in the satra and developed ideas of his own, in particular the notion of factuality, objec- 
tive existence or is-ness (astitva) which he applied to substances, qualities, motions, uni-. 
versals, particularities and inherence. This is characterized as not being necessarily co- 
extensive with knowability (jileyatva) or nameability (abhidheyatva). Consequently, he 
distinguishes two different relations to being: some entities, specifically those categorized 
as universals, particularities and inherence, are 'intrinsically real' (svitmasattva) while . 
others (namcly substances, qualities and motions) are joined temporarily with being (satta 
sambandha). This highlights the importance of inherence (samavdya) which can function. - 
as the connection between relata that are ontologically distinct, that is, between reals (sat), 
and contingent entities, between wholes and parts, or between substrates and their 
qualities or motions, on the analogy of the relation between container and contained . 
49 
The refutation of this doctrine in the MAL is obviously extremely brief, and does not pur- 
port to be comprehensive, the TS having fulfilled that function previously. Nevertheless, 
we would expect it to address the doctrine fundamentally, at its root. Does it do this? 
Taking Dharmakirti's refutation of Vaigeýika theism as our reference, we note that this 
falls into three main parts. 50 First, he refutes Tivara's authority; second, he questions 
ffvara as a conscious cause of worldly effects; and third, he refutes ffvara as a causal 
agent by examining the characteristics of the causal process. In the MAL, only the third 
type of refutation is used. Having said that, ýdntar*ita addresses the question of the true 
existence of consciousness separately, in verses 16-60, but only within an internalist 
49gAntar*ita! s critique of the Vaigeýika doctrine is detailed in the TS in which he devotes chapters X to 
XV to an analysis of each of their categories (padartha) in tum. In verses 571-3 he refutes their classifica- 
tion of reality into categories of reals on the grounds that it is based on the erroneous assumption that the 
structure of language reflects that of reality itself. In particular, the use of the genitive in such phrases as 'the 
colour of the cloth' or 'categories of existence' cannot lead to a valid conclusion regarding inherence. 
5OPrarnapasiddhi chapter of the Pramdýavdrttika, verses 8-9,10-20, and 21-28. See also Jackson (1985). 
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model of epistemology, so as a refutation of theism it is unsatisfactory. The issue of 
authority, however, is not addressed here at all. 
gantarakýita's reasoning is not very original. The refutation of the unitary existence of 
an entity on the grounds that it is made of parts, either spatially or temporally, is classi- 
cally found in the Abhidharma. For example, Milindapailha 1.1 argues that a chariot does 
not substantially exist because it is not unitary and partless, it therefore exists merely as a 
designation; likewise, the person does not substantially exist because it can be reduced 
through analysis to a sum of different functions (1.1), and the identity of a person as a 
permanent entity is also mistaken because it can be seen to change and involve different 
temporal parts (H. 1). However, the MAL differs from this presentation in so far as it 
refutes permanence/unitariness on the grounds that they contradict the causal process. 
Several Madhyamikas before ýdntarakýita used a similar argument. As we mentioned 
earlier, it reflects a characteristically Madhyamaka interpretation of pratTlyasamutpMa, 
showing that causality is logically impossible if entities are held to be truly existent. 
Aryadeva, for instance, devoted Chapter 9 of the CS to a refutation of permanent pheno- 
mena, and Chapter 15 to his refutation of truly existent characteristics in entities involved 
in production. His arguments mainly centre around issues of timing (does the cause pre- 
cede the effect or not? ) and around ontological problems related to essence and difference 
(what is the definition of 'otherness'? ). Candralirti's arguments in MAV 6: 13-22 against 
the production of an effect from a truly existent cause that is 'other' than it, have a similar 
basis to Aryadeva's. The 'neither one nor many' argument used by ýZintarakýita was used 
previously in a similar context by Ridnagafta in verse 14 of the SDV, as mentioned 
above, so its use in the MAL is not an innovation. 
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In conclusion, we have seen that gZintaraksita's refutation of theism hinges very largely on 
the Buddhist definition of existence, and it could be argued that the definition itself begs 
the question. To define existence as functionality (arthakriyAdritva) and momentariness 
(kýapikatva) eliminates the possibility of permanent existence from the outset. On the 
other hand, it is difficult to reconcile the true existence of permanence with a dynamic 
relationship to the impermanent, if we take permanence to refer to eternality and not to 
medium-term continuity. Likewise, it is not easy to fathom what it means to say that a 
truly existent one can have a connection (sambandha) with multiple contingent entities, 
be they established as existent or not. The Vaigeýika solution to these problems, deve- 
loped in the theory of inherence (samaviya) only displaces the difficulty. By pin-pointing 
the issues of number and timing, gdntarakýita does therefore appear to have refuted the 
fundamental weaknesses of his opponent's position. Within the theoretical perspective of 
the rNying ma school his refutation is coherent and convincing. 
But from a broader perspective, his refutation of theism raises other more fundamental 
philosophical questions. We might attack it, in particular, on the grounds that it is philo- 
sophically inconclusive. The antagonism between Ny5ya-Vai9qika and Buddhist views 
on theism can be seen to rest not so much on the validity or invalidity of the rational 
arguments involved, but rather on the pre-philosophical premises underlying those argu- 
ments. 51 Both Buddhist and non-Buddhist dardana-s attempted to discover an immutable 
state that was free of the vicissitudes of saýnsdra, and yet in their attempts to understand 
this state, they arrived at very different conclusions. On the basis of religious experience 
and logic, Hindu schools, including Ny5ya-Vai9qika, concluded that if we are to account 
for the continuity of the impermanent entities of our empirical world, they must in some 
5'See Roger Jacksorýs critique, op. cit., p. 339. 
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way be subsumed by an eternal substance. Buddhists, on the other hand, concluded on the 
basis of their religious experience and logic, that there is not nor could there be any eter- 
nal substance because such a substance could not interact with the impermanent world. 
Hindus insist on the necessity of permanence to explain continuity, while Buddhists insist 
on the necessity of impermanence to explain change. These are deep-seated antithetical 
positions, and despite their common ground of shared logical rules, one suspects that both 
sides are using reasoning merely as a tool for explicating a pre-philosophical view. In 
such a case, their differences are irreconcilable. 
We might be tempted at this point to dismiss all Indian thinking as pre-philosophical or 
even as non-philosophical, just as Anthony Flew has done. 52 But there are other ways of 
approaching this problem which show it to be common to both Indian and Western philo- 
sophies. Rudolf Carnap maintains that ontological questions such as'does God existTare 
invariably posed in relation to a particular conceptual framework. 53 He defines a frame- 
work as a system of terms and expressions, together with rules governing those terms and 
expressions. Ontological questions can be divided into internal questions and external 
questions, that is, questions asked within the system and questions asked from outside the 
system looking in. Internal questions are philosophically trivial: to ask'does God existT 
from within the Christian theological framework, for example, will of course yield an 
affirmative answer because God has already been accepted as part of the framework. To 
ask it from outside of the framework is quite different and, according to the deflationist 
theory developed by Carnap, the answer can only be a pragmatic one related to the per- 
52An Introduction to Western Philosophy - ideas and argumentfrom Plato to Popper by Anthony Flew, Thames and Hudson, 1971,1989 revised, p. 36. 
5"Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology'by Rudolf Carnap, in Philosophy ofMathematics, ed. P. Benacerraf 
and H. Putnam, Cambridge University Press, 1983, pp. 241-257. 
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ceived advisability of adopting the framework itself. The reason for this is that 'existence', 
takes its meaning from within a given framework-what we mean by the existence of 
prime numbers is quite different from what we mean by the existence of a vase or the, 
existence of God-so external questions cannot yield satisfactory metaphysical answers. 
Now this model is applicable to our situation, insofar as gantarak§ita is questioning the 
existence of Tivara from outside the Hindu theistic framework. Arguably, his fundamental 
reason for not accepting the existence of Tivara is pragmatic and soteriological, logic 
alone being inconclusive. As we have seen, what he understands by 'existence' is different 
from the meaning ascribed to it within his opponenfs framework. 
The difficulty lies in the deflationist implication that frameworks and the truths they yield 
do not reflect reality. 54 Hindus claim that when they speak of Mara they are speaking of 
the real, and that language (dabda) has a direct and powerful connection to reality. The 
Svatantrika school holds that dhannic discourse can point to the ultimate. So neither side 
would admit that they are merely speaking within an axiomatic framework which reveals 
nothing about metaphysical truth. This is the crux of the problem: their respective theories 
of language preclude them from recognizing that their debate has no real common ground 
and that the pre-philosophical experiences on which it is based are radically different. 
55 
it is therefore highly significant that gdntaraklita's refutation is logical rather than onto- 
54For a discussion of this topic, see Arguing for Atheism: an introduction to the philosophy of religion by 
Robin Le Poidevin, Routledge, London and New York, 1996, pp. 124-134. 
5571bis difficulty is by no means peculiar to Indian philosophy. For example, in God, Reason and 77teistic 
Proofs, pp. 192-3, Stephen Davis writes: "In the end it does seem that theistic proofs are very much optional 
for theists. The fact of the matter is: I enjoy discussing theistic proofs, consider the enterprise valuable, and 
even consider that there do exist successful theistic proofs. Nevertheless, the reason I am a theist has almost 
nothing to do with theistic proofs. It has a great deal to do with experiences I have had that I interpret in 
terms of the presence of God ... That is why I would be extremely suspicious of any apparently successful 
atheistic proof. That is why I claim to know that God exists. " 
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logical. He does not attack his opponent's view with reference to any correspondence 
theory of truth, but rather on the grounds that it is internally and logically incoherent. 56 He 
does not question the Vaigeýika religious experience per se, he refutes as incoherent the 
way they interpret it. ýdntarakýita's refutation should therefore be measured solely in 
terms of its logical coherence. 
VI. 2.2 The existence of permanent unitM dharma-s asserted by the Vaibhasikas 
Next, gZintaraksita turns to the views of certain Buddhist schools, and discusses the 
existence of unconditioned dhamia-s in verses 3 to 8. 
[3] According to the [Vaibhiiýika] view, the unconditioned are objects or the 
cognition that arises through meditation; so the unconditioned are not [in 
fact] unitary entities since they are related to successively arising [moments 
of] cognition. 
bsgoms las byung bai shes pa yisll shes bya Vus ma byas smra ba'ill 
lugs la'ang gcig min de dag nill rim can shes dang 'brel phyir roll 
[4] If the intrinsic nature of an [object] known by a former cognition 
continues to exist [in the object of a] later [cognition], the former cognition 
becomes the succeeding one, and the latter becomes the same as the former. 
rnam shes snga mas shes bya ba'L11 rang bzhin rjes su 'brang na nill 
shes pa snga maang phyi mar 'gyurllphyi ma 'ang de bzhin snga mar 'gyurll 
[5] [On the other hand], if the essence of that [object] does not occur at all 
previous and subsequent occasions, it should be understood that the uncondi- 
tioned is a momentary occurrence, Just like cognition. 
sngon dang phyi ma 7 gnas mams sull de yi ngo bo mi 'byung nall 
Vus ma byas de shes pa bzhinll skad cig 'byung bar shes par byall 
[6] If it arises by the force of successive moments, the unconditioned is not 
[really] unconditioned, just like mind and mental states. 
snga ma snga ma 7 skad cig gill mthu yis 'byungs bar 'gyur ba nall 
'dus ma byas su 'di mi 'gyurll sems dang sems las byung ba bzhinll 
[7] If it is asserted that these momentary entities have arisen independently, 
they would remain permanently existent or non-existent, since they are not 
reliant on anything else. 
skad cig pa rnams Vi dag tull rang dbang 'byung bar 'dod na nill 
gzhan la b1tos pa med pai phyirll rtag tu yod paam med par 'gyurll 
56For a discussion of the relation between these different understandings of truth to the question about the 
existence of God, see Vardy (1995: 15-23). 
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[8] [Finallyj since these propounded entities cannot perform any function'. 
what is the point of investigating them? Lustful [women] may wonder 
whether a eunuch is handsome or not, but what purpose will their examina- 
tion serve? 
don byed nus pa ma yin Ia// de 'dod brtags pas ci zhig byall 
ma ning gzugs bzang mi bzang zliesll'dod Idan rnwns kyis brtags ci phanll 
ýAntarakýita's first point, in verse 3, is to show the self-contradictory character of the 
Vaibhdsika view, according to which there are unconditioned states that are the objects of, 
consciousness and that exist substantially (dravya) as dhanna-s. This view is presented 
by Vasubandhu in the first and second chapters of the AK and AKB. According to the 
Vaibhdýika school there are three unconditioned things, namely "space and the two types 
of nirodha" ý7 In terms of those things that are "objects of the cognition that arises 
,, 58 through meditation practice , i. e. the category specifically targeted by verse 3 of the 
MAL, 59 we are concerned here with the two types of cessation (nirodha) termed prati- 
sathkhydnirodha (the cessation of impure dhanna-s due to knowledge) and aprati- 
saihkhydnirodha (the cessation of impure dharma-s due not to knowledge but rather to the 
insufficiency of causes for their arising). 60 Vasubandhu explains that these are indeed 
considered by the VaibMýikas as objects (Wambana) of the mind. He states that "all the 
dharma-s, conditioned as well as unconditioned, are'objectsof consciousness of the 
mind and its mental states" ý' Vasubandhu also confirmS62 that unconditioned dhanna-s 
are held by the Vaibhd§ikas to be real, independent, substantially existing entities 
(dravya). 
57AK 1: 5c. Pruden, vol. 1, p. 59- 
5WAL verse 3: bsgoms las byung ba'i shes pa yis/ 
5Me question of space will be dealt with in verse 10 under the general unitary pervading entities. 
6OTbe explanation given here is based on AK and AKB 1.5c-6d, op. cit., pp. 59-60. 
61AKB 2: 62c. 
62AKB 2: 55d. "This dharma, in its nature, is real but indescribable ... it is only possible to indicate its general 
characteristics, by saying that there is a real entity (dravya), distinct from others, which is good, and eternal, 
and which receives the name of pratisarhkhydnirodha ...... Transl. Pruden, p. 280. 
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Now the incoherence of this view arises, argues gdntarakýita, from the fact that the 
Vaibhdýikas assert that consciousness is a serial continuum, 
63 that the apprehension of 
objects of knowledge occurs as a series of momentary events, and that consequently un- 
conditioned dhanna-s-like conditioned dharina-s-must exist in a series corresponding 
to the series of mental objects apprehended. This follows for two reasons. First, the 
VaibhROkas asserted that perception is non-mistaken, so the way things appear to us is the 
way they actually arc. And second, the Vaibhaýikas believed that unconditioned dhanna-s 
can be apprehended in meditation by the human mind, so they can be treated as objects of 
knowledge. Therefore, if they do exist in a series, then they cannot be unconditioned since 
by definition "unconditioned dharina-s are outside of time", 64 the "unconditioned lasts 
eternally in its own nature , 65 and is "devoid of the characteristic 'arising"'. 
66 Furthermore, 
these dhanna-s could no longer be unitary, unconditioned entities since each moment of 
their existence would be distinct from every other. 
Since the main thrust of gdntarakýita's argument is to show that unconditioned dharma-s 
cannot be unitary, it is interesting to note that this is acknowleged by the Vaibhaýikas 
themselves. With respect to pratisarhkhydnirodha, they admit that it does not exist as one 
single dharma because the cessation of each defilement occurs separately. Otherwise, 
the cessation of one defilement would automatically entail cessation of them all. 
Is there but one single pratisadikhyiinirodhaftom all of the impure dharma-s? 
No. 
Why is this? 
[6b] Each [cessation occurs] separately. 
Each cessation taken separately is pratisaflikhyanirodha. The objects of cessation 
63 AK and AY. B 1: 38b, op. cit., p. 105. "The last three dh&w-s are momentary. 71be last three dhatu-s are 
the mental organ, the object of mental consciousness, and the mental consciousness. " Unconditioned 
dharma-s are specifically objects of the mental consciousness (see AKB 1-48a, op. cit., p. 129). 
64AKB, 2: 55a-b, op-cit., p. 278. 
65AKB, 2: 45c-d, op. cit., p. 239. 
66AKB, 2: 46c-d, op. cit., p. 249. 
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are as numerous as the objects that arise. If it were otherwise, if pratisaflmyd- 
nirodha were single, then a person who has experienced the extinction of the 
defilement which is abandoned by seeing the Truth of Suffering would have 
obtained at the same time the extinction of the deftlements which are abandoned 
by the Seeing of the other Truths, and by meditation. It would be uselessfor him to 
cultivate the part of the Path which is opposed to these deftlements. 67 
The argument used in the MAL, therefore, pointing to the relation between unconditioned 
dhanna-s and the successively arising moments of wisdom that ascertain them, is 
directly related to this passage of the AK since both are based on an analysis of the nature 
of cognition. In so far as anything is an object of cognition it must be conditioned, which 
implies it is composite. The contradiction inherent in the Vaibhdýika view hinges on the 
incompatibility of maintaining that unconditioned dhanna-s substantially exist outside of 
time while also asserting that they are objects of the mind ascertained through meditation. 
The passage from the AK and AKB quoted above illustrates that this particular argument 
of ýantarakýita's is not new. He has relied on previous sources, namely the Abhidharina- 
koia and the Vibhdýd, to make his point without adding anything new. In verses 4 and 5 
gdntarakýita develops his argument further, exploring more contradictions related to 
unconditioned dhanna-s being objects of cognition. Here, the point he makes is that if the 
nature of these dharma-s is eternal and unchanging, they would give rise to an unchang- 
ing cognition, and this is impossible since cognitions occur in a series. In other words, the 
same object would continue to exist for successive moments of cognition; what I appre- 
hend at t, is entirely identical with what I apprehend at t2, t3 and so on. But this is non- 
sensical, since each moment of cognition is defined by having a distinct object and a 
distinct moment of apprehending consciousness, so that the continuously existing dharrna 
67AK 1: 6b, op. cit., p. 60. The notes by Louis de la Vall6e Poussin indicate that this point is based on 
wbhjyj TD27, p. 16406. 
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would be overlaid with a momentary dharma relating to the same phenomenon in each 
given moment of perception. The only solution to this situation is to say that the uncon- 
68 ditioned dhanna is momentary, like cognition , which is tantamount to saying that it is 
not in fact unconditioned at aH. 
Now this argument rests on a number of assumed principles. The first is that the nature of 
an unconditioned dharina is eternal and unchanging. What does this mean? According to 
the definitions given by Vasubandhu, even conditioned dhartna-s have such natures. He 
explains that conditioned dhanna-s exist in time but that, despite this, "a dhartna does not 
change its nature by changing its time period". 69 To Mustrate this, he uses two language- 
specific (and hence rather unsatisfactory) examples: milk in the udder is called 'that 
which has been drawn, and a heap of kindling is called'wood to be burned. The implica- 
tion is that although a dharina is momentary, since it arises, lasts and decays, its'nature'is 
not. As Williams (1981) explains, impermanent dhanna-s are particular instantiations of 
permanent natures (svabhdva). 
These arguments raise two concerns. What is meant by existence? And what is meant by 
nature? If we consider existence first, we see that the Vaibhiiýikas assert that conditioned 
dharma-s exist in past, present and future; in other words that existence (sat) is not only 
ascribed of present things, but also of past things and future things. 70 The past exists now 
and the future exists now. If this is the case, how do conditioned dhanna-s differ from 
68MAL 5: 'dus ma byas de shes pa bzhin// skad cig "byung bar shes par bya// 
69AKB 1: 7a-b, op. cit., p. 61. 
7OIn his grub paY mtha7 main par bzhagpa rinpo cheYphreng ba, dKon mchogjigs med dbang po (1728- 
91) characterizes the Vaibh5sikas as follows: "(the Vaibh4ikas propound) that the three times [past, present 
and future] are particulars [or instances] of substantial entities... Yesterday's pot exists today as a past pot. 
The past of a thing occurs after its present existence, that is, after its present existence has passed. 
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unconditioned dharma-s that exist etemaRy? In his notes on AK 1-48b, Louis de la. Vall6e 
Poussin explains that unconditioned things are eternal because they do not go from one, 
time period to another. This is unconvincing. The system requires radical revision if it is 1. - 
to be coherent. 
This was the aim of Sarpghabhadra, an important orthodox Vaibhdýika who wrote a 
commentary on the Abhidharmakoia in response to Sautriintika critique. In his Nydyd- 
nusara7l he distinguishes between different types of existence: 72 the inherent nature 
(svabhjva) of a dharma exists in past, present and future, but its ability to act causally 
(karitra) exists only in the present. So the presence or absence of svabhava does not 
determine a dharma's temporal status, but does determine whether it is a primary existent 
(dhartna, dravyasat) or a secondary existent (prajhaptisal). Primary existents are the 
elementary building blocks of reality which cannot be further divided either physically or 
conceptually, whereas secondary existents are conceptually constructed entities composed 
of, and dependent on, dhanna-s. This classification leads to a definition of the Two 
Truths according to the Vaibhdýikas the implications of which will emerge later. 
Existents are of two sorts: those which exist substantially, inherently, and those 
which exist as designations. These two categories correspond, infact, to the dis- 
tinction between ultimate truth and experiential truth. 73 
ýdntarakýita`s argument also rests on other assumptions that revolve around Vaibhdýika , 
epistemology. One of these is the theory that consciousness is always intentional, in other 
Tomorrow's pot exists today as a future pot. The future of a thing occurs before its present existence, that is, 
when its present existence is yet to be. Today's pot exists as a present pot today. " (Sopa and Hopkins, 1989, 
P. 180 and 192). This theory was deemed necessary to accomodate memory and imagination within the con- 
text of the intentionality of consciousness. 
71This text is now extant only in Chinese. Parts of it have been translated into French by Poussin (1937). 
72See Paul Williams' article 'On the Abhidharma Ontology, in JIP 9 (198 1), pp. 227-257; and the Vaibh5sika 
chapter in On Being Mindless: Buddhist meditation and the mind body problem by Paul J. Griffiths, Opin 
Court, La Salle, Illinois, 1986, pp. 43-75. 
73Translated from Poussin (1937), a: 28. 
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words it is always consciousness of something, and this is combined with an a priori 
assumption that the object of cognition must exist. Along with this, they hold a causal 
theory of cognition. There must be a referential cause of cognition, namely the object of 
cognition, so that every moment of cognition arises from two factors coming together: 
an object and the corresponding sense-organ. This principle is necessary in the Vaibhd- 
ýika system since cognition, being a conditioned phenomenon, arises from multiple 
causes. Furthermore, the senses are said to apprehend the sensory world directly, as it is; 
in other words, there is unmediated contact between the senses and their corresponding 
sensory objects. 74 This is consistent with the idea that objects of cognition exist, and in 
the particular case of unconditioned dharma-s apprehended through meditation, these also 
must exist as they are objects of the mental consciousness (manovij; Wna). However, 
existence is usuaRy characterized by 'the three marks': 75 impennanence (aniiya), suffering 
(duýkha) and no-self (andunan) or, in an alternative enumeration, by arising, old age and 
impermanence; so to say that anything 'exists eternally' is a contradiction in terms unless 
we can distinguish between what it means for a conditioned thing to exist, and what it 
means for an unconditioned thing to exist. This problem was a subject of debate between 
Vaibh5gikas and Sautrantikas. 76 The theory developed by Samghabhadra is one response. 
As kntarakýita argues that an eternal object would give rise to an eternal cognition of it, 
he is also assuming that the nature of the object of cognition corresponds to the nature of 
the cognition itselL This is so because they are causaUy connected, and in Buddhist 
logic a cause can only produce an effect of the same species. 77 The problem is that this 
74AK 1: 42a, op. cit., p. 114: "It is the organ of sight which sees visible matter. " 
75SajpyUtta Nikdya IV. 259 and Aigwara Nikaya IV. 293. 
76See AK and AKB 2: 45c-d, op. cit., pp. 238-9. 
77See Dignaga's Pranoýzasamuccqya, 61.9b (Hattori, 1969: 68). "A result that is different could not be 
found. " 
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goes against another Buddhist tenet, namely that consciousness itself is not unconditioned 
but momentary. Indeed, its intentionality alone makes it momentary. Hence kntarakýita's 
conclusion that two cognitions of the same unconditioned object would have to occur 
simultaneously if both these principles were to be satisfied. 
95. ntarakýita's argument in verse 3 implies that since consciousness is a stream of aware-, 
ness of events occurring in time, it cannot apprehend an object that is not also of that 
nature. 78 This does not in itself imply that nirvd,: ta and other unconditioned dharma-s are 
untenable, but it does imply that even if they were to exist, we would not be able to know 
them. The downfall of the Vaibh5sika position is that it asserts that nirvina is an object of 
knowledge, which it is bound to do since it holds that consciousness is always intentional. 
The Vaibhdýika view is logically absurd, and has been defeated through prasafiga 
reasoning. 
ýdntarakýita's refutation in verses 3-5 bears on the existence of one type of ultimate in the 
Vaibha§ika system, namely unconditioned primary existents. But the implications of his 
refutation are more far-reaching than they may at first seem. His argument identifies the. 
main flaw as being the very possibility that anything unconditioned can be an object of 
consciousness. But for the Vaibhdýikas, the ultimate (whether conditioned or uncondi- 
tioned dhanna-s) can always be an object of consciousness, indeed it is apprehended 
either conceptually through reductionist analysis79 or in an arhaf s meditation. A more 
7TIbiS point Was made by niKhan po Chos grags in his oral commentary on this text, in Hookham (1999). 
79By Ireductionist analysis, I refer here to the Buddhist method of analytically reducing things to their parts, 
and the parts to their parts, and so on. It is a logical sequence which deconstructs the apparent wholeness of 
composite entities by revealing that they are not only composed of parts, but are nothing other than the suM 
of their parts. Infu-Ate regress is avoided by asserting that partless particles are ultimate, and hence the buil- 
ding blocks of reality. The point of the analysis, which is carried out by using logic and contemplative 
meditation together, is that the student realizes that once it is broken down into its component parts, nothing 
remains that can be called a whole over and above the sum of its parts. Since the resulting notion of a lack 
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fundamental flaw, then, lies in the whole Vaibhaýika approach to the Two Truths. If 
ultimate truth is defined as an object of consciousness (viifldna), it can never be a true 
ultimate since the cognition process is momentary and conditioned. At best it is only a 
logical ultimate. In Chapter IX on the Two Truths we will consider whether the same 
flaw applies to Madhyamika ideas about the apprehension of the ultimate. 
Next, in verse 6, ýdntarakýita attacks these same unconditioned dharma-s on the grounds 
that they are, in fact, subject to causation and are not reaUy unconditioned. They arise by 
the power of successive (preceding) moments. 80 The Abhidharmakoda explains this in 
several ways. For example, it is said that nirvioa depends on certain indriyas, faculties 
that have the power to bring something about. 
The fivefaculties-faith, force, memory, absorption, discernment-are the 
support of nirvana. Nirvana is generated, appearsfor thefirst time, through the 
first purejaculý, anZijiiatam5jiiiisyiinii7ndriya. Nirvdýia lasts, is developed, through 
the second purefaculty, djftendriya. Nirvdiýa is 'experienced'by the third pure 
faculty, 5jfidt, 5v-Indriya, for, through thisfaculty, one experiences the satisfaction 
and well-being of deliverance. 81 
The result of arhat is obtained through nine indriyas: the mental organ, either 
satisfaction, pleasure or indifference, thefive moralfaculties, iijfiendfiya and 
dyi, qtaVý &iya. 82 In 
In addition, the Vaibh59ikas assert that a person masters or appropriates the unconditioned 
states by means of a dharma named prdpti (acquisition, possession, mastery). "As for 
unconditioned dhanna-s, there is prdpti of pratjsaihkhyjnirodha and apratisathkityd- 
nirodha. , 83 The process is further explained: "Possession (prdpti) has an effect. It is the 
of inherent existence is arrived at through reasoning and experienced in meditation, it holds personal con- 
viction. 
IOMAL 6: snga ma snga maI skad cig gi// mthu yisbyung bar'gyur ba na// 
81AKB 2: 6, op. ciL, p. 159. 
82AKB 2: 16c, op. cit., p. 177. 
83AK 2: 36c, op. cit., p. 207. 
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cause of the arising of the dharma-s". 84 All this certainly appears to indicate that the two 
unconditioned dhanna-s that are apprehended through meditation are the results of a 
causal process. However, we should note that the Vaibhagika theory of causation is 
different from that of other Buddhist schools. When they assert dharma-s to be kdrana- 
hetu, that is, they function as the cause for something else to arise, this can be applied in 
one of two ways. "What is called cause or reason for existence [i. e. karaVahetul may be 
what is capable of causing, or of not causing an obstaclc". 85 In other words, the 
Vaibhdýikas admit that a dharma may be involved in the causal process passively, as it 
were, simply by virtue of not preventing something else from arising. 
The Vaibh5sikas were clearly sensitive about criticism on this issue, and it re-appears, 
later in the Abhidharmakoia at 2: 55d. In this passage, they maintain that "the uncondi- 
tioned has neither cause nor result", and explain this by adding that "it is the obtaining or 
the possession (prapti) of cessation which is the result of the path, and not cessation 
itself'. So although the path is not strictly speaking the cause of cessation, one can 
loosely say that pratisathkhydnirodha is the result of the path. Furthermore, it is correct to 
say that unconditioned things are themselves causes (kara? tahetu) but only in the sense 
that they do not create an obstacle to the arising of any dharina. However, they are not 
involved in the causal process in the usual sense since they do not produce results. "Being 
outside of time, [an unconditioned thing] can neither project nor produce a result". 
Interestingly, the Vaibh5§ikas defend the need to assert unconditioned things as causes on 
the grounds that otherwise they could not function as "an object as condition" (dlambana- 
pratyaya) of the intentional consciousness that refers to them. 86 So the whole problem 
84AKB 2: 36d, op. cit., p. 208. 
85AKB 2: 50a, op. ciL, P. 256. 
86 See Pruden, op. ciL, pp. 278-280. 
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derives from a rigid theory on the intentionality of consciousness. We might conclude that 
if consciousness is asserted as only intentional, we can never know an ultimate truth since 
cognition necessarily arises from a conditioned consciousness apprehending a conditioned 
object by means of conditioned senses. It follows that even if there is something that is 
true ultimately, cognition of it would behave in the same way as cognition of relative 
things. Even nirvapa in such a system is not true liberation since it is an object of condi- 
tioned consciousness like any other. On the rNying ma view of what is meant by ultimate 
truth, this is absurd. 87 
Verse 7 of the MAL restates the argument of verse 6, while verse 8 concludes knta- 
rak§ita's first refutation: that of the existence of permanent entities asserted by non- 
Buddhist and Buddhist dardana-s. The humour of verse 8 is revealing, where interest in 
the nature of unconditioned phenomena is likened to the curiosity displayed by lustful 
women in the body of a eunuch. Maybe ýdntarakýita is keen to dismiss these opponents, 
and eager to move on to what he sees as more interesting and substantial topics. Indeed, 
the question as to whether anything permanent and unconditioned exists smacks of the 
type of metaphysical speculation which the Buddha rejected as being fruitless. 138 The point 
ýdntarakýita is making in this stanza is that since a permanent, unconditioned nirvd, ýa can 
not be the object of a conditioned consciousness, then it cannot be the eternal end to con- 
ditioned existence; consequently, it does not serve the function that it was meant to per- 
forin. And if investigating nirvatza is not an aid to liberation, then it is useless since the 
purpose of knowledge is always liberation. 89 Even here, ýdntarakýita is pointing out con- 
87 See Chapter IX below. 
88See Harvey (1990), pp. 65-6. Sfitra passages on the undetermined questions that Buddha did not answer 
include Samyutta IV. 373-400, Majhima 1.126-31 and 1.395. 
89As Vasubandhu asserts at the beginning of the AK: "Apart from the discernment of the dharma-s, there is 
no means to extinguish the defilements, and it is by reason of the defilements that the world wanders in the 
ocean of existence. So it is with a view to this discernment that the Abhidharma has been, they say, taught 
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tradictions inherent in the Vaibhdýika system without voicing his own view. Whether or 
not we agree with the idea that knowledge has a soteriological goal does not matter; the 
point is that this school is internally inconsistent. 
VI. 2.3 Refuting Mrsons as truly existent uni! M entities 
In verse 9 of the MAL, kntarakOta refutes the true existence of persons. It is important 
to note here that he is dealing specifically with concepts of the person which fall under 
the category of 'permanent unitary phenomena'. 'ýO So for example, he is not refuting any, 
concept of the person based on partless moments since he has not yet established that 
such moments are neither one nor many. 91 
Other than as momentary or non-momentary the person (gang zag, pudgala) 
cannot be demonstrated. That it's nature is neither unitary nor multiple 
is therefore clearly and thoroughly recognized. 
skad cig skad cig ma yin par11 gang zag bstan du mi rung basll 
gcig dang du mai rang bzhin dang11 bral bar gsal bar rab tu shesll 
Although the refution of the true existence of persons is one of the hallmarks of 
I '; I Buddhism, gantarak§ita only devotes one stanza to this in the MAL. The brevity of his re- 
futation must be seen in context. Firstly, the issue of persons had been debated from the 
earliest days of Buddhist philosophy, as testified by the Kathdvatthu which is dated to 
the third century B. C. E. The philosophical arguments had been explored in detail by 
several masters before kntarakýita, in particular by N5g5rjuna (MMK chapters VIII an d 
XVHI), by Vasubandhu (AK chapter IX), by BhRvaviveka (MMH Chapter IV: 89-92) and 
by Candraldrd (MAV 6: 120-165). Secondly, ýdntaraksita had already reviewed the argu- 
[by the Buddha]. AY. B 1: 2c-d, op. cit., p. 57. 
9OKamalaffla! s pahjik4 says that what is thoroughly established to be a person in this case is an entity whose 
nature is either unitary or multiple, existing as an aggregation [of parts] each of which is permanent. re zhig de Itar rtag pA phung po gnas pa mams la geig dang du maI rang bzhin dang bral bar bsgrubs pa yin no// , Ichip (1985.43). MALP P-93a. 
910ral commentary by mKhan po Chos grags. 
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ments himself in chapter VH of the TS. Does the brevity of the MAL's treatment of the 
topic imply that he had nothing to add? It does; but there are wider implications to the 
issue of the refutation of persons as we shall argue. 
The use of the term gang zag (pudgala) in verse 9 indicates that this refutation targets the 
Pudgalavddins, and is not intended to address non-Buddhist views of the person. In parti- 
cular, according to the commentaries, ýZintarakýita is concerned with the doctrine of the 
VAts-Iputdyas (gnas ma bu pa) who are classified as a subschool of the Sarpmat7iyas. 92 Un_ 
fortunately, their views are known to us largely from statements made by their opponents, 
there being little surviving V5ts-iputilya literature. 93 Bareau (1955: 115-120) has 
summarised the main theses attributed to them under forty different headings, ranging 
across many aspects of Buddliist doctrine. For the purposes of the refutation in verse 9, 
the views that are relevant here are the following: the person (pudgala) is perceived 
(upalabhyate) as a manifest entity (saksUklaparamdrthena). The person is neither iden- 
tical (sama) with the aggregates (skandlia) nor different (visama) from them. It exists 
neither within the aggregates nor outside them. The person (pudgala) is that which trans- 
migrates (salikrdmati) from one life to the next. The person (pudgala) is the subject of 
knowledge (janati dhanna). The knowable (jileya) is either expressible (abhilapya) or in- 
expressible (anabhildpya), and the pudgala is inexpressible. The fetters (saMyojana), that 
92Tbere were various traditions for explaining the origins and development of Buddhist schools in India. In 
summary, the VAts71putffyas appear to have developed as a subschool of the SarvAstivAdins some 300-400 
years after Buddhaýs parinirvdýza. They then subdivided into four subschools: the DharmonarTya, Bhadraya- 
n1ya, Sarpmatlya and ýýagarika. However, the Saqunatlyas became so widespread that by the 7th century 
the VAts7iputriyas were considered to be a subschool. of the SarpmatTyas rather than the other way round. See 
Andr6 Bareau (1955), Les Sectes Bouddhiques du Petit Vghicule; Etienne Lamotte (1958), Histoire du 
Bouddhisme Indien; Edward J. Thomas (1933), The History ofBuddhist 77tought; and Samuel Beal (1884), 
Buddhist Records of the Westem World. 
"Williams (2000: 124ff. ) notes two surviving texts in Chinese translation. For a detailed study of the sur- 
viving texts and their doctrines, see Bhiksu Thich Tien Cbau, The Literature of the Personalists of Early 
Buddhism, English translation by Sara Boin-Webb, Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam Buddhist Research Insti- 
tute, 1997; and'Pcrson and Self by Lance Cousins, in Buddhism into the Year 2000: International Con- 
ference, Proceedings, Bangkok and Los Angeles, Dhammakaya Foundation, 1994. 
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which can be bound (saýnyqjanTya) and the person (pudgala) are reals. Only one uncondi- 
tioned (asaýnskrta) dharma is accepted, namely nirvd. ýa. The Buddha's teaching is partly 
esoteric since it has three levels of meaning (artha): revealing the faults that lead to birth 
and death; revealing the virtuous acts that lead to liberation (vimukti); and that which 
cannot be revealed. 
Prior to kntarak§ita, this so-called 'personalist' doctrine had been refuted in various ways. 
In Chapter IV of his Madhyamakahrdaya Bhdvaviveka94 directly attacks the VAts71putr! ya_, 
contention that the pudgala is substantially real and also inexpressible, claiming that it is 
merely imputed and is just as expressible as, say, a perfumeý5 Furthermore, its essential 
nature (mtshan nyid) cannot be perceived as other than any one of the aggregates, so it is 
IiI 
as non-existent as a flower in the sky. FinaRy, he dismisses the VAts-1putriya position on 
the basis of logical error. If one maintains that "although it cannot be pointed out exactly, 
and although it is indescribable, nevertheless the pudgala is real", one's statement fails 
because the reason (hetu) is uncertain, that is, over-extended. The pudgala might be either 
indescribable but real like an excellent perfume, or indescribable and unreal like die com- 
plexion of a barren woman's child. In other words, reality is not necessarily a corollary, of 
indescribability. 
Candrakirti's refutation of the Vats7iputriya doctrine is found in verses 146-149 of chapter 
VI of the MadhyamaA0vatara. He takes the argument significantly further and asserts , 
ý, 
that whatever is said to be inexpressible cannot substantially exist. First, Candralarti 
94 MMH ch. IV, vv. 89-92. Tibetan and Sanskrit texts in Iida (1969), pp. 195-198. 
95Perfume is often used as an example by Sautrantikas to illustrate phenomena that are both present and not 
present. Scents often linger long after the object that smelled has gone. Furthermore, it is notoriously 
difficult to actually describe a scent. 
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argues in verse 147 96 that anything that is established as existing must be established not 
only as uniquely characterized but also as distinct from other existents; therefore if the 
self is proved to be an existent entity, it must be expressible since it must be distinguable 
from other entities. Second, in verse 148 97 he argues that just as an object like a pot is 
accepted by the Vatslputriyas as neither identical with, nor different from, its ground of 
labelling (e. g. form), by the same token the person can be said to be neither identical with 
nor different from its aggregates. But this being so, the person (bdag) is no more of a real 
entity than a pot. And thirdly, in verse 14998 he refutes the possibility of a truly existing 
person being neither the same as, nor different from, the aggregates on account of the 
general principle that all existents can be considered in two ways: as identical to them- 
selves and as different from other things. Since the person (bdag) of the ViRsTputriyas 
lacks these two qualities, it cannot be regarded as existent. This last argument is unsatis- 
factory, however, since it hinges on the very point at issue: whether it is indeed coherent 
to assert a type of existence that is neither identical nor different from that of other 
entities. 
These arguments of Candrakirti's reflect a crucial feature of the M5dhyamika understan- 
ding of emptiness (Yanyatd), which is that it makes no sense to talk of a "real entity" that 
exists in a context defined by its identity and characteristic qualities on the one hand, and 
its difference from other similarly real entities on the other hand. Entities are real insofar 
as they participate in the relationships that make up everyday experience. Emptiness 
(danyatd) therefore implies the ultimate insubstantiality of this interpenetrating maze of 
96gang phyir gzugs las sems brjod med rni rtogs// dngos yod brjod med rtogs pa ma yin nyid// gal te btag 
'gW dngos por grub gyur na// sems Itar grab dngos brjod du med nii'gyur// 
97gang phyir khyed bum dngos por ma grub pai// ngo bo gzugs sogs las brjod med'gyur bas// bdag gang 
phung po las brjod med'gyur te// rang gis yod par grub par rtogs nii bya// 
98khyod kyi mam shes rang bdag las gzhin ni// mi 'dod gzugs sogs las gzhin dngos 'dod eing// dngos la 
mampa de nyid mthong'gyur bal/ de phyir bdag med dngos chos dang bral phyir// 
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relationships, and never a negation of our conventional cxpcricncc of thcm. 
99 To put this 
another way, one M5dhyamika critique of the VitsTputilya position could be that 
it fudgcs 
the distinction between conventional and ultimate truths; it ncithcr accords the pudgala 
the accepted characteristics of conventional existence (e. g. idcntity and diffcrcncc), nor 
does it claim that it has ultimate existence since the only unconditioned dharyna, nirvdtta, 
implies the cessation of the pudgala. The Vitslputriya attcmpt at creating a third altcrna- 
tive to fit the pudgala is just muddled thinking. 
Vasubandhu's refutation of the pudgala in chapter IX of the AbUdhamiakold is far more 
comprehensive than either of these two. He examines the rclation between pudgala and 
the skandha-s; what it means to say that the pudgala can be perceived; the existence of 
the pudgala as a justification for omniscicncc; the birth of persons; pudgala and jiva; 
pudgala and kanna; pudgala as necessary to explain memory and recognition; and 
pudgala as the basis for consciousness. We cannot review all his arguments here, so let it 
suffice to say that in the main they follow the first chapter of the Kashavaithu very 
closely. '()o VasubandhWs originality is to take the Vitsiputtlyas at their word, arguing that 
if indeed the pudgala is indescribable, as they claim, then there is nothing we can say 
about it. In that case we cannot say that it exists (as a new category of dharma), nor that it 
does not exist. In fact, as soon as they say that the pudgala is a real they arc guilty of 
inconsistency because they are describing the indcscribablc. 
The refutation of the pudgala presented by tAntaraklita in TS 336-349 is rclativcly con- 
g9see 7he Emptiness of Emptiness: An introduction to early Indian MWhyamika by CW. I luntington. Jr.. 
University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu. 1989: 258. n. 179. 
iooFor a detailed analysis of this refutation, we The Refutation of the Se(f in Vajubandhu's AbhWharmak(Aa. 
unpublished dissertation by D. Mcsscnt subrnitted to the University of Cambridge. UK. 1996. 
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cise, and indeed Kamalani a (TSP 348) acknowledges chapter IX of the AK as the 
reference on this subject, and the reason why the TS does not need to enter into all the 
arguments again. gAntaraklita rehearses Candrakirti's point that if an entity exists, it must 
by definition be expressible as the same ordiffcrcnt from other cxistents. Hcaddsthat 
there is a further internal contradiction in the Vats-iputriya view, namely that by asserting 
that the pudgala is inexpressible they arc, by implication, saying that it is in fact different 
from the skandha-s which arc held to be expressible. He rc-asscrts (as we saw above) that 
existence means a capacity for effective action, and that this is concomitant with 
momentariness; so if the pudgala cannot be said to be momentary, it does not exist. 
So how does tdntaral4ita's argument in the MAL sit in this context? Clearly, one can 
argue that it does not do justice to the complexity and, some might say, subtlety, of the 
VAts-iputriya view. t-Intaralqita focuses only on their assertion that the pudgala is perma- 
ncnL Insofar as permanence can be a corollary of true existence, it is legitimate to say 
within the framework of rNying ma thinking that whatever other characteristics the 
pudgala is claimed to have, refuting its permanence is tantamount to refuting its true 
existence, and is therefore a direct and succinct method of refuting the entire doctrine. 
Mi pham's commcntary'01 explains that the view of the gnas ma bu pa is that the person 
exists as an entity which serves as the support of actions and their results (las 'bras kyi 
rten). But just as it cannot be said to be either one with the aggregates (phung PO) or 
different from them, similarly it cannot be spoken of as permanent or impermanent either. 
His implication is thcrcfore that if the pudgala cannot in fact be said to be permanent, 
then it cannot be truly existent. By extending this same argument, tdntarakýita concludes 
that we cannot therefore say of the pudgala that it has a unitary nature, nor that it has a 
'O'C p. 170ff-. V. p. 129ff. 
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multiple nature. As Vasubandhu had argued, we cannot say anything of it at all. 
Verse 9 of the MAL is therefore unremarkable in that it does not differ significantly from 
previous Buddhist refutations of the pudgala, nor does it add to them. But Mi pharn's 
commentary on this verse is of interest and goes into considerably more detail than the 
verse itself, highlighting for us the controversies he was addressing in the context of l9th_ 
century Tibet. Tibetan interpretations of Indian Buddhist doctrines of the 'person' and the 
'self are amongst the key views dividing the various Tibetan schools of Buddhism. 102 
Limiting ourselves to what is of immediate concern in relation to ýdntar*ita's position, 
Mi pham implicitly rejects two dGe lugs pa interpretations of the Svdtantrika view on 
persons. The first of these, propounded by the Tibetan dGe lugs pa Gung thang, claims 
that the SvRtantrikas say that phenomena cannot be merely imputed by thought, but must 
be posited through the force of their appearance to unmistaken consciousness. 103 That is, 
unlike the PrRsaf1gika-M5dhyamikas, they maintain that a phenomenon can be found 
when sought among its bases of designation. According to the Mongolian Ngag dbang 
dpal Idan (bom 1797), the Sautriintika-Svdtantrikas assert that the illustration of the 
person from among the bases to which it is imputed is the mental consciousness, whereas 
for the YogZic5ra-SvAtantrikas the person is the continuum of the mental consciousness. 104ý 
102For a critical survey of this debate based on dGe lugs pa sources, see Assertions on the person in Buddhist 
doctrines of selflessness, Appendix to The Meaning ofMind in the Mahilyana Buddhist Philosophy ofMind 
only, unpublished Ph. D. by Joe Bransford Wilson Jr., University of Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1984 (micro- 
film 1986). Vol-2, pp-781-802. 
103Gung thang dkon mchog bstan pSi sgron me (1762-1823), in his Grub mtha'bzhi'i 'dod tshul sogs dris la 
nsna Ishogs kyi skor, cited by Bransford Wilson, op. cit., p. 79off. 
104Grub mtha'chen moi mchan 'grel dka'gnad mdud grol blo gsal gces nor, Annotationsfor (Jarn dbyangs 
bzhad pa's) "Great Exposition of Tenets"I Freeing the Knots of the Difficult Points, A Precious Jewel of 
Clear Thought, 26a. 1-2. Cited by Bransford Wilson, op. cit., p. 791. 
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According to dKon mchogjigs med dbang po (1728-91), 105 both Sautrantika-Sviitantrikas 
and Yog5c5ra-Sv5tantrikas assert that a subtle, neutral mental consciousness is an illus- 
tration of the person-in other words, that there is no significant difference between the 
two SvZitantrika schools. 106 According to Mi pham, however, ýdntarakýita's view is that 
what we conventionally call a 'personý is merely dependently imputed onto the aggregates, 
which are the basis of the imputation. 107 No 'person' can be logically demonstrated to 
exist other than the five momentary aggregates, so it has no ultimate truth. Yet, in relative 
truth the five aggregates function as the cause for the observation of a self. When un- 
differentiated (cha ma phyes pa) they are apprehended as one and then called 'the person', 
and the instants that make up the continuity of the aggregates are apprehended as one and 
called'the continuum'. Mi pham points out that this process is identical to that which 
operates when we say that we apprehend a vase or any other object. The observed object 
of a mind apprehending 'vase' is merely the imputed vase, while the basis for the imputa- 
tion is posited to be the observation of the specifically characterized [phenomena] of form 
and so forth. 108 Similarly, what is observed by a mind apprehending 'person' is the five 
aggregates. If, for example, the self is considered to be the agent of actions, after investi- 
gation we find that the self is merely an imputation of one on to many (e. g. the agent of 
past actions, the one who experiences in the present, the one who will experience in the 
future). What is called 'person' is seen to be nothing but a succession of momentary 
1051bis Tibetan scholar was the reincarnation of 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa and author of the textbook literature 
of sGo mang college, 'Bras spungs monastery, Lha sa, and bKra shis 'khyiI monastery, A mdo province. 
106Grub pai mthai mam par bzhag pa rin po chei phreng ba in Cutting Through Appearances: Practice 
and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism, by Geshe Lhundup Sopa and Jeffrey Hopkins, Snow Lion, Ithaca, 1989, 
pp. 287-8. 
'O'See Chapter VIII for further discussion of sectarian views concerning the person and its basis of imputa- 
tion. 
108bum'dzin gyi blos dmigs yul btags pai bum pa tsam yin kyang/ gdags gzhi gzugs la sogs pai rang mtshan 
dmigs parjog pa bzhin no/ 
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[occurrences] (rim pas skad cig ma). Moreover even the aggregates themselves are found, 
under investigation, to be imputations. 
On the face of it, then, Mi pham's analysis characterizes the Yog5c5ra-Sv5tantrika view of 
the person in a different way from certain dGe lugs pas. He asserts that for 
kntaraksita,,, 
what is conventionally known as the person is merely imputed to the aggregates 
(skandha-s; phung po) which do not ultimately exist themselves but are also imputations. 
However, the final point he makes is significant: he says that the person under considera- 
tion in this verse is 'the basis of actions and their results' (las 'bras kyi rien) which should 
not be confused with ideas of the self based on the ground for the infusion of habitual 
tendencies and so forth (bag chas bgo zhi sogs kyi rten du go bar mi byao); that is, ideas -, , 1, 
of the person imputed on the basis of the Yog5c5ra notion of Waya consciousness. So the. 
subject has not yet been fully addressed in the MAL, and a final definition of ýdnta- 
rakýita's view on persons must await further examination of the text (in Chapter VIII). 
In summary, it is useful to differentiate between 'personý and 'self . By 'personý (pudgala) 
we refer to the individual who is the object of unmistaken conventional apprehension, and 
by 'self (atman) we refer to a metaphysical entity that is not an object of worldly appre- 
hension. Buddha never denied the conventional existence of persons but he did refute the 
inherent existence of a 'self . 
109 An analysis of Vasubandhu's refutation of the pudgala 
shows that the fundamental error committed by VZits7i-putriyas is to have confused these 
two. 110 They justified their philosophically established pudgala on the grounds that it 
109See Samyutta Nikaya IV. 400-01 when the monk Vacchagotta asks the Buddha whether a self exists. The 
Buddha neither said that it exists (the extreme of etemalism) nor denied that it exists (the extreme of 
nihilism), so the matter is considered 'an undetermined (avydkata) question'. In Samyutta U. 17 the Buddha 
accepts the conventional existence of the empirical world. For a discussion of this topic see The Selfless 
Mind by Peter Harvey, Curzon Press, 1995, pp. 17-42. 
11OMessent (1996). 
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accounts for the conventional apprehension of the existence of persons. In the light of Mi 
phain's commentary, it is evident that ýAntarakýita is not refuting the belief in the 
existence of persons on a conventional level, but only philosophical theories of the 'self, 
for such theories mistakenly assert the person or self to be truly existent when it is only 
conventionally so. Having said this, we may well have reason to question the efficacy of 
gdntaraWta's refutation here, bearing in mind that in his time the Pudgalav5dins were 
probably the most numerous group of NikAya Buddhists in India. "' Despite the many 
well argued refutations of the pudgala over the centuries, some of which we have referred 
to here, the number of adherents to this doctrine continued to increase. This may serve to 
illustrate the fact that on account of our ignorance (avidyd) and of our innate attachment 
to self-identity (atman), logical reasoning (yukti) is not sufficient to help us realize self- 
lessness (anatman). To be effective, reasoning must go hand in hand with meditation 
(famatha and vipaýydna). 112 The limitations inherent in even sound Madhyamika argu- 
ments are especially apparent when the existence of persons is concerned. 
It is interesting to note that this concern is addressed by the 18th century dGe lugs pa 
scholar lCang skya rol pa'i rdo de (1717-86) who questioned the effectiveness of logical 
reasoning in the MAL. FoRowing Tibetan tradition, he distinguishes between cognitive 
ignorance or misunderstanding (avidya, ma rig pa) and innate ignorance (sahaja, lhan 
skyes). Concluding his analysis of the various refutations in the MAL, he writes: 
These are the ways to refute the object of negation imputed by our own and other 
schools, but in order also to refitte the object of the innate conception of true 
existence, one must know well how damage is done by these reasonings. 113 
"'Barcau, op. cit., pp. 38-39. Our evidence is based on inscriptions and Chinese travelogues dating up to 100 
years before ý5ntarakjita. Reports spanning the period between 2nd and 7th centuries C. E. show no signifi- 
cant change in the preponderance of PudgalavAdins, so it is reasonable to suppose that their numbers had 
not significantly changed in proportion to other schools by the 8th century. However, it is not clear whether 
the Chinese are referring to those who held PudgalavAda tenets, or those ordained in the related Vinaya. I 
am indebted to Paul Williams for this last observation. 
112 Hopkins (1983: 10; 199). 
191 
lCang skya acknowledges that ýRntarakýita's logical method is adequate for eliminating ý 
misunderstanding associated with erroneous philosophical views, but he wonders how 
effective it is in eliminating the innate (sahaja, Man skyes) conception of true existence 
from which all beings in saýnsdra suffer. This latter type of ignorance includes the innate 
sense of self. The issue is more fully considered in Chapter VIII below. 
VI. 2.4 Refuting the true existence of general unitary Mrvasive entities 
Having refuted the true existence of particular unitary pervasive entities asserted by either 
Buddhist or non-Buddhist philosophical schools, gantaraksita considers the true existence 
of general unitary pervasive entities. According to Mi pham's commentary, this refutation 
is found in the first two lines of verse 10. 
Since they are related to that which has various directions/sides, 
How can pervasives be unitary? 
tha dad phyogs can dang 'brel phyirll khyab mams gcig pur ga la 'gyurll 
Generally speaking, pervasion (khyab pa) is of two kinds: (a) where the pervader is con- 
comitant with several entities that are of the same essence, as for example, in the case of 
universals (spyi) and particulars (bye brag); and N when the pervader is concomitant 
with several entities that are of a different essence, as for example, in the case of a dye 
pervading a piece of cloth. In addition, Mi pham notes that in the case of (a), the 
Vai9qikas assert that universals and their instances are separate substances, whereas the 
SarpUyas claim that they are of identical substance. The refutation made by gdntarakýitý 
in this verse covers both these possibilities. 
Mi pham summarises the argument as follows. 114 If the pervading entity is not related to 
1131Cang skya! s Grub pal mthal mam par bzhag pa (Presentation of Tenets) transl. Lopez (1987: 370). 
114Cp. 177. de la sogs, pakhyab byed rnams gang Yin Yang rung rigs pa'dis'gog payin te// thadadpal 
phyogs can narn/ phyogs tha dad pa can te khyab byal dngos po mi'dra, ba shing la sogs pa dangbrel bal 
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particulars, then it cannot be posited as a pervading entity at all. If it is related to parti- 
culars, and if one accepts that all particulars are conditioned and made of different 
aspects or parts, then we must ask whether the pervader of one aspect is identical to the 
pervader of another aspect; or is it different? For example, is the space that pervades a 
tree to the east the same as the space that pervades the same tree to the west? If it is, then 
the pervaded object must in fact have a unitary nature just as the pervader is said to have. 
Also, it would follow that when one tree is pervaded by space, then all trees must be 
similarly pervaded simultaneously. Therefore, if particulars are conditioned whatever 
entity pervades them cannot be unitary. 
This argument appears to be flawed. The example used by Mi pharn in this passage is 
curious. Space is surely characterized by its lack of spatial determination; we cannot point 
east and say 'there is space', and then point west and say 'there is another space'. There is 
no boundary between eastern space and western space, and if our thinking espouses the 
notion of directions, these are determined in relation to particular locatable objects and 
not in relation to general pervaders such as space. So it is arguably fallacious to apply the 
parameter of location to a pervading entity which is characterized by unlocatability. This 
is especially the case because of the way Dharmakirti differentiates between particular 
entities and general entities (this distinction is the basis'for the two subheadings of this 
section of the MAL). Being an individual or particular means having clear identity condi- 
tions specifiable in terms of determinate spatio-temporal location and distinction in entity; 
this is what he calls a specifically characterized phenomenon (svala4ana, rang mtshan). 
phyir na/ khyab pai dngos por'dod pa de mams kyang geig pur bden par ga la'gyur te/ gal te nam mkhd 
dang spyi la sogs pa khyab pWi dngos po de dag khyab bya phyogs dang dus kyis bsdus pa! i dngos po de 
dag dang ma'brel na ni khyab parjog mi rang la/'brel na ni shar phyogs kyi shing la khyab pa! i cha de nub 
phyogs kyi shing la khyab pgi cha de dang geig yin nam min/ 
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Generally characterized phenomena (siminyala4ana, spyi mtshan), on the other hand, 
do not satisfy these identity conditions-and indeed it is on account of this that they are 
not accepted by Dharmaldrti as reals independent of cognizing minds. ' 15 It is therefore 
quite odd for ýAntarakýita to apply location criteria to a general entity such as space. On 
the other hand, it must be conceded that some general pervasive entities occupy a some- 
what ambiguous position between the two definitions given above. If we consider pheno- 
mena such as tastes and odours which do not occupy a clearly definable spatio-temporal 
location, should these be classified as general or as particular? The categorization itself 
may be at fault. 
But what is being refuted here is the idea of general pervasive entities that tMly exist. We 
have seen above how the Vai9qikas asserted the true existence of six categories 
(paddrtha) of universals, 116 of which the first is substance (dravya) which includes earth, 
water, fire, air, ether (akada), time (kala), space, self (itman) and mind (manas). Both ,- 
space and time are therefore held to be permanent, truly existing pervading entities which 
are separate from the particulars that they pervade. The Buddhist refutation therefore 
makes sense only if we realize it is a refutation of the true existence of pervading entities 
such as space, and not a refutation of what is conventionally understood as space. Indeed, 
this refutation follows a similar argument to that used for the refutation of Mara, because 
the fundamental problem ýdntarakýita is pointing to in both cases is the nature of the 
relationship between truly existent unitary entities and the particulars of empirical 
experience. 
'IsSee Dreyfus (1997: 130). 
116These are substance (dravya), quality (guýta), motion (kannan), universal (sam4nya), particularity 
(videýa) and inherence (swnav4ya). 
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According to Mi pham, another category of the general pervasive entities refuted here by 
gdntarakýita is that of universals (sJmdnya, spyi). In considering these, Mi pham. alludes 
to the detailed discussion in chapter XIH of the TS, where gdntarakýita examines espe- 
cially the Vai9qika idea of universals and categories. kntarakýita argues that universals 
(sdm, dnya) have no objective existence but are merely conceptual constructs developed by 
way of other-exclusion. That is to say that when one sees branches endowed with leaves, 
one designates it 'tree' after eliminating all that is non-tree. This is the Buddhist theory of 
apoha (set ba), meaning 'exclusion of the contrary', a sophisticated semantic theory first 
developed by DignAga, then by Dharmaldrti, and significantly extended by kntarakýita 
himself. 1 17 A universal is a single contrary, that which appears in opposition to another, 
while a particular is a double contrary which not only appears in opposition to another 
but also to all that which is of concordant type coming down to the specifically charac- 
terized. ' 18 According to this view, both universals and particulars are merely imputations 
of one onto many, and so neither can be unitary entities. 
Up to this point, kntarakýita's philosophical concern has been ontological. He has refuted 
true existence as opponents have applied it to various entities, and has addressed the 
question of true existence in terms of its ontological claims, that is, as a mode of being 
that is permanent, independent, and unitary. On the question of universals, however, it is 
117See Dreyfus (1997: 205-250); and Mo4gkaragupta in Kajiyama (1989: 122-130). DharmakIrti elaborated 
the theory of apoha whilst safeguarding the epistemological validity of language despite the absence of real 
universals. This he did by distinguishing perception (positive apprehension of reals) and inference (negative 
apprehension of universals which are the objects apprehended by thought). Propositional knowledge is due 
to the conceptual categorization of experiences, and this process is essentially negative, through elirriination 
of the contrary. gintaraksita modifies the theory so apoha refers not just to the elimination of the contra- 
dictory of a thing (non-xj but also to the representation or mental image that acts as a support of the con- 
ceptual process. These representations are eliminations (a) because they are distinct from other appearances 
and (b) because they are the cause of obtaining things that are excluded from others. TS 391.2-3: prati- 
bhds5ntar5d bhed5danyavyAvrttavastunah/ prAptihetutayA/ We examine 9IntaraIqita! s understanding of 
mental images or aspects in Chapter VHi. 
"I'de la gzhan las Idog par snang baI Idog pa chig rkyang, spyi dang/ gzhan dang rang gi rigs mthun mtha' 
dag las kyang Idog paI Idog pa nyis tshog ni rang mtshan la'bab pas bye brag yin lal Mi pham, C. p. 178. 
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significant that Mi pham's commentary switches the argument from the ontological realm 
to the semantic one. It would indeed be perfectly possible to attempt a refutation of uni- 
versals on ontological grounds. This would entail an examination of issues such as 
whether universals denote reals that exist independently of the observer (and independ- 
ently of language). The Ny5ya view of universals is that they are denotational, and this. is 
classed as an extreme form of realism with regard to universals. Yet 
ýdntarakýita does not 
formulate an attack on the Nyaya view from an ontological perspective. He is interested 
in the relationship between truly existing unitary entities and manifold particulars-not in 
their true existence per se; the status of universals is approached from a semantic point of 
view, looking at the relationship between a universal and the nature of what it refers to. In 
this respect, ýdntarakýita was building on the legacy of Dignaga and DharmakIrti, and his 
approach was a modem one in his day. 
In concluding this first section on pervasive entities, we may wish to question the validity 
of categorizing Mara as a particular rather than a general entity. Generally speaking, the 
principle represented by Tivara has no spatio-temporal location, and should logically fit 
into the general category. Certainly the Western concept of God would seem more of a 
general entity than a particular one. The justification for this Buddhist classification is 
that F§vara is considered to be the personal embodiment of the impersonal universal prin- 
ciple of brahman, and to the extent that Mara is personal, and to the extent that he acts, 
he can be considered an individual entity. Similarly, to the extent that the Judaeo- 
Christian God is seen as a personal God, and the agent of action, he is an instance of a 
particular rather than a general entity. Nevertheless, within the terins of the respective 
definitions of what constitutes particular and general, the status of Tivara is ambiguous. 
Bearing this in mind, together with the other exceptional cases we mentioned above, the 
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classification on which this section is based (particular pervasive entities / general perva- 
sive entities) is unsatisfactory. 
In these initial verses, gdntarakýita has begun by refuting substantialist ontologies. He has 
done this by showing such positions to be internally incoherent by means of the 'neither 
one nor many' argument. By refuting the true existence of universals in verse 10, his field 
of enquiry shifted from the ontological to the semantic. This is a stepping stone to the epi- 
stemological enquiry he carries out in verses 16-61. 
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CHAPTERSEVEN THE EXTERNAL WORLD 
VIELI What is at issue? 
gdntarakýi&s refutation of partless particles in verses 11-15 might well strike a modern 
reader as relatively uninteresting. 
' Similar refutations had frequently been made in 
Buddhist literature prior to this, and in any case modem science has rendered such dis- 
cussions irrelevant. But it does, in fact, play a pivotal role in the progression of his argu- 
ment. If minute particles are proven to have parts, all physical phenomena will necessarily 
be proven to have parts, since they are composed of minute particlesý It therefore entails 
the refutation of the true existence of the entire material world, as well as the rejection of 
realism. But the logical implications take us even further than this. If the objects of the 
five sense consciousnesses are not truly established, the sense consciousnesses themselves 
are not truly established because they depend on the sense objects for their production. 
Therefore, based simply on the refutation of partless particles, it can be inferred that 
neither sense consciousnesses nor their objects truly exist? This reasoning leads directly 
to the detailed consideration of minds and cognition which spans verses 16-61. It provides 
the hinge between arguments around matter and arguments around minds. 
From the philosophical point of view, the status of external phenomena could hardly be 
more crucial if we are seeking to determine the nature of Adntarakýita's Yogaara- 
Madhyamaka synthesis. Both Yogdc5ra and Madhyamaka separately refute the notion 
that external objects have any intrinsic existence (svabhjva), but the implications they 
'The term used here for Skt. partunLIDzu, Tib. rdul phran is 'Partless particles' rather than 'atoms' as they are 
frequently translated. 'Particles' is preferred because modem science has shown atoms not to be the ultimate 
building blocks of matter since they can be split. In other words, the word'atorn! carries a specific scientific 
meaning which prejudices its use in philosophy. Since the main idea here is that paramanu refers to the 
most minute constituent of things, the term'particle is neutral and appropriate. 
2Lopez (1987: 183-4). 
3TSP 1998. 
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draw from this and the methods they use are different. MAdhyarnika refutations usually 
concern the ontological status of partless particles and the external objects they constitute, 
while YogacArins typically focus on the epistemological aspects of the refutation. Yoga- 
cdrins use the refutation of partless particles to establish idealism, but Mddhyarnikas do 
not. Yog5carins refute external objects both ultimately and conventionally, whereas 
Mddhyarnikas refute them ultimately but not conventionally. On the face of it, one can 
adopt one approach or the other, but not both at once. 
How does kntarakýita understand the status of the material world? The issue is that al- 
though material external phenomena do not exist for him ultimately, they do exist con- 
ventionally. 4SO to what extent does he espouse Yogk5ra idealism at all? In which sense 
can it be justified to call him a Yogdcdra-MAdhyamika? And if external phenomena exist 
conventionally, in which way do they exist? How does ýdntarakýita's position distinguish 
itself from the Sautrdntika-based view of Bhdvaviveka? All these questions will allow us 
to begin to address the important topic of what tdntar-akýita takes to be the given. 
VIEL2 Presentim 9iintar"k ita's argument 
The remainder of Adntarakýita's argument in the MAL is concerned with his refutation of 
the oneness of what are technically termed "non-pervasive entities" (ma kIlyab pa 7 gcig 
bden dgag pa). This refutation extends from verse 11 to verse 61, and is divided into two 
parts. Firstly, in verses 11 to 15 Adntarakýita demolishes the Abhidharmic and Vai9qika 
understanding of the existence of external reality. And secondly, in verses 16-61, he con- 
siders the nature of consciousness, and refutes the true existence of unitary moments of 
consciousness as held by all Buddhist and non-Buddhist schools other than the Madhya- 
maka school. Firstly, then, he considers the theory that there are truly existing particles 
4MAL 64. 
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(Paramaýu; rdul phran) that constitute material objects. 
[11,12] Whether particles exist conjoined [with others], surrounded [by 
others] with intervals in-between, or immediately contiguous [with 
others], if it is claimed that the nature of the central particle that faces 
a [second] particle is the very same as the nature that faces a [third or 
fourth] particle, then earth, water and so on could not develop, could 
they? 
'byar ba dang ni bskor ba 'anL11 bar med mam par gnas kyang rung1l 
dbus gnas rdul phran rdul gcig Ia// b1tas pai rang bzhin gang yin pall 
rdul phran gzhan la blta ba yangll de nyid gal te yin brjod na// 
de Ita yin na de lta bull sa chu la sogs rgyas 'gyur ranill 
[13] If one asserts that the side facing a [second] particle is different from 
the side facing a [third] particle, how then can the most subtle 
particles be unitary and partless? 
rdul phran gzhan la Ita bai ngos5ll gal le gzlian du 'dod na nill 
rab tu phra rdul ji Ita burll gcig pu cha shas med par 'gyurll 
[14] It has been proved that particles have no intrinsic nature. Therefore, 
the eye, substance, and so on, and the numerous [other entities] that 
are postulated as real by ourselves and others, are clearly devoid of 
intrinsic nature [too]. 
rdul phran rang bzhin med grub pall de phyir mig dang rdzas la sogsll 
bdag dang gzhan swas mang po dagll rang bzhin med par mngon pa yinll 
[15] They are compounds composed of [particles]. Moreover, the nature of 
these entities, their composition, their qualities and type of function, ' 
and their general and particular characteristics, [all] come from these 
[particles]. 
de yi rang bzhin des brtsams dang1l de yi yon tan de las bdagIl 
de yi spyi dang khyad par yangll de dag de dang Vu ba canll 
The steps of ýAntarakýita's argument are as follows. First, he shows that the existence of 
unitary partless particles is an absurdity (verses 11-13). Then, on this basis, he argues in 
verses 14 and 15 that the existence of composite entities-including entities that are 
objects of sensory experience as well as entities that are philosophical constructs-is 
thereby invalidated too. This corollary is presented in two stages: first, the general argu-, 
ment is stated in verse 14; and next, verse 15 establishes the proof of the argument by 
showing its pervasion (khyab pa sgrub pa), that is, how it applies to all relevant cases. In 
summary, if particles do not truly exist, then any entity that is claimed to be composed of 
5The Tibetan text is n-dstakenly transliterated by Ichig6 (I 985: CXV) as "rdul phran gzhan Ja Ita ba 'ingos". 
200 
such particles cannot exist either. It makes no sense to speak of a truly existing whole if 
that whole is made of non-truly existing parts (and if the whole is taken to be the mereo- 
6 logical sum of its parts). 
His refutation targets the Abhidharmic view of external reality, which is known for its 
reductionist analysis of wholes into smaller and smaller parts. 7 The thrust of this analysis 
is to show that if a supposed whole can be broken down into constituent parts, either 
physically or through analysis, one finds that the 'whole' no longer exists, and one can 
8 
then conclude that wholes are actually nothing other than the sum of their parts. For 
example, if a vase is shattered into pieces, and then ground to a fine powder, one cannot 
really say that the heap of porcelain dust on the floor is a vase because it does not 
function like a vase. Porcelain dust in this example illustrates what are known as 'coarse 
particles' (rdul phran), and according to Abhidharmic analysis, these can be broken down 
further into subtle particles (rdul phra rab). 9 It takes a minimum of seven subtle particles 
to make one coarse particlelo the latter being defined by Mi pham" as a particle that can 
be apprehended by the human senses. 12 
6See the discussion on wholes and parts at the end of Chapter V. 
7See King (1999: 118ff), Williams (2000: 88-9); Harvey (1990: 83-4). 
8Cf. Milindhapafiha, 1.1; and Sathyutta nikaya i. 135. The argument is that since wholes are a sum of parts, 
they are mere designations and have no intrinsic identity or existence. 
717he equivalent terminology used by Vasubandhu and Sarhghabhadra is paramdýtu for a subtle, indivisible 
particle (sometimes translated as 'atorn), and safthataparamiRtu for an aggregate of particles, occasionally 
rendered as 'molecule'. 
IOThis is the minimum number of subtle particles necessary for a gross particle to become perceptible to 
beings in the Realm of Desire (kamadhitu) according to Vasubandhu (AKB ii. 22). Other schools had 
different theories. The VaigeOkas maintained that atoms combine to make dyads, three of which combine to 
make the smallest perceivable object, exemplified by the particles of dust in a sunbeam. See King (1999: 
106ff. ) 
"The points Mi pharn makes in his commentary on the MAL are similar to those in his mKhas pai ishul la 
jug pa7 sgo zhes bya bai bstan bcos Tibetan text and translation in Gateway to Knowledge, Rangjung 
Yeshe Publications, Kathmandu, vol. I 1997 and vol. 112000. His explanation of particles occurs in 1: 22-23, 
vold p. 21. 
12It should be noted that this question was hotly debated by the Vaibh5§ikas and SautrAntikas. The Vaibha- 
sikas maintained that gross particles individually possess the quality of being the cause of the arising of 
consciousness while the Sautrantikas asserted that only collections of particles can be apprehended by the 
sense organs (AKB i. 20a-b; and i. 44a-b). For the Sautrdntikas, then, individual particles arc imperceptible. 
Mi phams definition is acceptable here because gAntaraksita is concerned with the Vaibh5sika view. 
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The gross objects of our perception-ranging from large objects such as iron, water, 
rabbits, sheep, cows and sunbeams, to cite Mi pham's examples, to smaller objects such as 
louse eggs and grains of barley-are all composed of multiples of coarse particles. The 
general way of justifying this theory is to say that although the coarse can be split into 
parts and particles, it would be entirely non-existent if there were no final basis for its 
existence in the form of ultimate particles which cannot be split any further; that is, ulti- 
mate, subtle, partless particles. The theory of subtle particles is therefore a means to avoid 
infinite regress, or to avoid the conclusion that nothing exists at all. 
We can summarise the principles on which the Abhidharmic position is based. (1) It 
assumes or infers the existence of external objects. (2) It rejects the intrinsic existence of 
wholes on the grounds that they are merely designations to a sum of parts; wholes could 
therefore be said to exist only conventionally. In Western terminology, it rejects sub- 
stance or substrata-based theories of wholes in favour of bundles. (3) It posits the intrinsic 
existence of subtle partless parts, which function as the building blocks of material reality, 
and without which material objects would not exist at all. (4) It posits the existence of 
matter as distinct from mind. 13 And (5) it maintains that the human mind is capable of 
apprehending the reality of intrinsic existence as it is (specifically, partless particles can 
be perceived) . 
14 It is the combination of these positions that ýdntarakýita rejects. 
Mi pham's commentary indicates that what is at issue here is not so much the merits 'or 
demerits of the Abhidharmic reductionist analysis per se, but rather, what one takes the 
status of subtle particles (rdul phra rab) to be. Most's Buddhist schools agreed in a basic 
131t was noted in Cliapter V that matter is characterized by extension and locatability whereas rninds are 
determined by time. The material is not reducible to the mental, and vice versa. 
14According to the Vaibh5sikas. 
15With the exception of thý dGe lugs pa school following Tsong kha pa. 
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way about the designated status of wholes, but the status of particles caused doctrinal 
differences. Buddhist schools such as the Vaibhdýikas, and certain non-Buddhist schools 
such as the Vaige§ikas, believed subtle particles to be permanent entities endowed with an 
intrinsic nature and a unique defining character. 16 Madhyamikas, on the other hand, con- 
sider particles to be impermanent just like the composite entities which they make up. 17 
gdntarak§ita's refutation applies only to theories that uphold the permanence of particles 
because only these theories also assert the unitariness of particles. As we have seen, they 
actually define subtle particles as 'units', in the sense that particles are discrete elements 
acting as the 'building blocks' of reality. 18 
VH. 3 Madhyamaka and Cittamfitra refutations of the true existence or particles 
VII. 3.1 Madhyamaka refutations 
The Madhyamaka refutation usually hinges on a logical analysis of causation, arguing the 
absurdity of any theory which holds that causes (hetu, rgyu) have an intrinsic power 
(kriya, bya ba) to bring about their effects, and that this power is part of their essence or 
intrinsic nature (svabhdva, rang bzhin). The Madhyamaka argumentation is sometimes 
applied to causation generally, as for example in the first chapter of Mig5ijuna's MMK, 
and sometimes applied specifically to the perception process, as in Chapter IX of the 
MMK. Aryadeva extends the argument to particles in Chaper IX of the CS where he 
16Dharma-s are defined as having a self-emnce (sasvabhava) and as being a primary existent (dravyasat). 
Vasubandhu's definition (AKB i. 2) is that a dhanna is that which bears (dhjra.! ta) self (or unique) charac- 
teristics. 
"In chapter XV of the MMK, Nig5rjuna shows that the idea that anything has an essence or intrinsic nature 
(svabhjva) is incompatible with the Buddhist doctrines of impermanence, emptiness, and liberation. "T'hose 
who see [entities as having] an intrinsic nature, the nature of otherness, or as being [truly] existent or non- 
existent do not see the truth of the Buddha's teaching. " svabh5varn parabhAvarn ca bh5varp cdbhdvameva 
ca/ ye pdyanti na pagyanti te tattvaxp buddhagiisane// (XV. 6). Fui&rmore, it IS incoherent to maintain that 
permanent dhanna-s with a self-nature constitute wholes that are impermanent and mere designations, 
because there must be a connection between the two such that like should give rise to like. "It is not tenable 
[to assert] that that which depends on something else is different from it". yatprat7itya ca yattasm-atta- 
danyannopapadyate// (XIV. 5) 
18Bhikkhu Bodhi (1993: 4). 
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addresses the Vaigqika view of truly existent particles. 
19 His method is similar to that in 
the MAL. 
Axyadeva shows the absurdity of asserting that particles are partless since they are 
acknowledged to be material and thus have the qualities of matter, e. g. they occupy three- 
dimensional space, have sides and can move. He employs a prasafiga argument to turn 
the following assertion on its head: "gross objects [i. e. wholes] would not exist if the part- 
icles that produced them did not exist; therefore particles exist. "20 But, responds 
Axya- 
deva, one observes that at the moment that B is produced by A, A ceases to exist, as in the 
case of a seed and a sprout; therefore the cause A is not permanent. So the logical need to 
posit the permanency of particles in order to avoid infinite regress cannot be coherently, . 
satisfied. 
Axyadeva then dismisses the Vaibh5ýika and non-Buddhist assertion that subtle particles 
can be perceived. This is an important assertion, of course, because if they can be per- 
ceived it can be argued that in some sense they must exist. Axyadeva's refutation rests on 
logic alone, not on empirical corroboration. If, he states, particles have no sides, no front, 
middle or rear, then this means they must be immaterial and therefore by definition* invi- 
sible since the object that corresponds to the visual sense organ is formýl If particles are' 
immaterial, how can they possibly be seen? It follows that empirical knowledge of part- 
less particles is impossible. The argument thus exhausts both possibilities, knowledge of 
particles through sense perception and knowledge by inference. 
19See rGyal tshab! s commentary on CS verses 212-219, in Ruth Sonam (1994-208-211). 
20CS 218: "Ibe effect destroys the cause, therefore the cause is not permanent. Alternatively, where the 
cause exists, the effect does not. " ibid., p. 210. Transl. Ruth Sonam. 'brasbuyisnirgyubshigpat/desna 
rgyu ni rtag ma yin// yang na gang na rgyu yod pa// de nabras bu yod ma yin// 
21CS 217: '"Ibat which does not have a front, nor a middle, and which does not have a rear, being invisible, 
who will see it? " ibid., p. 210. gang la dang po yod n-dn zhing// gang zhig la dkyiI yod min Ia// gang la tha 
ma yod min pa// mngon med de ni gang gis mthong// 
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Aryadeva further links the question of particles to the classic debate about fire and fuel. 22 
If one maintains that particles are unitary, then a substantial truly existent fire particle 
would contain only fire and not the other elements, and this would imply that fire exists 
without fuel. The implication is that fire can exist uncaused. This idea is untenable for all 
Buddhist schools. 
kntarakýita's own detailed refutation of particles is found in the TS, 23 where the main 
points are the same as in the MAL. His refutation is part of a broader argument seeking to 
prove that if particles do not exist, then composite entities do not exist either. Firstly, he 
asserts that particles must occupy discrete spaces if one is to account for the existence of 
large objects, such as a hill, which indicate three-dimensional aggregations of particles. If 
this is the case, and if, as the opponent admits, particles exist (somehow) in conjunction 
with other particles, then it must be acknowledged that particles have several parts and are 
not unitary. He concludes that if particles are not one they cannot be many, that if some- 
thing is neither one nor many it cannot exist at all, and if particles do not exist then 
neither can composite entities that are said to be composed of particles. In a curious way, 
therefore, gantaraksita argues exactly the reverse of the Abhidharma. That proves the 
non-inherent existence of wholes by showing that they have parts, while kntarakýita 
proves the non-inherent existence of wholes by showing that they do not have parts. Ile 
critical difference between these two approaches rests on the fact that they are each refu- 
ting different types of whole. The Abhidharma refutation succeeds against substance- or 
substrata-based wholes, whereas giintaraksita's refutation attacks aggregates and bundles. 
Furthermore, ýdntarakýita asserts that partless particles cannot be apprehended by human 
22CS 343. If the particle has no fuel, (then] fire exists without fuel. If it does have fuel, the particle does not have a unitary nature. gal te rdul la shing med na// des na shing med me yod do// gal te de la shing yod na// 
gcig gi bdag can rdul yod min// 
23TS and TSP 1989-1998. 
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perception. 24 If particles were perceptible then one of two options would hold. 1) Objects 
would be perceived as non-different to particles; but this is clearly not the case because 
objects are perceived as gross objects not as particles. 2) Objects would be perceived in 
the form of gross objects but composed of particles; this is not the case either, because 
although the form of the gross object is perceived the particles are not. The perceptibility 
of particles is therefore refuted for lack of empirical evidence. it is absurd to hold that 
something is perceptible when nobody perceives it. This argument is significant only 
because it assumes a position of strong substantival idealism which holds that to be a 
thing or entity is to be discerned or perceived. 25 For a thing to exist it must be accessible 
to cognition. Esse est percipi. To prove it is imperceptible is to prove it does not exist. 
The Madhyamaka argument on particles rests on two other fundamental premises. First, 
matter and mind are characteristically distinct, the material being three-dimensionally 
extensive and the mental not being so. The argument on particles would fall were matter 
to be defined otherwise. And second, it rests on the principle that partless particles are not 
perceptible. Today, however, it could be argued that such entities are perceptible by 
means of microscopes, electron microscopes and other instruments, and this development 
invalidates the refutation. In the light of modem physics, the arguments justifying partless 
particles and the arguments refuting them need to be revised and re-expressed to take 
account of modifications in these two basic premises. 
VII. 3.3 The Cittamatra refutation 
A classic Cittamatra refutation of the existence of particles is that of Vasubandhu's Viýn- 
datikilkdriM (Twenty Verses) and its vrtti. 26 This work sets out to prove the thesis that the 
24TS and TSP 1968-69. 
2511dealisd by Nicholas Rescher, in A Companion to Epistemology, ed. Jonathan Dancy and Ernest Sosa, Blackwell, Oxford, 1992, pp. 187-19 1. 
26See Anacker (1984: 161ff). Tbe Sanskrit text is reproduced on pages 413421. 
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three realms of existence are mind only (cittamdtra) so the significance of his refutation 
of particles must be seen in this context. Vasubandhu demonstrates that the very notion of 
wholes and parts is absurd. Substance-based concepts of wholes where the substance is a 
unity (a view held by the Vai9qikas) are untenable because such unitary substances have 
never been perceived as entities separate from their component parts. Wholes are not 
multiple either insofar as the numerous particles which compose them are never perceived 
singly. And wholes are not aggregates of particles because the existence of partless parti- 
cles cannot be demonstrated. 27 In modem terminology, Vasubandhu refutes substance- 
based wholes, aggregates and bundles at a stroke. 
Vasubandhu's argument, however, is not a general one because as soon as it is introduced 
in verse 1128, it is specifically applied to perception. Rather than speaking of 'external 
objects', or'entities, Vasubandhu refers to 'sense objects' (viýayaý) immediately giving 
the refutation an epistemological slant. It emerges that perceptibility is a key criterion for 
determining the tenability of anything's existence. The arguments he uses subsequently 
are similar to those in the MAL and the TS: they address the questions of conjunction 
between particles, aggregates of particles occupying a larger space than individual parti- 
cles, and the logic of particles having a number of directional sides. His conclusion places 
the interest once more in the domain of epistemology. 29 If entities were unitary, he argues, 
then absolute identity and absolute difference between entities would be established. But 
if this were true, any gradual action or movement or evolution of species would be im- 
possible. Absolute difference implies difference in characteristics, which in turn implies 
27Vasubandhu's, qtti on verse 11 in Anacker (1984: 167). 
21na tadekam na cAnekam visayaý param5j)u9a4/ na ca te sarhhat! yasmatparamdouma sidhyati// A sense 
object is neither a singleý thing, nor many things from the point of view of particles, nor is it an aggregate 
[of particles], so particles cannot be proved. 
211f their unity existed, one could not arrive at anything gradually, there could not be apprehension and non- 
apprehension simultaneously, there could not be separate, several developments, and there would be no 
reason for the non-seeing of the very subtle. Verse 15. Transl. Anacker, op. cit., p. 169-170. 
207 
differences between particles. Particles can therefore not be of one kind so a form of 
association between different types of particles would have to be admitted, with the 
impli- 
I. z 
cations already seen. Therefore, as they have not been shown to be unitary, it follows that 
neither sense objects nor their sense organs can be established as different, that is, they 
cannot be shown to be independently existing, distinct entities. What is established 
instead is perception-only. 
The nature of this reasoning is arguably both ontological and epistemological. It is onto- 
logical in the sense that it proves that neither particles nor material objects truly exist, and 
it is epistemological in the sense that it demonstrates that neither the objective nor the 
subjective components of sense perception truly exist, and that, as a result, it is not 
possible to apprehend an external world. External objects cannot be established so we can 
not assume that knowledge is derived from a perceptual given. Thus far, the argument 
refutes externality in favour of two forms of idealism. Firstly, Vasubandhu subscribes to 
strong substantival idealism. 30 just as we saw previously is also the case in Madhyamaka. 
If a thing exists, it must in principle be accessible to cognition. He uses this version of 
epistemic idealism to refute all types of whole. And secondly, he concludes with the most 
radical ontological version of idealism, which holds that minds and their thoughts are all 
there is. If the object of knowledge is not material it can only be mental, and from this. the 
inference is made that there can exist nothing other than mind. Perception and cognition 
occur as in a dream. 
The CittamAtra view is characterized by dBus pa. blo gsal as follows: "[They assert] that 
all phenomena are of the nature of mind onI Y. "31 Similarly, dKon mchogjigs med. dbang 
3ONicholas Rescher, op-ciL 
31chos kun mam rig tsam nyid du ... gsungst/ bLo gsal grub mtha!, X1.1ab, in Mimaki (1982-. 95). 
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po defines a proponent of Cittam5tra as "a person propounding Buddhist tenets who 
does not assert external objects. 02 
External objects are defined by Sopa and Hopkins (ibid. ) as objects that are different enti- 
ties from the consciousness apprehending them. The Cittamiitrin refutation of external 
objects denies that objects are different entities from the minds that apprehend them, and 
therefore entails that forms and so forth are the same entity as the consciousness that per- 
ceives them. The sense object and associated sense consciousness are both produced from 
a single predisposition contained within the mind. The Cittarnatrin position entails that 
there is no perceptual given. dKon mchogjigs med dbang po goes on to explain that both 
subschools of Cittam5tra are similar in asserting that blue appears as a gross object to an 
eye consciousness apprehending blue, and that blue falsely appears to be an external 
objeCt. 33 Even to a non-defective sense consciousness, objects appear as though they 
were external when they are not. Both subject and object are produced from a latent pre- 
disposition within the mind, fulfilling the third feature of radical ontological idealism 
which is the reality of the mind itself. 
VII. 3.3 gantaraksita's argument and its intelpretation by Mi p-ham 
The main point made in the MAL can be summarised thus: if a partless particle combines 
(in whatever way this is understooe) with a number of other particles to constitute 
coarse particles and gross objects, then it follows that the partless particle cannot be 
spatially unitary or spatially partless, since it requires a number of facets each linking 
32Sopa and Hopkins (1989: 249). 
33ibid., p. 251-2. 
3qbe three different theories mentioned by 95ntarakýita regarding how particles combine were each upheld 
by separate schools: the Nygya school maintained that particles must meet in order to combine; the Vaige- 
sikas and the Vaibh5sikas of Kashmir (AKB L43d) claimed that they are merely surrounded by other parti- ýIes, with space in-býtween; the Sautrdntikas (AKB i. 43d) asserted that particles are merely contiguous, and 
juxtaposed without interval. 
209 
with a corresponding number of other particles. No two particles can occupy the same 
space. This principle is necessary to account for the existence of large objects which are 
more extensive than any single particle. The argument is straightforward and shows the 
absurdity of asserting that partless particles are constitutive of matter. 
Faced with such a radical conclusion, how does kntaraksita account for the existence of 
the known world? In his commentary on verse 15, Mi pharn explains ýAntarakýita's 
position in the light of the Madhyamika interpretation of interdependent origination? 
5 
(On account of this 36), these particles are asserted to exist co-emergently with the 
entities [they compose]. Since these [particles] do not exist, all those [entities] 
that are related [to them] will also be devoid of existence since they are rooted in 
the partiCleS. 37 
Rather than maintaining a diachronic explanation of causality, where a particle at tj 
combines with other particles at t2 to form a composite object at t3, and where, con- 
versely, analysis can trace the process backwards by reduction, Madhyamikas instead 
envision the synchronous co-emergence of all relevant factors moment after moment, 
implying that both particles and the entities they compose are impermanent and have the 
same non-inherent (i. e. without svabhdva) but dynamic existence. 38 The crucial conse- 
quence of this reasoning, continues Mi pham, is that if sense objects, and the senses them- 
selves do not exist inherently, then neither does the knowing consciousness. Sense con- 
sciousnesses and the mental consciousness are said by Buddhists to arise as a result of the 
coming together of objects and senses, and if these two lack svabh4dva then so does the 
35See Murti (1960: 132-140) for a review of how the dialectical M5dhyamika method analyses causality; 
36Mi pharn has previously reviewed the first three lines of verse 15. 
37C. p. 190. Mi phards references to the MAL are in bold. rdul de dag cig shos kyi dngos po de dang lhan c 
ig Idu ba can yang yin par'dod pa de'i phyir de med pas de la dngos sarn brgyud pasbrel ba de marns .- kyang rdul phran gyi rtsa ba can yin pas na med par 'gyur te/ 
38NEgajuna, in particular, refuted the coherence of any theory of diachronic causation that asserts that an 
entity x is produced by one or more different entities y and 7. such that y and z exist prior to the existence of 
X. in technical terms, he attackedproduction from other. In MMK 1.1 he wrote: "Neither from itself, nor - 
from another, nor from both, nor without a cause, does anything whatsoever arise anywhere. " na svato napi 
parato na dv5bhyarn nApyahetutah/ utpann5 jatu vidyante bhIvah kvacana ke canal/ 
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consciousness they produce. 39 This implies that there is no ultimate truth to perception- 
based cognition. All externalist assertions-whichever category of phenomena they relate 
to-are therefore destroyed at a stroke. Mi pharn concludes: 
In short, if one investigates thoroughly, by virtue of the interdependent origination 
of cognition and the cognized, one will realize that ifparticles are not established 
then matter is not established, land] itfollows that mind (sems) is not established 
either. Finally, this [insight] is capable of destroying attachment to the true 
[existence] of any phenomenon whatsoever. When, for example, any one of the 
twigs in a bundle is pulled out, the others will no [longer remain] close-knit, but 
will gradually scatter. 40 
Rather than interpreting the verses in terms of a refutation of Abhidharma and Vai9qika 
ontology, Mi pharn considers that kntarakýita's argument concerns the process of cogni- 
tion, and effectively interprets it as a bridge between the earlier verses and the following 
section (v. 16-61) which deals explicitly with cognition and the nature of consciousness. 
Interestingly, Mi pharn likens cognition to a whole in the sense of a bundle. On the 
Buddhist view, cognition can be considered a bundle made of a combination of material 
and mental parts (sense objects, sense organs and sense consciousnesses in Sautrantika, 
for example). When any one of these parts is eliminated, the bundle disintegrates. But is 
Mi pharn reading too much into the text? What evidence is there that kntarakýita had 
-41 epistemology in mind? The conclusion of the corresponding passage of theylitt , on 
which, incidentally, Mi pham's commentary is very largely based, is as follows: 
By eliminating the [true existence of] permanent entities [such as] space, time, 
direction, the self, and subtle particles, it has been shown first that [nothing 
has] an intrinsic nature. 
rtag pa 7 dngos po nam mkhadang dus dang phyogs dang bdag dang phra rab 
dag kyang bsal tel rang bzhin med par sngar bstan zin toll 42 
39In the causal account of cognition common to the Vaibh4ikas and Therav5dins, cognitive events invol- 
ving the physical senses occur when four factors come together: the sense organ; the appropriate object; the 
appropriate physical elements (light, space, air, water and earth for seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting and 
touching respectively); and attention (manasikAra). See Bhikkhu Bodhi (1993: 151-2 ff. ). Me Vijfi5navildin 
account is very different since it accepts this analysis specifically at the phenomenal level but not in any 
ultimate sense. 
40C. p. 192. mdor na legs par dpyad na shes dang shes bya phan tshun rten `brel du gyur pai gnad kyis rdul 
ma grub pas bern po mi 'grub la/ des sems kyang bden par grub pa med par shes shing mthar chos kun 
Wang bden pSi zhen pajig nus te/ dper na Icug phran kyi phon po las gang yang rung ba zhig phyung bas 
gzhan mi brtan zhing rim gyis'thor'gro ba bzhin nol/ 
411chig6 (1985: 66). MALV P. 56b. 
42ibid. 
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The way ýdntarakýita couches his conclusion indicates that the issue at stake is ontologi- 
cal, not epistemological. There is no sign in the MAL or the vati that tantaraWta was 
following in the line of Vasubandhu's style of analysis. If tantarak§ita had lived earlier, 
one could account for the discrepancy by saying that epistemological issues had not risen 
to the fore, and scholars were still focused on ontology. But this is hardly the case, 
because the bulk of the MAL is devoted to the mind and the process of cognition, so it is 
quite clear that kntarakýita was keenly aware of the importance of epistemology. One 
cannot attribute Mi pham's interpretation merely to the fact that he lived a thousand years 
later. The position we will defend here is that Mi pham's understanding of the MAL is 
accurate insofar as it points to the implicit logic between verse 15 and verse 16. This is 
indeed a similar logic to that used first in the VhViatikdWriki! and then in the TS. In all 
three works, the argument proceeds from showing that particles do not truly exist, to 
_- 
showing that coarse material objects do not truly exist, to the application of this to the ý 
perception process, to the conclusion that since the mind does not apprehend external 
objects, if knowledge is to make sense at all the mind must be self-aware (svasaTvedana; 
rang rig). Although ýdntarakýita may not use CittamAtrin or epistemological terminology 
he does follow the steps of Vasubandhu's logic. 
This is the reasoning par excellence which literally serves as the bridge between ontology 
and epistemology. It is not simply Mi pham or Vasubandhu who have chosen to make this 
link; the connection between these two domains is inherent in the logical progression. 
Ontology has implications for epistemology. But does it? The point is that 8antaraksita 
does not draw the same conclusions from this reasoning as Vasubandhu does. In fact he 
makes it quite clear that he does not subscribe to a radical ontological version of idealism 
by inserting the first two lines of verse 16 between the refutation of partless particles and 
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the assertion that mind is self-aware. These two lines posit the irreducibility of mind and 
matter, thus anticipating any interpretation of his refutation as being motivated by 
idealism of an immaterialist variety. 
VIRA A critical assessment 
All Buddhist schools are characterized by one shade of idealism or another. Both Thera- 
v5dins43 and Madhyamikas", for example, share common ground in asserting that gross 
objects are merely designated to a series of cognitions and their reality is imputed 
(prajiliptisat), being formed by patterns of the human mind. In other words, their stand- 
point is a form of conceptual idealism where reality is understood in terms of our mental 
categories and tendencies. Mahdy5nists extend this position so it applies not just to 
wholes but to all objects of knowledge. Furthermore, Mah5y5nists (but not Sautr5ntikas) 
espouse strong substantival idealism, asserting that whatever exists must be discerned. 
We have seen evidence that ýantarak§ita holds both these views. Ironically, Buddhists 
share the latter form of epistemic idealism with the realist opponents they seek to refute. 
They set out to attack both scholastic realism-the position that real things just exactly 
are things as philosophy takes them to be-and naive realism, where real things just 
exactly are things as commonsense takes them to be. Both these forms of realism see reals 
as inherently knowable and do not envisage a reality that transcends or otherwise eludes 
the mind. Such realists therefore share the substantival idealism of Buddhists. 
As for gRntarakýita's position with regard to ontological idealism, this must be considered 
in the light of his view of external entities i) ultimately and ii) conventionally. Verse 92 of 
43Milindapailha 1.1. 
44TS 1972. "Just as in the case of the coming into existence of similar moments, there is an illusion of per- 
manence, so when there is an unbroken series of cognitions of similar atoms. there is an illusion of gross- 
ness. " 
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the MAL defines his position with regard to the ultimate reality of the external world., 
Based on the standpoint of Cittamfitra, one must know that external entities 
do not [truly] exist. 
sems tsam la ni brten nas sull phyi rol dngos med shes par byall 
So external entities are empty (stong pa) of independent existence ultimately. But what of 
their conventional existence? According to the blo gsal grub mtha' ýdntarak§ita is not an - 
idealist in the sense of Cittam5. tra. 
The scholar gantaraksita, the scholar Haribhadra, and theirfollowers assert that 
appearances such as)6rms and so on, mind and mental events, the objects [per- 
ceived in] dreams, and so forth, [are accepted] in relative trutIL45 
It is dBus pa blo gsal's view that gdntarakýita accepts the conventional existence of the 
material world. In this case, he is following the Madhyamaka approach rather than the 
Cittamatra one. Cittamatrins deny the existence of external reality on both the ultimate 
and conventional levels, but Madhyamikas refute the external world on the ultimate level 
and accept its existence on the relative levelý6 They do not deny the material world of 
empirical experience. The evidence for dBus pa blo gsal's view is MAL 64 where ýdnta- 
rakýita defines relative truth- 
One should understand that the nature of relative (truth] is (1) that which is 
delightful only as long as it is not investigated critically; (2) that which is 
subject to arising and decay; and (3) that which has causal efficiency. 
ma brtags gcig pu nyams dga'zhinll skye dang jig pai chos can pall 
don byed pa dag nus mams kyill rang bzhin kun rdzob pa yin rtogsl 
Relative truth is the domain of impermanent phenomena subject to causation ý7 But he 
45See Mimaki (1982: 166-7). slob dpon zhi batsho dang slob dpon seng ge bzang po la sogs pa ni gzugs la 
sogs par snang ba dang sems dang sems las byung ba dang rmi lam gyi yul la sogs pa yang yang dag paI 
kun rdzob tu bzhed de/ 
461be definition of a proponent of the Madhyamaka school given in the grub mtha'of dKon mchogjigs 
med dbang po (Sopa and Hopkins, 1989: 279-280) is a person propounding Buddhist tenets who asserts that 
there are no truly existent phenomena, not even particles. However, "the refutation of true existence does 
not mean that things actually do not exist; rather, they seem to be their own mode of subsistence whereas 
they are not, and thus are falsely established. " This definition applies to both SvItantrikas and to PrA- 
safigikas. However, there are differences in the way Prisahgikas and SvAtantrikas respectively accept con- 
ventional existence and these are discussed in Clapter IX. 
471chig6 (1985. LXI-LXVI). 
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also explains that relative truth has the nature of cognition and mental states. In verse 91 
he asserts: 
That which is cause and effect is nothing but mind-only. It is established that 
knowledge is that which is self-validated. 
rgyu dang 'bras bur gyur pa yang1l shes pa 'ba zhig kho na stell 
rang gis grub pa gang yin pall de ni shes par gnas pa yin: 11 
To explain causation kntarakýita does not follow Cittam. 5tra insofar as causes are not all 
held to be mental in nature. 
[651 Even that which is agreeable and acceptable as long as it is not investiga- 
ted critically implies the production of similar successive effects conditioned 
by their own successive causes. 
brtags pa ma byas nyams dgabaangll bdag rgyu snga ma snga ma lall 
brten nas phyi ma phyi ma yill'bras bu de 'dra 'byung ba yinll 
[661 Therefore, [for an opponent to say] "if relative [existence] has no [truly 
existing] cause, it could not exist [at all]"-that won't do. If there is a truly 
existing [cause] that expropriates [the relative], tell [me] what it is! 
de phyir kun rdzob rgyu med nall rung min zhes paang legs ma yinll 
gal te Vi yi nyer len pall yang dag yin na de smros shig1l 
gdntarakýita asserts that the cause of relative phenomena is the individual series of 
moments arising from a beginningless past, the implication being that there can be 
material series and mental series. The cause is not an inherently existent substratum. 
Similarly, Kamalagila asserts: 
... we claim that the cause of relative phenomena is a beginningless [series ofl 
successive causes. 49 
So dBus pa blo gsal is correct in claiming that ý5ntarakýita believes in the relative 
existence of external reality. Further evidence for this is in verse 16: 
Consciousness arises as [that which is] intrinsically opposed to the nature or 
matter... 
mam shes bems po 7 rang bzhin lasll bzlog pa rab tu skye ba stell 
48MALV P. 78b2-3. 
49MALP P. 122b8-123al. 
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This verse asserts that matter is distinct from the mind. Mind is that which is self-aware, 
and matter is that which is not self-aware. Mind and matter are opposites, and cannot be 
reduced the one to the other. The verse thus corroborates the view of dBus pa blo gsal, 
that both (material) forms and mind have relative existence for ýdntar*ita. It follows 
that in relative truth there can be a perceptual given, and there can be both object and 
subject, cognized and cognizer. But what is the nature of the cognized? Let us compare - 
verse 16 with the vrtti on verse 91. In this passage, ýdntaraksita explains that the bifurca- 
tion of Madhyarnaka into YogdcZira-Madhyamaka and Sautrantika-Madhyamaka was the 
result of their differing views concerning what exists in relative truth. 
One cannot conceive of the nature of knowledge as something other than its being 
established by itself This nature of knowledge that is self-validated is just like the 
form of a dream, an illusion and so forth. 50 
Bhdvaviveka, on the other hand, maintains that relative truth has the nature of an external 
entity whereas ýantarak§ita does not admit the existence of an object external to the mind. 
One cannot conceive of the nature of knowledge as something other than its 
being established by itself. This nature of knowledge that is self-validated isjust 
like theform of a dream, an illusion and the like. 
rang gis grub pa'i ngo bo bor nas shes pa'i ngo bo gzhan rtog pa med do// rang gis 
grub pai rang bzhin yang rmi lam dang sgyu ma la sogs paI gzugs bzhin no//51 
That which lies in the domain of cause and effect is called relative, and the relative is 
ultimately nothing but mind-only. Both matter and mind exist in dualistic opposition on 
the relative level, but ultimately neither matter nor mind exists. Conventionally we can 
account for the empirical world by referring to matter and to cognizing minds, but this is_ 
an understanding that has not been analysed or investigated from the ultimate point of 
view (one of the three features of relative truth defined in MAL 64), and it is in fact 
erroneous. If we ascribe our perceptions to external objects we are deluded. Nevertheless, 
-IOP. 78b, 4-5(lchig6,1995: 292-294). rang gis grub pa! i ngobobornas shespa! i ngobo gzhaartog pas med 
do// rang gis grub p; A rang bzhin yang rmi lam clang sgyu ma la sogs pa! i gzugs bzhin no// 
51MALV P. 78b, 4-5. (Ichig6,1985: 292-294). 
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it is not denied that deluded beings do just this. But once one comes to analyse the 
relative in order to identify the ultimate nature of causation then one can only conclude, 
says ýdntar*ita, that everything is but mind-only. 
It is still not clear, however, whether kntarakýita's acceptance of matter on the relative 
level actually entails an ontological commitment. If it does, this might mean that the 
entities he refutes are subjects (chos can) that appear in common (mthun snang ba) to 
both parties in the debate, that is to both himself and his opponents. In order to explore 
this further, one needs to distinguish between extemalist accounts of perception, such as 
that of the Sautrantikas, which infer the external existence of objects, and intemalist 
accounts of perception such as those put forward by the Yogac5ra schools, which do not. 
This is what kntarakýita proceeds to do in verses 16-61. The results of his analysis will 
therefore determine, inter alia, how one defines him as a Svdtantrika, and will be 
evaluated in Chapter IX. 
So what are the implications of his refutation of the material world for the nature and 
existence of consciousness? Although Mi phani points out that the interdependence of 
cognizer and cognized signifies that neither has an intrinsic nature, if ýantarakýita had 
succeeded in refuting the existence of the mind here he would have had no need to engage 
in the detailed discussion of verses 16-61. What is implied by Mi pham is that the refuta- 
tion in verses 11-15 includes a refutation of the intentional consciousness, that is, the con- 
sciousness that knows objects, or, to put it another way, the consciousness that arises in 
co-dependence upon an object of cognition ý2 Within the Abhidharma framework, this 
refers to the mental consciousness (mano; sents), being both the consciousness that per- 
5zMe Theravadins, like the Sarv5stiv5dins, considered that consciousness is always intentional. In his 
AuhasdlinT, Buddhaghosa asserts that consciousness may arise without adverting (i7vq! #=) attention but 
not without objective support (aramma. ýa): vina hi Avajanena cittarp uppajjati, ArammaQena pana vina 
Wuppajati- ti (PTS, p. 278). 
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ceives thoughts as its designated objects, and that which coordinates data from the five 
sense consciousnesses. 53 We have already considered the Vaibhdýika view of the intcn- 
tionality of consciousness in the discussion on cessation in Chapter VI. As Paul Williams 
(1981: 230) explains, "philosophically the Sarviistivadin doctrine was essentially built on 
the intentionality of consciousness, the theory that all consciousness must be conscious of 
something". 95ntar*ita's implied refutation of its existence at this point of the MAL is 
entirely consonant with the fact that he is addressing the existence of external objects, for 
such a theory of consciousness, and of cognition, entails an a priori assumption that the 
intentional object must exist (Williams, ibid. ). 
What ý5ntarakýita has specifically not refuted thus far is the existence of any mode of 
consciousness that is not intentional. But in addition, he has not refuted any type of cogni- 
tion based on the existence of an intentional consciousness whose objects of knowledge 
are mental in nature (and not defined as external). In other words, he has not addressed at 
all the analysis of the mind presented by Cittamatra in which both these options are 
asserted. In order to examine this important and thorny question thoroughly, he' devotes 
the remainder of his analysis to the processes of cognition and perception. 
The conclusion drawn by Cittamatrins from the refutation of particles is that there can be 
nothing other than perception-only. Their position is one of strong idealism in the sense 
53See David J. Kalupahana, The Principles of Buddhist Psychology, sUNY. 1987, especially pp. 29-31, for 
another Therav5din analysis. "Mano is a specific faculty with dhamma [concepts) as its object, whereas 
vihficjýta represents experience based upon all six faculties and their six objects ... Yet mano has a very speci- fic function which is not shared by any of the other faculties and, therefore, adds a special clement to con- 
sciousness or experience. It consists of the ability to survey the fields (gocara) or the objects of the other - 
senses ... This reflective faculty is also the source of the sense of personal idcntity or the conception of self... It may be noted that mano is never described as having continuity, while WMJýw is sometimes referred to 
as an unbroken stream (abbocchinnam viUdnasotam). 
In the AKB i. 16d, Vasubandhu clarifies the distinction between the two functions of mano by designating 
them with two different terms: manovijfiJna(dhJtu) refers to the n-dnd that apprchcnds concepts as its object 
while manodhatu or manas refers to the mental function of coordinating the sense consciousnesses and 
acting as their support. Indeed, manas also acts as a Support for manovijfidna (AKB i. 17c-d). 
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that it entails three things: knowledge is creative such that the world we know is imagin- 
ary (parikalpita); there is nothing given in perception because all knowledge ultimately 
comes from the mind knowing itself-, and creative knowledge itself is real. 54 The external 
world does not exist either in ultimate or in relative truth. 
The problem with the Cittam5trin position is that the mere refutation of the true existence 
of external objects does not necessarily entail such strong conclusions and is not sufficient 
to render a philosopher an idealiSt. 
55 To say that the realist's contention is unwarranted is 
one thing, but to conclude from this that idealism is established is another. From the 
assertion that the external world is unknowable we cannot infer that it does not exist at all. 
We can say that its existence cannot be known, but it is not valid to deduce from this that 
because it is unknown and unestablished it must be non-existent. Further arguments are 
needed to make this connection, such as arguments that show that phenomena depend by 
their very nature on the consciousness that apprehends them. That the claim of strong 
substantival idealism is not a necessary entailment of the refutation of the material world 
is exemplified by Mddhyamikas who make this refutation without falling under that 
idealist label. That is gantar*ita's project. 
54The Yogdcara Idealism by A. K. Chatterjee, Motilal Banarsiclass, Delhi, 1962, px. 
55Chatterjee (1962: 48-9). 
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CHAPTER EIGHT THE NATURE OF COGNITION 
V1H. 1 Introduction 
One of the chief innovations of the MAL is its detailed analysis of cognition in verses 16- 
61. In-depth philosophical analysis of the cognitive mechanisms of the mind is character- 
istic of YogAcRra treatises such as Asafiga's Mahdyjnasamgraha, Bodlzisattvabhami and 
Abhidharmasamuccaya, and Sthiramati's Madhydntavibhjgap-W. Yogdc5ra is concerned 
first and foremost with the nature, development and workings of the mind because it con- 
siders the mind so essential to the meditative process. ' But Madhyamaka treatises 
authored before ýantarakýita do not address detailed questions of epistemology. Although 
Jfianagarbha introduced epistemological questions into the SDV he did not address the 
cognition process systematically. This discussion is therefore a prime example of the way 
ýdntarakýita brought Yogac5ra and Madhyamaka together in the MAL. While the topical 
content of the analysis is typical of Yogdcara, the logical approach (i. e. the neither one 
nor many argument) is typical of Madhyamaka. tantar*itas own awareness of how 
innovative this was may be one of the reasons for the length of his discussion since 
nothing similar had ever been presented in such a context before. He was breaking new 
ground, both in the history of MahayZina treatises in India and in the development Of his 
own personal thinking. 
The discussion on cognition contrasts markedly with the preceding verses considered in 
Chapters VNII, in the sense that it is so detailed and explicit. This is partly what justifies 
the interest of the text for a modem reader for similar epistemological issues are debated 
in contemporary philosophy. kntarakýita may have been innovative within his own 
historical context, but since his time the questions he raised have become standard 
'On Knowing Reality by Janice Dean Willis. Motilal Banarsidass, Dellii, 1982, pp. 29ff. 
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nourishment for Buddhist and non-Buddhist philosophers the world over-questions on 
the relation between matter and mind specifically object and mind, object and image, and 
image and mind. It explains why for Mi pham, the interest of the MAL on cognition is of 
a different order: he believes the epistemological views expressed by ýdntarakýita are 
important because they represent the view of the rNying ma school. Over and over again 
in his commentary, he mentions that 8, qntarakýita's position (on Mi pham's interpretation, 
of course) is identical to that of the rNying ma school. According to Mi pham and to con- 
temporary rNying ma scholars such as mKhan chen Pad ma shes rab, the MAL presents 
the basis of what has since become the rNying ma view of the mind and cognition. It is 
not at all clear that such a thing exists at all-that is, a single view that is adhered to by all 
exponents of the rNying ma tradition. 2 However, insofar as Mi pham composed textbooks 
for the rNying ma tradition (rang lugs kyi yig cha) at the request of 'Jam dbyangs rnkhyen 
brtse'i dbang po, his views are regarded as authoritative by contemporary rNying ma pas. 
3 
This rNying ma view of cognition differs from prevailing dGe lugs pa views on a number 
of points. Its interest for modem scholarship therefore lies in the fact that it represents an 
alternative understanding of Buddhist epistemology to those with which most scholars are 
familiar. The present study is therefore one of the few English-language presentations of a 
rNying ma approach to cognition in the context of Madhyamaka rather than of rDzogs 
chen. 4 The exercise of comparing and evaluating rNying ma and dGe lugs epistemology 
systematically is an enormous task in itself requiring specific methods and sources, so it is 
2See Pettit (1997: 99). Pettit shows that what unites rNying ma pas is their adherence to a core of received 
VajrayAna texts and to the view of rDzogs chen as ultimate. But it is precisely in the area of Madhyamaka 
exegesis that interpretations within the tradition are diverse. 
3ibid. 
4'Mose works of kLong chen pa that are translated and studied in the English language are primarily rDzogs 
chen works: e. g. the Ngal gso skor gsum translated by Herbert V. Guenther as Kindly Bent to Ease Us, vols. 
I-IIII. This is partly due to the fact that the greater part of kLong chen pa! s Madhyamaka works are now lost. 
However, one presentation of the rNying ma approach that deserves special attention is Kennard Lipmans 
translation of the first chapter of kLong chen pa! s Fid bzhin rin po chei mdzod in Crystal Mirror V. pp. 344- 
364. For a rNying ma and rDzog chen study of the mind and cognition see From Reductionism to Creativity 
-rDzogs chen and the New Sciences ofMind by H. Guenther, Shambhala, Boston, 1989, pp. 189-243. 
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beyond the scope of this study and requires further research. This Chapter win simply 
examine ýdntarakýita's arguments on cognition with reference to Mi pham's commentary. 
Certain points that gave rise to divergent views in India or Tibet win be identified and 
examined in more detail. ýdntarakýita's view of cognition will then be critically appraised. 
V111.2 Debates on coanition: an overview 
VIH. 2.1 Extemalist and intemalist p2sitions 
In his commentary on verse 16 of the MAL, Mi pham presents an overview of the various 
theories on mind and cognition held by different Indian schools, both Buddhist and non- 
BuddhiSt. 5 This section of our study will draw from Mi pham's commentary in order to 
introduce the issues raised while at the same time broadly relating these to Western philo- 
sophical. theories of the mind and cognition, thereby laying the terminological and con-, , 
ceptual foundations for a critical appraisal of tdntarakýita's view. 
In analysing the process of cognition and the nature of consciousness, the first distinction 
we can make is that between externalists and internalists. We call externalists those who 
assert the existence of external objects such that external objects are independent of any 
mind that cognizes them, and of a different nature to that of the minds that cognize them.. 
And we call internalists those who hold that objects of cognition are necessarily mental in 
nature; cognition is a process internal to the mind. The model of cognition associated with 
externalism is one that posits some form of relation between subject and object, and -- 
between mind and matter. (It is not necessarily a dualist stance; externalist models of 
cognition could be associated with physicalist or supervenience theories of mind. ) In the 
Buddhist context, there are two possible views in externalism: 1) the view that asserts that 
5For another overview of Buddhist episternologies, see'Sarhvrti and Pararn5rtha in YogAcAra. according to 
Tibetan sources'by H. Guenther, in The Problem of Two Truths in Buddhism and Veddnta, ed. Mervyn , Sprung, 1973. The part of Mi pharres commentary that is referred to in the following section is found at, 
C. p. 194ff. 
external objects are apprehended directly by the senses, with no intermediary; and 2) the 
view that what appears to perception is an image, aspect (dkdra; rnam pa) or mental 
representation of the ob ect, not the object itself. The implication of this difference for j 
knowledge is that in 1) it is possible to know reality directly, but in 2) real external 
objects are not perceived directly, and their existence can only be inferred. 
VIH. 2.2 Aspqctless externalism 
The view that we directly perceive objects in an external world, and apprehend them just 
exactly as they are, is called commonsense realism in Western philosophy. This is the 
view behind everyday expressions such as "I saw the vase with my own eyes". In the 
Indian context, this position was that of a number of schools including the Vai9qikas and 
the Vaibh5ýikas. Mi pham. explains: 
[The VaiSesikas] assert that external objects exist, and that they are perceived by 
the sensefLulties. The consciousness is like a crystal sphere, and does not appre- 6 hend any of the objects'features. 
Proponents of this view think that objects are apprehended directly and nakedly, just as 
they are. This means that if a hundred people look at a vase, they all see just exactly that 
single vase. Perception cannot be mistaken unless the sense organs are defective. But Mi- 
7 pham explains that the SautrZintikas criticize this view on a number of counts. Firstly, it 
is absurd to claim that cognition is an activity of the sense organs rather than the con- 
sciousness. Sense organs are material in nature, and matter is defined as that which is not 
aware. Only mind is defined as capable of awareness and cognition. Therefore the sense 
organs cannot possibly cognize objects. Secondly, although according to the aspectless 
extemalist view objects are apprehended directly, in fact there must be a connecting link 
6C. p. 194. phyi don yod kyang de dbang pos mthong ba yin gyi/ marn shes ni shel sgong Ita bu yul gyi 
mam pa mi'dzin par'dod de/ 
7C. p. 195. 
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between subject and object. For cognition to take place, there must be a relation between 
object and subject. This is not accounted for in the Vaibhdýika theory (and in modem-day 
theories that do attempt to account for such a link, the issue is invariably problematic). 
Thirdly, if matter and mind are posited as opposites (verse 16 of the MAL), it follows that 
cognition of external material objects is impossible. The object of cognition must be of 
the same nature as the cognizing consciousness; how else could they be related? Finally, 
if it were correct to maintain that external objects are apprehended just exactly as they are 
then one hundred people looking at a vase would each see exactly the same thing; but 
experience tells us that owing to their respective angles of vision, and so on, what each 
actually perceives is unique. The conclusion is that if we want to posit external objects, 
the only way of making sense of cognition is to accept aspects in perception. 
VIH. 2-3 Extemalism endowed with asMts 
The Buddhist Sautrantika school urges an externalist model of cognition endowed with 
aspects. Sautz-antikas hold that what is perceived is an aspect (mam pa; akdra) of the 
object, not the object itself. In inferring that such an image must be produced by an un7 
perceived object, they hold that the external object must exist in exactly the way the 
8 aspect appears. The example given is the way the images of objects appear in a mirror. 
This correspondence principle therefore guarantees the validity of knowledge. At the 
same time, the Sautrdntikas admit that the aspect an object casts in my mind must be 
different from the aspect it casts in anyone else's mind, so that perception is exclusive to a 
particular mental continuum. Finally, they explain delusion as the mistaken belief that 
what is perceived is the object itself when it is only a representation of it. 
Our belief leads us to take the perceived world for the real world. In fact reality always 
EC p. 196. mam pa de la ji yod pa ma Ihag ma chad par phyi rol la'ang yod dgos la/ 
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remains hidden, concealed behind the aspects as it were, and beyond our direct apprehen- 
sion. Reality can only be known by inference. Furthennore, cognition is a faculty of the 
consciousness and not of the sense organs. What is apprehended in cognition is mental in 
nature, while the external world remains different from it. On Mi pham's view, if external 
objects are asserted then the Sautrzintika theory is the best. 
This is the approach of the externalists who hold that there is no [other] position 
that is better than [that ofl aspected [cognition]. As long as external objects are 9 asserted, there is no more appropriate position, so this system is very acceptable. 
Mi phamlo then dismisses a criticism levelled at the Sautriintikas. The argument is that if 
it is asserted that external objects are never known directly, why is it justified to posit 
them at all? It would be logically possible to perceive things that do not exist, such as the 
form of formless spirits (sha za), for how could we ever know for certain that the aspect 
in cognition actually coffesponded, to an external object and was not an haflucination? 
Critics of this persuasion suggest that the external object is directly perceived in a first 
moment, and that in subsequent moments reality is hidden by the image we have of it. 
That initial moment of direct perception secures the validity of knowledge. This theory 
was propounded by the Buddhist Logicians, who are sometimes considered to be Sautrdn- 
tikas. 11 Nevertheless, Mi pharn urges that it reveals a misunderstanding of the Sautrantika 
view. 
Yet this [shows] an incomplete understanding of the Sautrdntika viewpoint. If 
there were an awareness of the actual object in thefirst moment, why would there 
not be [such] an awareness in the second moment, and so on? Although [the 
object] is hidden, the apprehended aspects are still those of that [object] and can- 
not be those of anything else. [Likewise, ] although an actualfonn does not appear 
in a mirror, that which is directed towards the mirror appears there, and notjust 
9C p. 196-7. phyi don dngos ni Ikog na mol tshul te marn pa de'i phag tu yib pa Ita bul tshul gyis mthong ba 
med par'dod/ lugsdi phyi don yod. par'dod phan chad'di Itar khas len pa lasos med pas shin tu'thad/ 
IOC p. 197. 
"See Hattori (1968: 93). 
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anything at random. 12 
Since cognition concerns the consciousness, the process of cognition must be explained in 
terms of series of moments of consciousness. And therefore, if there is a moment of direct 
perception this cannot stop abruptly and become something else, such as the apprehension 
of an image. That initial moment requires its own coherent series of subsequent moments. 
The Logicians' compromise does not work. In addition, it is a principle of the Sautriintika 
view that there is a necessary and exact connection between the aspect and the object that 
produced the aspect, and this implies that no aspects could appear in the mind that had not 
been so produced. In other words, it is unreasonable to suppose that aspects can be pro- 
duced at random or can arise without cause. The criticism is rejected on these grounds. 
VIH. 2.4 Internalist views of conition 
The externalist model of cognition endowed with aspects is very similar to the 
internalist model of cognition endowed with aspects, namely in the Buddhist context the 
theory of Cittamdtra- The main difference between them, on Mi pham's view, lies simply 
in whether or not aspects in cognition are said to be produced by external objects. 13 
Internalists refute the existence of external objects by way of 'the reasoning that refutes 
production' (skyes la 'dra ba 'gog pa 7 rig pa). 14 They claim that it is unreasonable to 
assert that what appears in perception is produced by an external object. The mere pre- 
sence of an aspect in cognition is not sufficient to establish the existence of an outer 
object. The logical inference that attempts to establish the link is uncertain, because there 
22Cp. 197. de lakhacig gis. phyi don gtan nas ma snang na sha. za sogs kyi mampa! ang cis mi'dzin te/burn 
pa dang sha za gnyis Ikog gyur yin pa la khyad med pSi phyir na skad cig dang po la phyi don snang zhing 
de phan chad Ikog gyur yin ser kyang mdo, sde pa! i grub mtha! gtan ma, chub pa ste/ skad cig dang po la. yul 
dngos su rig na gnyis pa. sogs sifi'ang cis n-A rig/ Ikog gyur yin yang gang gi mam pa gtad pa dei mam pa 
'dzin pa las gzhan n-d srid tel me long gi nang du gzugs dngos shar ba nam yang n-d srid kyang/ gang me 
long la phyogs pa de'char ba las gang rung rung mi'char ba bzhin not 
13C P. 197. 
14Tbe overview of the CittamAtra position is taken from Mi pharifs commentary on verse 44. C p. 262ff. 
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are cases where it is commonly acknowledged that the image that appears to perception 
is not just exactly as the external object must be. One example of such a case is when a 
visually impaired person sees two moons. Such instances call into question the Sautrzin- 
tika principle of an exact correspondence between aspects and the objects that produce 
them. 15 
Furthermore, Cittamatrins assert that subtle particles cannot be perceived and arc there- 
fore unestablished, and gross objects have been shown to be unestablishcd too. But their 
principal argument against the external world is one which establishes that the nature of 
all that appears in cognition is identical to the nature of consciousness. 
The principal proof of [the fact that] apprehended and apprehender are not 
different is the argument that all appearances have the essence of clear and aware 
consciousness. [This] is established through the certainty of simultaneous obser- 
vation. Regarding that [certainW, the valid cognition observes the object blue 
simultaneously with the cognition apprehending blue. [This occurs] not only on 
occasion; the pervasion or the certainty of Ithis being so] is constant. [The 
argument is] set out asfollows: The object blue and the cognition apprehending 
blue are not different because they are certain to be observed simultaneously just 
as the appearance of two moons [and the cognition apprehending two moons]. 16 
The internalist refutation of the external world is directly connected with the assertion that 
"In his philosophical analysis of what is meant by 'illusion' in Advaita Veddnta, Richard W. Brooks (1973) 
makes a distinction between illusion and delusion. Illusion is intersubjective, while delusion is either a 
purely private experience, the judgement about which does not reflect a true state of affairs in the world, or 
the acceptance of an illusion as a true state of affairs in the world. On this definition, illusion implies an 
apparent objectivity, while delusion implies an apparent state of affairs which is subjective. Delusion also 
involves belief of some sort whereas illusion does not. 7bese distinctions are useful when it comes to under- 
standing notions such as error or ignorance in externalist and internalist epistemologies. I usually translate 
the term avidya (ma fig pa) in this study as 'delusion! on the basis that in Buddhism, and especially in 
Madhyamaka, avidya denotes first and foremost a particular defiled state of mind in the subject. 
16C p. 263-4. gzung'dzin rdzas tha dad ma Yin par bsgrub paI gtso bo snang ba thams cad shes pa gsal rig 
gi ngo bor skyes paI gtan tshigs dang/ Man cig dmigs nges kyis sgrub par byed pa Yin te/ de la yul sngon 
po dang sngo'dzin gyi shes. pa gnyis dus lhan cig tu. tshad mas dmigs pa dang/ de'ang res'ga! ba ma Yin par 
gtan du khyab paýarn nges pa ste'di Itar/ yul sngon po dang sngo'dzin gyi blo chos can/ rdzas gzhan ma. 
Yin te/ Ihan cig dmigs pa nges paI phyir/ z1a. ba gnyis snang ba zhin/ 
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consciousness is self-aware. Self-awareness in this context means the mind's ability to 
be 
aware of its own cognitions-that is, not only does the mind apprehend the object blue, 
but it is aware of apprehending the object blue. Not only this, but both these awarenesses 
are simultaneous. One might well wonder why this simultaneity entails the claim that the 
object and the cognition of it must be of the same nature. 
17 The internalist defence states 
that when phenomena are of separate substance, such as 1) blue and 2) yellow, they will 
not always be apprehended together or simultaneously. It does not always follow that 
when 1) is observed 2) will be observed at the same time. However, in the case of a cog- 
nition apprehending the object blue and the cognition that is aware of apprehending blue, 
the two are invariably simultaneous. One never occurs without the other. In short, the 
Cittarnatra view holds that whatever appears to cognition must be cognition. If something 
is not cognized, it cannot be experienced at all. And if a person is not cognizant, then he 
or she is incapable of experiencing anything. '& 
Finally, internalist Cittamdtrins assert the existence of a storehouse consciousness (alaya; 
kun gzhi) understood as that aspect of consciousness that is not engaged with objects of 
cognition but which functions as the support for habitual tendencies. 19 Mi pham summa- 
rises the characteristics of the alaya as follows: 
The term 'storehouse consciousness' is applied to Ithat aspect of] one's conscious- 
ness which is mere awareness and clarity, not confined Ilike a] consciousness of 
engagement directed to different JobjectsL but that whichfunctions as the support 
for habitual tendencies. It is neutral in essence, a mere awareness of the actuality 
of objects, and it arises moment by moment. It is endowed with the retinue of the 
five ever-present mere [mental states] of contact and soforth. It is not clearly 
17C p. 264. 
18C p. 264-5. shes. pa la snang pa yin na shes pa yin dgos te/ ma shes na rang &is myong par yang mi rung 
ba! i ... /- 19For a detailed study of the 6IqyavijFIdna in classical YogkAra, and of the arguments justifying its exis- 
tence, see Griffiths (1986: 91-106). 
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focused (mi gsal ba), but is an expansive awareness of the world and beings. 20 
The key points about the storehouse consciousness are that it is the mere essence of clear 
and aware cognition, not engaged with the apprehension of objects, and not focused on 
anything in particular. Rather, it serves as the support or storehouse for karmic seeds 
which stay there until they ripen and produce their appropriate effects. The effects they 
produce take the form of the diverse appearances in cognition and the variety of exper- 
iences associated with them. It is these seeds, then-rather than external objects-that are 
asserted to be the causes of whatever appears to perception. That these appearances are 
apprehended as separate from the consciousness that cognizes them is due to a mistaken 
delusion, likened to the way a dreamer takes his dream to be objectively real. It can be 
seen from this reasoning that the storehouse consciousness must be asserted if one 
chooses an internalist position. It is necessary for the coherence of the position, which 
holds that the aspects appearing in perception are mental in nature and have a cause in 
consciousness. 
Mi pham's characterization of the storehouse consciousness corresponds to what is stated 
in the classical Yogac5xa treatises. The first definition given by Asafiga in the Mahdydna- 
sawraha 21 , for example, is that it serves as the repository (alaya) for mental seeds. 
Similarly, Vasubandhu describes it as a 'store-consciousness' for mental seeds in the 
TrimAdkdrika and in the KannasiddhiprakaraVa. 22 However, both Asafiga and Vasu- 
21C p. 265. rang gi marn par shes pa gsal rig tsam'jug shes so so ba! i phyogs su ma lhungs pa zhig la, bad 
chags kyi rten du gyur pa! i kan gzhi'i mam par shes pa zhes gdags pa ste/ deang ngo bo, lung ma bstan yul 
Syi don tsarn rig pa rgyun skad cig marbyung ba/ 'kor rig sogs kun'gro Inga tsam. dang Man pa/ dmigs pa 
n-d gsal ba/ snod bcud rgya chen po la dmigs pa yin par'dod la/ 
21Maloycmasaýn raha, 1.1-3, in Lamotte (19731.4 and H. 12-14). Asahga cites the Abhidharmasatra as an .9 authority on the alaya, and asserts that the consciousness that is endowed with all the [karmic] seeds of all 
phenomena is called storehouse consciousness. chos kun sa bon thams cad pa'ifl rnam, par shes pa kun gzhi 
stet/ de bas kan gzhi marn shes te// 
22TfiTdikdWHk4 2, in Anacker (1984: 186); Kartnasiddhiprakarana 33, in Anacker (1984: 113). 
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bandhu mention other functions of the dlayavijfidna as weU, such that it is the appropria- 
ting consciousness (dddnavijiIdna) that takes rebirth, and also the retributory conscious- 
ness (vipdkavijfidna), 23 but Mi pham does not mention these. 
Such are the broad lines of Mi pham's overview. It is clear that some of his points require 
elaboration and clarification, and this will occur over the following pages. In particular, 
he has not mentioned two developments, the first of which was important for kntarak- 
§ita's philosophy and the second of which was instrumental in shaping Mi pham's own 
views. The first point-which Mi pham clearly assumes his reader is already familiar 
with-is the theory of cognition developed by Dign5ga and Dharrnaldrti that strongly 
influenced ýantar*ita and became normative in Tibetan Buddhism. And the second 
point is the development of the Madhyamaka view of the mind and cognition, and 
especially the emergence of dGe lugs pa Pr5saAgika re-interpretations of Dharmaldrti 
combining a realist view of perception with aspected cognition, and refuting self- 
awareness in relative truth. These debates have been addressed in lucid detail by Dreyfus 
(1997), and a selection of relevant points will be examined during the course of 
the present discussion. 
V111.2.5 Divergences of view 
Mi pham. does review two other heated debates between Buddhists, which can be divided 
into those that were current in India (in particular, in tantaraksita's time) and those that 
emerged in Tibet. The MAL directly addresses the two main topics that proved controver- 
sial in kntarakýita's time. The first concerns the nature of the relationship between the 
aspects appearing to cognition and the consciousness of them. There were three positions 
on this: those of the Non-Dualists, the Half-Eggists and the Equalists. All three positions 
MMahilyanasa? i raha 1.5 and 1.35; Karinasiddhiprakarapa 33. .9 
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apply to both Sautrantika and CittarnAtra views. The second area of contention concerns 
the nature of the aspect that appears to cognition. Views are divided between those who 
assert that the aspect is real (sakdravddins) and those who do not (nirakiravidins). This 
debate was internal to the Cittarndtra school. Both these areas of controversy will be 
examined below. 
The issue for this study is to know which of these options is preferred by ýAntarakýita, 
and this is in itself a subject of contention between dGe lugs pa and rNying ma commen- 
tators. The MAL is open to different interpretations. Our task, then, will be to determine 
whether the rNying ma interpretation presented by Mi pham is justified by the text. 
VIIEL3 The main features of glintarak5ita's philosophy of mind 
VIII. 3.1 His general p2sition 
As indicated above, Mi pham considers that the Sautrantika theory is the best if one 
accepts the existence of external objects, and his view is corroborated by two passages in 
the MAL where ý5ntarakýita implies that the Sautriintika theory is acceptable if one posits 
external objects. The relevant passages are found first in verse 18: 
Therefore, since this is the nature of consciousness, [the mind] is able to cog- 
nize itself. But how can it cognize objects whose nature is different? 
don gyi rang bzhin gzhan dag lallde yisfi har shes par 'gyurll 
And having refuted Vaibh5sika, Vaigesika, Jaina, Mim5msaka, Lok5yata, SRmkh a and y 
Veddntin theories of cognition, ýd=arakýita concludes in verse 43: 
Therefore it is established from every point of view that cognition [occurs] 
with the appearance of various [aspects]. 
de phyir sna tshogs snang ba yill rnam shes mam pa kun tu gnasll 
ýAntarak§ita considers that two of the main SautrAntika principles are reasonable, that is: 
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consciousness can only cognize objects that are mental in nature, not objects that are 
material, since only two entities of similar natures can be causally connected; entailing 
2) 
his preference for a theory of aspected cognitioný4 However, as we have already seen 
in 
Chapter VI, ýRntarakýita does not accept the true existence of external objects, so it , 
follows that he must in fact reject both Vaibhaýika and Sautrdntika theories of cognition, 
including the compromise theory outlined above asserting that the first instant of cogni- 
tion apprehends the object itself while subsequent moments apprehend the aspect in 
cognition. In verse 33 he states: 
I have never perceived particles [such as] white and so forth, unitary and 
without parts, that appear to [a first-instant] cognition. 
rdul phran bdag nyid dkar la sogsll gcig pu 7 bdag nyid cha med Paq 
shes pa gang Wang snang gyur parll bdag gis rab tu tslwr ba medl? 
5 
kntarak§ita refutes the existence of partless particles on the grounds that they have never 
been perceived. He therefore adopts a position of strong substantival idealism. Since they 
have never been perceived, their existence cannot be established. 
VM. 3.2 How does ý5ntaraksita understand svasamvedana? 
The fact that ýdntaraksita asserts the self-aware nature of consciousness (svasam. vedana; 
rang rig) is accepted by all commentators and is not disputed. This assertion is given as 
one of the defining characteristics of the Yogiicdra-Madhyamaka school. 
26 However, the 
subject of self-awareness is certainly a matter of dispute in Buddhism generally. In Tibet, 
for example, dGe lugs pa Prasafigikas do not accept it27 even in relative truth whereas 
2471he MAL is used in dGe lugs pa institutions as a primary Indian source for Sautrintika tenets. See Klein 
(1998: 105,109-110). 
251chigUs translation of this verse is doubtful. "To what object would the [instantaneous] cognitions [pro- 
posed by the Sautrantika) refer, since [the objects] 'white and the like are of the nature of atorns which have 
no parts? [Ibe cognition] does not [merely) perceive itself. " 
26For example, see Sopa and Hopkins (1989-283); Guenther (1971: 131); Lati Rinbochay (1980: 19). 
27ibid., p. 308. See also Williams (1998) for a detailed discussion of dGe lugs pa critiques of self-awareness. 
Self-awareness was refuted by Tsong kha pa as one of the eight great difficult points (Aa'gnas chen po 
bryyad) and his successors in the dGe lugs pa school followed this lead. It is also one of the eight chief dis- 
tinguishing features of Prisafigika according to the dGe lugs pa scholar lCang skya. lbesc eight are: 
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rNying ma pas do. 28 And in ancient India, Madhyamikas such as Bhdvaviveka29 and 
ýRntarak§ita accepted it while Candrakirti3o and Rizinagarbha3l did not. Disputes concer- 
ning self-awareness were intense in 19th century Tibet when Mi pham was writing his 
commentary on the MAL, and we should be aware in reviewing his defence of 
ýdntarak- 
§ita that he himself accepted rang rig in relative truth and upheld this view against his 
dGelugs pa critics on several occasions. 32 Our task here, then, is to examine what is meant 
by this term as used by ý5ntarakýita, and to analyse the role played by self-awareness in 
the cognition process on his view. By examining how 85ntarakýita's presentation stands in 
relation to Buddhist critiques, we will assess whether it is reasonable for him to posit self- 
awareness. The view defended here is that Buddhist criticisms of self-awareness, and 
particularly of a concept of self-awareness of the type proposed by 8antarak§ita, have 
largely been made at cross-purposes. This is why we need to begin by defining our terms. 
In the first chapter of his recent study on self-awareness in Buddhist Madhyamaka, Paul 
WilliamS33 attempts to clarify an alleged ambiguity in the Buddhist use of the term by dis- 
tinguishing what he calls 'self-awareness (i)' and 'self-awareness (ii)'. The former refers to 
the subjective consciousness which takes the aspect of an appearing object as its object of 
1) refuting dlaya; 2) refuting svasaýnvedana; 3) the non-assertion of autonomous reasons; 4) its unique way 
of asserting external objects; 5) its proof that Hearers and Solitary Realizers realize the selflessness of 
phenomena; 6) its unique way of positing the conception of a self of phenomena as an affliction; 7) its 
unique way of asserting that disintegratedness is a functioning thing; and 8) its unique presentation of the 
three times. See Unique Tenets of the Middle Way Consequence School by Daniel Cozort, Snow Lion, 
Ithaca, New York, 1998. 
From these points one can see that what is generally termed 'Prasahgika-Madhyamaka' in the research 
literature is actually more precisely 'the dGe lugs pa presentation of PrdsaftgiW. rNying ma pas generally 
consider themselves to be Pr5saiigikas, but their interpretation of what this means differs on many issues, 
particularly with regard to alaya and svasajpvedana, and to the existence of disintegratedness. 
21See Pettit (1997: 77; 98-100). Mi pharn himself accepts rang rig in relative truth. See Williams (1998, 
ch. 7). 
21See the reference from his Tarkajvalil in Williams (1998: 4-5). 
30MAV 6: 74-75. 
31SDV 6c: "because self-awareness is impossible". rang rig rigs pa ma yin phyir// In Eckel (1987: 72,157). 
32Williams (1998) argues that Mi pham defends this position in his commentaries on the ninth chapter of 
gantideva's Bodhicary4vatara, on Candrakirti's Madhywnakavatara, and on the MadhyamakAlamkdra. 
33The Reflexive Nature ofAwareness: A Tibetan Madhyamaka Defence by Paul Williams, Curzoý Press, 
London, 1988. 
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awareness. There is therefore 'seeing blue' and 'knowing I am seeing blue'. The latter type 
of self-awareness refers to reflexivity as a defining characeristic of consciousness in 
general. Williams appears to imply that this distinction has never been previously claril- 
fied. Ironically, however, Mi pham makes just such a distinction in his commentary on. 
- 
the MAL and emphasizes how crucial it is for a correct understanding of self-awareness. 
When it is said that consciousness is self-aware, this is therefore not an assertion 
in terms of the production of the cognition of [something] actually differentf-rom 
consciousness itself, as when an axe strikes wood. Such [an assertion] is not made, 
in terms of the entities of objects that cognition is aware of, and an agent that 
cognizes those objects. Since this is therefore Iheld to be] the [very] nature of 
cognition, self-awareness is conventionally acceptable and appropriate. [But] if 
self-awareness is asserted here as in fact the nature of subject and object, 
produced and producer, this is unacceptable. 34 
Mi pharn expresses a rNying ma view 35 that it is imperative to distinguish two types of . -, 
self-awareness: the first is that awareness which arises when consciousness is intention- 
ally engaged with an object of awareness, and when it can be divided, so to speak, into 
subject and object. The subjective awareness is aware of the aspect (mampa; dkara) of 
the object which is also mental and of the nature of consciousness, but which is termed. 
the objective aspect of awareness for the purposes of this analysis. It is this type of self- 
awareness that we refer to when we discuss the topic of knowing that we know x. By con- 
trast, the second type corresponds to Williams"self-awareness (ii)' and is a defining 
characteristic of the mind applied to consciousness as it is, without an intentional object 
and considered by itself and not necessarily in relation to anything else. Williams is un- 
doubtedly correct in maintaining that discussion becomes hopelessly muddled if these twO 
senses of the word are confused. 
34C. p. 205-6. shes pa de yi rang gis rang rig pa zhes rjod pa gang yin pa nil sta re shing la gdab pa Ita bur 
dngos su rang las tha dad pai rang 'dzin shes pa bskyed pa'am/ shes pas rig par bya ba yul dang/ yul de rig 
par byed pa'i dngos por'dod ba inin pa de yi phyir na'di ni shes pa yi rang bzhin yin pas bdag zhes kyi 
tha snyad'thad cing rung ba yin no// de la dngos su rang rig pa, zhes, yul can dang yul bskyed bya skyed 
byed kyi rang bzhin du'dod na mi'thad de/ 
37111iS point is taught by contemporary rNying ma scholars such as Dzi gar kong sprul rin po, che as a key to 
understanding this topic and gantaraklitA view of it. 
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In selecting the terminology used here, we will follow the definitions and categories 
suggested by Matilal (1986: 142-9). 
1) The reflexivity of awareness refers to the definitional character of awareness as 
being self-aware. The theory is that if an awareness cl arises, it apprehends not 
only the thing, a, or the proposition, p, but also cl itself by the same token. 
2) Introspection is specifically defined here as the awareness of an immediately 
preceding awareness. If cl arises, it apprehends only the thing, a, or the proposi- 
tion, p, and we need another event, c2, to apprehend cl. 
3) Reflective awareness refers to the awareness that an awareness has arisen in 
one's mind, such that one needs an inference to be aware of one's awareness. 
06 "Since I am aware of this object, there must have arisen an awareness in me. 
In verses 16-18 of the MAL, ýdntarakýita asserts the reflexive nature of consciousness. 
Consciousness arises as [that which is] intrinsically opposed to the nature of 
matter. The nature of that which is immaterial is self-awareness. 
The self-aware nature of the mind should not be analysed into action and 
agent since it is unitary and without parts, and cannot be divided into three 
[i. e. the knower, the known and the knowing]. 
Therefore, since this is the nature of consciousness, [the mind] is able to 
cognize itself. But how can it cognize objects whose nature is different? 
rnam shes bems po 7 rang bzhin las. 11 bzlog pa rab tu skye ba stell 
bems min rang bzhin gang yin pall de 'di 7 bdag nyid shes pa yin: 11 
gcig pa cha med rang bzhin la// gsum gyi rang bzhin mi 'thad phyirll 
de yi rang gi rig pa nL11 bya dang byed pa 7 dngos por minll 
de 7 phyir 'di ni shes pa yL11 rang bzltin yin pas bdag shes rung1l 
don gyi rang bzhin gzhan dag laff de yis ji Itar shes par 'gyurll 
Consciousness or mind is defined as that which is self-aware, and matter is defined as that 
which is not self-aware. Furthermore, self-awareness is asserted to be unitary and without 
parts (gcig pa cha med), so it is not a cognition in the sense of a mental event that is pro- 
36Matilal adds that the first view is held by certain Buddhists, the second is the Ny5ya view, and the third is 
the Bh5tta Mim5msaka view (held by Kumarila), indicating just how generally this topic was debated in 
India during kntarak0ta's time. 
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duced by something and which has an object. In other words, self-awareness should not 
be understood in terms of a mind that cognizes another mind as its object; it is not a 
dualistic mode of cognition. Self-awareness is the very nature of consciousness, and not 
an act or specific mode of cognition; it implies that all cognition is naturally and 
necessarily self-aware. 
These verses correspond to verses 2011-2028 in the TS where 
ýEintarakýita similarly 
asserts the existence of self-awareness and defends his view against that of Kumdrila who 
propounded the reflective type of self-awareness. In defending the reflexivity of con- 
sciousness, ý, qntarakýita argues that unless we define consiousness as capable of being 
aware of itself, then we cannot account for the possibility of it being aware of the appre- 
hended aspect (rnam pa; dkdra), which is mental in nature. If a cognition is uncognized, 
what other cognition could there be that would bring it to awareness? In other words, he 
argues that unless we posit reflexivity, introspection and reflectiveness are impossible (to 
use Matilars terminology). If a subsequent moment of awareness is required for the first 
moment to be cognized, this implies the first moment occurred without one's awareness of 
it, but what determines the time or the cause for the subsequent moment of awareness to 
occur? As Kamalani a (TSP 2024) puts it, "How can a thing which is not cognized at the 
time of its own apprehension become cognized at the time of the cognition of something 
else? " The problem is that if one asserts either introspection or reflectiveness without also 
asserting reflexivity, one falls into infinite regress (TS 2025). If one has to postulate 
another cognition to account for awareness of a first cognition, there is infinite regress. 
On the other hand, if we accept that the first cognition is self-aware, then all subsequent 
moments can also be self-aware. Furthermore, unless we accept self-awareness our entire 
theory of cognition falls into absurdity since a first moment of apprehension would be 




one have an awareness that one is unaware . In other words, it is a contradiction in 
terms to call anything a cognition unless it is conscious and self-aware. In summary, 
gdntarakýita defines self-awareness as a combination of two factors: 
(i) a cognition does not depend on anything else to make itself known or cognized. 
'Self-awareness' must therefore be understood structurally and conventionally as 
equivalent to an awareness that is 'not made known through another'. 38 
(ii) it does not remain uncognized. 39 
That mind is self-aware is presented as a definition, and therefore as a presupposition. 
Arguments are invoked to make sense of the claim, but essentially it is a premise upon 
which the remainder of the theory is based. In his -qtti, ýdntarakýita posits self-awareness 
as part of the definition of mind as being luminous by natureýo And Kamalani a's pan-JUd 
emphasizes the fact that self-awareness is not infer-red as part of an epistemological theory 
but is posited on the basis of common empirical experience. 41 The quality of not needing 
anything else for the consciousness to be illuminating is part of our experience of things. 42 
A similar approach is taken by Mokýdkaragupta, 43 who argues that since it is part of our 
common experience it cannot be denied--on principle, Madhyamikas following Candra- 
kIrti never deny that which is accepted conventionally by people. This element of empiri- 
cal evidence allows Mi phani to disassociate svasamvedana from the CittamAtra theory of 
svasaýnvedana without which this definition of mind is still valid. 44 
37Matilal (1986: 144). 
38WilliaMS (1988: 89). 
39FOr this summary see Matilal (1986: 156). 
40MALV 16, in Ichig6 (1985: 68ff. ). 'di rang rig pa! i rang bzhin du marn par gzhag pa ni rang bzhin gyis 
gsal ba! i bdag nyid yin pa! i phyir te/ shing rta la sogs, pa la rig pa. med pa! i rang bzhin las bzlog pai phyir ro// 
41MALP 16, in Ichiga (1985: 69ff. ). gsal ba gzhan la mi Itos pa nyid du tha snyad kyi lam la'jug pa yin no// 
42Williams (1998: 23-24). 
43See Kajiyama (1989: 5 1). 
44See Williams (1998: 24-25). 
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Mi pham clarifies several points regarding ýdntarakýita's concept of self-awareness. 45 
(1) He acknowledges that any theory that interprets self-awareness as an intentional mode 
of awareness is unacceptable. He points out that any theory of cognition based on the 
principle that a cognizing consciousness is produced by the appearance of an object of 
cognition can be refuted according to the arguments used by Ndgdrjuna in his refutation 
of causation. 45 Furthermore, it is absurd to imply that anything can engage with itself- 
that a knife can cut itself, and so on-and equally absurd to imagine that the mind can 
apprehend itself as an object. These arguments entail that self-awareness is only coherent 
as long as it is understood as a non-intentional mode of consciousness. 
(2) Mi pham's second point is to demonstrate the implications of ýdntaraksita's definition 
of mind and matter. Since material objects are not aware (by definition), they depend on a 
mind that is clear and aware to be known. But since the mind is clear and aware by nature, 
(and by definition), it is not dependent on any object in order to be aware of its own 
essence. " So the conventional existence of self-awareness is a reasonable assertioný8 The 
point is that consciousness is not dependent on anything else to become aware; that is its 
nature. The example given is that of a candle flame which illuminates the darkness: dark- 
ness depends on candlelight to be illuminated, but for the illumination of the candlelight 
itself no other cause is necessary. 
(3) Mi pham further acknowledges that self-awareness is unacceptable if it is held to be 
45C p. 205ff. 
46MMK Ch. l. 
47Ms is the argament given in TS 2012. 
48C p. 206. de Ita bas na yul bum pa sogs bern po yin pas de dag la gsal zhing rig pa mi srid la/ des na de dag 
gi ngo bor rig par byed pa rang las gzhan pa gsal zhing rig pal blo la Itos dgos kyang/ shes pa'di ni rang gi 
ngo bo bem po Ita bu ma yin pas rang gi ngo bo rig par bya ba rkyen gzhan la Itos mi dgos pa de phyir rang 
rig ces bzhag pa tha snyad ches'thad de/ 
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truly existent. 49 In fact, those who attack it and demonstrate its absurdity through the 
examples of the mind illuminating itself, the eye seeing itself, an acrobat riding on his 
own shoulders and so on, would be justified to do so if it were held to be truly existent. In 
such a case 'being itself would be incompatible with 'being an object of awareness'. How- 
ever, if self-awareness is not held to be truly existent, subject and object are mere depen- 
dent designations (btags pa tsam). 
(4) Finally, Mi pham maintains that the theory of self-awareness is crucial if one is to 
accord any validity to knowledge in the case of defiled beings as Svatantrikas, of course, 
want to do. 
The [validity ofl inference as [a mode of] valid cognition (pramdlýa; tshad ma) is 
finally down to direct perception (pratyakýa; mngon sum), and [in turn] the direct 
perception of objects isfinally down to the clear experience of seV-awareness. If 
one asserts any principlesfor the validity of cognition in [bein s with] limited 
understanding, self-awareness will therefore be indispensable. 
C, 
Mi pham's comment here refers to the two modes of valid cognition accepted by Buddhist 
logicians, namely perception and inference. 51 And indeed, to appreciate ýRntarakýita's 
assertion of self-awareness one has to refer to the work of Dignaga and Dharmaldrti on 
which his theory was based. Dhannalirti states that cognition is self-luminous (svayam 
prakUa; rang gsal ba), that is, self-presencing and inherently reflexive. 52 His presenta- 
tion of cognition is explained by Dreyfus (1997: 339) as follows: 
From one side, consciousness has an externally orientedfeature called the 
objective aspect (gr5hydkdra; bzung mam). This is theforin that a mental state 
assumes in order to bring about knowledge of an external object. The second side 
4Miis was indeed one of the criticisms of self-awareness, for example in Prajfi5karamatrs Bodhicarydva- 
larapahjika on ch. 9: 21. See Williams (1998: 47). 
50C p. 208. de'ang rjes dpag tshad mai mthaý mngon sum la thug cing/ mngon sum don rig kyang mthar gsal 
bar nyams su myong bai rang rig gis tshar phyin pa yin pas tshur mthong tshad mai mam. gzhag zhig'dod 
narang rig med du mi rung bayin past The phrase 'tshur mthong tshad ma' is a technical term for a cate- 
gory of valid perception in Mi phams unique system of prwnCkta- See the end of this Chapter. 
5'Dign5ga, Pratn4aswnuccaya I. 2a-b, in Hattori (1968: 24). 
52See Dreyfus (1997: 338-341); Matilal (1986: 150ff); Nyayabindu 1.10. 
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is the internal knowledge of our own mental states. It is called the subjective 
aspect (grdhak5k5xa; 'dzin mam), thefeature that ensures that we are aware of the 
objective aspect, the representation of the object. However, these two parts do not 
exist separately. Rather, each mental state consists of both and, hence, is 
necessarily reflexive. 
This presentation is very close to that given by Dignaga. 53 
The cognition which cognizes the object, a thing of colour, etc., has [a twofold , 
appearance, namely] the appearance of the object and the appearance of itself [as 
subject]. But the cognition which cognizes this cognition of the object has [on tile 
one hand] the appearance of that cognition which is in conformity with the object 
and Ion the other hand] the appearance of itself. Otherwise, if the cognition of the 
object had only theform of the object, or if it had only theform of itself, then the' 
cognition of cognition would be indistinguishable from the cognition of the object. 
For both Dign5ga and Dharmakuhi, self-awareness is not a third type of valid cognition, 
but rather one of the four types of direct perception (pratya4a; mngon sum) which are 
sensory, mental, yogic and self-cognizing perceptions. 54 For Dharmaldrti it is not intro- 
spective or reflective because it does not take mental states as its objects. Self-cognition is 
nothing over and above the subjective aspect of consciousness beholding an objective 
aspect. It is the self-revealing aspect of a mental episode, the intuitive presence that we 
feel towards our own mental episodes. On this view, our limited self-presence is not due 
55 
to a metaphysical self but to self-awareness. It is simply the nature of mind to know 
that it knows. 
It is relevant to our study of the MAL to note that the arguments advanced by Dharmaldrti 
in support of self-awareness are essentially tied to the Yogacara thesis that the distinction 
between the apprehensible object (grdhya) and the apprehending cognition (grahaka) is 
an illusion like that of a double vision of the moon. An awareness-event is an indivisible 
whole, it illuminates itself, for there is nothing else to illuminate. The non-difference of 
53Pramanasmnuccaya I. llab, translation in Hattori (1968-29-30). 
s4See Hattori (1968: 27). DignAga explains the features of perception in Pramdnasamuccaya, 1.6a-d, and 
self-awareness as a type of perception in Va-b. See also MoksAkaragupta in Kajiyama (1989: 44); Lati Rin- 
bochay (1980: 16ff). 
s'Dreyfus (1997: 339-340). 
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the objective and subjective aspects of cognition is established on the evidence that the 
two are invariably and necessarily apprehended together. 
56 
It is interesting to compare this idealist defence of self-awareness with the arguments put 
forward by Candraku-1i and Managarbha against self-awareness, since this will help us 
gauge ýdntarakýita's view more precisely. 57 Candrakirti refutes self-awareness in the con- 
text of his lengthy refutation of Cittam5tra. In MAV 6.74-75 he writes: 
Self-awareness can indeed be experienced, 
Yet since a memory of a memory is unknown 
It would be like something other and never known arising in the mind. 
This reasoning vanquishes [all] others. 
According to our tradition, 
Because memory is not other than that [which experiences an object] 
It is the memory which thinks 7 saw. 58 This agrees with ordinary conventional experience. 
Candraldrd refutes the Cittamatra theory of self-awareness by attacking their argument 
establishing it from memory. This was developed by Dignaga. 59 The idea is that memory 
involves a past object as well as a past experience. The recollection of these two elements 
differs in their form. I remember a subjective experience as well as the object itself. This 
difference can only be accounted for if we posit that the original experience had two 
aspects, one oriented towards the external world and one directed inward. Candrakirti's 
refutation boils down to refuting the true existence of the subjective and objective aspects 
taken as distinct from each other and giving rise to distinct conscious series. While Pra- 
56Pra? W-qzavL1rttika, Pratyak§a chapter, verse 328; and Pramd? tavinifcaya 1.55. Cited in Matilal (1986: 154). 
57Although Williams (1998: 43) asserts that there is only one Indian source refuting self-awareness in rela- 
tive truth, namely Candraldrti, there is at least one other-Jfidnagarbha. So in the 8th century when the 
MAL was composed, the rejection of self-awareness was a view that could not be ignored. It might be the 
case, in the light of other evidence uncovered by Williams, that Candraldrd and JfiRnagarbha were the 
exceptions that proved the rule. 
51MAV 6: 74-75. rang rig pa ni grub la rig mod kyiH de Ita! ang dran pa! i dran pa rigs min te// gzhan phyir 
ma shes rgyud la skyes pa bzhin// gtan tshigsdis ni khyad par dag kyangjorns// gang phyir gang gis yul 
myong gyur de las// dran pa 'di gzhan nga la yod n-dn pa// de phyir nga yis mthong snyam. dran'gyur te//'di 
yang'jig rten tha snyad tshul lugs yin// 
"Pram, 10asainuccaya, I. 1 Ic-12d. See Hattori (1968: 30-3 1); Dreyfus (1997: 550, n. 1). 
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safigikas accept this phenomenological description of the memory process, they do not 
treat subjective and objective aspects as philosophically 'other; they accept it as a de: scrip- 
tion of conventional experience without analysis. It follows that Candraldrti is actually 
refuting as truly existent the reflective character ascribed to self-awareness, that is, the -. I- 
mind's ability to become aware of its own thoughts and experiences. He does not refute 
reflexive awareness or memory in this passage, in relative truth. 
As for JMmagarbha, he refutes self-awareness in SDV and SDVV 6c. The SDV asserts: 
(Because) self-awareness is impossible. 60 
JfiRnagarbha argues that the mind cannot cognize itself because it is empty of any aspect 
of itself. 61 If one were to respond by asserting that the mind does cognize an aspect of 
itself, that aspect would be different from the cognition and lead to infinite regress. If 
self-awareness of cognition A is an awareness of the image of cognition A, then it is no 
longer identical to cognition A itself. So cognition A would require another awareness to 
be aware of itself, and so on. Rianagarblia supports his view by citing DignAga and 
Dharmaldrd who hold that there can be no cognition without the aspect of what is cog- 
nized. 62 In summary, RiZinagarblia argues that if self-awareness involves the mind cogni'- 
zing an aspect of itself this leads to infinite regress, and if it does not involve cognizing an 
aspect then it is not a cognition. Self-awareness is therefore untenable. However, one 
must note here that Ridnagarblia's refutation of svasamvedana comes in a section of the 
SDV dedicated to ultimate truth. Ridnagarblia refutes svasaMvedana in ultimate truth, but 
there is no indication that he refutes it in relative truth. 
60rang rig rigs pa ma yin (phyir)// Eckel (1987: 157). 
61SDV and SDVV 6c in Eckel (1987: 72-3 and 157-8). shes pa ni bdag gis bdag shes pa ma yin te// rang 
snang bas stong pa! i phyir shes pa gzhan bzhin no// 
62DharmakIrti criticises the doctrine of nirIWIrajildnavada in PramdqavtIrttika 2.13-18. See Eckel (1987:. 
120-121). We have already noted that self-awareness is linked with aspected cognition for Dharmajarti. 
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Once again, the refutation is based on the idea that the subjective and objective aspects of 
a cognitive episode are philosophically other. But Jfidnagarbha's argument itself assumes 
the same as his opponent in this respect: that the image or objective aspect is real, either it 
does exist, or it does not exist and it is absent. And, just like Candraldrd, his refutation 
concerns the reflective nature of consciousness, not the reflexive nature of consciousness. 
95ntarakýita's reply to these views would surely be that it is a fundamental mistake to 
consider self-awareness as an awareness of anything-including awareness of another 
mental episode, of an image, of an object, and so on. Such a view, he would agree with 
his opponents, invariably leads to contradictions. Self-awareness only makes sense as the 
characteristic reflexivity of consciousness, not as an inherently reflective activity of the 
mind. ý5ntarakýita goes further than this, and implies that cognition is impossible unless 
we assert the reflexivity of consciousness. Without this, one cannot account for awareness 
occurring at all; awareness is nothing unless it is aware of itself. The Ny5ya theorists 
countered this view by asserting that knowledge and the knowledge of knowledge must 
be distinguished because they have distinct causal conditions. 63 Knowledge is caused by 
the presence of an object (a real) whereas self-awareness is caused by mental causes and 
conditions. But in 85ntarakýita's system this defence does not work because he has 
rejected external objects and considers the causes of cognition to be mental in origin. 
There is thus no difference in nature between the objective and subjective aspects of a 
cognitive episode. His assertion in the MAL that consciousness is unitary echoes Dharma- 
kidi's view that cognition is an indivisible whole, and the difference between subjective 
and objective is an illusion. 
Given all the evidence for and against self-awareness in ultimate and in relative truth it 
63Matilal (1986: 160ff). 
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would seem that the fuss is not really warranted as far as gdntarakýita's view is con- 
cerned. He explicitly rejects the reflective model of self-awareness which leads to dualist 
complications. All he is saying is that mind is defined as that which is self-aware. And. 
Mi pham is saying, quite reasonably, that there is no good reason for Prasafigikas to dis-, 
agree with this as a definition of conventional mind, for it does not necessarily entail any 
unwanted philosophical commitments such as the ontological reality of the mind. Indeed, 
the reverse is the case: it would be unreasonable for PrRsaihgikas to reject self-awareness 
in relative truth---on the understanding that they are specifically rejecting the reflexivity 
of consciousness-since it accords with conventional experience and can therefore be 
accepted as such without investigationý4 As Williams (1998: 174) reminds us, for Mi 
pham PrasaAgikas do not have a view about the relative in any case, and it is not legiti7 
mate for them either to accept or to deny anything in relative truth as long as it accords 
with ordinary conventional experience. 
That critiques of ýRntarakýita's position are based on differences in definition is especially 
clear in the modem-day dGe lugs pa presentation of cognition given by Lad Rinbochay. 65 
In her introduction to his book Mind in Tibetan Buddhism, Elizabeth Napper explains that 
according to the dGe lugs pa presentation of Sautrdntika 66 there are four types of direct 
perceivers (pralya4a; mngon sum): sense, mental, self-knowing (svasaýnvedana) and 
yogic. With regard to the third, she points out that "the positing or not of the existence of,, 
such a direct perceiver serves as a major basis for distinguishing schools of tenets" and 
cites the Yogdc5ra-SvZitantrika-Madhyamaka school as one of those that does assert its 
existence. 67 She then goes on to explain what Lati Rinbochay means by the term. 
64Mi pharrfs conunentary on MAV 6.74-75 argues just these points. 
65Mind in Tibetan Buddhism by Lati RinbOChay and Elizabeth Napper, Snow Lion, 1980, p. 17ff 
66The dGe lugs pa presentation of awareness and knowledge (blo rig) is based on Sautrantika, following 
what is for the most part DharmakIrti's approach. 
67ibid., p. 19. 
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For those schools which do posit the existence of a self-knower, itsfunction is to 
make possible the memory of one's cognitions. Its proponents say that if there 
were no consciousness observing the consciousness that perceives an object, there 
would be no wayfor one to know that one had perceived something. The systems 
which do not assert self-knowers deny that they are necessary in order to 
remember one's cognitions and say that positing them leads to an infinite regress 
of self-knowers knowing the sey-knowers, and so forth. 
The function of a self-knower [i. e. svasamVedanal is just to make possible 
memo7y offormer consciousnesses. It does not 
ýave 
an active role of introspection 
or setf-awareness, as its name might suggest; such is carried out by a mental 
factor called introspection (sarpPrajanya; shes bzhin) which can accompany a 
main consciousness. 68 1 
And later in the book Lati Rinpochay (1980: 59-60) himself asserts: 
The definition of a self-knower is that which has the aspect of an apprehender. 
We need to identify the apprehended (grdhya; bzung ba) and the apprehender 
(grdhaka; 'dzin pa). The blue which is the object of the eye consciousness appre- 
hending blue is the apprehended, whereas the eye consciousness itself is the 
apprehender. Furthennore, the eye consciousness apprehending blue sees the 
aspect of blue and is thus called that which has the aspect of the apprehended 
(gr5hya-Wra; bzung mam). The consciousness which experiences that eye con- 
sciousness sees the apprehender itself and is thus called that which has the aspect 
of an apprehender (gr5haka-Rkara; 'dzin mam). 
In these passages, the authors define svasaýnvedana being that the positing of which 
distinguishes different schools of Buddhist tenets. It is justified solely in relation to 
memory and described in terms of the dual aspect of what we have termed reflective con- 
sciousness, where the self-knower apprehends the consciousness apprehending blue and 
so on. This is exactly what 85ntarakýita rejects as a definition of svasaýnvedana in verse 
17 of the MAL, where he states that it does not concern apprehended and apprehender. 
Clearly, such an analysis is quite different from that of Mi pham, and quite different too 
from the final view of the rNying ma pas which can now be seen to be much closer to 
that of kntaraksita than that of his dGe lugs pa critics. 
68ibid., p. 19. 
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VHI. 3.3 Does ýAntaraksita accept Wayaviihina in relative truth? 
Another area of contention is whether or not ýdntarakýita accepts the Cittamatra theory of 
eight consciousnesses, including the storehouse consciousness (Wayavijilana; kun gzhi). 
This question is of interest for several reasons. First, Pr5sabgika Mddhyamikas of the 
dGe lugs pa school accept only six consciousnesses and do not accept the Cittarnatrin 
storehouse consciousness, whereas in relative truth rNying ma pas accept the theory of 
eight consciousnesses in their final position. 69 The issue of the Waya is therefore a live 
one in the Tibetan tradition. 70 Second, there is disagreement between certain dGe lugs pa 
interpretations and that of Mi pharn as to what ýdntarakýita's final position actually is. 
Thirdly, in India this question represented one of the main doctrinal differences between 
Cittarn5trins Following Scripture and Cittam5trins Following Logic, although the distinc- 
tion was probably made only later by Tibetans. 71 The former, in the line of Asafiga, 
accept eight consciousnesses while the latter, in the line of Dharmalarti, accept only six. 
According to the dGe lugs pa doxologist dKon chogjigs med dbang po, for example, the 
Yogiicdra-Svdtantrika-Madhyamaka school is defined as a school that asserts six con- 
sciousnesses and that rejects the storehouse consciousness. 
Both subschools [i. e. Yogdcdra-Svidtantrika and Sautrdntika-Svdtantrikal do not 72 
assert a mind-basis-of-all or an afflicted mind but assert six consciousnesses. 
Mi pham disagrees and contends that Santaraksita does accept the Cittam5tra model of 
cognition entailing eight consciousnesses including the storehouse consciousness. But 
69Dudjoni Rinpoche (1991: 178-186); Bransford Wilson (1984: 39). 
7OTbe dGe lugs pa scholar Gung tang (1762-1823) rejects the identification of the storehouse consciousness 
with the tathigatagarbita, a position sometimes ascribed to YogAcAra-Madhyamaka. and especially to 
Kamalaffla. This debate is presented in La tUorie du Tathagatagarbha et du Gotra by D. Seyfort-Ruegg. 
See also Bransford Wilson (1984: 39ff. ) who mentions that other dGe lugs pa refutations, of the storehouse 
consciousness emphasize that even if it is accepted it can be of no soteriological value, and that tantric and 
sutric presentations of it are often confused. The topic of the dIayavijfiJna was also discussed by Tsong, kha 
pa as one of the difficult points. 
71ibid., pp. 51-2. See his note 45. 
72Sopa and Hopkins (1989: 287). The translation is theirs; mind-basis-of-all refers to 11aya (kun gzhi). 
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before we examine Mi Pham's reasoning, let us see the evidence that might support dKon 
chog 'jigs med dbang po's assertion. In verse 34 of the MAL we read: 
It is established [by the Sautriintikas] that the five kinds of sense conscious- 
ness have aggregates [of atoms] as their object, while the sixth [i. e. the mental 
consciousness] has cognition and mental states as its objects. 
rnam shes Inga yi khams rnams nL11 bsags la &nigs pa 7 rnam pa yinll 
sems dang sems byung dmigs pa nL11 drug par bzhag pa byas pa yinll 
It is the SautrZintika view that cognition involves six consciousnesses: five sense con- 
sciousness and the mental consciousness, each with their own associated types of object. 
Now, although the Sautrantika theory is not ý5ntarakýita's final position, as he is not an 
externalist, we have already seen that it is his favoured position if external objects are 
posited. And since we also know (verses 64-66) that kntarakýita qua Mddhyamika 
accepts empirical reality conventionally, it is not unreasonable to conclude that he accepts 
the six consciousness model of cognition in relative truth. As Mi pharn writes: 
However, in this [treatise, i. e. the MALI external objects are not said to be hidden, 
[that is, inaccessible to direct cognition], they appear as the projections of the 
mind, and their appearance has to be analysed by conventional reasoning. 73 
Although ýZintarakýita does not infer the existence of external objects despite their im- 
perceptibility, as the Sautrantikas do, nevertheless cognition is explained in these terms 
conventionally. This dGe lugs pa interpretation has the advantage of being supported by 
the fact that this was the approach taken by DharmakIrti. 74 Furthermore, it is reinforced 
by the view of the 15th century Sa skya scholar kkya mchog Idan who identified 
SautrZintika threads in ýRntarak§ita's treatment of relative truth . 
75 He classifies M5dhya- 
13V P. 56- 'dir phyi don Ikog na mo mi'dod kyang// sems kyi dbang gi snang ba sna tshogs su shar bai 
snang tshul de la tha snyad kyi gzhal tshul'di Itar byed dgos so// 
74Mi pham (V p. 56) cites Dharmalard's famous statement: "When I investigate outer phenomena, I take the 
Sautrdntika view as my starting point. " However, Dreyfus (1997: 20-21) points out that the importance and 
nature of the Sautrantika school in India is unclear, and the Sautrantika doctrine itself is not always readily 
defined. Tibetan commentators were aware that Dharmaldni's position does not always follow the Sautran- 
tika doctrine as presented by Vasubandhu, and therefore created a separate doxographical category for his 
work, dividing the school into SautrAntikas Following Reasoning and Sautrdntikas Following Scripture. 
7SMimald (1976: 74-5) points out that both gantaraksita and KamalaMa present certain aspects of the 
SautrAntika doctrine in their respective discussions 
ýf momentariness (kýaoabhafiga, skad cig ma Yig pa). 
The analysis presented by gaya mchog Idan (1428-1507) is summarized in Mimaki (1982: 36-7) from The 
Complete Works (gsung 'bum) ofgSer mdog Paýz chen gXqa mchog ldan, Thimpti, 1975, vol. 14, fol. 4a4 ff. 
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mikas into those who reach the Madhyamaka view by way of lower doctrines (grub mtha' 
'og ma) and those who present it directly after seeing what is accepted by the world (jig 
rten grags pa nyid). ýdntarakýita belongs to the former category and according to this 
Sa skya author reaches the Madhyamaka view progressively by way of Sautrantika and 
then Yogacara. This analysis does of course follow the structure of the MAL presentation. 
Despite such considerations, Mi pham argues that there are grounds for believing 
tdntarakýita accepted the eight consciousnesses in his final position. His argument is 
found in the preliminary section to his commentary. 
Regarding 19dwara4ita's] way of expounding the Cittamatra [view], certain 
later commentators have taught that the great Abbot did not assert a storehouse 
consciousness differentfrom the six consciousnesses. 77tey say that in general the 
term Tun gzhi' refers to a certain subtle mental consciousness, and that some 
Great Mddhyamikas and many tantrikas affirm this too. Since the term Tun gzhi' 
does not occur explicitly in this text, commentators have been able to make 
whatever assertions suited their purpose. Yet the assertion o appearances as Pf 
mind does not make sense without a definite acceptance of a storehouse con- 
sciousness that serves as the repository of habitual tendencies. If an authentic 
Cittamatra doctrine is propounded, in the same way that it is presented in the 
LafikRvatdra SUtra, the Sarpdhinirmocana SUtra and other texts, the storehouse 
consciousness must certainly be asserted. The storehouse consciousness is, as it 
were, the core of the Cittamdtra viewpoint. If that is established, the existence of 
the afflicted mental consciousness (nyon yid; klistamanas) is also affirmed and 
not contradicted, and so the eight consciousnesses are necessarily asserted 
In this text I9dntarak#taJ says, 7 will briefly teach a vehicle that unifies the two 
approaches (tshul) ". It seems to me, therefore, that in accordance with the quota- 
tionfrom the Lafik5vatgra SUtra about thefive objects of knowledge, the three 
natures and soforth, [9intaraksital does affirm the storehouse consciousness 
Oust as] it is asserted in the general Cittamatra doctrine. 76 
76V p. 46. sems tsam du bzhed tshul de Wang phyis su gzhung'cad ba dag gis/ mkhan chen'di nyid kyis 
tshogs drug las tha dad pa7i kun gzW ini bzhed la/ spyir yid mam la cha phye ba7i phra mo *ga7 7lÜg la kun 
gzhi'i sgras bstan pa dbu ma pa chen po'gW dang sngags phyogs sWang mang pobyung ngo zhes gsungs 
kyangl spyir gzhung'di na kun gzW bzhed pWi tshig zin gsal kha mi snang bas rang'gnod dang bstun te de 
Itar bzhag kyang re zhig chog modl lar snang ba sems su'dod pa la bag chags'dzin pWi kun gzhi zhig nges 
par khas ma blangs na mi rung bas/ lang gshegs dang dgongs'grel la sogs pdi bstan don ji Itar ba bzhin du 
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Mi pham concedes that it is not unreasonable to say that the MAL presents a six- 
consciousness view of cognition. The term kun gzhi (Waya) does not appear in the text. 
There is no positive evidence that can discredit such an interpretation easily. However, he 
suggests two reasons for saying that the dlaya is accepted in the MAL: the first is based 
on the logic of internal coherence, the second is a scriptural validation. 
Mi pham argues that since there is evidence that 95ntarakýita accepted the idea that 
aspects appearing to cognition are caused by karmic seeds and habitual tendencies, it is a 
necessary corollary that the storehouse consciousness must be accepted too. The part of 
the Cittamatra theory that is espoused by 95ntarak§ita is presented in verses 79-81. 
Therefore [having established the non-substantiality of all things, and since 
things do nevertheless appear as mere experience] one must infer that there 
are seeds corresponding to the ideas of existence, non-existence and the like, 
[which] arise from the beginningless continuum of existence. 
These [ideas] do not arise by the force of [external] entities since the [latter] 
do not [truly] exist, the inherent nature of such entities having been refuted in 
detail. 
Because they occur serially, [ideas] do not arise without cause, or from an 
eternal [cause], nor are they themselves eternal. Therefore, the first [moment 
of mind] arises from [a preceding moment] of its own kind, because [ideas/ 
appearances arise] in the manner of being habituated to something. 77 
de phyir thog med srid rgyud nasll dngos dang dngos med rtog sogs kyill 
rigs mthun sa bon yod par nill rjes su dpag par bya ba yinll 
'di ni dngos poi mthu stobs kyisll'byung ba ma yin de med phyirll 
dngos po rnams kyi bdag nyid dell rgya cher rab tu bkag pa yinll 
rim gyis 'byung phyir glo bur min1l rtag 'byung ma yin rtag ma yinll 
de bas goms 'dra de nyid phyirll dang po rang gi rigs las skyesll 
If ideas, images, aspects, and anything that appears to cognition, are not produced by any 
sems tsam mtshan nyid pa zhig khas len na kun gzhi nges pardod dgos te/ kun gzhi ni serns, tsam gyi grub 
mthaI snying po Itar bu yin cing/ de grub na nyon yid kyang yod pa la'gal ba med pas tshogs brgyad'dod 
dgos la/ gzhung 'dir yang/ tshul gnyis kyis bsdus paI theg pa mdor bstan pa ni 'di Ita ste/ zhes chos Inga 
rang bzhin gsurn sogs kyi lung drangs pa Itar sems tsam spyi lugs kyi kun gzhi'ang ci'i phyir mi bzhed de 
bzhed do snyam mo/ This translation has benefitted from oral teachings by mKhan chen Pad ma shes rab. 
77Ichig6's translation of the last two lines of verse 81 appears doubtful. He interprets 'gom' as referring to 
meditation, but it is not clear why meditation is relevant in the context. '"Merefore, the [notions of pro- 
duction and non-production, which we have discussed] previously, arise from their own species, because 
they are indeed [ideas of existence and non-existence], as in meditation practice. " 
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type of external cause whatsoever, then they must be produced from 'seeds' internal to the 
mind and mental in nature. These seeds arise from the beginningless continuum of mind - 
that does not itself have a cause. Since that which appears to cognition is subject to the - 
laws of causation, this means that appearances are caused rather than uncaused or eternal; 
and there is a type-correspondence between the seed (cause) and the appearance (effect) 
such that appearances do not arise at random. Furthermore, ýAntaraksita adds that this 
similarity of type between seed and appearance, and the principle that the seed or 
appearance that arises at tj is causally linked to a similar appearance arising at t2, is con- 
sistent with the idea that the tendencies generating such appearances are habitual. Habit, 
by definition, is a process that tends to produce successive events of a similar kind. 
Mi pharn's argument, then, infers from the above three verses that gdntarakýita must 
accept the storehouse consciousness if he accepts karmic seeds and habitual tendencies. 
His argument is persuasive, at least provisionally, if we want the MAL to be internally 
coherent. 
The second justification advanced for Mi pham's interpretation relies on the scriptural 
authority of the Lahkdvatira Si7tra, which speaks of the five objects of knowledge, three 
natures and so on, which are aH regarded as features of the Cittarnatra view. The verses in 
question are the following: 
Then at that time the Blessed One recited these verses: 
The world [as we see it] exists not, pluralities of things risefrom the Mind being 
seen [externally]; body, property, and abode are manifested to us as of the Alaya- 
vijAdna. 
The leaders talk about citta, manas, [mano+ijfidna, the [triple] svabhava, the 
five dharmas, the twofold egolessness, and purification.. 
Analysed down to atoms, there is indeed noform to be discriminated as such; 
what can be established is the [truth ofl Mind Only, which is not believed by those 78 
who cherish erroneous views. 
The idea here is that if ýdntarakýita's exposition of Cittamqtra doctrine in relative truth is 
eo 78The Lahkavatara Satra, II. XIH, transL D. T. Suzuki, C rge Routledge and Sons Ltd, London, 1932, p. 49. 
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authentic, it must be comprehensive and complete. He cannot accept part of the doctrine 
and not another part-and especially, he cannot reasonably reject such a structurally 
crucial element as alayavijildna. His acceptance of the storehouse consciousness is 
inferred as a matter of internal consistency and doctrinal authenticity. This argument of 
Mi pham's is highly debatable and we could even say it is begging the question. 
Ihe point is to determine what ýdntarakýita did and did not accept of the Cittam5tra 
doctrine in developing his synthesis. Mimaki (1982: 27-54) and others" have shown that 
the mere appellation of Sautr5ntika-Madhyamaka does not actually entail a complete 
endorsement of Sautrantika theories; similar considerations could well apply to Yogdcdra- 
Madhyamaka. Furthermore, Williams (1998: 99-100) points out that while Mi pham was 
strongly influenced by ýdntarakýita's interpretation of 'alayavyn-ana and maintained it 
himself in relative truth, the meaning he ascribed to the term cannot be identified with 
that upheld by Cittamatrins for whom it is resistant to ultimate analysis. A similar 
comment might apply to the MAL so it is too much to assume that kntarakOta must have 
accepted the Cittamatra doctrine wholesale for the sake of consistency. 
In order to make sense of these conflicting claims, it is helpful to recall the distinction 
made by mKhan po Pad ma sbes rab, and mentioned in Chapter III, between early and 
later Cittam5trins. kntarak§ita's view and Mi pham's interpretation of it are coherent only 
if we make this distinction, the thrust of which is that early Cittam5trins such as AsaAga 
do not posit the ultimate existence of the mind (whether that be described asdIayavijfidna 
or svasaýnvedana) whereas later Cittamatrin theorists such as Dharrnapdla do assert the 
mind in ultimate truth. 80 If we examine evidence for the mKhan po's claim specifically in 
relation to WayavijiIana, we note a significant shift in emphasis between Asailga and 
"')See Dreyfus (1997). 
800ral comment by mKhan po Pad ma shes rab. 
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Dharmapala. The first chapter of the Mahdyinasaipgraha presents alayavijOna and the 
associated kligamanas in detail, and on a number of occasions asserts that they exist. 
But 
the existence of both these consciousnesses is argued through reasoning on the grounds 
that if one does not posit them, one cannot make sense of other aspects of the mind and 
the cognition process-81 In other words, they are theoretically necessary and perform 
crucial phenomenological functions, but Asaliga does not make the leap from this 
explanatory analysis to an ontological assertion. Nevertheless, critics could maintain that 
the Mahdydnasaýn raha is ambiguous because Asaliga does not mention the Madhya- .9 
maka paradigm of the Two Truths. 
82 This may be one of the reasons for the subsequent 
disputes between Mddhyamikas and Yog5c5rins. 
By contrast, Dharmapdla offers a Yogdc5ra interpretation of the Two Truths in his dispute 
with BhZqvavivcka, that commits him to defending the validity of worldly convention and 
of language, to asserting the trisvabhdva is a fundamental structure of the mind that con- 
tinues through defilement and enlightenment (the difference being that a buddha is aware 
of the unreality of the imagined), and to according an ultimate status to the mind which 
Madhyamikas will find unacceptable. 83 His position leads him to state: 
... the reality of that which 
is imagined (parikalpita) is non-existent, while the 
reality of things that arise co-dependently (paratantra) does exist. 84 
We have evidence that ýdntarakýita rejected DharmapMa's interpretation of the Two 
B'For example, 1.7 explains that if kligamanas did not exist, then there are six features of the mind that can- 
not be explained. Similarly, 1.33-42 cites the various mental phenomena which cannot be explained without 
ajayavijiiana. They include defiled actions (kannasamkkda), rebirth in saýnsilra (janmasaýnkleia), taking 
on a new body, the six consciousnesses, rebirth in thý higher realms (samahio bhamiý), existence in the 
formless realm (drapyadhatu), thoughtless moments of consciousness in this life, supramundane thoughts 
in the realm that is beyond consciousness and unconsciousness (naivasaýnjildndsajpjildyatana), and physical 
experiences at the moment of death that are caused by karma. See Larnotte (1973: 53-63). 
92See Keenan (1997: 40). 
631be text of DharmapMa! s critique of BhAvaviveka is extant only in Chinese as the Ta-ch eng Kuang Pai- 
lun Shih-lun, T-1571, vol. 30, pp. 242-250. The Chinese text is reproduced in Keenan (1997) with an intro- 
duction and translation. 
84T. 1571: 247bl5, in Keenan (1997: 104). 
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Truths, and the wish to refute Dharmapdla's position may have been a powerful motiva- 
ting factor behind not only Ridnagarbha's SDV but also the MAL itselL85 Returning to the 
MAL, then, we could say that ýdntarakýita incorporates the early Cittamatra view into his 
synthesis in a comprehensive manner. 
Mi pharn does not allude to these distinctions within the Cittarn5tra school, and instead he 
claims that dGe lugs and rNying ma disagreements on the existence of the storehouse 
86 
consciousness in general, stem from confusion about what is meant by the term. In other 
words, they are only disagreements based on differences in definition. According to Mi- 
pham, if one refutes the existence of Waya (kun gzhi) on the basis that it establishes a con- 
sciousness that is separate from the six consciousnesses, then this descends into absurdity, 
positing two distinct mindstrearns in a single person. The only point in asserting the store- 
house consciousness at aH is to distinguish its specific function from that of each of the 
six consciousnesses-and. its specific function is to be the repository for karmic seeds and 
habitual tendencies. (Insofar as conventional existents are defined by their function, it is 
legitimate to accept the relative existence of the storehouse consciousness. ) To avoid the 
storehouse consciousness by including its function amongt those of the mental con- 
sciousness is merely to juggle with words. If we remember that this entire model of cog- 
nition and consciousness is only accepted in relative truth, whether one asserts the store- 
house consciousness or not, then nothing is gained by rejecting dlayavyfidna and nothing 
is lost by accepting it. 
Neither does Mi pham mention the fact that some dGe lugs pa critics of the storehouse 
IsSee Eckel (1987: 70). RiAnagarblia. opens the SDV by asserting that although the Buddha and scholars like 
NAg5rjuna explained the Two Truths well, other Buddhists have not, requiring (RIAnagarblia) to set the 
matter straight. 95ntarakýita! s subcommentary identifies these Buddhists as'Dharmap5la and others'. See 
also Keenan (1997: 64). 
86V. pp. 46-7. 
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consciousness reject it on the grounds that it is identical with the tathagatagarbha, and so 
ontologically distinct from tile six consciousnesseS. 87 In the particular context of the M, ýL 
it is fair to say that ýdntarakýita does not mention or imply the existence of the tathagata- 
garbha, and that this issue is extraneous to his concerns. There is no evidence in the MAL 
or in Mi pham's commentary to identify the storehouse consciousness with the tathigata- 
garbha ; and no reason to suppose that if ýdntarakýita did accept alayavijOna, he took it 
as anything other than a conventional consciousness functioning as the repository for 
karmic seeds. In fact, this is the only reason to imagine that ýdntarakýita accepted the 
storehouse ground consciousness at all. The fact that the Yogacam-Madhyamaka school 
has been associated with the tathigatagarbha theory is due to developments after ýRnta- 
rak0ta. It was his disciple Kamalaffla who introduced a discussion of tatlogatagarbha 
and gotra theories into his Madhyamakdloka . 
88 Kamalagila's move was followed by 
Dharmamitra, an immediate successor of Haribhadra, in his Prasphtqqpadd! 9 However, 
there is no clear evidence to link ýantar*ita or the MAL with these theories. 
So on Mi phamýs view one of the characteristics of the Yog5cdra-Madhyamaka synthesis 
is that it propounds the early scriptural Cittamatra approach to the mind and cognition in 
relative truth. The conclusion that Mi pham draws from this is perhaps surprising: he 
claims that the relative assertion of Mind Only is in fact a position common to all 
Mahaydnists; and not exclusive to Yog5cdm-Madhyamaka. 
If anybody were to assert that these phenomenal appearances do not ariseftom 
mind, this necessarily implies that one believes that their cause is differentfinom 
the mind. And since this involves the assertion that beings are bound in sarpsRm 
87Bransford Wilson (1984: 39). rNying ma pas distinguish the MahAyIna and rDzogs chen meanings of the 
term alaya(vijfiana). In rDzogs chen, the t7laya is the basis of deluded mind, and therefore not identical 
with tathagatagarMa or'pure mind!. 
88Ruegg (1981: 95). 
89ibid., pp. 102-3. 
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or deliveredfrom it, through causes other than their own minds, it will doubtless 
lead one to fall into extreme views. It is therefore established step by step that if 
there is no external creator and no external world, appearances are merely 
mental. This assertion that the relative world is 'mind only' is established as a 
general Malidyina view. 90 
If this is the case (and more discussion would be needed to establish that it is the case? ) 
one might well ask why other Madhyamikas do not openly accept Cittam5tra in relative 
truth. Mi pham's answer is that Candraldrti, in particular, emphasizes reasoning esta- 
blishing ultimate truth in his Madhyamakdvatira, whereas 95ntarakýita emphasizes 
the approximate absolute in the MAL . 
92 Nevertheless, even Prdsafigikas accept con- 
ventional phenomena as dependent arisings (rkyen nyid Vi pa), and whenever they reason 
on the relative level they accept the twelve interdependent links of existence, and so forth. 
Thus, they show that phenomena arise dependently through the power of the pure or 
impure mind, so for Mi pham even Candrakirti does not refute Cittamdtra in relative truth. 
VIH. 3.4 Summ 
It has been shown that Aantar*ita propounds an internalist theory of the mind that in- 
cludes aspected cognition, self-awareness and eight consciousnesses in a manner that is 
acceptable to a Mzidhyamika. Tibetan dGe lugs pa critiques of these concepts have been 
90V p. 41. gal te su zhig srid pa! i snang ba'di mams rang sems las ma byung bar smra na de! i rgyu sems las 
logs su 'dod dgos la/ de itar na gang zag gi sems 'khor bar bcing grol gyi rgyu gzhan khas blangs pas gdon 
mi za bar mu stegs kyi grub mthar Itung bar'gyur ro/ des na byed po gzhan med cing phyi don med par 
sems kyi snang ba tsam duýang rim gyis'grub pas ni// tha snyad sems tsarn du'dod pa'di theg chen spyi 
lugs la grub pa yin no/ 
91This point has been discussed by Williams (1988: 43), who links the theories of illayavijilana and svasaýn- 
vedana, and dGe lugs pa refutations of them in relative truth, and shows a startling lack of scriptural 
evidence in Indian sources to justify such a refutation. Only Candraldni's MAV 6.73 rejects svasaipvedana 
in relative truth, and as we saw above the meaning he ascribes to this is not that of reflexive awareness. 
Since both these theories are characteristic of CittamAtra, and their conventional refutation is unestablished 
in Indian sources, it is reasonable for Mi pham to assert that Cittam5tra theories of n-dnd are acceptable in 
relative truth for Mahayana Buddhism. 
92V pp-42-43. See Chapter IX for an examination of the Two Truths in the MAL. It is interesting to note 
that Mi pharn cites Candrakird and him alone as a source for this view, in the light of the evidence men- 
tioned in note 34 above. 
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found not to apply in ýdntarakýita's case. His general philosophy of mind, then, as out- 
lined, appears coherent. Yet even if we cannot find fault with 
gdntarakýita, as Dreyfus 
(1997: 402) states there are a number of unanswered questions in the presentation so far. If 
self-awareness is cognition, does it have an object? And if it does not, in what sense can 
it 
be called cognition? What exactly is the nature of the aspects appearing to perception? 
And how do they relate to the objects that produce them (in Sautrdntika)? Furthermore, 
what is the relation between subjective and objective aspects of consciousness? We will 
now look at the way ýRntarakýita deals with such questions in the MAL. His analysis is an 
example of how he added to the continuing tradition of Dharmaldrti, since Dign5ga and 
Dharmaldrti did not themselves clarify these questions. Detailed philosophical explora- 
tion of the issues occurred only later on, in Tibet, and must faU outside the purview of this 
study. It is nevertheless interesting to note how influential kntaraksita's view was for ,-, 
Tibetan commentators. As late as the 14th century, the Sa skya scholar gYag ston sangs .' 
rgyas dpal defended the reflexive interpretation of self-awareness in a manner reminiscent 
93 of the MAL. 
VHI. 4_ Epistemological debates 
VM. 4.1 Non-pluralists. half-eggists and gqualists 
There are three basic presentations in Buddhist philosophy of how aspected. perception 
knows an object, those of the Non-Pluralists (sna tshogs gnyis medpa), the Half-Eggists 
(sgo nga phyed tshal ba) and the Equalists (gzung 'dzin grang mnyam pa). 94 In general, all 
three are common to both Sautrantika and Cittamatra, although some dGe lugs pas assert, 
93rang rig pa! ang rig bya rig byed gnyis su phye ba! i rang rig pa ma yin gyi bem po las log nas rig par skyes 
tsam de nyid yin no/ des na rang rig la yul med do/ "As for self-awareness it is not the type of self-aware- 
ness in which cognizer and cognized are distinguished, but it is the very [nature of consciousness] being 
merely produced as awareness that is different from matter. Therefore, self-awareness has no object. " sde 
bdun gyi dgongs 'grel tshad ma rigs pai gter gyi de kho na n)id gsal bar byed pa rigs pai 'od stong 'phro' 
ba, Delhi, 1992,299.4-5. Cited in Dreyfus (1997 -. 402-3). 
94See Klein (1997: 108-110) for a dGe lugs pa presentation of these positions. The following summary is 
based on Klein. 
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there is no Half-Eggist Sautrantika position. 95 
a) The Non-Pluralists maintain that the many aspects of a given object appear to a single 
consciousness simultaneously, and that this consciousness takes on all such aspects. Some 
SautrAntika scholars are said to be Sequential Non-Pluralists, holding that these asPects 
appear sequentially and not simultaneously. 
b) The Half-Eggiste6 assert that only a single aspect-for example, a general aspect like a 
table or a multi-coloured cloth- appears to a single consciousness, and that this con- 
sciousness is generated only into that aspect. They maintain that although only a single 
general aspect is cast, the consciousness is still able to see the separate colours / shapes 
and so on, because it does not follow that only something which casts its aspect is capable 
of being seen. The appearance of the individual colours/ shapes and so on win be weak 
whereas the collection of colours etc. will be strong. 
c) The Equalists assert that whatever number of aspects exist in a table or other object, 
that same number of aspects are cast to the perceiving consciousness. Some Equalists also 
assert that there are as many simultaneous consciousnesses as there are appearing aspects; 
others that a single consciousness is generated into as many aspects as are cast toward it. 
We can see from this description of the three positions that three main issues are at stake. 
First, what is the numerical relationship between the aspects appearing to perception and 
the cognitive consciousness(es) they generate? Second, do the many aspects cast by an 
object appear to perception simultaneously or sequentially? And third, does perception 
95ibid. 
"According to the contemporary rNying ma scholar Khe tsun zang bo rin po che, the Half-Eggists are so 
called because they assert that subject and object are like two halves of an egg. However, the explanation 
given by dKon mchog 'jig med dbang po is that they are half like SautrAntikas, in that they assert that an 
eye consciousness and its object are different entities, and half like Cinamdtrins because they assert that the 
eye consciousness and its object are of the nature of the mind. Both explanations are reported by Klein 
(1998: 237, n. 60). 
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actually apprehend the object directly and completely or not? As Anne Klein remarks, it 
would be interesting to carry out targeted experiments to clarify these questions once and 
for all, since these days they cannot be properly debated without recourse to empirical 
evidence. 97 It is therefore not our intention to argue in favour of one or other of these 
views philosophically. The only issue that is relevant to this study is to decide which 
option ýdntarakýita favoured and this, as Mi pham explains, is another subject of sectarian 
controversy. 
If it is asked which among these three is conventionally accepted in the present 
treatise, dGe lugs pa scholars will argue that all [treatises on] valid cognition, 
including this one, agree in accepting the Non-Pluralist [position]. Generally, 
when turning inward, thinking of the mere continuity of cognition in terms of self- 
awareness, there may well be occasions on which it is conventionally appropriate 
that multiple appearances are non-dual as the mind. Yet in the present [context] 
of the three [options, Non-Pluralism] is notjust that. It is to be understood here 
as [referring to] an apprehension of aspects by way of their dichotomy [with 
cognitions], so it is extremely unreasonable. In this system, it is only the Equalist 
[view] that is established by unimpaired valid cognition in relative truth. 
Personally, I assert exactly this [too], and this is also the intention of the text. 98 
Mi pham counters dGe lugs pa interpretations of the MAL which, he says, treat it as a 
standard epistemological text. He argues that the Equalist position is upheld by tantarak- 
ýita, not the Non-Pluralist position, and goes on to explain why the Equalist position is the 
most cogent. Critics of Equalism. charge that according to scripture and to Dharmakirti, it 
is impossible for there to arise two co-emergent cognitions of concordant type (shes pa 
97Mein (1997: 237, n. 63). 
98C p. 198. gzhung'dir tha snyad du de gsum gyi nang nas gang bzhed ce nal dge Idan gyi mkhas pa mams 
ni tshad ma dang'di kun mthun par sna tshogs gnyis med par bzhed ces gsungs kyang/ spyir kha nang Ita 
rang rig gi dbang du byas nas shes rgyud tsham la bsams na/ snang ba sna tshogs sems su gnyis med ces pa de'i tha snyad rung bal skabs tsam zhig yod mod kyi/ su gsum po'i skabs'dir ni de tsam min par zla! i stobs kyis marn pa'dzin tshul la go dgos pas na shin tu n-d'thad pas lugsdir ni tha snyad kyi tshad mas grub cing 
gnod pa med pa ni gzung'dzin grangs mnyam pa go kho nar mthong bas bdag ni de kho na Itar smra lal 
gzhung gi dgongs paangdi Yin te/ 
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gnyis Ihan cig 'byung bar mi srid pa), and that therefore the Equalist position is untenable. 
But Mi pham urges that the authoritative sources from which this principle is taken are 
referring to the impossibility for a cognition to arise at the same time as its antidote, the 
two being conflicting opposites. Such does not apply to cognition generally. Mi pharn 
therefore implies that for ýantarakýita it is possible for several cognitions to occur simul- 
taneously. He goes on to strengthen this idea by relating it to the dual aspects of cognition 
posited by Dignaga and Dhannaldrti, namely perception and inference. 
In the present context, the distinctions between conceptual and non-conceptual 
cognitions [tend to] become mixed up, and it is rare tofind someone who speaks 
correctly. [Nevertheless, ] in non-conceptual cognition the aspects of the objects 
do infact appear separate and not as one. Whatever is one cannot appear as 
separate [identities], for if it did appear [in this way] mind and its object would 
not be in harmony. It is necessaryfor cognition to be in accordance with the 
appearance, andfor the appearance to be in accordance with the object. 99 
Dign5ga asserted that perception is non-conceptual, while conceptual cognition takes the 
form of inference. 100 What Mi pharn is saying here is that for cognition'to be valid 1) the 
object, 2) the aspect(s) it casts in our minds, and 3) our non-conceptual perception of 
these aspects, must all correspond in a fundamental way. If this were not the case, the 
cognitive process would contain an inherent distortion. Given this principle, it follows 
that the number of characteristics of the object must correspond to the number of aspects 
it casts toward consciousness, and in turn, the number of aspects must correspond to the 
number of consciousnesses generated. Such a model safeguards the accuracy and diver- 
sity of knowledge. Mi pham's interpretation is justified by several points in the MAL: 
99C p. 200. de la skabs'dir phal eher rtog pa dang rtog med kyi byed pa'dres te tshul bzhin smra ba dkon 
par'dug na'ang/ don du rtog med kyi shes ngor yul gyi rnam pa tha dad la gcig tu mi snang/ gcig la tha dad 
du snang mi srid de/ snang na blo don mthun du mi'gyur pas na don ji Itar snang ba Itar shes pWarn de Itar 
'gyur dgos pa nil 
100Prameasamuccaya, 1.3c. 
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[23] Consciousness should not be unitary, since it is related to a plurality of 
aspects. Otherwise how can the identity of the two be explained? 
rnam pa rnams dang ma bral basll mam shes gcig pur mi 'gyur roll 
de Ita min na 'di gnyis lall gcig ces ji skad brjod par byall 
[26] Even if we consider only conceptual cognitions, they do not cognize 
[aspects] sequentially. Since they do not last long they are like all cognitions, 
occurring rapidly [in succession]. 
yid kyi rtog pa 'ba zhig Wang# rim du shes par mi 'gyur roll 
ring du gnas pa ma yin pasll blo mams kun kyang mgyogs 'byung Wrall 
[27] Therefore objects are not apprehended sequentially, even thought it 
appears as if [a series of] separate aspects are apprehended all at once. 
de phyir yul mams thams cad Ia// rim gyis 'dzin par mi 'gyur gyL11 
mam pa dag ni tha dad 1tarll cig car 'dzin par snang bar 'gyurll 
Mi pham makes the same points as kntarakýita, that is: the cognizing consciousness must 
correspond to the object of cognition, and it is therefore untenable to assert that one is 
single and the other is plural. Both conceptual cognition and non-conceptual perception 
separately cognize the object all at once. This is theoretically possible because this system 
holds that several co-emergent cognitions can arise in the mind simultaneously, provided 
they are not opposites the one of the other. 
In an illuminating comment on this entire debate, the contemporary rNying ma scholar 
Dzi gar kong sprul rin po che has suggested that there is an underlying misunderstanding 
that gave rise to the debate in the first place. 101 Although perception is held to be non- 
conceptual, nevertheless a multiplicity of data can be perceived simultaneously. Some 
scholars have considered that this situation is untenable since differentiating between a 
number of things is a conceptual act. 102 If perception is non-conceptual, then even if it 
were the case that a multiplicity of data were being apprehended at once the perceiver 
1010ral cornments, made to the present author in September 2000. 
102In DignAga and Dharkanfirti's systems, the distinction between perception and inference is fundamental. 
Perception is non-conceptual while inference is rational and conceptual. Furthermore, perception merely 
reflects things as they are without interpreting them, while conception categorizes the objects perceived and 
synthesizes them. One of the characteristics of concepts is that they differentiate one thing from another, 
and according to the Buddhist theory of apoha, identify and name x by eliminating all non-x. See Dreyfus 
(1997: 217ff). 
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would not be capable of distinguishing one element from another, so the result would be 
an unhelpful soup of sensibilia. And if the various data cannot be distinguished non- 
conceptually, then it is as though one were perceiving just one object. Dzi gar kong sprul 
rin po che asserts that on the rNying ma view he follows, it is considered acceptable to 
claim that we perceive a multiplicity of things simultaneously without any confusion, and 
indeed it is this clear and complex perception that the conceptual mind interprets in the 
second moment. If perception were not complex and clear, on what basis would the con- 
ceptual mind be able to articulate clear and complex knowledge? The rNying ma view- 
point therefore highlights the capacity of the non-conceptual mind to know, and does not 
ascribe clarity exclusively to the conceptual mind. 
As we hinted earlier, this entire discussion may be of little interest in the contemporary 
context since it is not based on empirical evidence. At best, gantaraksita's position can be 
seen as consistent with his overall argument based on the mutual exclusion of one and 
many. However, Mi pham draws out the significance of this discussion in terms of impor- 
tant implications for the theory of mind in general, and this is where the interest of the 
debate lies for him. He asserts that 95ntar*ita's position means that there is no problem 
with the idea that the storehouse consciousness matures into separate identities when its 
diverse aspects appear as abode, body and enjoyments. The unacceptable consequence of 
having a plurality of storehouse consciousnesses is thus avoided. 
What is the purpose and what is the quality [of such an argument, i. e. upholding 
the Equalist theory in relative truth]? There will not be thefault of the storehouse 
consciousness of maturation turning into separate [identities] when its various 
aspects appear as the diversity of abode, body and enjoyments. Therefore it is 
superior to the view that you hold. 103 
103C p. 199-200. dgos pa yon tan ci yod ce nal marn smin kun gzhi'i shes pa gnas lus longs spyod sna tshogs 
su snang baI marn pa tha dad pas tha dad par 'gyur bai nyes pa ni mi bskyed pas khyod kyi khas len tshul 
las 'phags so/ 
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Although the Half-Eggist and Non-Pluralist theories are refuted both ultimately and rela- 
tively, the MAL refutes the Equalist theory ultimately but accepts it relatively. This 
means that the non-Mddhyamika defence of the Equalist position is also refuted insofarasý 
it asserts any factor of the cognition process to be truly and independently existent. 8zinta-' 
rak§ita's acceptance of the Equalist view is made strictly within the bounds of Madhya- 
maka ontology. 
V111.4.2 Sjkdrai; ijnavddins and NirWraifidnavidins 
VIII. 4.2. a) Overview of the issues 
All three of the positions discussed immediately above are held only by those Buddhists 
who assert that knowledge is endowed with the aspect (, akdra; rnam pa) of an object 
appearing to perception. Indian epistemology involved an important debate between those 
schools which held that knowledge is endowed with aspects, the Sakdrav5dins or SatyR- ' 
karavddins, and those who did not: the NirakaravAdins or Allik5kdravadins. SRk5ravAda is 
maintained by Sdqikhya and Vedanta as well as some Buddhist schools, while Nir5k5xa- 
v5da is held by the Nyayavaige§ika, M-im5rhsaka and Jaina schools as well as by certain 
Buddhists. 10' Within Buddhism, the Vaibhaýikas are regarded as nirakiiravadins, while 
Sautrantika. and YogRcdra are sa5ravadins. However, controversy emerged within the 
Yog5. c5ra school itself so that Yog5c5rins include proponents of both positions. Although 
the sources of their views are traced back to Asafiga and DignAga respectively, the dispute 
seems to have begun with Dharmapdla (sdk5ravadin) and Sthiramati (niriikdrav5din) and 
apparently developed after Dharmakirti. 105 kntarak§ita's historical position within the 
controversy is therefore an early one, and with hindsight he can perhaps be credited with 
104See'Controversy between the sAk5ra- and nirWra-vMns of the yog5cAra school-some materials, by Y. 
Kajiyama, in JIBS, XIVA (1965) pp. 429-418. And also Kajiyama (1989: 62, n. 148). 
105ibid. 
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appreciating how significant the debate could be by devoting so much of the MAL to a 
discussion of it. The main proponents of these two epistemological positions came later: 
for example, Dharmaku-Ii of SuvarQadV-ipa'06 and his disciples Ridnagrimitra and Ratna- 
kirti were sdkdrav5dins; while Ratndkaragdnti'07, a nirWraviidin, seems to have followed 
ýdntarakýita. 101ý 
According to Ratnakarag5nd, both these views were also held within the Madhyamaka 
school too. 109 And indeed more recently, the Yogac5ra Svatantrika M5dhyamikas have 
been subdivided into Siik5ravadins (rnam bden pa dang mthun pa 7 dbu ma pa) and 
Nirdkdravddins (niam brdzun pa dang mthun pa 7 dbu ma pa) by Tibetan doxographers 
such as dKon mchogjigs med dbang po andJam dbyangs bshad pa (1648-1722). "o This 
Tibetan distinction is based on Indian sources, one frequently cited instance of which is 
Sahajavajra's Tattvadafakap-M which names ýdntar*ita as the proponent of the Sakara 
subschool and Kambala as that of the Niriik5xa subschool. 111 We therefore have evidence 
that gdntarak§ita was regarded as a SWraviidin in India by the 11 th century. 112 However, 
neither Ye shes sde nor bLo gsal mention the distinction in relation to Madhyamaka al- 
106AIso known as Dharmapala (Chos skyong) of SuvaroadvTpa, he is known as the master of Atiga (Dipaip- 
karagrIjUna) who lived c. 982-1054. SeeRuegg(1981: 110). 
107Ruegg (1981: 122) cites the Deb thersngonpo as his source for stating that RatnAkardanti lived c. 1000, 
was based in VilcramaM5, and was a contemporary of MAn"rimitra, Prajfi5karamati, N94ap7ida and Maitff- 
pAda. Ruegg classifies him as a proponent of a Vijilapti-Madhyamaka synthesis. 
101YIhis is the view of S. Yamaguchi, published in Japanese and cited by Kajiyama (1965). 
109PPU 165 a ME Cited in Kajiyama (1965: 419). 
11OSee the discussion on these two subschools in Nagashima (2002), chapters 1,2 and 4. 
111P. 3099 mi 180a5 ff. yang na rnam beas ma yin rnam med min// zhes bya ba ni mam pa dang bcas pa' 
idbu ma dang/ marn pas med pai dbu ma gsal bar bya bSi gtso bo'i di dag go// gang gi phyir zhi ba'tsho'i 
zhal snga nas la sogs pas marn pa dang bcas pa! i dbu. ma nyid khas len par byed de/ Neither S&Ara nor 
Nir5k5ra! (Tattvadadaka v. 2a) means that the SM-wa-Madliyamaka and the Nir! kAra-Madhyamaka are clari- 
fied as the two main [schools]. Accordingly, gantaraksita and others among the early [masters] accept the 
S5kara-Madhyamaka ... and the Nirakira-Madhyamakaýis accepted by Kambala and others. " Kambala, or Kambalapada, is regarded as a Yog5cAra-SvRtantrika-M5dhyamika of the Nirmala-Ah-k5kara 
branch (Ruegg, 1981: 106). He was an approximate contemporary of Jfidnagarbha according to T-Aran5tha 
(fol. 99A). 
It is interesting to note the discrepancy between gdntarakýita's classification as a s5kAravadin in this 
passage, and Yamaguchi's suggestion that the nirMckav5dm RatnWragAnti foHowed glntarakýita! s 
approach. 95ntaralqita's actual position may be more ambiguous than either of these sources allow, as we 
shall see later in the present Chapter. 
112Sahajavajra was a direct disciple of Advayavajra, who himself was a contemporary of AtTga (982-1054). 
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though the difference is made by bLo gsal in connection with the Yogacara school. 
113 
Indeed, even dKon mchogjigs med dbang po discusses the issues raised by the two sub- 
schools only in his presentation of CittamRtra, while his Yogac5ra-Madhyamaka section 
merely alludes to it in passing. 114 
The issue at stake here is the nature of the aspect (mam pa; Wra) that appears to percep- 
tion. dKon mchog 'jigs med dbang po explains that the precise meaning of 'aspect' in this 
context is the mode of appearance of the object (yul, viýaya) . 
115 This is not merely a tech- 
nical discussion. The significance of the debate in Buddhism lies in its implications for an 
understanding of liberation. An emancipated mind is said to have acquired non- 
conceptual, supermundane knowledge (nirvikalpakajildna), so the question is: if cognition 
occurs for a buddha, is it not the case that cognition endowed with aspects is incompatible 
with non-conceptual knowledge? And can it be acceptable to have a theory of cognition 
that applies only to beings afflicted by delusion and dualistic apprehension? Our answer 
to this question will determine the way we see the essential nature of the mind. 
Mokýdkaragupta presents the rationale behind the debate on aspects as a concern about 
the identity of the cause and effect of cognition. 116 The concern is that a resultant cogni- 
tion should be of the same nature as that which produces it. The Sautrdntika SdUiravadin 
position is described as follows: 
From an object such as blue is produced twofold [determinate] knowledge: one is 
the aspect or concept of blue, the other consists of the consciousness of blue. The 
knowledge consisting of the aspect of blue is Idetermined as] distinctfrom the 
aspect of non-blue, and is regarded as the instrument of knowledge. The know- 
ledge consisting in the consciousness of blue is also [determined as] distinctfrom 
the consciousness of non-blue, and is the knowledge as resultant (pramiti). 771is is 
the same as the effect [of cognition]. 117 
113See Mimaki (1982.99-105) where these two subschools of YogAcAra are discussed in the bLo gsal grub 
mtha'. 
114Sopa and Hopkins (1989: 250ff-, 284). 
115ibid., p. 25 1. 
I%Tarkabhjýa 22.17 in Kajiyama (1989.60ff). 
117ibid., p. 61. I have changed 'image' for'aspect', otherwise the translation is Kajiyama! s. 
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The Sautrantikas consider that cognition is produced by the aspect appearing to cognition, 
which is itself of the nature of cognition. Indeed they go further and assert that knowledge 
is necessarily endowed with an image or aspect, implying that aspectless cognition is im- 
possible. 118 This principle is authoritatively expressed and argued by Dharmaldrti: 
How can a [momentary] thing which exists at a different time [from that of the 
direct perception grasping it] be an object of direct perception? We reply: 
philosophers recognize that the essence of a sense-object consists in its being a 
cause capable of leaving its image (or aspect) in consciousness. 119 
The SdUravddins consider that a blue patch that appears as a gross object does in fact 
exist in the manner it appears; in other words, the aspect 'blue' pertains to an object 'blue'. 
On the other hand the NiraUxavddins do not consider that the aspect 'blue' pertains to an 
o, ect 'blue', and claim that the assertion that 'blue' exists as an external object is false. 
For them, the aspect pertains to cognition and not to an external object, and results from 
vdsand-s (bag chags) that are latencies or karmic seeds embedded in the mindstream. 
Both subschools agree that blue appears as blue to an eye consciousness apprehending 
blue; and also that blue appears-falsely-as a gross object to an eye consciousness 
apprehending blue. But they differ in their understanding of how ignorance enters into the 
cognition process. Sdkdravddins assert that the appearance of blue as an external object to 
an eye consciousness apprehending blue is tainted by ignorance, whereas an appearance 
of blue as blue and an appearance of blue as a gross object are not. Nirak5raviidins hold 
that all three of these types of appearance are tainted by ignorance. In summary, Sakdra- 
v5dins can be defined as those who assert that the appearance of a gross object to a sense 
consciousness exists as it appears, while NirdkdravAdins are defined as those who hold 
that it does not. 120 Or, to put it another way, the former assert that non-dual vijhjna con- 
tains an objective aspect, and the latter do not. 121 
118ibid., p. 61-2; Tarkabhap 23.7-8. 
119PV IH, v. 248, Derge ed. 15 8 b. 1. bhinnakWarh kathaih gr5hyarn iti cet gr5hyataih vihuh, hetutvam eva 
yuktijfta jfidnMcMxpapkýarnarm 
12'Sopa and Hopkins (1989: 251-2). 
I-IRuegg (1981: 92). 
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Nirak5ravadins, for their part, cite Asafiga's MalOyinasarhgraha as their authoritative 
source. 
If the object of cognition were established as objectively existing there would be 
no non-conceptual knowledge (nirvikalpakajfidna; shes pa rtog pa med); without 
this it is not possible to attain buddhahood. 122 
When non-conceptual knowledge is acquired, no objects appear, therefore one 
must understand that objects do not exist, and since they are non-existent the 
aspects (mam pa) of cognition are also non-existent. 123 
It is interesting to note just how close the Nirak5xavAda view is to certain interpretations 
of Vedanta where mJyd or the illusory nature of reality is held to have no ontological 
basis whatsoever and to be fundamentally non-existent. 124 Such a view, termed the 'soft' 
line of Vedanta by O'Flaherty, holds that everything is unreal in distinction to the liard' 
line which holds that everything is real but we mistake it for what is unreal. This 'soft! line 
rests on the idea that the entire known universe is a magical illusion created by God. 
For the Yogav5sigha, 'delusion(moha in Sanskrit)-the 'mistaking' of a ropefor 
a snake-is ultimately subject to correction, when we discover that it is 'contrary 
tofact'(that there is a rope there); this correction then becomes the vehicle by 
which wefree ourselvesfrom thefar more pervasive and thereforefar more 
difficult to dispel 'illusion t-the mdyd where, 'in spite of appearances', there is 
ultimately nothing there at all. 125 
There seems to be a very fine line between this 'soff Veddntic view and the Nirdk5xavRda. 
z 
view that one should realize that there are no objects whatsoever in cognition. "In spite of 
appearances", and specifically in spite of the appearance of aspects in consciousness, 
there are ultimately no aspects there at all. This parallel highlights how the NirAkdravdda 
view might easily entail the position that aspects are actually non-existent, leading, of 
course, to unacceptable consequences. And yet one can appreciate the Nirakdra viewpoint 
122Lamotte (19731.31 and 11.105): Mahdyi2nasaftraha 11.14b-c; don ni don tu grub gyur na// shes pa rtog 
pa med mi'gyur// de med pas na sang rgyas nyid/Pthob par 'thad pa ma yin no// Also VIH, 20C. 
123ibid., 1: 31 and H: 107; Mahayanasaftraha 11.14b-f. mi rtog ye shes rgyu ba Ia// don kun snang ba med' 
phyir yang// don med khong du chud par byal/ de med pas na marn rig med// Also VM 20 f. 
124See "Illusion and Reality in the Yogavdsigha" by Wendy 071aherty in Joumal of the Royal Society of Arts, January 1981, pp. 104-123. 
125ibid., p. 116. 
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as a soteriological device to help the meditator/philosopher abandon grasping to the 
existence of aspects. The non-existence of aspects is therefore an antidote to the belief in 
their existence. It is then but a short step to viewing them as interdependent. 
Finally, in appraising the sdkdrav5da/nir5kdravAda debate, it is worth noting the irony of 
both positions. Whereas Sautriintika developed the theory of aspects to counter theories of 
direct, umnediated perception, when aspected cognition is considered within an inter- 
nalist framework cognition becomes unmediated once again. For Cittamatrins, there are 
really no external objects in the equation. Cognition happens simply between conscious- 
ness and aspects appearing to consciousness, and so one could say that on this view, there 
occurs unmediated cognition of the aspect. Since the chief refutation of the VaibhA§ika 
interpretation of umnediated cognition relied on the difference in nature between object 
and subject, that refutation does not apply on the internalist model. There is no reason to 
object to cognition being unmediated as long as it is entirelY mental in nature. 
VIII. 4.2. b) 9dntarak#ta's position 
Although, as we have seen, kntarakýita is considered a Sdkdravddin by Indian and 
Tibetan scholars, in the MAL and in the TS he employs arguments against both the views 
under consideration. His objection to the Sautrantika Sa5ravddin theory rests on his refu- 
tation of the true existence of external objects, which we have already examined in detail, 
entailing that external objects being non-existent cannot be apprehended. 121, MiS objection 
is reinforced by the principle previously examined above, which is that mind and matter 
being of opposite natures, it is not possible for mind to have a cognitive connection with 
matter. 127 Neither is it the case, claims tdntarakýita, that consciousness apprehends the 
121TS and TSP 1998. See Chapter VII above. 
'-'Ibis argument is also found at TS and TSP 2032-3. 
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imprint that an object leaves in the consciousness since objects are inactive and can only 
rest within their own nature. 
128 There is therefore no way that an object can 'reach out' to , 
the apprehending consciousness or somehow transform itself into an imprint in con- 
sciousness. 129 Consciousness can only cognize objects that are of the nature of conscious- 
ness. All these arguments have already been presented in connection with self-awareness. 
In addition, ýdntarakýita counters the Mara position by pointing out that the aspect that 
appears to perception can be shown not to accord with the object to which we think it is , 
linked. 130 He illustrates this argument with examples of visual distortion. When we see 
our face in the mirror, the size and position of the reflection are not those of our face: if 
the mirror is small the reflected face will be smaller than our face, and if we are facing 
north the reflection will be facing south. Similarly, trees reflected in a clear lake will 
appear upside down. From this one can conclude that cognition does not apprehend either 
an object itself, or an image or aspect that is like an object; rather it apprehends an aspect 
that is different from the apparently related object. This therefore destroys a principle 
fundamental to the S5k5ra theory: that the aspect and the object inherently correspond the 
one to the other. 
131 
U2TS and TSP 2034-5. 
1291n Buddhism, it is mind that is the active principle, not matter. As Elizabeth Napper (Lati Rinbochay, 
1980: 15) notes, "Consciousness (Mina; shes pa), awareness (buddhi, b1o) and knower (saMvedana, rig pa) 
are synonymous; they are the broadest terms among those dealing with the mind ... These terms should be 
understood in an active sense because minds are momentary consciousnesses which are active agents of 
knowing. In Buddhism mind is not conceived to be merely a general reservoir of information or just the 
brain mechanism, but to be individual moments of knowing, the continuum of which makes up our sense of 
knowing. " 
WrS and TSP 2081. In TS 1999, kntaraksita actually distinguishes three positions on this topic, not two: 
nirWravada according to which knowledie is not endowed with the aspect of an object; sa UravWa that 
holds the object is cognized by knowledge endowed with an aspect that corresponds to the object; and anya 
nirbhjsajiIanavada, holding that the object is cognized by knowledge endowed with an aspect that is 
different from that of the object. Ifis examples of visual distortion fit this third category. 
It should be noted that examples of visual distortion were cited above as key arguments in the refutation 
of externalist models of cognition. 
131The third option suggested by gdntaraksita, namely that cognition is endowed with aspects that do not 
conform precisely to the object, appears to be that which fits closest to contemporary empirical evidence, 
exemplified by optics where the image that appears to cognition is inverted or otherwise distorted. 
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In the MAL, gantaraksita's objection to the Sdkdra subschool of Cittarn5tra is based on 
the difficulty involved in holding that knowledge is unitary or multiple. 
MAL 44: [The YogdcArins hold that] the aspects of deluded [cognition] 
appear [in our consciousness] produced by the ripening of latencies in the 
individual continuum from the beginningless past. Yet their intrinsic nature 
is like an illusion since they are the result of error. 
ci ste thog ma med rgyud kyill bag chags smin pas sprul pa yill 
mam pa dag ni snang ba yangll nor bas sgyu mai rang bzhin 'drall 
MAL 45: Even though we appreciate this [doctrine], let us consider whether 
these entities [i. e. the aspects] exist ultimately or are agreeable and acceptable 
only as long as they are not investigated critically. 
de dge 'on kyang de dag gW dngos de yang dag nyid dam cill 
'on te ma brtags gcig pu na// dga'bar khas len 'di bsam moll 
MAL 46: If [the aspects were] ultimately real, either consciousness would be 
multiple or the aspects would be unitary. If consciousness and its aspects had 
contradictory natures they would definitely be distinct. 
gal te yang dag rnam par shes: 11 du mar 'gyur ro yang na nill 
de dag gcig 'gyur 'gal Idan pasllgdon mi za bar so sor 'gyurll 
MAL 47: If aspects are not distinct [from consciousness] it is difflicult to 
refute consequences such as with [aspects of] movement and rest etc., where a 
single [aspect of] movement would cause everything to move, and so on. 
rnam pa tlza dad ma yin nall g. yo dang mi g. yo la sogs pall 
gcig gis thams cad g. yo la sogs. 11 dial bar 'gyur te Ian gdab dka'11 
MAL 48: Even in a theory that maintains the true existence of external 
objects, the same applies. If the aspects are inseparable [from consciousness], 
one cannot escape [the fact that] everything would be reduced to a single 
phenomenon. 
phyi rol don gyi tshul la yangll de Itar rnam par ma bral nall 
gcig gi chos su thams cad kyang1l jug par 'gyur le bzlog pa medll 
These points are very similar to the arguments used in relation to the Half-Eggists, Non- 
Dualists and Equalists. The problem lies in explaining how aspects, being numerous, can 
relate to the consciousness, since S&Uravddins hold that the aspects appearing to cogni- 
tion truly exist. The 'neither one nor many' argument shows this position to be untenable. 
The contradiction will be unavoidable in any system that posits either the true establish- 
ment of consciousness, or that of aspects, or both. For this reason, it is vital to distinguish 
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clearly between actuality and imputation in the context of the MAL. 132 
Not content with his refutation of Sak5ravada, kntarakýita goes on to expose the weak- 
nesses of the Nirak5ravadins in verses 52-60 of the MAL. We will recall that according to 
Dignaga and DharmakIrti, knowledge without aspects is impossible. 
MAL 52: [The NirfiUravadins hold that consciousness] does not intrinsically 
possess aspects, but by dint of an error they appear to consciousness even 
though consciousness is not endowed with aspects ultimately. 
ci ste ngo bo nyid du de'ill main pa 'di dag med pa stell 
yang dag tu na rnam med pa'ill rnam par shes la nor bas snangll 
MAL 53: If [aspects] do not [ultimately] exist, how can they be perceived so 
clearly? Cognition, if different from the entity of [aspects], would not be like 
that. 133 
gal te med na ji Ita burll de dag 'di Itar gsal bar tshorll 
de yi dngos las tha dad pa'ill shes pa de 'dra ma yin noll 
MAL 54: Thus, when there is no aspect present in the knowledge [of some- 
thing], there will be no cognition of it. Just as [we do not feel] pleasure when 
there is no pleasure, or [see] white in [that which is] not white, and so forth. 
Vi Itar gang la dngos gang medll de la de shes yod ma yinll 
bde ba min la bde sogs dang1l dkar ba rnams Wang mi dkar bzhinll 
MAL 55: The term 'cognition' is not appropriate to [perception of an unreal] 
aspect because this is contrary to [the nature of] cognition, like a sky-flower 
and so on. 
mam pa Vi la shes pa 7 donll dngos su Mad pa ma yin tell 
shes pa 7 bdag dang bral ba 7 phyirll rnam: mklw 7 me tog la sogs bzhinll 
MAL 56: Since that which is non-existent has no causal efficiency, like the 
horns of a horse, [an aspect that is non-existent] is not efficient even figura- 
tively because it cannot produce knowledge of its own appearance. 
med pa nus pa med pas nall gdags paang mi rung rta ru bz/jjn// 
bda8 snang shes pa mi skyed lall nus pa rung ba ma yin noll 
MAL 57: So how is it that that which is definitely felt to be existent is related 
to cognition? [Being] non-existent [the aspect] is not of the nature [of cogni- 
tion] nor is it produced from it. 
gang phyir de yod nges tshor ball shes dang 'brel ba ci zhig yodll 
bdag med de yi bdag nyid dangll de las byung ba ma yin noll 
132 C. p168. 
133'Ibere is nothing in the root text or in Mi phain's commentary that justifies the interpretation given to Us 
verse by Ichig5 (1985: CXL) who translates: "If (images) are unreal, how can they be perceived so 
clearly [even by an ordinary man]? His knowledge is not the same (as non-dual or supramundane) know- 
ledge. The latter is distinct from (the knowledge that cognizes) the appearing images. " 
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MAL 58: If [an aspect] has no cause, why does it arise at different times? If it 
is endowed with a cause, how can its dependent nature (paralantra-svabhfiva) 
be avoided? 
rgyu med na ni gang zhig gisll res 'ga "byung ba 'di mng 'gyurll 
rgyu dang ldan na gang zhig gis. 11 gzhan gyi dbang las bzlog par 'gyurll 
MAL 59: If [the aspect] did not [truly] exist, cognition would still occur in the 
absence of aspects. [Yet] a consciousness like a pure crystal sphere has never 
been experienced (or can never perceive anything). 
de med na ni shes de yangll mam pa med pa nyid kyis 'gyurll 
shel sgong dag pa 'dra ba yinll shes pa rab tu tshor ba medll 
AUL 60: If it is said that [the aspect] is cognized on account of delusion, is it 
different from that which is contingent upon delusion? If it arises by the 
power of that [delusion] then it does indeed have a dependent nature. 
'di ni 'khrul bas shes she nall de ci 'khrul la rag las sanill 
de yi mthu yis byung na nL11 de yang gzhan gyi dbang nyid doll 
ne NirAkdra position is that the nature of consciousness is devoid of aspects and likened 
to a pure crystal. 134 Even though it is conceded that aspects do appear to the mind, they 
are not accorded any truth or reality; in fact, they only arise on account of our delusion. 
This implies that not only is the object to which the aspect apparently refers merely an 
iRusion, but also that aspects are in no way inherent to consciousness itselL Mi pham 
explains that on this view aspects are not mental in nature, and are as illusory as the tufts 
of floating hair seen by those who suffer from an eye disease. 135 
kntarakýita first refutes this theory by pointing out its contradiction with empirical 
experience. If the aspects appearing to perception are sensed as clear and distinct by 
everyone from the infant to the scholar, how is it possible that they are in fact non- 
existent? 136 The Nirdk5ra position is flawed with internal contradictions, since on the one 
hand it does not claim that aspects do not arise at all, and yet it must accept that if they are 
non-existent they cannot be experienced. In addition, they assert that aspects are false and 
134Tbe following analysis of gfkntarak4ita's refutation follows Mi pharn's commentary on the above verses. 
135C. p. 280. 
136C. p. 281. 
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non-existent while cognition is true and truly existent. 
137 Furtheimore, close investigation 
will reveal that aspects must necessarily be mental in nature (this was argued earlier in 
this Chapter). 
The Nirak5xav5dins argue that what appears to perception is merely illusory. But if we 
consider the traditional example of the tufts of floating hair perceived (mistakenly) by 
someone with an eye disease, then this position does not make sense. One can acknow- 
ledge that although the tufts of hair lack objective existence, this does not in itself contra- 
dict the mere experience of hair as such. But if it is claimed that not even the aspects 
(rnam pa) of the appearance of hair tufts exist, then the cognitive experience that arises in 
the mind in association with these aspects can have no existence whatsoever. In other 
words, to say that no aspects exist is tantamount to saying that cognition does not occur. 
This is too broad an implication because it cancels out any difference between true and 
false knowledge. The position is unacceptable. Mi pham sums up the debate as follows. 
In short, separate aspects and cognitions are merely distinguished in dependency. 
One will never succeed in asserting any actual distinction in terms of the existence 
and non-existence of [either] entity. Aspects (mam pa) are nothing other than 
simply the clarity and awareness of consciousness to the various objects that are 
known by the mind. Apartfrom the entity of those aspects, such isolated cogni- 
tion is not possible under any circumstances. ( ... ),. I 
Since itfollows that the genuine proponents of Cittamitra are the Sakdravadins, 
what the Sakdravddins assert is sound. [And yet] as the Nirdkdravdda does not 
hold that external objects are true like the mind, it is a little closer to the truth of 
emptiness and itforms, as it were, a bridge to Madhyamaka. For that reason it is 
classified as a higher stage on the gradual path. Nevertheless, since there are 
important [points in the Nirilkilra system] that are conventionally unacceptable, 
one must only affirm relative truth in accordance with the Sdkdra school. 138 
137Ratn5kara§dnti refers to both these arguments in PPU 168, a4 ff, cited in Kajiyama (1965*419-420). 
138C. p. 284. mdor na shes marn tha dad du Itos nas phye ba tsarn yin gyi/ dngos su. khyad phyes nas yod 
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Mi pharn reiterates the thrust of ýdntarakýita's argument, namely that what is untenable is 
the assertion that either aspects or consciousness exist truly and inherently. If one drops 
this ontological position, then cognition can be understood in terms of aspects and con- 
sciousness where both are merely dependent upon one another. In this way, the SAk5xa 
model can be upheld relatively as a helpful way of explaining the functioning of mind in 
the cognitive process. Paradoxically, however, the Nirdk5ra view is closer to the Madhya- 
maka understanding of emptiness simply because it recognizes the illusory quality of both 
objects and aspects. The fact that objects and aspects are held to be illusory does not, of 
course, imply that they are totally non-existent, only that they do not have true existence 
ffiden pa yodpa). Theoretically, then, it would be possible to retain the Nirakdra model of 
cognition but to modify its underlying ontology so that all the factors in the model (i. e. 
including consciousness itself) are non-truly existent and mutually dependent. So why did 
ýdntarak§ita not choose this option? Why did he prefer the Sak5ravada option? What are 
the "important points" in the Niradravada that Mi pham claims are conventionally 
unacceptable? 
The main problem with the Sakdra view is that arguably it does not take non-conceptual 
cognition into account, as Asafiga pointed out above. That is, it does not allow for the 
possibility of aspectless cognition. The big question, then, is whether the non-conceptual 
cognition of a liberated being is aspectless or not. 139 When one has overcome the subject/ 
object duality of deluded perception that is characterized by the distinction between the 
grasper and the grasped, the nature of the knower becomes one with the nature of the 
med cig mam pa kun tu 'jog mi nus te/ mam pa shes pa shes pas yul so sor rig pa! i gsal rig gi cha tsam las 
logs su dbye ba med pas na/ rnam pa de yi dngos Ins tha dad pa'i shes pa yan gar ba de 'dra zhig mam pa 
kun tu srid pa ma yin not ( ... ) de Itar na sems tsam mtshan nyid pa ni mam bden pa yin pas rnam bden pa 'di gzhung Ming zhing/ mam brdzun pa phyi dan sems su'ang mi bden par'dod pas bden stong la cung nye bas dbu ma dang mtshams sbyor Ita bu yin pas go rim gyis'di gong mar bzhag kyang/ tha snyad la mi'thad 
pa chen po'ong bas tha snyad mam bden pa kho na Itar khas blang bar bya ba yin no/ 
139See section V111.5.3 below. 
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known, so does it not follow that in these circumstances there can be no distinction bet- 
ween the consciousness (subject) and the aspects in consciousness (object)? Framed in 
logical terminology, do we not have a case of the incompatibility of mutual exclusion 
140 
between non-conceptual cognition and aspected cognition? An argument that can be ad- 
vanced against the NirdUxavadin defence is one of Mi pham's "important points". If the 
cognition even of deluded beings is free of truly existing aspects, then why do deluded 
beings not experience the non-dual cognition of liberated beings? If mind is essentially 
like a pure crystal, then how can deluded beings possibly fail to ascertain reality in a non-, 
conceptual way? In other words, although Nirdk5ravdda might account for liberated cog- 
nition it does not give an adequate account of deluded cognition, and to be acceptable any 
Buddhist epistemology has to account for both. Even if it asserts (v. 60) that for deluded 
beings aspects arise from delusion, then it cannot avoid them being of dependent nature 
(gzhan dbang nyid) and so is internally contradictory. 
Finally, ýantarakýita`s refutation of Nirakdrav5da is in fact critical to his entire enterprise. 
If aspects do not truly exist and all that truly exists is the luminous, clear self-awareness 
of mind, then it can be argued that mind in this system is unitary. And if that is the case, it 
would not withstand the application of the'neither one nor many' argument. His accept- 
ance of aspects in knowledge means that mind is arguably not unitary; and his assertion 
that mind-only does not exist either means that the mind is not truly existent. Both these 
points are fundamental for the universal pervasion of his argument. If this were not ýZinta- 
rak§ita's position, he would be unable to use that single argument throughout the MAL. 
ý 
Kajiyama (1978: 114-143) has noted the same progression of views along the gradual path '' 
14OIn this case, the mutual exclusion would pertain to the mind (blo 'gal) rather than to the object (don ', gal) 
since the discussion concerns two apparently incompatible modes of cognition. 
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as that mentioned in the commentary by Mi pham. 141 Both are based on Kamalani a's first 
Bliavanakrama which, as we saw in Chapter V above, follows the structure of the MAL 
closely. According to Kamalani a, the Sdk5ravadins hold aspects or mental images (mam 
pa; dkdra) to be truly existent, and experience them as real in meditation; while the Nir, 5- 
kdravAdins recognize the emptiness quality of mental aspects, and are left asserting only 
the true existence of the self-illuminating, reflexive nature of mind. It is this, and this 
alone, that they experience as real in meditation. From here, there is just one more step to 
take in order to reach the Madhyamaka view, namely to realize that the self-illuminating 
mind is itself empty too. It is in this sense that Mi pham. refers to the NirRkAra view as a 
bridge to Madhyamaka. 8antaraksita does, of course, take this final ste from verse 91 to p 
verse 92 of the MAL. 
All the remaining refutations of NirRkdravada (verses 54-60) should be assessed in the 
light of this framework. kntarakýita argues (v. 54) that if cognition is based on subject 
and object, and if the Nirak5ravadins deny the existence of the object (or its equivalent, 
the mental aspect) this is untenable because we cannot be left with a subject and no 
object. Further-more, according to their theory cognition would actually be impossible 
(v. 55) because it could not take place in either of the only two possible ways: actually or 
nominally. By actual cognition we mean cognition that arises clear and aware as the 
aspects of an object. By nominal cognition we mean, according to the externalist view, 
aspects resembling an object that arise by means of the power of that object and according 
to the internalist view (v. 56) aspects that arise in relation to a non-existent object. If the 
object is non-existent it cannot produce aspects (or anything else) so this latter view is un- 
tenable. If the horns of a horse do not exist, then they are not capable of producing a cog- 
nition of their appearance. 142 And similarly, if the aspect is non-existent, as the NirAk5ra- 
141See Chapter V, Table 2. 
14ýrta`i rwa cho la kho rang snang bai shes pa bskyed pa'i nus pa med pas/ 
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v5dins claim it is, then it cannot produce a cognition that appears clearly and 
distinctly as 
in the case of a patch of blue. This refutation is intended to show the absurdity of aspect-, 
less cognition. 
if aspects are held to be non-existent, and cognition itself is held to be existent, then the 
aspects cannot be related to cognition because their natures are opposite (v. 57). The 
logical law regarding the incompatibility of mutual exclusion (1han cig mi gnas 'gal) 
applies. Furthermore, if it is claimed that aspects have no cause (v. 58) then this is incon-., 
sistent with the fact that they occur only occasionally. And if it is claimed that aspects do 
have a cause, then they are dependent and conditioned but not non-existent. And in the 
context of Cittam5tra, since the only cause that is accepted is cognition itself it will be 
impossible not to conclude that aspects have a dependent nature (paratantra svabhdva; 
gzhan gyi dbang yin pa). CittarnAtrins might still argue (v. 59) that since consciousness is 
reflexively aware, cognition can still take place in the absence of aspects. This is refuted 
on the grounds that cognition that is purely subjective in nature has never been exper- 
ienced and therefore does not exist. 143 Also, even if the mind is like a crystal sphere, in 
cognition it nevertheless actively observes and experiences, and these two are contra- 
dictory. Mi pham comments on this verse as follows. 
The tenn 'cognition'is generally applied to an awareness of the different aspects ý, 
of the various objects. Let us consider the eye consciousness, for example. Without 
an observation of any of the aspects ofform one will not be able to identify exactly 
what eye-consciousness is. Likewise, a solitary cognition without any aspects can- 
not be experienced. That which is called 'mere clear awareness, like a pure crystal 
sphere'is an apprehension of the aspects observed when consciousness itself is 
taken as the object. When it is said that one thing, x, is similar to another, y, it 
must be that x appears with the aspects of y. If no aspects have appeared then to 
143See MALV (P. 602) "If there is not an aspect existing in or outside [of the mind], knowledge would 
necessarily cognize only itself. " nang dang phyi rol tu 9yur pSi mam pa med na stobs kyis'di'ba! zhig 
dmigs par 'gyur ro/ That is to say, all cognition would be only self-awareness. 
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classify [things as] 'this'and 'that'will be hollow, like saying that the barren 
woman's son is ir. 144 
Mi pharn argues that conventionally speaking, the term 'cognition' always implies an 
awareness of the different aspects of an object, understood as corresponding (in one way 
or another) to the various characteristics of that object. Objects cannot be known in isola- 
tion from their characteristics-for example,. one cannot ascertain an object 'grass' if one 
does not also apprehend the aspects 'green', 'damp' and so forth. This, of course, follows 
Buddhist ontology insofar as it is held that no object such as 'grass', 'pot', 'chariot' and so 
forth exists apart from its characteristics. 145 It is also consistent with the Buddhist theory 
of apoha according to which objects are conceptually identified, named and classified by 
excluding all those characteristics that are not the characteristics of the given object. 146 
I can assert this is a pot because I have mentally excluded all the characteristics pertaining 
to non-pot from those I am currently apprehending. Similarly, if there are no objects apart 
from sets of characteristics, there can be no cognition apart from an awareness of aspects. 
Even when we say that the mind is'mere clear awareness'what we are referring to is how 
the mind apprehends itself. When the mind apprehends itself reflexively, it'sees' itself 
with the aspects 'clear' and 'aware'. Such a statement therefore corresponds to what the 
144C. p294. de la spyir yul gang dang gang so sor rnam par rig pa la main shes zhes gdags pa ste/ de'ang 
mig shes Ita bu Wang gzugs kyi mams pa mthaý dag ma dmigs na mig shes go rang 'di'o zhes gzung bar mi 
nus pa de bzhin mani pa med pai shes pa rkyang pa nyams su myong ba med de/ de la gsal rig tsain shel 
sgong'dra ba zhes zer baang shes pa nyid yul du byas pa! i main pa la dmigs pa yin no/ des na'di dang'di 
'dra'o zhes gang dmigs na de dang de'i mam par'char dgos kyi/ mam pa ma shar bar de dang der bzhag pa 
ni dam bca! tsham ste/ mo gshani gyi bu mdog dkar po yin no zer ba dang'drao// 
145This point is argued by gAntarak§ita and KamalaMa at TS and TSP 562,587. TSP 587 reads: tasya ca 
mlAdir5pasyaikdnekasvabhdva§Fanyatvena bhr5ntijfidnapratibh5satmakatv&t/ ndpi parm4avaý siddh5b teýdrp 
paurvdparydvasth5yitayd digbhRgabhedindm ekatvAsiddeb/ tarp prati katharp rulddir0patay! param4flnarp 
pratyaksatvam paurv5paryasya bAnupalaksanam bhr5ntinimittenRrffiAntarasamArop5d iti 9akyarp vaktumfl 
Mi jharrfs own definition of perception is similar. In the mKhas jug (1.28) he writes: "perceptions con- 
sist of the grasping of distinguishing features". 'du shes ni nitshan mar 'dzin pa stel 
It is also interesting to note that gantarakýi&s unique contribution to Buddhist logic was the application 
of the apoha theory to aspects (mwn pa) themselves. He calls mental representations eliminations (apoha; 
sel ba) because they are distinct from other appearances, and because they are the cause of our obtaining 
things that are excluded from other appearances. (TS 1007 abc) If this is the case, then aspects are not reals 
but play a part in the conceptual construction of the known. See the discussion in Dreyfus (1997: 233-243). 
141See TS and TSP 587. 
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'subject' mind says of the same mind taken as 'object', but strictly within a meditative state 
where subject and object are not two distinct things but simply terms that facilitate us 
talking about the reflexivity of the mind. 
Finally, ýdntarakýita (v. 60) refutes the Nirdk5ra argument that aspects are non-existent 
because they arise from delusion. 147 If they arise from delusion they must have a depen- 
dent nature; they will have to be related to the latent tendencies from which they arise, 
and must therefore not only have a compatible nature to them, but be existent. Even if one 
accepts that there are no external objects that give rise to the aspects that appear in con- 
sciousness, there is no cognition unless the aspects themselves are acknowledged to exist. 
Mi pham stresses how important ýdntarak§ita's refutation of the Nirdk5ravada. is for his - 
project of synthesizing Yog5c5ra and Madhyamaka. 
This reasoning that refutes the Nirdkdravddins is extremely powerful. It possesses 
extraordinarily profound key points, and if one is capable offully realizing these 
one will [be able to] reach a conclusion regarding the Cittamitra view. Since ., 
these/points] also reveal the secret Points of Madhyamaka, nothing is more signi- 
ficant than this in the [present] synthesis [of Yogdcdra and Madhyamaka). 148 
The key points in question here are points that are found in the commentaries 149 showing 
how interdependence (pratTtyasamutpdda) offers a convincing and coherent account of 
the cognition process without rendering causation meaningless. On the contrary, the argu- 
ments put forward show that any philosophical scenario other than that of Madhyamaka, 
renders causation-and specifically the cognitive process-logically impossible. Most of 
these arguments have already been considered in different parts of this study: temporal 
147Ms is one of the chief arguments put forward by Ratn5kargdnti in defence of the Nir5k5ravada. See 
PPU 161, a5-161, M. Reproduced in Kajiyama (1965: 421-420). 
148C. p. 302-3. rnam brdzun pa'gog, pa! i rigs padi mams shin tu stobs dang Man cing/ thun mong min pa! i 
zab gnad yod pa legs par myong nus na sems tsam gyi grub mtha! i phu thag chod cing, dbu maI gnad gsang 
ston par byed pa yin pas tshul gnyis kyi lugs la'di las don che ba med do// 
149In Mi pharn! s commentary on verse 60, which is based on Kamalaglia! s pafijikA. 
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difficulties in the relation between cause and effect, which can be neither consecutive nor 
simultaneous; the impossibility of truly existing aspects or cognitions either to cease to 
exist, or to arise when they were previously non-existent (this point is important when 
considering how cognition works in a purified mind that is no longer deluded); the contra- 
diction of false aspects producing true cognition; and following all the previous points, 
the impossibility of accounting for how aspects (held to be false or non-existent) are 
connected with valid cognition. We can summarise by saying that these refutations cluster 
around a central theme: the difficulties involved in accounting for a relationship between 
one entity that is ultimately non-existent and another that is ultimately existent. 
VIH. 5 Appraising giintarak§ita's epistemology and philosophy of mind 
VM. 5.1 Doxographical issues 
The arguments that ýdntaraksita a lies to the nature of mind and the process of cognition pp 
are similar if not the same as the arguments he uses in the opening verses of the MAL 
against various philosophies of true existence. The analysis of these arguments previously 
carried out in Chapters V, VI and V11--covering the assumptions behind them and the 
logical laws on which they are based-is equally relevant here. Similarly, kntarakýita's 
understanding of what the 'neither one nor many' argument refutes and how, need not be 
repeated here. What is interesting is that the mind and cognition are simply treated as 
particular instances to which these general arguments apply. Mind is not accorded the 
special status attributed to it by the Cittamatra school. 
In order to assess ýdntarakýita's final position, the progression identified by 85kya 
mchogldan 150 appears to offer the most helpful account. He asserts that ýAntarakýita 
passes through Sautrantika and then Yog5cdra before reaching the view of Madhyamaka. 
IIOSee section VII. 3 above. See also Dreyfus (1997: 83ff). 
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This certainly seems to be exemplified by his treatment of cognition. As we have seen, 
85ntarakýita suggests in verse 43 that if one accepts the existence of external objects, then 
the Sautr5ntika view is the best since he has established that cognition occurs by means of 
aspects appearing to consciousness. In addition, he implies a preference for the Equalist 
subschool of Sautrdntika. So this is a first conclusion of his analysis. If one then goes 
further and refutes the existence of external objects, positing a theory where cognition is 
entirely mental in nature, then in verses 44-45 gdntarakýita expresses his preference for 
the view of the Sakdrav5din subschool of Cittam5tra in relative truth. Finally, he con- 
cludes in verse 92 that the Madhyamaka view of the non-true existence of conscious- 
ness is the correct view in ultimate truth. 
The difficulty is that the soteriological structure of the MAL is not just a question of form, 
it is actually the method kntarakýita uses to approach his subject. He has followed what 
Georges Dreyfus, in connection with Dharmaldrti, has called a "strategy of ascending 
scales of analysis" . 
151 Like Dharmalirti, he starts out explaining things on an externalist 
model, eventually critiques that position and then shifts to an internalist perspective. 
Dharinalirti's final position accords with Cittamdtra, whereas 8antaraksita critiques this 
as well and shifts to Madhyamaka for his final view. In assessing claims about 8anta- 
rakýita's own viewpoint, it is therefore necessary to bear in mind that some claims might 
apply to one level but fail on another. 
His position on the S5k5rav5da/NirRk5rav5da debate is a case in point. It has been shown 
that any attempt at classifying ýdntarakýita as a SAkdravddin or as a Nirdk5ravAdin is un- 
satisfactory-but this is true only if we attempt to define his final position. Although it 
can be said that he accepts SWravdda relatively, his standpoint in fact entails a radical 
15'Dreyfus (1997: 49,86ff). 
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re-interpretation of &ikaraviida in terms of dependent origination, such that his presenta- 
tion of it no longer accords with the Cittamatra presentation. The ontological basis of the 
epistemological model proposed by Cittamduin SakaravAdins is radically re-defined, as is 
its corresponding account of causality. This means that on the level of meditation 
experience, what is realized respectively by Cittam5trin and Mddhyamika Sakarav5dins is 
quite different. And although ýZintarakýita implies that Nirdk5rav5da is soteriologically 
superior to SdUravada he also maintains that it is inferior in terms of logical coherence. 
So in some sense he follows neither. And if one fails to appreciate the subtlety of his 
position, it is misleading to apply these doxographical terms to him. 
Ichig6 (1985: LXXIX-LXYX) comes to a similar conclusion and argues that "we can call 
ýRntarakýita a Sdkdravddin only in the sense that he holds that knowledge is endowed 
with an image [i. e. aspect--qny addition] which is not real. However, it would be more 
prudent to classify him only as a member of the Yogac5ra-Madhyamika school. " Ichig6 
asserts that he can be called a Sdkdravddin insofar as he accepts that self-cognition is 
always endowed with an aspect. But ýdntarakýita refutes the reality of aspects when he 
applies to them the criticism usually applied to partless particles (vv. 46-49). And his 
position is more akin to that of the NirdkdravAdins when he speaks of reflexive awareness 
as illumination (prakdia) in MALV 16. 
There is another outstanding issue in relation to ýdntarakýita's epistemology and philo- 
sophy of mind which is similarly affected by this strategy of ascending scales of analysis; 
and this concerns how he can legitimately be termed a Sv5tantrika. The problem is that 
dGe lugs pa Prasafigika definitions of what is taken to be the epistemological 'given' in 
Svdtantrika do not fully match kntarakýita's own presentation. Sara McClintock has 
cogently argued that dGe lugs pa claims may be judged successful on the externalist level 
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of analysis, but not on the internalist level. 
152 
The term 'given' refers in contemporary epistemology to "the immediate apprehension of, 
the contents of sense experience", 153 in other words to that which presents itself immedia- 
tely and in some sense unassailably to awareness. The given can be subdivided into what 
we will call the perceptual given, that is, non-conceptual sense data, and the phenomenal 
given by which we mean seeming-objects of awareness, whether perceptual or hallucina-, 
tory. 154 The perceptual given functions on the external model of cognition while the 
phenomenal given is addressed by internalist models. Now, as we have already noted, 
dGe lugs pa definitions of Svatantrika highlight two key points with regard to the given: 
1) that Svdtantrikas accept a commonly appearing (mthun snang ba) subject (chos can) of 
debate; and 2) that this subject appears to non-erroneous cognition (pranotta) meaning a 
non-defective sense consciousness (dbang shes gnod med). For example, lCang skyaýs 
definition is as follows: 
Thus, the meaning of svatantra is asfollows: there is a subject that appears in 
common to the non-mistaken cognition of the proponent and the opponent by 
virtue of that thing's mode of existing in terms of [being] a basis of designation, 
and not only on account of what has been accepted by the opponent.. Further, in 
the Svitantrika system, in conventional terms non-defective sense consciousnesses 
are non-mistaken with regard to the objects that appear [to them]. And the reason 
that [the non-defective sense consciousness] is non-mistaken in this way comes, 
down to thefact that [Svdtantrikas] accept thatforms and so on appear to non- 
defective [sense] consciousnesses to be established by way of their own nature, 
and theý assert thatforms and so forth are [actually] established in their own 
nature. M 
152"The Role of the 'Given' and its Implications for the Tibetan (dGe lugs pa) Classification of gAntaraksita 
and Kamalaffla as Yog5c5ra-Sv5tantrika-Madhyamakas", oral presentation by Sara McClintock, IABS ýon- 
ference, Lausanne, August 1999. An updated version of this talk will shortly be published in The Svatan- 
trika-Pr4saAgika Distinction, eds. George Dreyfus and Sara McClintock, Wisdom Publications, Boston, 
due October 2002. 
153Entry under'gived by Alan H. Goldman in A Companion to Epistemology eds. Dancy and Sosa (1992: 
159-162). 
15AHere I follow McClintocles terminology. It is used to simplify the presentation, on the understanding that 
both givens are phenomena and both can and do occur in perception. 
1551Cang skya grub mtha! (Collected Works, nga, 28a): des na phyi rgol gyi khas blangs tsarn la ma'khris 
par gdags gzhi'i ngos nas don gyi sdod lugs kyi dbang gis rgol phyi rgol gyi tshad ma ma'khrul ba la chos 
can mthun snang du grub cing/ ( ... ) de yang rang rgyud pa! i lugs la dbang shes g. nod med marns tha snyad 
du snang yul la ma Tdirul ba yin la/ de ltar ma Tdirul pa! i rgyu mtshan yang g. nod med kyi shes pa mams la 
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The critical linkage made by dGe lugs pa scholars starting with Tsong kha pa, is that the 
SvRtantrika commitment to a commonly appearing subject entails an ontological commit- 
ment to the existence of things being established by way of their own natures (rang bZ11in 
156 
gyis grub pa). This is possible in light of the second tenet which holds that the sense 
157 
perception even of ordinaxy beings is non-mistaken (abhrdnta). That is why it follows 
that since things appear to be established in their own nature, they must actually be so. In 
Western terminology, on the dGe lugs pa reading of the Sviitantrikas, there is an unassail- 
able given. This given is what is termed variously 'established by way of its own nature' 
(rang bzhin gyis grub pa), 'established by virtue of its own character' (rang gyi mtshan 
nyid kyis grub pa), 'established from its own side' (rang ngos nas grub pa) and 'esta- 
blished by way of its own entity' (rang gi ngo bos grub pa). It is the Svatantrika commit- 
mI ent to such a given that enables them to postulate subjects that appear commonly to both 
parties in a debate. 158 Not only do the subjects (dhannin; chos can) appear commonly, so 
do their characteristics, and these can be used as evidence (rtags) in proof statements con- 
cerning the subject. dGe lug pas call such evidence "autonomous evidence" (rang rgyud 
kyi rtags). On the dGe lugs pa view, PrAsafigikas reject any commonly appearing subject, 
and accept evidence only insofar as it is accepted by the opponent (gzhan grags kyi gtan 
tshigs). 
In assessing the dGe lugs pa claims in connection with kntarakýita, there is an obvious 
problem, namely that the subject of debate (dhannin; chos can) is necessarily conceptual 
and yet is said to appear to a non-conceptual perceptual awareness. The difficulty might 
gzugs sogs rang gi ngo bos grub par snang zhing gzugs sogs kyang rang gi ngo bos grub par zhal gyis bzhes 
pa nyid la thug go// See also the translation in Lopez (1987: 294-5). 
"Tor Tsong kha pa's position see dGongspa rab gsal 101b3h de Ita gzugs sgra sogs Inga rang gi mtshan 
nyid kyis grub par dbang shes la snang ba ni/ ma rig pas bslad pa yin pas shes pa de dang/ gzugs brnyan 
dang brag cha sogs snang bai dbang shes mams la/ phra rags tsam ma. gtogs pa snang yul la Idirul ma TJiml 
la khyad par med cing/ Cited in McClintock (1999). 
157! §Rntaralqita defines sense perception as non-mistaken in TS 1214. 
158See Tillemans (1982: 109 and n. 22). 
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not be insurmountable within an externalist Sautrdntika analysis, where the aspects that 
appear to perception have a structurally isomorphic congruence with the ultimately real 
particulars that cause them. So although the dhannin itself is a conceptual 
fiction, it is 
based on the non-erroneous perceptual given and has an indirect correspondence to the 
real natures (svabhdva) that are the causes of the aspects in perception. In this sense, 
it is 
fair to say that Sautrdntikas do accept that things are in some sense conventionally "esta- 
blished by way of their own natures". 
However, if we turn to the internalist analysis the structural isomorphism of the aspect in 
perception no longer applies. The fundamental cause of the aspect is not an external parti- 
cular but the ripening of latencies (vdsana) that have existed in the mind since beginning- 
less time. But even though the primary cause for perception is the mind itself, the aspects 
or images that arise appear to exist externally (they correspond to what we have termed 
the phenomenal given). The point here is that despite being non-conceptual, the dualistic 
appearance of these aspects contradicts the principle that perceptual awareness is non-, 
erroneous, since the object of the awareness does not exist in the way that it appears. 
Thus Kamalani a asserts that according to internalist analysis, the aspects in perception 
are not free from error in the same way as they are on the externalist level. 
The tenn 'non-erroneous'should be understood as 'trustworthy' (avidsarpvRda), 
and not as 'having for its basis a form as it really exists. If this latter were meant, 
here, then, since on the Yogdcdra view there can be no real basis, the definition 
would not be applicable to sense perception as accepted by both schools [i. e. , Sautr, dntika and Yogacdral. Asfor being trustworthy, what this means is 'the pre- 
sence of the capacity to envisage a thing which is capable of the intended effective 
action ý-not actually envisaging it, as obstacles are likely to appear in the actual 
envisaging. 159 
Kamala0i a maintains that on the internalist model of cognition, sense perception is non- 
159TSP 1312. abhräntamaträvisarpväditvena dre"am na tu yathävasthitälambanäkäratayäl anyathä hi 
yogäcäramatenälambanäsiddher ubhayanayasamägrayaenestasya pratyalqalaksanasyävyäpitä syäti avi_ 
sasväditvam cäbhimatärthakfiyäsamarthäMapräpaQagalýiýatvam na tu präpaQam eva pratibandhädisam- 
býavät/ Transl. McClintocL 
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mistaken only in the sense that it can lead one to an object capable of effective action. 
Although the phenomenal given is non-conceptual, it is not congruent with its causes. 
This position poses a serious challenge to our considering ýRntarakýita and Kamalani a as 
SvAtantrikas according to lCang skya's definition of that term. In fact, on account of this 
problem the dGe lugs pa doxographical definition of Sv5tantrika is more appropriate in 
the case of Sautrdntika-Sviitantrika-Mddhyamikas such as Bhavaviveka, and that it is 
unhelpful for characterizing gdntarakýita. 
If it is difficult to apply the SvRantrika tenet of non-erroneous sense perception to knta- 
rakýita, what of the other tenet, namely the existence of the commonly appearing subject? 
Even if what appears to perception is erroneous, there is still something that appears. And 
in verse 78 of the MAL ýAntaraksita says, I do not refute entities insofar as they are of 
the nature of appearance" (bdag ni snang ba 7 ngang can gyill dngos po dgag par mi byed 
dell). 160 If there is something-anything-that kntarakýita does not deny, does it fall into 
the category of things that are established from their own side, at least relatively? The 
question here is whether, by accepting "that which is of the nature of appearance", 
gdntarakýita is thereby making an ontological commitment to inherent existence. This 
question is especially critical when we recall his preference for SdUravzida in conven- 
tional truth, illustrating his preference for a theory where aspects (rnam pa) have some 
kind of existence over a theory where they donI. 
We found earlier in Chapter VI that the logical subject (dharinin) of verse 2 of the MAL 
160'Ms statement is used to answer the charge of afrayasiddha, or subject failure, in his argument on the 
non-true existence of things. Subject failure would occur if the Buddhist proponent considered that those 
entities held to be truly existent by his opponent were in fact non-existent. In this case, the Buddhist argu- 
ment would lack an existent subject (dharmin) and would be no different from pronouncements about the 
proverbial barren woman's son. However, by accepting "the entity that appears" ýAntarakýita safeguards the 
logical correctness of his reasoning even though his conceptual understanding of the dharmin is quite 
different from that of his opponent. 
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was not accepted by both sides. McClintock (op. cit. ) also finds that there are clear cases 
where both ýdntarakýita and Kamalaglia use evidence that is accepted only by the 
opponent. 
To take one example, consider the arguments against the notion of a gross object 
setforth in the Dravyapad5rffiaparlikýd of the TS and TSP. 161 Here, the opponent 
maintains that if gross objects did not exist, there could be no perception of such 
entities as trees and soforth, since the atoms that make up these entities are not 
perceptible. 9dntara4ita responds by noting that the atoms are perceptible, but 
only when they come together in such a way as they mutually support one another 
in becoming perceptible. He emphasizes here that one only has a determination of 
those aspects of the partless and utterly unique particularfor which the causesfor 
determination exist. Kamalailla explains that one does not have a determination 
of all aspects of those particulars, because one is not trained to see those aspects, 
or one's mind is not sufficiently sharp, and so on. Based on this argumentation, , gantaraksita and Kamalas-1-1a conclude that there is no gross entity apartfrom the 
individual atoms, because that which is known in direct perception can be shown 
to be the partless, momentary and unique particular. 
However, as we know, neither author ultimately accepts the existence of such 
particulars external to the mind Does this mean that in presenting their argu' ' 
ments concerning these particles and our perception of them that they have done 
away with the metalogical requirement of ubhayasiddha [i. e. that a subject should 
be recognized by both parties]? It seems that they have. 
ýAntarakýita's method of arguing philosophical views according to ascending scales of 
analysis means, for example, that in the MAL he provisionally adopts the SautrZintika per- 
spective to refute the Vaibhdýikas, the Cittamatra perspective to refute the Sautrzintikas, 
and only in his final position does he adopt what can be taken to be his own view, the 
Madhyamaka perspective, to refute the Cittamatrins. In all these argumentations save the 
final one, it is fair to say that the various dharmin he refers to are only accepted by the 
opponent. ýantarakýita accepts them only pragmatically for the purposes of debate, for 
without this no debate is possible at all. This evidence does not accord with the dGe lugs 
pa criteria defining SvRantrika. 
Finally, there remains the question of whether the acceptance of aspects in relative truth 
16'See TS and TSP 561,586-7. 
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entails the kind of ontological commitment ascribed to Svdtantrikas by dGe lugs pa 
scholars. In an internalist framework, the commonly appearing subject is the result not 
only of conceptual error (the error that applies in externalist models) but also of ignorance 
in the form of vdsand-s. So the object of perception cannot be said to exist as it appears 
even conventionally. And since the phenomenal given is the result of error and ignorance, 
its acceptance by both parties in a debate does not entail a subtle commitment to "exist- 
ence from its own side". Insofar as ýAntarak§ita does not deny aspects in cognition, we 
can agree with dGe lugs pas that he accepts the given. But that given is in no way un- 
assailable or non-erroneous. 
VIII-5.2 The nature of the mind 
All the different epistemological positions considered in the MAL from verse 16 to 60 
represent theories that apply to the nature of cognition in deluded beings. But to ascertain 
the essential nature of the mind on ýdntarakýita's view, one also needs to look at how he 
accounts for the workings of the mind once it is liberated from delusions and defilements. 
To begin with, ýdntaraksita's definition of the mind in verse 16 is generic, that is, mind- 
whether deluded or enlightened-is reflexive awareness. Furthermore, this essentially 
reflexive nature is intrinsically free of the dualistic type of cognition associated with 
ignorance, and characterized by the grasping and the grasped. In TS 2078 we read: 
Therefore, that which is disputed [i. e. svasarpvedanal is considered to be non-dual 
since it is devoid of object and subject because it is of the nature of knowledge, 
like a reflection. 162 
And in TS 208 1: 
The nature of consciousness is its capacity to illuminate, and that can have no 
place in the apprehended object. Since [cognition endowed] with no aspect and so 
on is not reasonable, the pervasion [of consciousness by non-dualiW is esta- 
blished. 163 
162ViV5ddspada mMdham vijfidnatvRd ato matah/ advayarp ve dyakartrtVaviyogdt pratibimbavat/ 163 vijfidnatvam praUýat * vam tac ca grMiye nirZaspadam anirbhZisadyayogena vy5ptis ten5sya nigcita/ 
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The aspects that appear in cognition are of the nature of consciousness, and there is there- 
fore no dichotomy between the nature of the aspect and that of consciousness itself. In 
fact, the aspect is cognition. Cognition is nothing other than the reflexive awareness of 
aspects and reflexive awareness is nothing other than the capacity to illuminate. Crucially, 
this applies not only to deluded beings but also to buddhas. 
ýantarakýita asserts in TS 
2046: 
Whether endowed with an aspect or not, cognition does not apprehend anything 
other [than consciousness]. Therefore, with regard to a buddha's cognition, the 
question does not arise. 164 
The difference between the cognition of ordinary people and that of a buddha lies in 
eo j1 65 whether it is false (alrka) or true (satya), and whether it is erron us (bhr nt ) or not. 
' 
Error in this case includes such tendencies as taking the aspect for an objective entity. 
This implies that there is no necessary connection between aspects and ignorance. Ichig6 
puts it this way: 
According to 9dntara4ita's position, it may be said that knowledge resultsfrom 
error or nescience, but not that the image arisesfrom it. Accordingly, because of 
self-cognition, knowledge is intrinsically endowed with an image. Therefore even 
the Buddha's knowledge cognizes images and it does not have a singular nature. 
( ... ) The difference 
between the knowledge of ordinary people and that of the 
Buddha has nothing to do with the existence or non-existence of an image. 
We have seen that in verse 60 of the MAL tdntarakýita questions the logic of saying that 
aspects arise from delusion. Aspects merely arise from the luminous clarity intrinsic to 
the mind, which makes the process possible for anyone endowed with a mind, whether 
ordinary beings or buddhas. Mi pham concurs: 
All the aspects of objects of cognition that are experienced have therefore, without 
exception, essentially arisen as clear and aware experience. ( ... ) The valid cogni- 
tion of inference is based on direct perception, and the direct perception of objects 
in the end reaches completion through the clear experience of self-awareness. If 
one asserts any principlesfor the validity of cognition in [beings ofl limited 
understanding this will be impossible without [positing] self-awareness. 166 
164sa5larp tan nir5k5rarp yuktaip n5nyasya vedakarp/ iti bauddhe'pi vijfiane na tu cinta pravarttate/ 
165See Ichip (1985: LXXII ff. ). 
166C. p208 des na gang shes byei mam pa nyam su myong ngo cog tham cad myong ba gsal rig gi ngo b6r 
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Far from being an expression of delusion, the nature of aspects is such that they safeguard 
the theoretical possibility that the cognition even of deluded beings can occasionally be 
valid. The difference between ordinary beings and buddhas lies not in the fact that the 
cognition of the former is always false and that of the latter is always true, but rather in 
how they respectively understand the nature of the aspects they cognize, which is tanta- 
mount to saying that it depends on how they understand the nature of their own minds. 
Further analysis of kntarakýita's view of the result of the path, the nature of the soterio- 
logical goal, is beyond the purview of this study. The MAL does not enter into this topic 
in more detail, but evidence for his view can be found in the final chapter of the TS. 167 
It is significant that the unique pramdtza system that Mi pham developed can be viewed as 
based on exactly the sort of analysis that ýdntarakýita carries out here. 168 With respect to 
conventional pramd", in the case of untutored ordinary persons Mi pham envisages con- 
ventional valid cognition of limited impure perception (ma dag tshur mthong tha snyad 
dyod pa 7 tshad ma). In the case of ordinary persons practising the path, he asserts, in 
addition, conventional valid cognition of pure sublime vision or understanding (dag pai 
phags pa 7 gzigs snang tha snyad dpyod pai tshad ma). As for enlightened beings, he 
admits both these types of valid cognition, on the understanding that a buddha is not 
'subject' to the cognition pertaining to limited impure perception, but nevertheless is 
aware of how ordinary beings perceive the world. 
skyes pas/ ( ... ) de'ang rjes dpag tshad mai mtha! mngon sum la thug cing/ mngon sum don rig kyang mthar 
gsal bar nyams su myong baI rang rig gis tshar phyin pa yin pas tshur mthong tshad maI marn gzhad zhig 
'dod na rang rig med du mi rung ba yin pas/ 
167Ms topic is the subject of a thesis recently submitted by Sara McClintock to Harvard University but un- 
available to the present author. 
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CHAPTER NINE SXNTARAMITA'S APPROACH 
TO THE TWO TRUTHS 
1X. 1 The problems raised 
The final topic addressed by this study is the particular way that ý5ntaraksita approaches 
the Two Truths. The Two Truths (satyadvaya; Men pa gnyis), that is, what we term ulti- 
mate truth (paramirthasatya; don dam bden pa) and relative truth' (saýnqfisatya; kun 
rdzob Men pa), are universally regarded as the main doctrinal framework in the presenta- 
tion of Mahaydna teachings of the Second Turning. 2 In terms of structure of presentation, 
they are to Madhyamaka what the Four Noble Truths are to the schools of Nik5ya 
Buddhism and the Three Natures are to the Cittamatra school. 3 We noted in Chapter 111.2 
that Mi pharn believes the MAL's approach to the Two Truths is not only characteristic of 
the Yog5c5ra Sv5tantrika-Madhyamaka school, but is also one of the main strengths and 
interests of the text and, accordingly, of ýantarakýita's philosophy. In view of the number 
of issues in the MAL that have been shown to be contentious, it may not be surprising 
that the Two Truths are no exception. Within the Tibetan Buddhist world, ýAntaraksita's 
approach has given rise to widely differing appraisals. At one end of the spectrum we 
have the critique of the 14th century scholar mKhas grub dge legs dpal bzang, a student of 
Tsong kha pa, in his sTong thun chen mo regarding §Antarakýita's understanding of the 
ultimate; while at the other end we have Mi pham's admiration for an approach that he 
personally endorsed. mKhas grub's remarks illustrate the sorts of issues raised. 4 
Anotherformer Tibetan master claims that there are two kinds of Mddhyamikas 
who are given [different] names depending upon how they accept the ultimate. 
(One is called) an utterly non-abiding Madhyamika, Ithe other] a Madhyamika 
who establishes the logic of illusion. Thefirst [category] is said to be comprised 
of Candrakirti and soforth who believe that the non-a ffirming negation (med 
'See Chapter V n. 5, for a discussion of the translation of the terms samqtisatya and kun rdzob bden pa. 
zMere are many studies in the research literature on the Two Truths. ýor detailed analysis see for example: 
Lindtner (1981); Sprung (1973); Newland (1992 and 1999); Cabez6n (1992); Murti (1960: 228-255). 
3See'Documents d'Abhidharma: les deux, les quatre, les trois vdritds'by Louis de la Vall6e Poussin, MCB 
pp-159-187,1937. 
qTC, Collected Works, vol. ka [82]. Translation by Cabez6n (1992: 89). 
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dgag), which is the refutation of there being any truth to appearances, is the ulti- 
mate truth. The second [category] is said to consist of 9jntarak#ta, Arya [Vimuk-' 
tasenal and Haribhadra who, lit is claimed] believe that the illusorylike conjunc- 
tion (tshogs) of appearance (snang) and emptiness (stong) is the ultimate truth. (... 
Because the illusory-like conjunction of appearance and emptiness infact is a 
conventional truth, there is no single Great Mddhyamika who accepts it as the 
ultimate truth. Were it an ultimate truth, it wouldfollow, absurdly, that everything 
that exists (gzhi grub) would be an ultimate truth, for it is impossible that a pheno- 
menon not be empty of truth. It seems that those who posit this believe that the ,. direct object (dngos kyi gzhal bya) of an inferential cognition [of emptiness] (rigs 
shes ýes dpag) is itself the ultimate truth. The direct object of an inferential cogni- 
tion, that is, the illusorylike conjunction of the subject [of the syllogism] (chos 
can) such as a sprout, and the predicate (bsgrub bya'i chos), truthlessness (bden 
med), is concordant (mthun pa) with the ultimate in so far as they [the ultimate 
and this conjunction] are both negations of [the same] object of refutation, 
namely true existence. For this reason, both the Madhyarnakdlarnk5ra and the 
Madhyamakdloka explain that it is [merely] labeled ultimate [without actually 
being so], and so not even gantara4ita and hisfollowers accept that such [an 
entity] is the ultimate truth. 
According to mKhas grub, CandrakIrti, and thereafter the PrZisafigika school, accept that'' 
emptiness (stong pa nyid) is a non-affirming negative (med dgag). By this we mean that 
when we say 'the cup is empty [of svabhdval' we are negating its inherent or independent 
existence but are not thereby positing anything else in its place. An example of an affir- 
ming negative would be when we say'grass is not blue'we are thereby implying that it is 
another colour instead. By using non-affirming negatives, then, PrZisafigikas refute the 
true existence of what appears to cognition and thereby establish the ultimate truth. The 
ultimate truth is emptiness (fiinyatd; stong pa nyid), and emptiness is a non-affirming 
negative regarding true existence. However, mKhas grub claims that gdntarakýita and his 
followers have a different understanding of the ultimate, and hence of what emptiness is. 
For his school, the ultimate is "the illusorylike conjunction of appearance and emptiness", 
but mKhas grub argues that such a conjunction must necessarily be a relative truth not an 
ultimate one. Cabez6n (1992: 440, n. 274) explains the argument as follows. Because every 
phenomenon is empty, it can be said to be the illusorylike composite of appearance and 
emptiness. But because the appearance part is a relative truth, it makes the conjunction of 
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appearance and emptiness a relative truth, even though the other half (the emptiness) is an 
ultimate truth. One can infer from this that for ýdntarakýita and his school, the ultimate 
truth itself is the direct object of an inferential cognition of emptiness, while the concor- 
dant (mthun pa) ultimate is the illusorylike conjunction of appearance and emptiness 
which is in accord with the ultimate insofar as both the ultimate and this conjunction are 
negations of the true existence of a given object. So for mKhas grub, even eminent 
scholars like ý5ntarakýita and Kamalaffla have fallen victim to internal contradiction in 
their system. While on the one hand they call the ultimate "the conjunction of appearance 
and emptiness", elsewhere they acknowledge that this is only the concordant ultimate, not 
the true ultimate. The so-called concordant ultimate should therefore not really be called 
an ultimate truth at all. 
Asserting that ýdntarak§ita's system fails to present ultimate truth correctly is tantamount 
to saying that he should not strictly be called a M5dhyamika at all. One wonders why 
mKhas grub does not pursue his argument as far as this. But once again, just as we saw on 
a number of occasions in Chapter VIII in relation to other scholars, this study will show 
that much of the disagreement between mKhas grub and 85ntarakýita is related to 
differences in definitions and terminological usage. 
The issues raised by this passage lead us to the heart of the matter: in order to appraise 
ý5ntarakýita's understanding of the Two Truths, we need to know: a) what he means by 
emptiness; b) what he means by ultimate and concordant ultimate; c) what he understands 
by relative truth; d) how he interprets the relation between the Two Truths. All these 
questions are genuine issues within MahAydna Buddhism itselL And even on the limited 
evidence we have seen so far, it is obvious that our answers to these questions will depend 
very much on the understanding that we ourselves bring to the text. If we read the MAL 
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through the lens of a commentary such as Mi phanýs, we get a very specific reading of 
it 
the philosophical assumptions of which should be transparent. This is why, 
before pro- 
ceeding with an examination of the MAL itself, we need to clarify 
further the under- 
standing Mi pham is bringing to his own reading of the text. This Chapter 
does not ask 
questions about whether the dGe lugs pa and rNying ma pa interpretations are right or 
wrong; it is concerned simply with appraising Mi pham's view as a philosophical elucida- 
tion of the text. 
But in addition, as Western critics of ýdntarakýita's system, we also need to ask questions 
from outside of Buddhism. For example, how coherent really is the Two Truth frame- 
work? So much of ýRntarakýita's argumentation rests on this underlying principle that a, 
final appraisal of his philosophy would be impossible without analysing it at least provi- 
sionally to see what implications follow from it. The Two Truths are not questioned by 
Mahay5na scholars within the tradition, and yet the principle is a complex one, and one 
that has no equivalent in Western philosophy. It links issues about levels of truth, about 
limits of thought, and about the possibility of metaphysics, and treats them together in a 
single framework. 5 Chisholm comes close to a type of 'two truths' framework insofar as 
he distinguishes types of truth. 6 He argues that what an entity is "in the strict and 
philosophical" sense is not identical to how it is understood in the "loose and popular" 
sense, and yet the two are not contradictory. Depending on which of these two senses is 
operating, an assertion such as "Mr Smith is not the person he used to be" has quite 
distinct meanings. As a mereological essentialist, he claims that it is impossible for a 
sSee Sprung (1973: 2). 
6See Person and Object by Roderick M. Chisholm, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1976, p. 108ff. Of 
related interest is the evaluation of his position in Loux (1998: 226ff. ). Chisholrrfs assertion is that truth, 
conditions and criteria depend on circumstance. The Buddhist principle of Two Truths is broader than this 
since it takes into account primarily the circumstance of the subject, that is, not only the truth criteria which 
the subject chooses to apply to the situation (e. g. commonsense or scientific) but also the subjecfs state of 
mind taken in a soteriological sense. 
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thing to remain the same through a change in its parts, and yet by virtue of this difference 
in types of truth, he maintains that this does not contradict the belief that, for example, the 
table I am now writing on is the same as the one I was writing on ten minutes ago. One 
might add to these two types of truth one or more scientific types of truth, so that it is not 
contradictory to say that (a) the table I am writing on is a combination of atoms and mole- 
cules and (b) the table I am writing on is made of wood and metal. However, the Two 
Truths in Buddhism concem more than types of truth, largely because the highest ultimate 
truth effectively sets the standard from which all other levels of truth are evaluated. And 
in Buddhism, such a criterion is only possible because the soteriological process of 
mental transformation is possible; without this, ultimate knowledge of the nature of things 
' that is, of things just as they are-would be beyond human reach. 
We should therefore be aware that of all the topics examined so far, the Two Truths arc 
the most difficult from a hermeneutical point of view. They do not fit neatly into the 
pigeonholes of metaphysics, epistemology, soteriology, theology or the study of 
mysticism. In fact they bring all these domains together in a way that is foreign to the 
Western tradition of thinking, and hence difficult to grasp. 7 Since it is said that complete 
understanding of the Two Truths is only gained through the perfect stabilisation of medi- 
tational equipoise, the analysis I make here can only be a modest and inadequate contri- 
bution to the subject. 
Although the principle of the Two Truths is philosophically radical from a Western view- 
point, on analysis we find that as a philosophical claim it is problematic. And so funda- 
mental is it to Mahdy5na Buddhism that any criticism of it will necessarily entail serious 
7Rupert Gethin (2001: 1-6) has a useful discussion of this issue. He is faced with similar problems in exa- 
mining the Abhidharma account of how one progresses from ordinarY experience to transcendental 
experience. 
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criticism of ýRntarakýita's entire system. In the process of assessing the principle, we pro- 
pose to show that Mi pham's unique re-evaluation of the doctrine, which was inspired by 
the MAL, is perhaps the only way of ensuring that the Two Truths are philosophically 
tenable. 
IX. 1.2 The criteria for distinguishing the Two Truths 
One of the most significant divergences in interpretation between dGe lugs pa and rNying 
ma pa schools of Buddhism is that which concerns the basis upon which each school dis- 
tinguishes between ultimate and relative truth. 8 For dGe lugs pas, the distinction is made 
on the basis of the object of knowledge (shes bya; jileya)ý Appearances are the object of 
knowledge in relative truth, while emptiness is the object of knowledge in ultimate truth., 
So the two truths are two types of things that we can know, and that we should aspire to 
know; they are both truths that are knowable and accessible to human understanding. 
They arc not two types of viewpoint or perspective on the world, nor are they different 
levels of reality. Paradoxically, neither are they two different types of truth! They are 
existents which is equivalent to saying they are objects of knowledge (shes bya). 
On the basis of this definition, mKhas grub's argument above is quite clear. To talk of the 
"conjunction of appearance and emptiness" is to blur what are two fundamental doctrinal, 
categories. Since appearance is relative and emptiness is ultimate, any conjunction of the . 
two is highly questionable in principle; but were there such a thing, it could not rightly be 
called ultimate (as ýantarakýita is claimed to do) because it is connected with the relative. 
Strictly speaking, it cannot be called relative either, but this is deemed the only acceptable 
option in the circumstances. 
Tor a detailed analysis of this divergence, see Pettit (1999: 101-133). 
9Newland (1999: 14). The following points on the dGe lugs position follow Newland closely. 
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The rNying ma understanding is quite different. Dudjorn Rinpochelo for example, makes 
a distinction between Outer Madhyamaka, which includes both Pr5safigika and SvRan- 
trika. systems, and Great Madhyamaka, a more subtle and inner Madhyamaka. " During 
meditative absorption there is no difference between them; both realize the cessation of 
all elaborate signs of subject-object dichotomy. But in meditational aftermath, the Outer 
Madhyamaka classifies the two truths by ascribing emptiness to the ultimate and appear- 
ances to the relative, while Great Madhyamaka determines the two truths according to 
whether abiding and apparitional natures are in harmony or disharmony (gnas snang 
12 mthun mi mthun). The expanse of reality (dharmadlidtu, chos dbyings), which is the 
ultimate, is the union (zung jUg)13 of appearance and emptiness without contradiction. 
This absence of contradiction is due to the fact there is no essential difference between the 
dhannadhatu on the one hand and, on the other, pristine cognition and the buddha-body 
which are naturally present and unconditioned. Dudjorn Rinpoche (1991: 207) describes 
ultimate reality as follows: 
[It is] the continuum of the basis, the embodiment of indestructible reality, the 
great seal, the emptiness endowed with all supreme aspects, the mind in its 
natural state, the naturally present pristine cognition, and so forth. If known as 
such, no one can contradict that this reality is the conclusive definitive meaning. 
This presentation makes the difference between the two truths in terms of appearance and 
emptiness a relative distinction, carried out in post-meditation for the purposes of debate 
10sKyabs rje bDudJoms rin po che was the head of the rNying ma school of Tibetan Buddhism until his 
death in 1987. For ease of reference, the Westernised spelling of his name is used here since it is the name 
he himself used in publication, and is that which is found in the bibliography. 
I 'Dudjorn Rinpoche (1991: 169). Great Madhyamaka (dbu ma chen po) is also known as YogReAra-Madhya- 
maka, which should not be confused with YoglicAra-SvAtantrika. It integrates the views of both rang stong 
(all things are empty of their own inherent substantiality) and gzhan stong (all enlightened attributes are 
empty of extraneous-samsdlic-phenomena). Dudjom Rinpoche's explanation of the Two Truths is 
selected here because it summarizes clearly and simply many of the points previously put forward by Mi- 
pham and kLong chen pa. 
12ibid., p. 206. Mi pham asserts the same thing (V. p. 32). 
"'Union' is used in this study to translate zung jug (yuganaddha). Other scholars have variously translated it 
as 'unioW, 'Unity', 'coalescence' and 'inextricably relational functioning!. It means a joining together such that 
the original elements are unrecognizable as separate elements. It is not like the intertwining of white and 
black threads to make a rope, but is more like the merging of milk and water. 
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and writing treatises. In this respect, it is helpful to have an indication of where the dis- 
tinction is coming from. But if the ultimate is pervaded by gnosis (ye shes) 14 and non- 
duality of subject and object, it seems contradictory to differentiate appearance from 
emptiness. The Great Madhyamaka criterion helps to answer this objection, since for this 
latter view both appearance and emptiness are present simultaneously for every pheno- 
menon, and the difference between the two truths lies only in the relation between these 
two: whether appearances are in harmony with emptiness or not. This was also Mi pham's 
view. 15 Furthennore, the rNying ma presentation does not base the distinction between 
the two truths on the object of knowledge. The ultimate reality is not conceived 
as an object of knowledge at all, since its description includes "the mind in its natural 
state". The rNying ma perspective on this appears to contradict the Siftra passage in which 
the principle of the Two Truths is set out: 
This is how the Tathdgata understood the two truths, relative and ultimate. [All] 
objects of knowledge (shes bya) are included in the relative and ultimate [truths]. 
Furthermore, the Blessed One utterly saw, knew and realized them as emptiness. 
That is why he is called 'Omniscient. Of these [two truths], the Tathagata saw 
that relative Itruthl is the practice of the world, and ultimate [truth] is beyond 
words. 16 
It is on account of the fact that the ultimate is beyond discursive thought, and beyond any 
subject-object dichotomy, that rNying ma pas consider it absurd to call it an 'object! that 
can be known by a consciousness since that description follows the subject-object model. 
.I 
Indeed, insofar as there are two sets of criteria for the two-truth distinction, one based on 
cognition in meditation and the other in post-meditation, if anything it could be argued 
that the distinction is based on the state of mind of the perceiver rather than the object 
perceived. Within each of these meditational situations, what are understood as the two 
truths are not seen as radicaHy different from one another; they are not opposites, or con- 
14Depending on the context, I have translated ye shes either as 'gnDsis' Or as 'Primordial wisdord. IsSee Pettit (1999: 123) and also V. p. 32. 
16pitilputrasamagama s0ra (yab dang sras mjal ba'i mdo) P. zhi, 70a4-6. The Sanskrit fragments of this 
passage are incomplete. 
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tradictories, or mutually exclusive in any way. There is no sense that they are distinct 
existents. Objects and the minds that apprehend them are both pervaded by non-duality. 
This is possible because the ultimate nature of objects is no other than the ultimate nature 
of minds. 
Let us critique mKhas grub's appraisal of ýAntarakýita in the light of Dudjorn Rinpoche's 
explanation. First, mKhas grub is assuming that appearance and emptiness are two dis- 
tinct existents; and objects of knowledge, which Mi pharn and DudJorn Rinpoche do not. 
On the basis of this, he argues that their union must be relative not ultimate, these two 
j being mutually exclusive; while the rNying ma pas understand union (zung Yug) to indi- 
cate a reality where dichotomies, opposites, distinctions and differentiation no longer 
obtain. So in the rNying ma pa terminology, there is no contradiction involved in the 
union of appearance and emptiness. 
IX. 1.3 The relationship between relative and ultimate 
Mi pham. addresses the relationship between the two truths in Topic 5 of his Nges shes rin 
Iý7 po'che'i sgron me, translated by John Pettit (1999) as The Beacon of Certainty. ' Manyof 
the points he makes imply difficulties with the system of the Two Truths itself. We will 
draw these out after first noting what Mi pham has to say. His first point is that neither of 
the two truths is more important than the other-18 The ultimate cannot be established over 
and against the relative; rather their relation is that which pertains between method and 
17Mi pham develops his presentation of the two truths, and in particular of the two types of uitimate truth, 
in Topic 22 of the MKhas Yug. This was written over 20 years after his commentary on the MAL, and is an 
expansion of the views expressed in this commentary. For an annotated translation see The Conditioned and 
Unconditioned Chapter ofMi phwn rgya intsho's mKhas pai tshul la Yug pai sgo by Steven D. Goodman, 
M. A. thesis presented to the Department of Far Eastern Studies, University of Saskatoon, Canada, 1978. Of 
particular interest is Mi pham's assertion that the non-discursive ultimate is experientially realized (riogs 
pa) through so so rang rig. gzung'dzin med pa mam par mi rtogs paýi ye shes so so rang rig pas rtogs par 
bya ba ni mam grangs min paI don dam yin te/ p-353. 
"'Pettit (1999: 214ff). 
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result. 
Without depending on an entityfor examination, 
Its nonsubstantiality cannot be established- 
Therefore both substance and nonsubstance 
Are the same in being mere relativity. 19 
Firstly, emptiness can only be established in relation to a given phenomenon, it does not 
'exist' on its own. I can establish the emptiness of God, or of a person, or of aspects in 
perception, and so on, but I cannot establish emptiness in the abstract. Emptiness is the 
ultimate nature of appearance, and only by investigating appearances can we arrive at an 
understanding of their nature. But the implication of this, according to Mi pham, is that 
the two truths themselves are both relative in the sense that they are established in relation 
to each other, and by means of conventional language. This is significant. It means that 
the two truths are identified and established from a relative point of view, and not from an 
ultimate point of view since the latter is non-dual and free of discursive thought (vikalpa). 
It follows that what we term 'ultimate truthý-insofar as it is described as non-dual, free of 
discursive thought and so on-is defined as ultimate from a relative point of view. Strictly 
speaking, from the ultimate viewpoint there are no two truths. 
When the ultimate (dharmadh5tu) is taken as authority (pramana) there is neither 
relative truth (sarpvftisatya) nor ultimate truth (param5xffiasatya). 20 
And as Mi pham himself writes in his mKhas jug: 
Realizing that these two truths are, in the perfect sense, an indivisible equality is 21 thefinal meaning-the most eminent among all objects of realization. 
That is to say, the two truths are actually just a single truth from the ultimate point of 
view. It has therefore emerged that it is of paramount importance to state from which -- 
19Topic 5.2.1.1.2.1.2. Pettit (1999: 214) 
2OFrom the Arya-Dhannadhatuprak. riyasaipbhedanirdefasatra, cited at the beginning of Bhavya's Madhya- 
makaratnapradi-pa, translated in Lindtner (1981: 169). 
21mKhas jug 14.4: de gnyis yang dag paI don du zung 'jug mnyam pa nyid du rtogs pa ni rtogs. bya mams 
kyi nang na mchog tu gyur pa. mthar thug gi don no/ Text and translation in Gateway to Knowledge by 
Jamg6n Mipham Rinpoche, vol. H, p. 174. 
302 
I' 
point of view one is speaking when talking of the two truths, because even if the two 
truths themselves are not contradictories, the relative and ultimate points of view cannot 
be held simultaneously. One problem with the dGe lugs pa claim that the two truths are 
about different objects of knowledge is that this does not make clear from which stand- 
point the claim is being made. The issue is relevant, since all Buddhists accept there is a 
difference between the standpoint of an ordinary deluded being who takes appearances as 
truly existent, and the perspective of a buddha who realizes that the nature of all 
appearances is emptiness. 
Whether or not the Two Truths properly refer to different standpoints or points of view is 
an issue of much debate between Tibetan Buddhist schools. 22 In order to analyse the 
debate critically, it is useful to distinguish with Streng (1967: 17) between philosophical 
truths and religious truths. Philosophical truths arc about states of affairs, but religious 
truths are not only about states of affairs; they are able to transform a person's life in a 
radical sense. Eckel (1980: 48) accordingly distinguishes three structures of religious 
apprehension. 1) The mythical, where words are a manifestation of sacred reality; 2) the 
intuitive, where words point to sacred reality that cannot be expressed; and 3) the dialec- 
tical, where words bring insight by opposing misconceptions. Here, transformation is 
defined not by the reality to which words lead but by the illusions out of which they lead. 
So religious apprehension of sacred truth, defined as truth about the universe just as it is, 
is not simply an intellectual insight but an experience. In Buddhism, Bh5vaviveka des- 
22In contradistinction to Newland's definition of the dGe lugs pa position, given above, there are numerous 
passages in Indian Buddhist literature that indicate that the principle of the Two Truths concerns the pers- 
pective of the knower just as much as the type of object known. In BCA IX. 3 and 5, for instance, kntideva 
writes: "In the light of this, people are seen to be of two types: namely, the spiritually developed and the 
spiritually undeveloped. Of these, the world-view of the undeveloped is invalidated by the world-view of 
the spiritually developed. Ordinary people see existent things and also imagine them to be real, that is to say 
not as an illusion. It is in this regard that there is disagreement between the ordinary person and the spiri- 
tually developed. " Translation by Crosby and Skilton (1995: 115). Also, Bh5vaviveka's use of the qualifier 
paramdrthatah is evidence of the ultimate as a point of view. 
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cribes the Mahdydna goal of Anyatd as an experience rather than an absolute reality. 23 In, 
fact BhRvaviveka goes into some detail in identifying the precise stage of meditational 
equipoise in which danyad is apprehended. 24 He says it is when discursive ideas are 
stopped by insight into danyatJ that objects of designation cease, for a yogi who dwells in 
emptiness dwells in the signIessness. This is why the reason to use designation ceases too. 
Consequently, the activity of the mind ceases. The vision of reality (tattva dardana) is to 
see neither presence nor absence, but a correct understanding of the nature of things. 
From passages such as these, it is clear that what is meant by 'standpoint' or 'point of 
view' in connection with the Two Truths refers to the soteriological stage of the subject's 
mental development insofar as this functions as a criterion of truth. 
Mi pham then explains how he reconciles his assertion that the relative and ultimate are a 
union with the fact that the most eminent Buddhist authorities (like Ndgdduna) find it 
necessary to differentiate them. 
Since both entities and nonentities should both 
Be taken as basesfor establishing emptiness, 
All appearances are just designations 
And emptiness too is just a mental designation. 
Therefore appearance and emptiness 
Can each be conceived separately 
But infact they are never different. 
25 Therefore, they are called "coalescent" , Since the confidence of seeing the nature of things 
Does notfall to any extreme. 
Then he places the logical approach to emptiness (such as that put forward by mKhas 
grub) quite precisely within the broad soteriological context. 
In the perspective of the wisdom of authentic analysis 
Appearance and emptiness are considered to be 
A single essence with different aspects 
Nonetheless, for beginners 
23Eckel (1980: 50). Chapter 18 of the Prajfiapradi-pa makes this clear. For example, BhAvaviveka, writes 
(18.84) "emptiness, which is characterized by this complete quiescence of discursive ideas, is liberation" 
(transl. Eckel, 1980: 217). 
24The following description is taken from Eckers translation of Chapter 18 (Eckel, 1980: 223). 
25This is Pettit's rendering of zung jug. This passage is Topic 5.2.2.1.2.1.21-3, in Pettit (1999: 216). 
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They appear as negation and negandum; 
At that time they are not combined as one. 
When the nature of emptiness 
Arises as appearance, one attains confidence. 
Thus, everything is primordially empty, 
And these appearances are empty ( ... ) This is the meaning of cutting f misconceptions 
Through study and reflection. 2, 
Mi pham asserts that 'emptiness' is a concept and word just like 'appearance' or any other, 
andaccording to commonly accepted Buddhist principles, both appearances and emPti- 
ness are therefore just mental designations. 27 Neither exists inherently, either independ- 
ently or as a possible object of knowledge. Beginners on the path have to conceive of 
them separately as a pedagogical method for introducing them gradually to the non- 
28 affirmative negation of emptiness. This use of logic and reasoning is soteriologically 
necessary, and aims to cut off misconceptions such as 'inherent existence'. However, 
study and reflection must be complemented by the third 'wisdom tool' of meditation, and 
the culmination of this process is a non-dual gnosis of the ultimate, what Mi pham calls 'a 
confidence' that no longer needs the support of reasoning. In fact at the moment of gnosis, 
all methods whatsoever are abandoned. In philosophical terms, by combining logic, 
reflection and meditation on the concepts of 'appearance' and 'emptiness', one reaches an 
understanding of 'appearance and emptiness' that is both an experience of the union of the 
two and, at one and the same time, a transformation of one's own mind such that know- 
ledge is non-discursive. Mi pham's claim is that the Buddhist method takes one beyond 
the limits of rational knowledge and thereby leads to a gnosis that is impossible for the 
2ITopic 5.2.2.1.2.1.2.4-5.2.2.1.3 in Pettit (1999: 216). 
27See the discussion on the designated status of wholes and parts in Chapter V. It is noted there that dGe 
lugs pas put forward different definitions of what it means to be an existent or object of knowledge. 
28It has been widely noted in Buddhist treatises as well as in the research literature that one of the primary 
purposes of the Two Truth principle is a pedagogical one. See, for example, Lindtner (1981: 162); Sprung 
(1973: 46); Murti (1960: 253). Mi pharn also states in his mKhas Yug 14.1: '"Me buddhas have taught the two 
truths, the relative and the ultimate, for the sake of establishing [certainty about] the nature of knowable 
things. " yang sangs rgyas mams kyis shes byai rang bzhin gtan la dbab pSi phyir kun rdzob dang don dam 
pa! i bden pa gnyis su gsungs te/ In Gateway to Knowledge, vol. 11, p. 174. The idea can be traced back to 
NRg5rjuna's Yuktiýagika 21-23 (in Lindtner, 1982: 108-9). 
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rational mind . 
29SO if it is described at all, it cannot be characterized in terms that properly 
apply to the rational mind. 
Mi pham3o follows ýZintarakýita3l and Bhdvaviveka 32 in positing two different types of 
ultimate. 33 One is the definitive ultimate (don dam mtshan nyidpa) which is non- 
conceptual and realized by sublime beings (drya; ýphags pa) in meditative equipoise; this 
final, non-conceptual ultimate (aparydyaparamdrtha; main grangs ma yin pa 7 don dam) 
is the union (yuganaddha; zung jug) of appearance and emptiness understood by gnosis. 
As it is free of elaborations (niýprqpafica; spros brab it is beyond affmnation and nega- 
tion. The other type of ultimate is the conceptual ultimate (parydyaparamdrtha; rnam 
grangs pa 7 don dam) considered as a non-affirmative negation (prasqjyqpratiýedha; med 
dgag). It is called 'ultimate' only because it is in accord (mthun pa) with the ultimate. It is 
accessed by a "valid cognition investigating the conceptual ultimate" (don dam rnam 
grangs pai tha snyad dpyod pa'i tshad ma). For Mi pham, negations of this sort are a 
suitable way for beginners to conceptualize the ultimate; but because it relies on concep- 
tual formulae this type of ultimate does not represent the final ultimate that is free of 
elaboration. To assert that 'the ultimate is free of conceptual thought', for example, is a 
conceptual formulation in itself. It is adequate to emptiness as an object of discursive 
thought in the post-meditative state (p!; ýthalabdha; rjes thob) but not to the non-concep- 
tual gnosis of sublime equipoise (dryajildna; ýphags pa 7 ye shes). 
Although Mi pham's view may be surprising to those who have studied Madhyamaka 
through dGe lugs pa eyes, he asserts that the non-conceptual ultimate in the Yogdc5sa- 
29See also BCA IX. 2. 
30V. p. 37ff. 
3lMAL 70. 
32TarkajV, Ila, P. 27.5.7-28.1.1. 
33pettit (1999: 109-110). 
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Svdtantrika system is exactly the same as the ultimate accepted by the Pr5safigika 
Madhyamaka of Candraldrti. 
A person who, by means ofpractice connected with this [concordant ultimate] 
f may be called either Prd attains the experience of the ultimate truth in itsel 
safigika or Svitantrika and so on, depending on the way he [or she] makes or 
does not make assertions with regard to the post-meditation period. But one 
should know that in the ultimate realization there is no difference between them. 
They both come to have the wisdom of the Aryas. 34 
Finally, Mi pham emphasizes that a key difference between Pr5saAgikas and Sv5tantrikas 
: 35 is that the latter analyse relative phenomena whereas the former do not. This means that 
for Sv5tantrikas there are two kinds of valid reasoning: relative and absolute, each with 
different spheres of application. So for instance, valid reasoning on the relative level does 
not consider the question of whether phenomena exist externally or as mental pro- 
jections on the ultimate level; it merely assesses phenomena as they appear. It is crucial to 
be clear about this distinction, because according to Mi pham one of the chief PrAsaAgika 
criticisms of Sv5tantrika stems from a confusion about these two. 
But confusing the two kinds of reasoning [i. e. relative and ultimate] some people 
believe that to apply a tenet that investigates relative phenomena is incompatible 
with the Prasafigika view [because Prasatigikas] accept phenomena without 
analysis, according to general consensus. It should be said, however, that [in the 
context of logic applied on the relative level] it is acceptable to say that entities 
exist according to their characteristics, or that they are established by valid cog- 
nition and soforth. The important thing is to distinguish [i. e. not to confuse] the 
kind of valid cognition used in the assessment. Because if relative phenomena are 
assessedfrom the standpoint of ultimate valid cognition, they would not be even 
slightly established by this reasoning. They would be just like darkness that dis- 
appears in a bright light. [On the other hand] if the assessment is madefrom the 
point of view of relative valid cognition, phenomena are [on this level] established 
ineluctably and undeniably. Therefore, however much relative reasoning may be 
used to examine phenomena in accordance with their mode of appearance, this 
investigation will never become an ultimate examination. 36 
34V. p. 37. tshul'di Ita bu la bsgoms bas nyams myong gis sus reg kyang gang zag des rjes thob kyi khas len 
mdzad tshul la Itos te thal rang sogs ming ci btags kyang rung/ rtogs pal mtho dman rdul tsal med par 
'phags pal gzigs pa gnad gcig tubab pa shes par byaW 
35V. p. 26ff. 
36V. pp. 27-28. gang dag tshad ma gnyis kyis gzhal tshul bsra bsrer gyur te/ ma brtags ma dpyad pal snang 
tsam las dpyad pal grub mtha! zhig khas len na thal'gyur bal lugs dang ches 'gal snyam du sems par mi bya 
ste/ de yang'dir su zhig gis chos'di dag rang gi mtsan nyid kyis grub bam zhearn/ de'i ngo bo, tshad mas 
grub pa sogs gang yin kyang rung ste/ jal byed kyi tshad ma shan phyed pa gal che ste/ don dam pal tshad 
mal ngos nas gzhal ba yin na ni/ snang bai mdun na mun pa Itar de'i ngor nam yang mi'grub pas na tsang 
zad kyang grub pa gzhag tu med la/ tha snyad pal tshad mai ngos nas gzhal ba yin na ni/ de'i ngor bslu 
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It follows from Mi pham's view that if Svdtantrikas assert that appearances exist by way 
of their characteristics in relative truth, this has no bearing whatsoever on how they are -, 
viewed in ultimate truth. In other words, one can draw no implications at all from this in 
terms of the alleged true existence of phenomena by way of their characteristics. The two 
domains are conceptually distinct and must remain so if they are not to be confused. 
IX. 1.4 The union of the Two Truths 
Mi pham's formulation of the Two Truths aims to reconcile a number of difficult doctrinal 
points into a coherent picture. On the one hand there are statements in the Buddhist litera- 
ture which indicate that the ultimate truth is dependent origination (pratTlyasamutpada)37 
while on the other hand there are assertions that the ultimate truth is non-conceptual? 8 
There are assertions to the effect that the ultimate can only be realized in dependence 
upon a specific entity in relative truth, 39 while elsewhere the ultimate is held not to be 
dependent on anything. 40 And whilst certain passages state that in ultimate truth the 
Madhyamika does not hold any view (cksp), 41 other passages do seem to express what 
could be called'the ultimate Madhyamaka view'ý2 Every Tibetan tradition has tried to 
make sense of these various claims. It is argued here that Mi pham's general presentation 
is perhaps the only way of making the MAL's approach to the Two Truths a coherent one. 
The MAL harbours a potential problem that threatens to defeat kntaraksita's entire 
argument and render the treatise philosophically worthless. ýdntarakýita demonstrates that 
med bsnyon med du grub pas des tha snyad kyi snang tshul dang mthun par ji tsam dpyad kyang tshad mSi 
gzhung nas skye ba snga phyi sogs yod par sgrub pal dpyad pa la sogs pa ji Ita ba bzhin tu don dam dpyod 
byed du mi'grdo/ 
37MMK XXIV, 18 and 40. 
38BCA IX. 2; MMK (last line of dedicatory verses). 
39BCA IX. 139. 
40MMK XXV. 12. 
41MMK XXVH. 30; YS 50. 
42NMK. I. I. 
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every possible object of knowledge (shes bya) is neither unitary nor therefore made of 
multiple units; nothing is either one or many. But the one thing that he has not applied his 
argument to is the Two Truths. He builds his discussion on the Mah5y5na framework of 
there being two truths, which means 2xI truth. He does not question his metalogical 
assumptions. And this is philosophically serious, because if truth is one, and there are two 
ones, then an opponent could claim that 'truth' (bden pa) is merely the Buddhist term for 
the absolute reality that Buddhism so ostensibly and persistently denies. Indeed, while 
some scholars such Bumouf and the early De La Vall6e Poussin have understood the 
Buddhist ultimate as nihilistic, others like Stcherbatsky have taken it to be a veiled 
affirmation of an Absolute Reality that cannot be describedý3 If any positive ontological 
status is given to the highest ultimate, then Buddhism would be no different than Vedanta. 
There are two ways in which Madhyamikas defend themselves against an objection of 
this sort. The first is to say that the ultimate, namely emptiness (ianyatd), is itself empty. 
All Mahdy5na classifications of the different types of emptiness include 'the emptiness of 
emptiness'. 44 This is considered important to prevent the practitioner's attachment to the 
view of emptiness. So in this way, MAdhyamikas have explicitly stated that they do not 
posit the ultimate truth as a 'truly' existing truth; and in ýAntarakýita's terminology, this 
means that ultimate truth is not unitary. A second Madhyamaka defence can be found in 
Mg, Rjuna's VigrahavydvartanTXXI-XXIV, where it is argued that even truthful Buddhist 
doctrinal discourse is empty of svabhjvaý5 That is to say, neither the view of emptiness 
43See the Introduction to A Question ofNihilism: Advaviveka's Response to the Fundamental Problems of 
Madhyamaka Philosophy, by Malcohn Eckel (1980), which contains an overview of the different views of 
the Buddhist ultimate in Western scholarship, and the question of what ontological status is attributed to it. 
Of interest too is Edward Conze's "Ibe Ontology of the PrajMparamitNin PEW IH. 2 (1953), pp. 117-129. 
44This is found in the Praifidparamita Satra in 25,000 Verses, and in the Madhyamakdvatara, for example. 
See also the Mah5vyutpatti verse XXXVII, 1- 18; and Sa)pdhinirmocana satra, VH1, p. 190- 1. The latter 
reads: mtshan ma de'i gnyen po stong pa nyid de nyid yid la byed pa! i stong pa nyid kyi mtshan ma gang yin 
pa de stong pa nyid stong pa nyid kyis mam par sel lo/ 
41577ie Dialectical Method ofNdgarjuna (Vigrahavyavartanr), transl. K. Bhattacharya, eds. E. H. Johnston 
and Arnold Kunst, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, pp. 17-19. 
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nor discourse on emptiness, should be understood as having an inherently existing and 
absolute nature. In connection with the Sv5tantrikas, therefore, this principle is significant 
in that it indicates that the concordant ultimate is empty. 
Mi pham's idea of the union of the two truths also safeguards the validity of the MAL. 
Especially so as the union (zung jug) to which he refers is beyond conceptuality and 
differentiation, and hence beyond enumeration. This means that the oneness etymo- 
logically implied by the English word'union'here does not refer to the number one as the 
first in a series; it is not a 'unit', it is an ineffable coming-together. (The Tibetan zung jug 
does not have any arithmetical connotation. ) For Madhyamaka to be coherent, the two 
truths themselves must be empty (stong pa). They cannot be real categories overarching 
the knowable, like the paddriha-s of the Vai9qikas. And if the two truths are empty, this 
means they do not exist ultimately and exist only in relative truth. This is in fact exactly 
what Mi pham maintains, namely that both relative and ultimate are relatively established, 
which is why the conceptual ultimate must be distinguished from the experience of non- 
dual gnosis. This is also what Dudjom Rinpoche suggests when he says that in meditation 
there is no differentiation between the two truths, and this occurs only in post-meditation. 
It will be argued that this rNying ma view is consistent with dGe lugs pa Prasaiagika, that 
is, with what came to be seen by many in Tibet as orthodox Madhyamaka. 
IX. 2 The Two Truths in the MAL 
IX. 2.1 The MAL verses 
ýantarakýita sets out his approach to the Two Truths in the following verses: 
[63] Therefore these entities are held to be characterized only by relative 
[truth]. If you [still] maintain that they are actual selves then what can I say? de phyir dngos po 'di dag nill kun rdzob kho nai mtshan nyid 'dzinll 
gal te Vi Mae don 'dod na// de la kho bos ci zhig byall 
46Ichig6's critical edition of this line has 'dag'for'bdag'. According to Mi phanfs commentary on this verse 
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[641 One should understand that the nature of relative truth is (1) that which 
is delightful47 only as long as it is not investigated critically, (2) that which is 
subject to arising and decay, and (3) that which has causal efficiency. 
ma brtags gcig pu nyams dga'zhingll skye dang jig pa 7 chos can pall 
don byedpa dag nus mams k-yill rang bzhin kun rdzob pa yin rtogsll 
[65] Even that which is agreeable and acceptable as long as it is not 
investigated critically implies the production of similar successive effects 
conditioned by their own successive causes. 
brtags pa ma byas nyams dga'baangll bdag rgyu snga ma snga ma lall 
brten nas phyi ma phyi ma yLllbras bu de 'dra 'byung ba yinll 
[661 Therefore [for an opponent to say] -ir relative [existence] has no [truly 
existing] cause, it could not exist [at all] "-that won't do. If there is a truly 
existing [cause] that expropriates [the relative], tell [me] what it is! 
V4 de phyir kun rdzob rgyu med nall rung min zhes paang legs ma yinl, 8 
gal te 'di yi nyer len pallyang dag yin na de smros shig1l 
[671 We reject the intrinsic nature of all entities postulated by those among 
our opponents who follow the way of logic. Therefore there is nothing to be 
refuted [in our system]. 
dngos po kun gyi rang bzhin nill rigs pai lam gyi rjes 'brang ball 
gzhan dag 'dod pa sel bar byed1l de phyir rgol ba 7 gnas med doll 
[68] Even with the greatest effort, it is not possible to criticize in any way 
someone [like myself] who admits neither existence, nor non-existence, nor 
both existence and non-existence. 
yod dang med dang yod med cesll khas mi len pa gang yin pall 
de la nan tan Idan pas kyang1l cir yang Han ka bya mi nusll 
[69] Therefore, ultimately there is no entity that can be established in reality. 
Because of that, the Tathfigatas taught the non-production of all dharma-s. 
de phyir yang dang nyid du nall dngos po gang yang grub pa medll 
de phyir de bzhin gshes rnams kyisll chos rnams thams cad ma skyes gsungsll 
[70] Some say that [non-production] is the highest truth since it is in accord 
with the highest truth. But in my view, the highest truth is that which is 
completely free of all [conceptual] elaboration. 
dam pa7 don dang 'thun pa7 phyirll'di ni dam pai don zhes byall 
yang dag tu na spros pa yill tshogs rnams kun las de grol yin: 11 
[841 Since causal relation is not denied in relative truth, there is no confusion 
as to the distinction between defilement and purification, and so on. 
rgyu dang 'bras bu 7 dngos po 611 kun rdzob tu ni mi bzlog pasll 
(C. p. 31 1) dag used as a plural particle is found in inaccurate editions, and bdag is the correct version. So 
rather than reading 'if these are held to exist ultimately' the line should read 'if these are held to be actual 
selves'. 
47 Mi pham points out that when ýAntaraksita defines the relative as 'delightful', he does not intend to ex- 
clude those things which frighten or horrify us. He is referring to all those phenomena that 'delighV the con- 
sciousness by seducing it and eliciting attachment. Delight is broader than pleasurable sensation. 
4"Ichig6's transliteration of this Tibetan verse has omitted the negative in the second line, which has 
naturally impacted on his translation. I am indebted to John Pettit for my understanding of this verse. 
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kun nas nyon mongs rnam byang sogsll rnam par gzhag pa 'khrugs pa medll 
[851 Indeed, since the law of causation has been established, it is also possible 
in our system to gather the pure accumulations [of merit and wisdom]. 
'di Itar rgyu dang 'bras bu yill chos 'di rnam par gzhag pas nall 
tshogs rnams dri ma med pa yang1l gzung 'di nyid la rung ba yin: 11 
[91] That which is cause and effect is nothing but mind-only. It is established 
that knowledge is that which is self-validated. 
rgyu dang 'bras bur gyur pa yangll shes pa 'ba zhig kho na stell 
rang gis grub ba gang yin pall de ni shes par gnas pa yinll 
[92] Based on the standpoint of Cittam5tra, one must know that external 
entities do not [truly] exist. Based on this standpoint [i. e. of the non-intrinsic 
nature of all dhanna-sl one must know that there is no self at all even in that 
[i. e. in Cittamfitra]. 
sems tsam la ni brten nas sullphyi rol dngos med shes par byall 
tshul 'dir Men nas de la yang1l shin tu bdag med shes par byall 
IX. 2.2 Relative truth 
In distinguishing the two truths, Madhyamikas make use of two means of evaluation: 
reasoning which evaluates from the ultimate point of view (don dam dpyod byed kyi tshad 
ma) and reasoning which operates on the level of conventions (tha snyad dpyod byed kyi 
tshad ma) . 
49 Everyone in the Tibetan tradition would agree that Madhyamikas, in general, 
employ the first, while Abhidharma and the logicians employ the second. 
50 In the light of 
these distinctions, we can see that ýdntarak§ita's definition of relative truth is strongly 
influenced by the logicians. When he characterizes the relative as causally efficient, he is 
primarily following Dharmakirti5l who also influenced Ridnagarblia. 
52 However, he is 
49See Lipman (1992: 27-8). 
50ibid. 
5IIn PV 111.2 and 3, DharmakIrti defines a thing (vastu; dngos po) as that which is capable of performing a 
function (arthakriyZismnartha; don byed nus pa). Dreyfus (1997: 66-7 ff. ) discusses the ambiguity and ten- 
sion in the way the term arthakriya is used by Dharmakliti. It has both ontological and epistemological 
meanings. According to the former, causal efficiency is a criterion of the ultimately real (PV 111.3a: artha- 
kriy5samartham yat tad atra pararti-arthasat), in line with Dharmaldas Sautr5ntika view that things exist 
independently of the observer. According to the latter, causal efficiency is the criterion which distinguishes 
valid knowledge from invalid knowledge. The latter sense is derived from the former, for only on the basis 
of their inherent causal capacity can objects fulfil such a function. This ambiguity is a function of his 
dualistic system involving the real-perceptual and the constructed-conceptual. Causal efficiency also 
differentiates specifically characterized phenomena (svalakfaýia; rang mtshan) from generally characterized 
phenomena (s&ni2nayaIak4a! ta; spyi mtshan) or universals (sdmdnaya; spyi). Ibe question is whether 
ý&itarak§ita is able to use the epistemological definition as a characteristic of his (true) relative truth with- 
out the ontological entailment of the former definition. The status of mtshan is ambiguous. 
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closer to Ridnagafta's interpretation of arthakriya than to Dharmakirti's for he unambi- 
guously uses it as a characteristic of the relative. It should follow that even the charac- 
teristics (mtshan) of relative phenomena are relative, and not truly existing as dGe 
lugs pas believe they are in Svdtantrika. We will note Mi pham's commentary on this 
point below. 
When ýdntarakýita defines the relative as "that which is acceptable when not investigated 
critically", it would be easy to think that he is following the Madhyamaka approach of 
PrAsafigika. scholars in the line of CandrakIrti who accept the unanalysed worldly view as 
the relative truth. 53 Candrakirti did not apply his own criterion of truth to assess what con- 
stitues true and false relative truth. For him, both are simply a function of what is con- 
ventionally accepted in the world. If most people think the Earth is flat, then in his system 
that would count as true relative truth. The Prdsafigika-Madhyamika would not judge its 
truth value in any way. But for a SvRantrika such as ýdntarakýita, the relative is always 
analysed. The use of Cittamatra as an account of the relative is an approach based on 
philosophical constructs above and beyond the worldly transactional analysis of ordinary 
people. So instead, when ýdntarakýita accepts appearances as long as they are not invcsti- 
gated critically, he means that they should not be investigated with logic investigating the 
ultimate. So his point is that even though phenomena do not truly exist, they appear, and 
the relative is about making sense of our experience of those appearances (MALV 64). 
Mi pham. points out the implications of ýZintarakýita's definition. 
52SDV 12: 'True and false relative [truth] are similar in appearance, but they are distinguished by their 
ability or inability to produce effective action. " snang du'dra yang don byed dag// nus paI phyir dang mi 
nus phyir// yang, dag yang dag ma yin pas// kun rdzob kyi ni dbye ba byas// For JfiAnagarbha, causal effi- 
ciency is unambiguously characteristic of the relative because both the entity and the causal action are 
empty. The distinction between true and false is therefore based on appearances and common consent. 
53In MAV VI. 25, Candraldrti writes: "What the world considers to be perceived by the six unimpaired senses 
is true from the worldly point of view; everything else is false from the worldly point of view. " gnod pa 
med PaI dbang po drug mams kyis// bzung ba gang zhig 'jig rten gyis rtogs te//jig rten nyid la bden yin 
Ihag ma ni//jig rten nyid las log par marn par gzhag// 
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The essence of the relative is mere appearance, empty of truth. If this were [some- 
thing that was] established the way it appears it would not be relative and 
similarly there would not then be [anything] ultimate either. The relative here 
[designates] solely that [which appears] without being established in the Way it 
appears, and by this very [definition] the ultimate has been established as well. 
Since all phenomena are devoid of nature ultimately and arefree of being unitary 
or multiple, these mere appearances are characterized as relative. 
54 
By defining the relative as that which is not rationally established, 8dntarakýita automa- 
tically implies that anything that existed ultimately would be rationally established. Rela- 
tive and ultimate are defined in relation and in opposition to each other. This verse sums 
up the conclusion of all the arguments in verses 2-62: no phenomenon can be rationally 
established as truly existent, therefore all phenomena are relative and not ultimate. But the 
link between the ultimate and rational establishment is problematic, because at the same 
time the ultimate is held to be non-conceptual. Even if we leave this obvious paradox to 
one side and accept that we are actually talking about the concordant ultimate here rather 
than the highest ultimate, ý5ntarakýita's view would be as follows: (1) for x to be truly 
established, x must be rationally established; (2) the reasoning that establishes true 
existence belongs to the concordant ultimate; (3) the concordant ultimate is inherently 
rational but the highest ultimate is totally non-discursive. So what precisely is the 
relationship between the concordant ultimate and the non-discursive ultimate? And 
between reason and non-conceptual gnosis? 
8Rntarak§ita goes on to define relative truth in terms of impermanence and causal 
efficiency. Mi pham's commentary explains what is meant here by impermanence at great 
length . 
55 His explanation is based on verse 65 where kntarak§ita makes it clear he is 
54C. p. 312. snang tsam. bden pas stong pa'di kun rdzob kyi ngo bo yin la/ gal te'di snang ba Itar grub pa, 
zhig na ni'di kun rdzob ma. yin la/ de ltar na don dam yang med par, gyur 7hing/'dir snang yang de Itar ma 
grub pa kho, na yin pas'di kun rdzob yin la de ltar na don dam pa! ang de nyid kyis grub pa yin pa dang/ chos 
thams, cad gcig dang du mar bral bai don dam par rang bzhin med pa dei phyir/ snang tsarn'di la kun rdwb 
kyj mtshan nyid thob par gyur ba yin pas/ 
551bis part of his commentary is an instance where he goes into great detail on a topic which was an issue 
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talking about entities that exist from moment (kýaýza; skad cig) to moment, and that are 
produced from causes that are similarly momentary. Impermanence goes hand in hand 
with the third definitional characteristic of causal efficiency in the sense that both together 
serve to define dependent origination (pratrtyasamutpida; rten 'byung) as a characteristic 
of relative phenomena. Mi pharn asserts that no other theory of causality is meant here, 
that is, no causation that involves truly existing, substantial causes and/or effectS. 56 In fact 
verse 66 of the MAL states that in ý5ntarakýita's definition of the relative there are no 
truly' existing causes. Dependent origination is a way of accounting for causality in the 
case of entities that do not inherently exist. 
85ntarak§ita does not distinguish in the MAL between true and false relative truth. 57 One 
might object that his principle of causal efficiency implies that anything held to exist that 
is devoid of causal efficiency does not fit into the definition of relative and must belong 
to some third category. Take the difference between water and a mirage: while water can 
effectively quench one's thirst a mirage cannot; lacking in causal efficiency, the mirage 
would therefore be neither relative nor ultimate. According to Mi pham, although there is 
nothing wrong in distinguishing true and false relative truths in relative truth, the reason 
that kntarakýita does not do so is because he investigates the relative from the point of 
for him, though it was not an issue for gantarak§ita. Mi pham's arguments are intended to counter dGe lugs 
pa interpretations regarding the permanence of phenomena, and he cites numerous scriptural passages in his 
defence. He then extends his polemics from impermanence to the dGe lugs pa notion that absence and nega- 
tion are existents. Mi phanys arguments against the dGe lugs pas warrant separate philosophical appraisal. It 
is interesting to note how Mi pharn effectively uses the MAL as one of the sources for his own views. 
51C. p. 317. 
570n the basis of dKon mchog 'jigs med dbang, po's Precious Garland of Tenets, Shotaro Iida (1973: 66) 
asserts that gAntaralqita (like Bh5vaviveka) distinguishes true (tathyasamyrn) and false relative truth 
(mithAsavKrO. However Ichig6 (1985: LXII-LXIH) disagrees. ý5ntaraisita makes no such distinction in 
the MAL, and Ichig6 therefore states that for gdntaraksita samyrd always refers to tathydsaýnyrti. Although 
it is correct that no such distinction is made in the body text ýf ihe MAL, there is a similar type of distinc- 
tion in the vmi where gintaralq. ita refers to authentic relative truth. MALV 64: skye ba med la sogs paang 
yang dag pa! i kun rdzob tu togs pa yin du zin kyang zhes gsungs pa! i phyir/ 
However, bLo gsal's grub mtha'(XII. 2ab) allows for exceptions to the general rule that Svatantrikas dis- 
tinguish true and false relative, and although kntarakýita is not named he would fit this category. mal'byor 
spyod pa'i dbu ma pag zhig la'di dag kyang yang dag pa1 kun rdzob yin no// "For certain YogAcira- 
MAdhyamikas, even these [appearances, i. e. floating hairs and double moons] are true relative [truth]. " See 
Mimaki (1982: 142-3). 
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view of valid cognition, primarily Mowing Dharmaki-ni. it follows that entities that are 
not causal. ly efficient are simply non-existent. 
So ýAntaraks. ita adopts Cittamatra in relative truth insofar as he follows its account of the 
functioning of mere appearances but he does not adopt the Cittam5tra model of causation. 
Is this problematic? What does it mean in terms of the statement in verse 91 that his 
system follows Cittamatra in relative truth? Is it in fact the case that he follows only 
selected parts of Cittamatra in relative truth? And if so, on what basis is that selection 
made? Were the selection to be made from a Madhyamaka perspective, do we not have a 
case of defining relative truth from the point of view of ultimate truth, and thereby not 
unifying but muddling the two truths? 
First, we should set out precisely what kntarak§ita takes from Cittamatra. In verse 66, he 
indicates that he does not accept any Cittamatrin position that posits a truly existing cause 
and that justifies this view on the grounds that without such a cause it is impossible to 
account for causation or appearances at all. This means, for example, that kntarakýita 
does not accept any Nirdkaravddin position that asserts a truly existing consciousness. In 
verse 79, he accepts the CittamAtra theory which holds that mistaken ideas like lexistence' 
and 'non-existence' are caused by karmic seeds that have existed in our mental continua 
since beginningless time. In verse 80, he also reminds us that he rejects the existence of 
external entities, and any theory of causation involving external entities. However, ýdnta- 
rakýita does not espouse an extreme immaterialist form of idealism such as that of 
Dharmap5la '58 because in verse 81 he argues that ideas arise from dependent origination 
5gDharmap5la! s thinking is described as an extreme form of immaterialist idealism by niKhan chen Pad ma 
shes rab. To evaluate this view one must consider that Dharmap5la! s enterprise aimed at a synthesis of 
YogAcAra and Madhyamaka. He attempted to bring together the Two Truths of Madhyarnaka with the Three 
Natures of YogAc5ra. He distinguished the Two Truths on the basis of discursiveness/non-discursiveness 
and then ascribed parikalpita and paratantra to the relative and pafiniýpanna to the ultimate. Thus Dharma- 
pala extended the CinamRtrin three aspects of mind to three categories that embrace all phenomena: the 
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affecting the mind, while in verse 82 he allows for material phenomena to arise from the 
successively preceding moments of their own continua, like a sprout from a seed. So 
mental and material phenomena arise through dependent origination from their own 
respective species. But this does not entail a hidden assumption that matter and mind 
are truly existing categories that ovcrarch the real: neither material phenomena nor mental 
phenomena exist inherently, neither do their categories. Mind and matter are conceptual 
designations and exist on the relative level in teims of distinct types of causal efficiency 
and so on, but they are not posited as ultimate: in this respect, kntarakýita's view is a 
classic Madhyamaka view. So when he indicates in verse 79 that the empirical world 
arises from karmic propensities, perhaps for ý5ntarakýita this means that phenomena are 
validly posited as the 'crystallization' or 'deposit' of the mind (Hog pai zhag pai tse grub) 
which would point to dependent origination. 59 
On reflection, it should come as no surprise (despite the comments made by Mi pharn and 
noted in Chapter VIM that kntarakýita does not import the entire Cittamatra tenet system 
wholesale in relative truth. If he did, that would imply that the mind is accepted as an 
absolute from the relative point of view! This would make no sense and would make a 
mockery of the Two Truths framework. Indeed, this is one of the downfalls of Dharma- 
p5la's synthesis. Instead, ýdntar*ita takes the Cittam5tra description of empirical reality 
and uses it as his own description of the relative, but excludes from it any ontological 
commitments that were embedded within it. This means, fundamentally, that he replaces 
assumption here is that all phenomena are entirely mental in nature. See Keenan, p. 122; 249b28, Dharma- 
pMa! s commentary to A ryadevaýs CS, chapter XVI. 
, His synthesis is problematic. It makes it difficult to account for the validity of language, a principle that 
Dharmapala upholds; and it ignores the Cittam&trin tenet that while the patikalpita does not exist and is 
illusory, the constructing activity of paratantra does exist. The status of paratantra within relative truth is 
therefore unclear. gantaralqita's own synthesis adopts a quite different approach that avoids these particular 
pitfalls. 
5Me idea that the empirical world arises from karmic propensities is not specifically Cittarn5trin or idealist. 
It can be interpreted in the light of any Buddhist philosophy and is found, for example, in Abhidharmakoda 
ch. 4.1 a. 
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its model of causation (where there are truly existing causes that produce effects) with the 
Madhyamaka equivalent, namely dependent origination. This is a vital point, because if 
causal efficiency is one of the defining characteristics of the relative, and the relative is 
held to follow Cittamatra, it is essential to know that kntaraksita's system actually under- 
stands causation according to Madhyamaka. '60 
But the very fact that ýdntarakýita made this substitution in causal theories shows that he 
is defining the relative from an ultimate standpoint. For within the sole domain of the 
relative, what can the criteria of ontological truth ever be? As soon as the relative 
involves valid cognition and degrees of truth (his soteriological hierarchy of philosophical 
views illustrates that he believed there was a way of assessing degrees of truth), it nece- ., 
ssarily blurs the boundaries between the two truths. Similarly, the fact that ýdntaraksita 
posits two types of ultimate truth further blurs the distinction between the two truths since 
the concordant ultimate is in fact only relatively ultimate! One can sympathize with those 
who might want to reject his approach. But in the end, the big question is whether it is 
ever possible for a Buddhist philosopher of any persuasion to resolve the matter any, 
better than this. In other words, is it kntarakýita's approach that is faulty, or is it the 
framework of the Two Truths itself? 
There is a further problem with gantarakýita's acceptance of dependent origination in 
relative truth. His position is at odds with that of BhRvavivcka who asserts that pratTt a- y 
61 2 
samutpida is ultimate truth and not relative truth. In his TarkajVgjd6 he distinguishes 
the highest ultimate (paramdrthasatya) from the concordant ultimate (sdthketikapara- - 
6071his may justify Mi pharifs assertion that gdntarakýita accepts the Wayavijilana. If he does, he would be 
stripping the concept of its ontological commitments and accepting it as a non-inherently existing factor 
within dependent origination. Defiried in this way, it becomes acceptable to a MAdhyamika. 
6'Ichig6 (1985: LXXXVII-XC). 
62P. 640-8. See Ejima (1980: 24-25). 
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marthasatya), respectively the truth that can be attained without conscious effort (mngon 
par 'du byed pa med par jug pa) and that which is attained by conscious effort (mngon 
par 'du byed pa dang bcas par jug pa). In the latter category he places non-conceptual 
knowledge, the teaching of dependent origination, and wisdom acquired through listening 
-63 study and meditation. These three are also called tathydsanivrv. Similarly, KamalaMa 
includes dependent origination within the concordant ultimatc. 64 So why does AAnta- 
rakýita characterize dependent origination as relative? 
In verse 71 of the MAL, kntarakýita defines non-production (skye ba medpa; anutpida) 
as the concordant ultimate. His view is that non-production is asserted in concordant 
ultimate truth while production (in the form of prairtyasamutpida) is asserted in relative 
truth. 65 So, for example, in relative truth t5ntarakýita might say that my fear of spiders is 
produced by certain karmic seeds that have been dwelling in my mental continuum since 
beginningless time, whereas in ultimate truth he would say that neither spiders, nor 
karmic seeds, nor my fear, nor my mental continuum inherently exist. However, it can be 
objected that 95ntarakýita's definition of relative truth is defcctive, bccausc it is not in 
accord with the passage in the A4ayamatinirdeda Si7tra defining relative truth and which 
he himself cites in the yrtti (MALV 64). 66 
What, then, is relative truth? It is all the conventional designations of the world, 
and [all] that which is explained by words, language and signs. What is the 
ultimate truth? It is the stage where there is no activity of mind, not to mention of 
words. 67 
kntarakýita connects his definition to the first part of this salra passage, but never 
addresses the question of the second. Tbus in hisipti on the same verse, he writes: 
63P. 58b2-3. 
64Bhavanakrwna 1. p. 199,7-9. 
65See Ichig6 (1985: LX-XCVII) for a detailed discussion of this view and its antecedents. 
661chig6 (1985: 204). Ak4ayamatinirdeja Satra P [34153.5.1-2. 
67de la kun rdzob kyi bden pa gang zhe na/jig rten gyi tha snyad ji snyed pa dang/ yi ge dang skad dang 
brda, bstan pa dag gol/ don dam paI bden pa ni gang la scms kyi rgyu ba yang med na yi ge mams Ita ci 
smos... 
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"Relative conventions" refer to the world of sentient and inanimate beings, it is 
concerned with the experiencer and the experienced since it includes the success 
ful performance of human actionS. 68 
Kamalani a counters this weakness by developing his category of false relative truth 
which he associates with ordinary verbal conventions that do not have as their objects any 
of the characteristics of those things which arise by dependent origination. 69 This includes 
not only perceived entities that are considered to exist inherently, but also words that 
designate universals as their objects, because universals are non-existent in this systemAn 
conclusion, then, there is no clear agreement between Svdtantrikas about the status of 
dependent origination because they have divergent definitions of what relative truth is. 
Finally, we need to consider the issue of characteristics as markers of phenomena in rela- 
tive truth. We noted in Chapter V. 6 above that according to dGe lugs pa doxographers, 
SvAtantrika is defined as a system that asserts inherent existence (rang bzhin gyis grUb 
pa), existence 'from its own side' (rang ngos nas grub pa) and existence by way of own 
character (rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub pa) in relative truth. Are there indications in the' 
MAL that this was indeed giintaraksita's viewpoint? If we define inherent existence ''' as a 
synonym of true existence (bden pa yod pa), then it is clear that gdntaraksita rejects the 
inherent existence of the relative insofar as he solely accepts mere appearances ansing in 
dependent origination. 
On the evidence of aH the arguments that gdntarakýita has put forward in the course of the 
MAL, Mi pham does not accept that his system asserts any form of true existence, either 
in relative truth or in ultimate truth . 
70 He holds simply that as a SvAtantrika, kntarakýita 
68MALV 64: serns can dang snod kyi bdag nyid kyijig rten myong bar bya ba dang myong bal ngo, bo'i' 
tshul'dir 'jig rten gyi tha snyad du dgongs pa ste/ byed p4 sgrub pa yongs su bzung bal phyir ro/ P. 68b6-7. 69MALP 64: 'on te rten cing 'brel par 'bung ba don bya ba byed pa gnag rdzi yan chad la shin tu grags pa de 
nyid brdal dbang gis kun rdwb kyi sgrar brjod. ces bya ba rtog pa gnyis so// Ichig6 (1985: 203). P. 121 al -3. 
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asserts that things exist relatively according to their characteristics without any ontologi- 
cal commitment. In fact, any assertion of true existence propuly belongs to statements 
about the ultimate, not the relative. 
The [Prisatigikal texts refute true existence, existence according to characteris- 
tics and soforth indiscriminately. But when one makes a distinction between these 
Iterms as Svdiantrikas do], it is important in order not to confuse people to distin- 
guish the targets at which these two kinds of reasoning are directed. Zf this is not 
done, and if one tries to establish a tenet simply on the strength of verbalformula- 
tions, one will only tire oneself. Therefore in post meditation, when the Itwo 
truths] are differentiated, one must establish without confusion the two types of 
reasoning that assess them. If onefails to distinguish reasoning [that establishes] 
the relativefrom reasoning [that establishes] the ultimate, to say that one enters 
the Mahdydna and attains enlightenment would be the same as saying that 
enlightenment exists ultimately. 
( .. ) However, it should be understood that in this tradition [i. e. the Svdlantrikal 
things are said to exist relatively according to their characteristics or else they 
are mind only. The opponent might object that the Prdsailgikas make assertions 
onlyfor the sake of others and do not assert a position of their own. But this 
contradicts 1hefact that in post-meditation they explain the grounds and paths, 
and assert that phenomena are merely dependent arising. 71 
In Mi pham's view, it is Bhavaviveka and other Sautr5ntika-Svatantrikas who define 
existence in relative truth as 'existence according to characteristics'. In this respect, he 
accepts the dGe lugs pa classification. But he argues that we would only be muddling the 
7OV. p. 26. gzhung'dir ni shes bya! i chos kyi khongdi na tang bzhin bdcn grub kyi dngos; po cung zad cig 
kyang khas mi len pa yin te/ 
7'V. p. 29-30. des na gzhung marns su bden grub dang rang mtshan gyis grub pa sogs la khyad med du dgag 
pa dang/ khyad par phye ste bshad pa Ita bu sogs skye bo marns mi rmongs par bya bai phyir tsad ma so sos 
gzhal tshul gyi gnad re yod pa shan ma phyed par tshig gi zer sgros tsam gyis grub mtha! phye pa shin tu. 
thang cad do/ des na rjes thob, shanbyed pa! i skabs su tshad ma gnyis kyis gzhal bai marn gzhag ma 
Idirugs parjog dgos kyi/ shan phyed pa med par tha snyad Mang dpyad pa tsam gyis don dam dpyod par 
'gro ba Ita bu na/ theg chen la zhugs pai gang zag Ishang rgya ba yod ces khas blangs, pd'ang don dam par 
yod par khas blangs pa Ita bur 'gyur zhing/ ( ... ) lugs des kyang tha snyad tsam du dngos po'i mtshan nyid 
grub pa dang/ sems tsam du smra ba! ang de Itar shes par gyis shig kho na re/ gal te de ni gzhan ngo, tsam du 
khas blang gi rang lugs min no snyam na rang la rjes thob kyi skabs na larn'bras kyi marn gzhag dang rten' 
byel tsam du khas len yod par bshad pa sogs dang 'gal lo/ 
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two truths if we were to interpret any type of existence in the relative sphere as having an 
ultimate connotation. Mi pham distinguishes Sautrdntika-Sviitantrikas from Yogacara- 
Svdtantrikas and implies that tdntarakýita does not accept existence according to charac- 
teristics because for him all phenomena are mind only. It follows that the dGe lugs pa 
doxography properly applies only to the Sautrantika-Svatantrikas and not to 
kntarakýita, 
and even in the case of the former Mi pham accuses the dGe lugs pas of confusing the 
two truths in the process of assessing its tenets. 72 
IX. 2.3 Ultimate truth 
In verse 70 of the MAL, ýdntaraksita sets out a distinction between truth that is in accord 
with (mthun pa) the ultimate truth, and ultimate truth itself. The key difference is that the 
former is discursive while the latter is completely free of all elaboration (tshogs rnam kun 
las grol yin). As he writes in his -v. rtti: 
[The highest truth is that which] eradicates the net offictional ideas such as 
existence and non-existence, production and non-production, emptiness and non- 
emptiness, and so forth. 73 
This distinction was not at all new in Buddhism. We have already pointed out that 
Bhdvaviveka made a similar distinction in his Tarkajvdla using the same criterion. In the 
Madhyamakah! -daya he describes knowledge of the ultimate as follows: 
In order to show the knowledge of ultimate truth, [it is said]: Jifl prajrid has the' 
functioning of the complete breakthrough of the net of thought [construction] and 
has the ýenetrationless-penetration' into the ultimate which is devoid of unitari- 
ness and multiplicity, immaculate [as] space, wordless, without thought-constru- 
ction, quiescence which is to be realized alone, [then it is the prajiial belonging to 
the ultimate. 74 
72COmpare Mi phards definition of the skandha of perception in mKhas jug I. 28: "Perception consists of the 
grasping of distinguishing characteristics". 'du shes ni mtshan mar 'dzin pa ste/ In this sense, characteristics 
simply exist relatively as an interdependent component of cognition. 
73MALV 70: don dam pa ni dngos po dang dngos po med pa dang/ skye ba dang mi skye ba dang/ stong pa 
dang mi stong pa la sogs pa spros pai dra ba mtha! dag spangs pa! o// Ichig6 (1985: 230-2). P. 71b. ,. 74MHK, III. 10-11. age§akalpandjMapratiF&avidh5yiri/ gAntapratyRtnasaipvedyanirvikalpanirak§are/ 
vigataikatva n5ndtve tat[tlve gagana nirmale/ apracira pracRr5 ca prajfiR syAt pdramýirffii]W Eda (1969: 82-3). 
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ýdntarakýita shares with Bhdvaviveka the view that there are levels of insight into reality, 
and that this key concept describes the relationship between saýnKiii and paramdr1ha ý5 
In verses 73-75 (translated below) ý5ntarakýita explains how the ignorance of ordinary 
beings prevents them from intuiting emptiness, while yogins who have purified the habit 
of mental construction are able to do so. He also states in verse 84 that the Buddhist path 
is one that leads from defilement (saýnkleda; nyon mongs) to purification (vyavadjna; 
byang), implying a progressive understanding of emptiness. I'lie culmination of the 
Buddhist path is non-dual gnosis, the penetrationIcss-penetrating wisdom (apracdra- 
pracard ca prajila). The gradual steps that lead to this pass, for Bh5vaviveka, through 
conceptual understandings of false relative truth (mithydsaýnv. ru), true relative truth 
(talhydsaT'ýpt) and the ultimate realized with effort (parydyaparamirtha) until the effort- 
less realization of the ultimate (aparydyaparamirtha) is attained. 76 For tgntarakýita, the 
path begins with relative truth, meaning true relative truth (kun rdzob bden pa) and passes 
through discursive ultimate truth (rnam grangs pa7 don dam) until it culminates in the 
non-discursive ultimate (rnam grangs ma yin pai don dam). Following Bhavavivcka, 
95ntarakýita interprets the two truths according to different viewpoints rather than in 
terms of distinct objects of knowledge like mKhas grub. 77 And again, like Bh5vavivcka, 
he employs the qualification 'ultimatcly'(paramarthatali; yang dag tU)78 indicating that 
the two truths arc a matter of standpoint. It follows that the difference between the dis- 
cursive and non-discursive ultimate is primarily one of standpoint. 
It is therefore reasonable for Mi pharn to explain the concordant ultimate as a necessary 
soteriological step towards the non-discursive ultimate, which is the union of the two 
75See lida (1973: 72). 
76See Iida (1973: 64-77). 
7Me soteriological progression outlined in Table 2 (Cbapter V) is also relevant here. 
78MHK IH. 22a-b; MAL 1 and 69. 
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truths. He describes the process as follows: 
When onefirst listens and reflects, the two truths are combined in such a way that 
production on the relative level and non-production on the ultimate level are the 
objects of words and concepts. This is the 'discursive ultimate' because it is 
contrasted with existence on the relative level. One can also say that it is [the dis- 
cursive ultimate] because it is considered to count as the ultimate. This is because 
it is a counterpart of the relative in the so-called two truths. It is only a gateway to 
the definitive ultimate and is merely concordant with it. If one becomes habituated 
to it, it is able to destroy one's powerful clinging to the reality of things, which has 
been [built up] through theforce of beginningless habits. It isfi-om this point otf 
view that it should be understood that [the Svdtantrikas] make assertions saying 
that things are not produced. However, even if such investigation is brought to its 
ultimate reach, it can only bring certainty in post-meditation. 79 
In this passage, Mi pham clarifies the relationship between the relative and the concordant 
ultimate in ýdntarak§ita's school. When one first begins to listen and reflect on the two 
truths, one's understanding of them is based on their respective definitions as opposites: 
relative truth is the domain of causal production, while ultimate truth is characterized by 
non-production. This corresponds to the Buddhist process of reasoning by negation: esta-' 
blishing the concept of emptiness as a non-affirming negative by refuting existence, ' - ý'ý ' 
causality and so forth. So at this stage, non-production (or dependent origination) is uIti- 
mate because it is contrasted with the relative and defined in contradistinction to it. So, 
says Mi pham, although this ultimate is not the definitive non-conceptual ultimate, at this 
stage it counts as the ultimate. It is an approximate ultimate, the nearest one can get to 
understanding the ultimate. Subsequently, by virtue of listening, reflecting and meditating 
on the two truths again and again, all clinging to the concept of existence is gradually - '' 
79V. p. 36-37. de Itar dang por thos bsain gyi sgra rtog gi yul du gyur pai tha snyad du skye ba dang/ don 
dam par mi skye ba Ita bu tshul gnyis zung du bzhag pal ya gyal marn grangs p; Yi don dam ni/ kun rdzob , yod p; A z1a la sbyar Wi cig shos kyi z1as drangs pal phyir ranV don dam p; A grangs su gtogs pas na marn 
grangs te/ bden pa gnyis shes pal kun rdzob kyi z1ar bgrang rgyu de yin la/ de ni don dam mthar thug dang 
mthun pal sgo tsam manV de goms pas thog med nas goms pal bag chags kyi mthu brtas pal dngos por ,' 'dzin pa gzhom nus pal phyir na don dam yang yin lat de'i ngo la Itos na skye ba med ces pal khas len yang 
yod par shes par bya! o/ de'i dpyad pa tshad du phyin kyang rjes thob kyi nges pa skye tshul tsam yin no/ 
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eliminated, implying that one comes closer to intuiting emptiness. And yet even so, 
according to Mi pham the method of reasoning and using non-affirmativc ncgations only 
brings about certainty in one's mind during the post-mcditation period. The implication is 
therefore that for confidence to arise during meditative equipoise, something else is 
needed, but what this might be remains a mystery as far as the MAL itself is conccmcd. 80 
But the point here is that the assertions made by Svatantrikas such as gantarakýita are 
made in concordant ultimate truth, and do not contradict the definitive ultimate or act as a 
substitute for it. 
So if Mi pham is right, doctrinal statements made by SvRtantikas, asserting for example 
the non-inherent existence of things or the truth of dependent origination, are made for the 
benefit of those on the path who have not yet realized the non-discursive ultimate. In 
other words, in Mah5yRna terminology, they are a skilful means (updya). Mi pham goes 
further, and claims that they are skilful means that ensure that one goes beyond all four 
extremes of existence, non-existence, both and neither, and not solely the conccpt of 
existence as mKhas grub's approach is in danger of doing. 
It is through simply the discursive ultimate that clinging to existence is, as afirst 
step, destroyed. Later, through showing the non-discursive ultimate, clinging to 
non-existence is also halted. In brief, this means that without predicating true 
existence etc. of thefour extremes of existence, non-existence, both and neither, 
BOGiven that Mi pham was not only a M5dhyamika but also a follower of Vajrayina and rDzogs chen, the 
extra clement required for this supreme confidence to grow could come from Tantric initiation, devotion or 
the blessing of the spiritual mastcr. But if we lirnit ourselves to the Madhyamaka context of the MAL, even 
though the text may lay down theoretical foundations that arc compatible with VajrayIna and rDzogs chcn, 
it does not itself venture into these domains. This may be a general limitation inherent to Madyamaka, in 
that Madhyamaka alone cannot account for the total leap between the conceptual and non-conccptual. From 
the rDzogs chen point of view, Madhyarnaka is still very much concerned with the conceptual insofar as it 
uses discursive language to communicate. As Dudjom Rinpoche (1991: 295) writes, "all these sequences, 
from Anuyoga downwards, arc exclusively spiritual and philosophical systems contacted through the 
intellect. All of them, on the surface of the intellect, produce such thoughts as 'this is non-existent, this 
empty, and this is true'. Apart from this and their convictions and their boasting through ideas and scrutiny 
that reality lies within the subject-object dichotomy, they do not perceive the abiding nature of the natural 
state, just as it is. " In order to be fully coherent with the principle that ultimate truth is beyond discursive 
thought, rDzogs chen employs non-discursive modes of communication, namely the'mind transmission of 
the buddhas' (rgyal ba dSongs brgyud) and the 'symbolic transmission of the knowledge-holdcrs (rig 'dzin 
brda brgyud) (Tulku lbondup, 1996: 18-22). With this in mind, Mi pharns prediliction for the concordant 
ultimate may be no coincidence, in that all Buddhist discourse including that of Madhyarnaka pertains to it. 
leaving open the possibility for the highest ultimate to be accessed through rDzogs chen. 
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all such conceptual targets collapse and the greatfreedom from elaboration, the 
profound meaning to be realized by all-discerning wisdom, is easily recognized. 
There is [therefore] a needfor [the concordant ultimatel. 81 
In accordance with Dudjom Rinpoche's framework of the Two Truths in Outer Madhya- 
maka and Great Madhyamaka, rNying ma pas consider assertions of concordant ultimate 
truth to be made from the standpoint of the wisdom that prevails in post-meditation , 'in a 
practitioner of Outer Madhyamaka who realizes the non-discursive ultimate during medi- 
tational equipoise. 
So why is it that Prasafigikas such as Candraldrti do not approach the two truths in the , 
same way? Mi pham 82 argues that it is because Candrakirti's standpoint is that which per-' 
tains in meditational equipoise where the Two Truths are but one truth; and he therefore 
uses only ultimate reasoning-the equivalent of the reasoning that corresponds to Dudjorn 
Rinpoche's category of post-meditation in Great Madhyamaka, when appearances are just 
that. ýdntarakýita, on the other hand, emphasizes the view of the discursive ultimate in 
post-meditation (in Outer Madhyamaka), where the two truths are held to be different, 
and accordingly employs relative reasoning to account for the relative level and ultimate' 
reasoning to account for the ultimate. Yet even for ýdntaraksita, the non-discursive ulti- 
mate, though not emphasized, is identical with Candraldrti's ultimate. It is important to 
differentiate these two occasions of mnyam bzhag and rjes thob otherwise when a yogi 
discusses the path and fruit, he would have to adjust his position in dependence on the 
83 views of ordinary people and this would be very strange. This must mean that assertions 
of Buddhist doctrine (as opposed to relative assertions on mundane causality and so on) 
81V. p. 6l. des na dang por rnam grangs tsarn don dam pa'dis dngos zhen bshig nas/ dei rjes su mam granis 
min paI don dam bstan paI dngos med la der zhen gyi cha! ang bkag ste/mdor nayod pa dang/med pa, dang/ gnyis yin dang/ gnyis min gyi mtha! bzhi ka la bden grub sogs kyi khyad par ga nga yang ma sbyar bar de dag gi dmigs gtad zhig pa! i spros bral chen po so so rang gis rig par bya ba! i don zab mo bde blag du' 
ngos zin pa! i dgos; pa yod do/ Ibis point is a subject of intense debate between Tibetan schools, and merits 
comparative study. 
92V. pp. 41-43. 
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are what are classified as the concordant ultimate. If this is how the concordant ultimate is 
defined, then it is reasonable for Mi pham to assert that the Pr5sahgikas also use it, since 
they make assertions on the path and fruit. But the PrAsabgika viewpoint is that of Great 
Madhyamaka, while the Svatantrika viewpoint is that of Outcr Madhyamaka. So in 
summary, we could say that ýantarakýita's approach to the Two Truths is in fact quite 
orthodox if one understands it as Mi pham does. Ile conclusion is that there is no signifi- 
cant or structural doctrinal difference between Prdsabgika and SvAtantrika. 
We might want to add to Mi pham's comments that one of the interesting aspects of the 
principle of the concordant ultimate is that it effectively makes the entire theory of the 
two truths possible. It is not just soteriologically necessary but philosophically necessary. 
The relative can only be defined and characterized as such from a non-rclativc point of 
view-it is only 'relative' to the ultimate, so to speak. 71at is surely the point-from a 
strictly relative and empirical point of view, the relative world is absolute I So Buddhists 
need to account for the way such a distinction comes about. Ile concordant ultimate is 
the solution; it is from this standpoint that the two truths arc distinguished, and it is from 
this standpoint that the wisdom gained through meditation informs the way one views the 
empirical world. It is only in the light of such wisdom that one can call it'rclativc'or'all- 
concealing' (kun rdzob). In fact, it is only by virtue of the concordant ultimate that 
Buddhists can say anything at all about their doctrine. tantarakýita's approach has the 
advantage of distinguishing categories of ultimate that it is philosophically useful to 
separate. 
So what of the non-discursive ultimate itself? If the use of non-affirming negations is 
not sufficient to bring us to a realization of the definitive ultimate, then how do we attain 
83V. p. 45. gzhan rnal'byor pa rang gi lam dang'bras bu'mam gzhag'zog tshel tha mal pa gzhan gyi blo la -ý 
Itos'cha7 dgos pa mthsar ro/ 
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it? How do we pass from the discursive ultimate to non-dual gnosis? ýdntarakýita outlines 
the process in verses 73-75. 
[73] If the nature of entities can be realized directly by understanding them 
[conceptually], why is it that uneducated people do not understand the nature 
of entities in this way? 
'o na de ni rtogs gyur pas: 11 de yi rang bzhin mngon sum phyirll 
mi mkhas rnams kyang dngos rnams kyill dngos po 'di 'dra cis mi rtogsll 
[74] [Yet] they do not. They cannot realize directly because every sentient 
being is subject to [the habit of] imagining things as real, which from 
beginningless time exists in each burdensome individual series. 
ma yin thog med rgyud ci barll dngos por sgro btags dbang byas pasll 
de phyir srog chags thams cad kyisll mgnon sum rtogs par mi 'gyur roll 
[75] Powerful yogins realize [the ultimate] directly and clearly [because] they 
have cut off [the habit of] imagining. Since logical arguments produce under- 
standing those who use inference understand. 
de la sgro btags gcog byedpallshes par byedpa7 gtan tshigs kyis, 11 
rjes su dpogs mams shes par byedll mat 'byor dbang rnams mngon sum gsaIll, 
Mi pham glosses these verses by saying that owing to our habit of superimposing con- 
cepts of existence and entityness on to what we perceive, we are incapable of ascertaining 
things just as they are. It is therefore absolutely necessary to go through the path of purifi 
cation in order to do so. The process involves the following. 
Cutting through or dispelling mistaken concepts regarding the nature of entities, 
the above explained logical arguments on the lack of unitariness and multiplicity 
produce an unmistaken understanding of what infact is the nature of entities. 
Having [gained wisdom from] listening in this way, those who are on [the paths 
ofl accumulation andjoining learn such arguments and make inferences by 
means of that wisdom which correctly contemplates their meaning. They will', 
hence understand, in the manner of an object universal, the emptiness which is the 
nature of [all] entities. Powerful yogis who have gainedfidlfamiliarity with such 
a meaning reach [the path ofl seeing through the eye of unerring primordial 
wisdom (ye shes). They hence perceive directly and clearly how the final nature of 
all phenomena is equality. 
It is in relation to this that on thefirst bhUmi one directly sees the equality [of. 
all things] by means of supramundane primordial wisdom. Then the vivid visions 
of the dharmadh5tu increasingly unfold, and whenfinally the natural state (gnas 
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lugs) is perfectly evidenced exactly as it is, that is the level of the Tath5gata. The 
primordial wisdom which has arisenfrom meditative equipoise, such as that 
which realizes the equality of all phenomena, is utterlyfreefrom the stains of 
conceptual thoughts (mam rtog). It comprehends how those external and internal 
entities which are deligho'41 when not examined all lack any corejust like the 
trunk of a banana tree, and therefore no seed of [such] superimposition will arise. 
( ... ) On the basis of this, when seeing how existence has absolutely no essence, 
one will leave what is not transcendental, namely this shore, this world of cyclic 
existence, and having so discarded cyclic existence one will reach the other 
shore, the transcendence of suffering. 84 
IX. 3 Conclusion 
The passage from conceptual understanding to non-conccptual wisdom is achieved by 
combining listening, reflection, reasoning and meditation. T'llis religious praxis which 
underpins Buddhism effectively opens up epistemological and metaphysical possibilities 
that are beyond the reach of Western philosophy as currently conceived, since its domain 
is restricted to what is knowable/possible/logical for what, in Buddhist terms, is the 
deluded conceptual human mind. It provides an account of how it is possible to know 
things just as they arc, and offers a structured explanation of why it is feasible to talk of 
levels of truth. Significantly, discursive language is held to be adequate to the task of 
talking about and pointing to non-discursive reality. If this were not the case doctrinal 
discourse (in any religion) would be philosophically impossible and empirically in- 
84C. p. 385-6. dngos pdi rang bzhin de la phyin ci log tu sgra btags pa geod pa! arn sel bar byed pa dang 
dngos po'i rang bzhin nyid ma nor bar shes par byed pa'i gian tshigs gcig dang du bral gong du ji skad 
bshad pa de Ita bu thos nas de dag gi don tshul bzhin bsarn pa! i shes rab kyis rjes sti dpogs par byed pai 
tshogs sbyor ba rnams kyis dngos pdi rang bzhin stong pa nyid don spyi'i tshul du shes par byed la de'i 
don ]a rab tu. gorns paI rnal 'byor gyi dbang po rnams kyis phyin ci ma log paI yc shes gyi spyan kyis 
chos thams cad rang bzhin mthar thug pa mnyarn pa nyid du mngon sum du gsal por gzigs pa yin te/ 
de'ang 'jig rten las'das pei ye shes kyis ranyarn pa nyid rnngon sum du mthong pa sa dang po/ dc nas chos 
kyi dbyings la gsal snang je cher mched de/ mthar gnas lugs je Ita ba bzhin rjogs par mngon du gyur pa ni 
de bzhin gshcgs pa nyid do/ de Itar yang chos tharns cad rnnyarn nyid di mam par byed pa'i teng nge 'dzin 
la sogs pa las byung bai ye shcs gang zhig marn rtog gi dri ma dang bral ba nyid kyis/ phyi nang gi dngos 
po ma briags nyarns dga' ba snying po, med pa chung shing gi stong po, har tharns cad ji Itar sgro, btags pa'i 
sa bon yang mi skye ba de Itar thugs su chud de/ 
C. p. 387. med nas ma mthong ba yin pa Itar srid pa Wang snying po gtan nas med par mthong na pha rol 
n-dn pdarn tshu rol'khor bdijig rtendi'i pha rol rnyangdas la son tekhor ba'dor zhes so/ 
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effective. For Buddhists this cannot be the case, since they hold that Buddha's discourse 
did hold soteriological power. 
There are many philosophical problems inherent in the Madhyamaka principle of the Two 
Truths. If they refer to distinct kinds of objects of knowledge, such as appearances and 
emptiness, are these apprehended simultaneously or separately? And if every pheno- 
menon is characterized by both appearance and emptiness, what is the relation between 
the two? Does it make sense to talk of 'objects' of knowledge in ultimate truth other than 
in metaphorical terms? And if the relative is defined, evaluated and described from a 
'higher' point of view, how relative is it? gdntarakýita offers what we would argue is a' 
cogent and successful solution to these questions. The distinction between the two truths 
can only be made when the mind is in a mode that is capable of differentiation. This 
means that the distinction is not made from the ultimate point of view, when the mind 
simply abides without elaboration in a state of equipoise. It is in post-meditation, when 
the mind re-engages with appearances, that two objects of knowledge are distinguished: 
appearances, constituting the domain of the relative, and emptiness as the nature of those 
appearances, constituting the domain of the ultimate. 85 In order to benefit beings on the, 
path of liberation, production is asserted of the former and non-production of the latter. 
It is only in the state of meditation itself, in the state of supreme even-mindedness, that 
one sees how both of these are non-contradictory in the great equalness of all things 
(Conze, 1953: 128-129). It is then that one realizes that both emptiness and appearances 
are the nature and display of mind itself. 
We can surnmarise the Yogdcdra-SvRtantrika stance by saying that ýRntarakýita 
851ronically, Mi phanYs interpretation of Madhyamaka connects with the dGe lugs pa Pr5safigika assertion 
that the two truths refer to different objects of knowledge, emptiness and appearances. The distinction 
made between the two truths in post-meditation according to these rNying ma pas is also based on an , 
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emphasizes the difference between the two truths in the case of beginners, while the pro- 
found union of the two truths is not realized until one becomes an advance yogi. 
Mi pham's theory of pramdVa is based on the same framework, in that he posits two 
distinct types of logic, each with their own domain of application: logic establishing the 
relative and logic establishing the ultimate. By contrast, Pr5saAgikas emphasize the union 
of the two truths from the outset, and Candrakirti's attack on the use of logic in the 
Madhyamaka context should be understood specifically as an attack on the use of logic to 
establish the relative (tha snyad tslwd ma). 
This approach to the Two Truths is a good example of the influence that tnntarakýita's 
MAL has had on the development of rNying ma doctrine. We have seen that Mi pham's 
system of pramj. ýa is based upon it. And after Mi pham, another rNying ma pa named 
mDo sngags bstan pa'i nyi ma attempted to delineate a rNying ma position on issues of 
Buddhist philosophy that had been debated over the centuries by the gSar ma traditions. " 
His system, too, is based on the Svatantrika distinction between relative and ultimate 
types of valid cognition. One point of interest that we will note here is that mDo sngags 
bstan pa'i nyi ma criticiscs Tsong kha pa's definition of what is to be negated (dgag bya). 
Tsong kha pa and dGe lugs pa PrdsaAgikas following him consider that what is to be 
negated by the non-implicative negation establishing Mnyatd, is the essence or true 
existence (bden grub) of entities, and not particular entities per se. Lipman explains: 
apprehension of emptiness and appearances as being distinct. However, rNying ma pas would not call thesc 
'objects of knowledge' existents in the deGe lugs pa PrAsah&a sense. 
86'What is Buddhist Logic? Some Tibetan Developments of PramaAa Theoryby Kennard Lipman. (1992: 
27). Kennard Lipman has analysed and translated part of the ITa grub shan 'byed by mDo sngags bstan pai 
nyi ma who was a student of Kun bzang dpal Idan, who was himself a student of Mi pharyL His work built 
on that of Mi pham, kLong chen pa and Lo chen Dharma§rT. He divides each of the relative and ultimate 
types of logic into two, making four categories in all: for the relative Qha snyad dpyod byedpa7 Ishad ma) 
one is based on impure perception and the other based on pure perception, while for the ultimate (don dam 
dpyod byedpa7 tshad ma) one is discursive and the other is not. He asserts that Svatantrikas properly 
employ the discursive ultimate type of reasoning (don dam mam grangs dpyod byedpai ishad ma), and 
accuses dGe lugs pa Pr5safigikas of converting the non-discursive ultimate type of reasoning (don dam 
mam grangs min par dpyod byedpa7 tshad ma) into the discursive type, resulting in their undcrtanding of 
fanyata as a non-affirming negation (med dgag; prasajya pratifedha). 
331 
bsTan pa 7 nyi ma's critique of this distinction is that if, at the level of a critique , from the ultimate point of view, we already know entities per se as conventionally 
existing in the manner of apparitions etc., then we would not in this case be led to 
assert some ultimate truth-statusjounded on these entities. Thus, the refutation of 
such a status would be redundant. 87 
This critique pinpoints a difficulty that is inherent in the framework of the Two Truths 
(unless, possibly, one makes the sorts of distinctions that are made by Mi pham. and his 
successors). And that is, that if one does not maintain a distinction between the Two 
Truths, and posit two types of logic respectively applying to each, then it does not make 
sense to negate the true existence of phenomena when such phenomena are already under- 
stood to be mere appearances in ultimate truth. Furthermore, we can add to this that it is 
not coherent to deny a distinction between conceptual and non-conceptual ultimates, 
when non-affirming negations along with all the related Madhyamaka terminology are the 
conceptual creations of philosophers. 
What the sources cited here do not say is that kntarakýita's assertion of two types Of Ulti7 
mate is the only way that one can find the Two Truths of Madhyarnaka philosophy to be 
coherent. Madhyamaka is inherently flawed in the sense that it is based on logic, 
reasoning and the use of discursive thought, despite the fact that it insists that the ultimate 
truth is non-discursive and cannot be put into words, Whether Prdsafigikas explicitly, 
admit a concordant ultimate or not, they are bound to use discourse to refute their oppo- 
nents. This means that the method of Madhyamaka is not in accord with its goal. It relies 
on the conceptual mind in order to reach the non-conceptual mind, and the precise link 
between these two is tenuous. The approach of rNying ma pas, based on kntarakýita, has 
the advantage of leaving the highest non-discursive ultimate as a domain which can be 
accessed in part through Madhyamaka, and in part through the non-discursive methods of 
Vajraydna and rDzogs chen. 
87Lipman (1992: 35). 
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CHAPTER TEN A THIRD CHARIOT WAY? 
X. 1 Characterizing kntarak$ita's thought 
During the course of this study, we have seen that many of the definitional features 
ascribed to the Yog5cZira-Svatantrika-Madhyamaka school by dGe lugs pa doxographcrs 
(in particular dKon mchog 'jig med dbang po and lCang skya) do not apply to kntarak- 
ýita's thought. A number of the disputed criteria do indeed apply to Sautrzintika-SvAtantri- 
kas like Bh5vaviveka. Whether they also apply to other Yogkiira-SvRantrikas such as 
KamalaMa and Haribhadra is a matter for further research. But in the case of tantarak-Ota 
himself who, after all, is considered the scholar who established the philosophical tcncts 
of this school as a coherent system, if we view his thought through these dGe lugs pa cycs 
it has many weaknesses and inconsistencies. On the other hand, if wc intcrprct it accor- 
ding to Mi pham's perspective, it does not. Ile MAL then emerges as a coherent philo- 
sophical system that is remarkable in the way it brings together Yog5cara and Madhya- 
maka streams of Mah5y5na thought, and also in the way that it presents a view that allows 
the option for Vajray5na or rDzogs chen elaboration. 
First, let us summarise the key points on which Mi pham disagrees with dGe lugs pa 
critics, which will yield the initial stage of our understanding of 85ntarakýita's philosophy 
-with reference to what it is not. The numbers in brackets refer to sections of this study. 
i) The logical grounds for classifying ggntarakýita as a Sv5tantrika arc incon- 
clusive. Whether he uses the ekanekaviyogahetu as a svatantra prayoga or 
a prasafiga argument is an open question. (V. 2) This ambiguity is pro- 
bably due to the fact that in his own time these two logical forms had not 
yet been clearly distinguished or their philosophical implications explored. 
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in addition, owing to 8antarak§ita espousal of ascending scales of analysis 
(following Dharmaldrti), it is clear that the subject (dharmin) of his argu- 
ments, is not always commonly accepted both by him and his opponent. 
(VIU. 5.1) The use of autonomous syHogisms cannot therefore be asserted 
as a necessary element of ý5ntarakýita's approach, either on the logical or 
the soteriological level. 
ii) Svatantrika is characterized by the view that the distinction between the 
self of persons (pudgalanairidtmya) and the self of phenomena (dharma- 
nairatmp) is based on Iww they are selfless (their relative subtlety) not on 
that which is selfless which is the PrAsaAgika view. But for tdntarakýita 
there is no difference in subtlety, and the distinction between the two self- 
lessnesses is made in terms of the basis to which emptiness is applied. 
(V. 7) His position is explained in the light of the Tibetan distinction 
between innate ignorance (ma rig pa Ilmn skyes) and the ignorance of 
imputation (ma rig pa 7 kun brtags), not Bh5vavivcka's distinction between 
afflictive obscurations (Heiavaratta) and obscurations to knowledge (jileyj 
vara"). Thus the two selflessnesses are realized simultaneously, first 
based on the ignorance of imputation, and second based on innate igno- 
rance. It is argued that this is why the MAL does not refute the self of 
persons separately. 
iii) That ýdntarakýita accepts svasaýnvedana is uncontrovcrsial but there is dis- 
agreement on what he means by this, and what the status of svasamvedana 
is. (VIR. 3.1) The MAL explicitly refiers; to reflexive awareness (Matilal's 
terminology), i. e. the definition of consciousness as being sclf-aware as 
opposed to matter defined as not sclf-awarc; and mjccts n, asa)pvedana as 
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reflective awareness being the awareness that an awareness has arisen in 
the mind. The dGe lugs pa Prdsafigika refutation of svasaýnvedana is 
made at cross purposes with regard to ýdntarakýita since it rejects 
reflective awareness. ý5ntarakOta asserts the reflexivity of mind only con- 
ventionally, without metaphysical entailment. 
iv) dKon mchogjig med dbang po asserts that Yogdcdra-Sviitantrika- 
Madhyamaka accepts six consciousnesses, whereas Mi pharn claims that 
ýAntarakýita accepts eight consciousnesses on the grounds that he accepts 
the Cittam5tra model of cognition in relative truth. (VIH. 3.3) However, he 
admits the alaya only in the role of storehouse consciousness for karmic 
seeds. (We hold that this is one of Mi pham's weakest arguments. He 
argues for alaya on the grounds that gantarakýita must accept Cittam5tra 
comprehensively in relative truth, and yet ignores all the other roles 
ascribed to the Waya by Asafiga implying that kntarak§ita's acceptance of 
Cittamatra is not comprehensive. ) 
V) Unlike some dGe lugs pa exegetes who consider that kntarakýita accepts 
the Non-Pluralist view in epistemology, Mi pham argues that he is an 
Equalist. (VRI. 4.1) The cognizing consciousness must correspond to the 
object of cognition, so the former cannot be single and the latter plural. 
The Equalist position is tenable if, and only if, one admits the possibility 
for several cognitions to occur simultaneously, provided they are not con- 
flicting opposites. 
vi) Sv5tantrikas are defined by dGe lugs pas such as ICang skya as those 
Madhyamikas who assert that the subject (dharmin) of a proposition 
appears to non-erroneous cognition (pramdtza) meaning a non-defective 
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sense consciousness. (VHI. 5.1) However, insofar as ýdntarakýita follows 
the intemalist analysis of Cittamdtra, he does not hold perception to be 
non-erroneous since things do not exist as they appear (they pertain to the 
parikalpita svabhjva). The way we perceive arises from ignorance and 
karmic latencies. 
vii) Refutations of ýdntarakýita's approach to the Two Truths by dGe lugs pas 
such as mKhas grub are carried out at cross purposes, since their respective 
understandings of danyatd are different. (IX. 1) For ýdntar*ita, the Two 
Truths are differentiated not solely as objects of knowledge but also in 
relation to the state of mind of the perceiver. (IX. 1.2) Furthermore, 
danyata is not simply a non-affirming negative but a realization that is 
beyond logic and discursive thought. 
viii) Finally, dGe lugs pa doxographers claim that relative truth in Svatantrika 
includes the existence of things by way of their characteristics. (V. 6 and 
IX. 2.2) But on the internalist analysis made by ý5ntarakýita the existenceof 
external objects is refuted and all phenomena are mind only. Appear- 
ances are accepted only in relative truth, with no entailments for ultimate 
truth, that is, for true existence. To assert otherwise is to confuse relative 
and ultimate truths. 
It follows from this analysis that 95ntarak§ita's viewpoint is not radically different from 
that which is usually classified as Prasafigika-Madhyamaka. This statement is consistent 
with the fact that Prdsafigika and Sv5tantrika had not been identified as two distinct 
systems of Madhyamaka in 95ntarak§ita's day, so he would not have had the intention to 
demarcate his position clearly in these terms. (111.4.2) This does not mean that gZintarak- 
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sita should now, with hindsight, be classified as a Prasafigika instead. Mi pham certainly 
considers him to be a SvAtantrika in the sense that his standpoint emphasizes the value 
and perspective of the conceptual ultimate (mam grangs pai don dam), by contrast to the 
Prasafigika emphasis on the non-conceptual ultimate (rnam grangs ma yin pai don dam). 
(1.2) Thus the Prasafigika school of Madhyamaka is held to be the higher. In conclusion, 
then, the point of contention concerns what is respectively understood to be Prasafigika- 
and SvRtantrika-Madhyamaka by rNying ma and dGe lugs schools. 
IX. 2 How gAntarali5ita brings together Yogkiira and Madhyamaka 
If we take YogacAra to include both the psychological and metaphysical tradition of 
Asafiga, and the logical and epistemological tradition of Dign5ga and Dharmaldrti, knta- 
rakýita incorporates both these streams of Yog5c5ra into Madhyamaka. 
He adopts Asafiga's framework of the stages of a gradual path to awakening by giving the 
MAL a phased soteriological structure. (Table 2) Although the MAL presents the basis or 
ground (gzht) of gantarakýita's view rather than the path (lam) of liberating practice, 
according to kkya mChog Idan and Kajiyarna, it nevertheless presents a staged pro- 
gression of philosophical views, adopting first Sautrantika and then Cittam5tra in relative 
truth, and Madhyamaka in ultimate truth. (V. 5) Since NdgRduna explored the ground 
(gzhi) of Mah5yRna and Asafiga developed its path (lam), kntarak§ita takes the further 
step of presenting a soteriologically phased approach to his understanding of the gound, 
thus combining both Madhyamaka and Yogacara strengths and finding a new formulation 
of MahdyRna in the process. 
ýdntarak§ita himself defines his synthesis as one that accepts Cittam5tra in relative truth 
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and Madhyamaka in ultimate truth. (MAL 92) Yet because the relative can only be 
defined in relation to the ultimate and vice versa, this characterization is more complex 
than it appears. For example, ýdntarakýita does not use his refutation of external objects 
to establish an immaterialist form of idealism. He accepts both matter and mind in relative 
truth (MAL 16) and therefore accepts that in relative truth there is a perceptual given. 
(VII. 3.2) Although he adopts many features of the Cittamatra model of cognition he does 
not accept them all: he accepts svasaýnvedana and may accept Waya, but makes no 
mention of tatlogatagarMa. And although he acknowledges that the Cittamatra Sakdra- 
v5din view is the most acceptable in relative truth, he re-interprets this in the light of 
Madhyamaka so that aspects (dkdra; rnam pa) arise through interdependent origination 
(pratrtyasamutpjda). Similarly, he re-interprets CittamAtra metaphysics in the light of 
Madhyamaka: when he accepts causal efficiency as a characteristic of the relative (MAL 
64), he interprets causality as interdependent origination. (IX. 2.2) 
In addition, whilst ýAntarakýita adopts the syllogistic methods of the logicians he clearly 
situates all logical argument and rational discourse within the Madhyamaka framework of 
the Two Truths. (MAL 70) Logic can either pertain to the relative (since for ýdntarakýita 
this refers exclusively to the true relative understood through pramapa) or the conceptual 
ultimate, for example in the case of Dharma. That is to say that language itself never per- 
tains to the highest ultimate. Accordingly, and in the light of other points raised above, his 
use of reasoning does not entail any of the unwanted consequences identified by dGe lugs 
pa Prasafigikas, such as accepting the independent existence of the dhannin or the ulti- 
mate validity of all logical methods. (V. 1: Tillemans, 1982) 
The way tantarak§ita has developed his synthesis of Yog5cAra and Madhyamak-a presents 
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us with a complex blending of the two that avoids the potential contradictions arising 
from their differences. His synthesis succeeds in bringing to light that which is common 
to both, and proves that it is possible to view them not simply as compatible but as com- 
plementary. 
X. 3 Does the MAL initiate a third chariot FaXZ 
Mi pham's commentary on the MAL is famous for having asserted that by combining 
Yog5cdra and Madhyamaka in the way he has, ýdntaraksita founded a third chariot way 
(shing rta). (H. 4.7) Buddhist historians agree that the first two were promulgated by 
NRg5ijuna and Asafiga respectively, but Mi pham's claim about gdntarakýita is contro- 
versial. In order to assess it, one must consider how a chariot way is defined by the tradi- 
tion. In a recent text by the rNying ma mKhan po brTsongrus, we find a discussion of 
this specific issue. ' 
Thefounders of the commentarial traditions of the PrajiMpdramitj are certainly 
two in number., 1) Ndgarjuna, who elucidated the stages of emptiness, the direct 
teaching of the PrajiWpdramitd Satras, and 2) Maitreya, who elucidated the 
hidden meaning, the stages of manifest realization. 
Generally, it is said that thefounder of the tradition of the Profound Madhya- 
maka is Arya Nigarjuna, and thefounder of the tradition of Vast Conduct is the 
noble Asajiga. In addition to these two, the Lord of Dharma Mi pham rin po che, 
who was Maiijuirr in actuality, in his commentary to the Madhyamakdlamkara, 
names the great mKhan po 9dwarakfita as thefounder of the tradition that united 
the Profound and the Vast. However, since these are thefounders of the general 
traditions of the Mahdydna, they should not be confused with the topic presently 
under discussion. 
The significance of the word Younder'or 'charioteer'is that having been 
accepted directly as afavourite son of the Victorious Ones by Maitreya or 
Mafijuýrf, one comments on the intent of the Victorious Ones independently, 
without relying upon any text of human authorship. 
'The following is taken from an unpublished translation by Adam Pearcey of a work by rDzogs chen 
mKhan po brTson'grus entitled "A Preliminary to the Explanation of the Prajilapdramila: The Founders of 
the Tradition, the Explanatory Sfitras, Ways of Commenting, and so forth" (Sherphyin 'chadpa7 sngon 
'gro), Ngagyur Nyingma. Institute, Mysore, South India. Shing rta is translated here as'founder. 
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The main point seems to be that chariot ways do not rely on any other human author. And 
therefore, since ýdntarakýita's Yogacam-Madhyamaka synthesis relies on philosophical 
treatises composed by humans before him, as well as on the works of two previous 
'charioteers', he cannot be defined as a charioteer himself. What he wrote was not 
radically new, it was based on pre-existing doctrines. Mi pham's claim is dismissed on the 
strength of such a definition. And indeed, in the light of all the evidence gathered in the 
present study, we have found that it is the case that the MAL is based on works and on 
developments in philosophical thought that pre-dated tantaral4ita by several centuries. 
His genius was not to invent a radically new Buddhist doctrine, but to bring together 




MI PHAM'S TOPICAL OUTLINE (sa bcad) 
elucidating the Madhyamakalamkdra 
Page numbers refer to the Chengdu edition (Text A) and to 
the Varanasi edition (Text B) respectively 
BSHAD BYA DNGOS BSRAD PA 
PART I- 2zhune don rnam Dar dbve ba dneos 
Text A Text B 
Page Page 
mtshan don: dbu ma rgyen gyi mam bshad 'jam dbyang bla ma dgyes pa'i 
zhal lung 118 86 
Z Igyurphyag 123 90 
3. gzhung don 124 91 
1. 
A. bden gnyis kyi tsbul ngos pung" ba 
1. don dam var dneos vo med var bstan Da 125 91 
a) tsa ba'i rtags 'god pa 125 91 
b) de'i tshul sgrub pa 139 104 
i) phyogs chos sgrub pa 139 104 
(1) Men va'! zci, - bral sgrub 12a 139 104 
1. khyab pa'i gcig dgag pa 139 104 
(1) khyab byed bye brag pa gcig bden dgag pa 140 104 
(a) rtags dngos gcig bden dgag 
i. gzhan sdes btags, pa'i rtag dngos dgag 140 104 
ii. rang sdes btags pa'i rtag dngos dgag pa 146 109 
A. 'gog byed kyi rigs pa mdor bstan pa 147 109 
B. de'i tshul rgyas par bshad pa 149 112 
(i) shes pa snga ma'i yul phyi'i ma'i ýes su 'brang na 
mi 'thad pa 150 112 
(ii) ýes su mi 'brang na mi 'thad pa 161 122 
+ yul 'dus ma byas skad eig mar thal ba 161 122 
+ de Itar khas len na skyon bstan pa 162 123 
(a' ) rkyen la Itos na 'dus byas su thal ba 163 123 
(b) mi Itos na rtag tu yod pa'wn med par thal ba 163 124 
171be spelling in the Chengdu edition is given as bzung ba, while that in the Varanasi edition is gzung ba. It 
seems that the Varanasi edition is correct. 
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EXPLARUNG THE SUBJECT OF THE TEXT 
PART I- The subject that is to be thoroughly established: the meaning of the text 
Meaning of the title: An exposition on the treatise [entitled] "Tle Ornament 
of the Middle Way", the words [of which] will delight the lama [who is like] 
Man-jugri 
Homage [by Mi pham] 
Meaning of the [main] text 
1. ESTABLISIENG THE BASIS OF WHAT IS TO BE KNOWN: THE WAY f OF 
DISTINGUISFUNG1 THE TWO TRUEHS 
A. Mastering the correct way [to distinguish] the Two Truths 
1. ShowinL- that entities do not exist on the ultimate level 
a) Presenting the main argument 
b) Proving [the validity of] this approach 
i) Proving this Buddhist view 
7) Provinr that entities with a unitary nature do not truly exist 
Stanza 
1. Refuting the true existence of unitary pervasive entities 
(1) Refuting the true existence of particular unitary pervasive entities 
(a) Permanent unitary entities 
i. Refuting permanent [unitary] entities presented by non-Buddhists 2 
ii. Permanent [unitary] entities presented by certain Buddhists 
A. Brief presentation of the argument that refutes [them] 3 
B. Detailed explanation of the refutation 
(i) T'he object of the first moment of consciousness cannot be 
identical with that of the subsequent moment 4 
(ii) [The object of the first moment of consciousness] cannot 
be different from that of the second moment 
" Ilie unconditioned object occurs in successive moments 5 
" Showing the faults [arising] from acceptance of this [view] 
(a) If the [objccfs] continuation depends on conditions, it 
is compounded 6 
(b) If it is not continuous, it is always either [truly] existent or 
non-existent 7 
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Text A Text B 
Page Pave 
iü. rtag dngos bkag pa'i mjug bsdu ba 166 126 
(b) gang zag gcig bden dgag pa 170 129 
(2) khyab byed kyi spyi gcig bden dgag pa 176 135 
2. ma khyab pa'i gcig bden dgag pa 178 137 
(i) phyi rol gcig bden dizag 179 137 
a. rags pa gcig bden dgag pa 179 137 
b. rdul phran gcig bden dgag pa 180 139 
(1) rdul phran 'gog pai rigs pa bstan pa 181 139 
* phyogs sngo'i 'dod tshul brjod pa 181 139 
* de dgag pa 185 142 
a) cha med na rags pa mi 'grub 185 143 
b) cha yod na phra rdul du nii 'thad par bstan pa 188 145 
(2) rdul phran de khegs pas dngos po du ma khegs pa 188 145 
rtags 'god pa 189 146 
khyab pa sgrub pa 189 146 
(ii) sbes pa gci bden dgag 12a 
1. phyi don yodpar 'dodpa'i lugs la shespagcig Men 
dgagpa 
(1) thun min so so 7 'dodpa dgag pa 
(a) rang sde don smra sde gnyis kyi lugs dgag pa 
i) mam med bye smra ba'i lugs dgag pa 
A. rang rig 'thadpar sgrub pa 
a. rang rig gi ngo bo ngos bzung ba 
b. de la rang rig tu gdags pa'i 'thad pa 
B. don rig mi 'thadpar bstan pa 













a. main bcas pa la don myong ba'i tha snyad 
tsam 'thad par bstan pa 
b. mam med pa la don myong ba'i tha snyad 
tsam yang mi 'thad par bstan pa 
ii) mam bcasý mdo sde pa' i3 lugs dgag pa 214 167 
YMe Varanasi text does not have the qualification mam bcas, and speaks here only of undifferentiated 
Sautdntikas. 
Wariant spellings are noted here: mdo sde ba7 in the Chengdu edition, and mdo sde pa7 in the Varanasi edition. 
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iii. Summary of the refutation of [such] permanent entities 8 
(b) ReAting persons as truly existent unitary [entities] 9 
(2) Refuting the true existence of general unitary pervasive [entities] 10 
2. Refuting the true existence of unitary non-pervasive [entities] 
(i) Refuting the true existence of unitary external objects 
a. Refuting the true existence of gross objects 
b. Refuting the true existence of indivisible particles 
(1) Presenting the argument that refutes indivisible particles 
" Expressing the view of the earlier schools 11 
" Refuting these [schools] 
a) if there are no parts, there are no gross objects 12 
b) showing that if there are parts, there are no indivisible 
particles 13 
(2) By refuting [the existence of] indivisible particles one [also] 
refutes [the existence ofl conditioned entities 
" Presenting the argument 14 
" Proving the pervasion 15 
(ii) Refuting consciousness as a truly existing unitary [entit 
1. Refuting the view of a truly existing unita1y consciousness [held byl 
traditions which assert that external oýiects exist 
(1) Refuting the beliefs of each school in turn 
(a) Refuting the view of the two Buddhist schools that assert 
[external] objects [exist] 
i) Refuting [the Vaibhdýikas] who hold that [objects are 
perceived] without aspects 
A. Establishing the validity of self-awareness 
a. Identifying the true essence of this self-awareness 16 
b. Consequently it is valid to assert a [consciousness 
that is] self-aware 17 
R Showing that [the idea that] consciousness [perceives 
external] objects is not valid 18 
C Showing the [Vaibhdýikal view [that perception occurs] 
without an aspect is not valid 
a. Showing that perception of an object with an 
aspect is only valid in relative truth 19-20 
b. Showing that it is not valid even in relative truth 
[to speak of] perception of an object without an 
aspect 21 
ii) Refuting the view of the Sautrantikas who hold that 
[perception] is endowed with aspects 
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Text A Text B 
Page Page 
A. sna tshogs Rnvis medpa 214 168 
a. shes pa bzhin du rnams pa gcig tu thal b2 214 168 
b. rnam pa bzhin du shes pa du mar thal ba 216 169 
c. de Ita min na shes rnam tha dad du thal ba 
dgag pa 216 169 
B. szo nga phyed tshal ba'i lugs dgag p 217 170 
a. 'dod pa brjod pa 217 170 
b. de dgag pa 219 171 
i) don dgag pa 219 172 
(a) yi ge la dmigs pa'i blos ma nges pa 219 172 
(b) yid rtog 'ga'a zhig yul la 'jug tshul 
gyis ma nges pa 221 173 
(c) blo tharns cad kyis ma nges par 
bstan pa 222 174 
ii) dpe dgag pa 223 175 
(a) rtags 'god pa, 223 175 
(b) de'i khyab pa sgrub pa 224 176 
* mthong dran yul 'gal bar bstan pa 224 176 
* mtshams sbyor yin na, gsal snang mi 
rigs par bstan pa 225 176 
gag pa C rnams shes ffy-n-as mnvam p-a _d 
226 177 
a. 'dod pa bdod pa 226 177 
b. de dgag pa 228 179 
i) blo thams cad du ma'i rnam pa can du 
sgrub pa 228 179 
ii) cha med kyi gcig bden mi srid par 
bstan pa 228 179 
(a) dmigs bya bem po la brtags na, gcig 
pur dmigs, pa med tshul 229 179 
(b) dmigs byed blo la brtags na, de med 
tshul 230 180 
(b) phyi rol pa'i lugs dgag pa 231 181 
i) rig pa can sogs kyi dgag pa spyir bstan pa 231 181 
ii) bye brag tu dgag pa 236 186 
A. WLal ba dang Mal d es pa'i lugs dizaga 12a 236 186 po, _ - 
4The headings given here are those in the Chengdu table of contents. However, referring to their appearance in 
the body of the text (e. g. Varanasi pp. 167-8), they could be read granunatically as follows: (a) shes pa bzhin du 
marns pa gcig tu thal bas dgag pa; (b) marn pa bzhin du shes pa du mar thal bas dgag pa; (c) de Ita min na shes 
marn tha dad du thal bas dgag pa. 
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A. 77ze non-pluralists 
a. The consequence that aspects would be unitary just like 
consciousness 22 
b. The consequence that consciousness would be many 
just like aspects 23 
c. If this is not the case, refuting the consequence that 
consciousness and aspects are separate [entities] 23 
R Refutime the view of the half-emeist 
a. Presenting their view 24 
b. Refuting this [view] 
i) Refuting the meaning 
(a) Uncertainty [in the case ofl a mind that perceives 
letters 25 
(b) Uncertainty [resulting] from the way of esta- 
blishing unitary mental concepts concerning several 
objects 26 
(c) Showing that this uncertainty [applies] to all 
perceptions 27 
ii) Refutation [based on] an example 
(a) Presenting the argument 28 
(b) Proving the pervasion 
" Showing the contradiction in [the opponenf s 
position on] seeing and remembering an object 29 
" Showing that if this is asserted, one cannot speak 
of 'clear perception! 30 
C Refuting the equalists 
a. Presenting their view 31 
b. Refuting this [view] 
i) Proving that all perceptions involve several aspects 32 
ii) Showing that the true existence of a unitary 
indivisible [moment of perception] is impossible 
(a) When we analyse a perceived material object, 
[we find that] there cannot be a perception of 
something unitary 33 
(b) When we analyse the mind that perceives, [we 
find that a unitary indivisible moment of perception] 
cannot exist 34 
(b) Refuting the non-Buddhist schools 
i) Presenting a general refutation of all these schools 35 
ii) Refuting each in turn 
A. Refuting the Jaina and MTmcuhsiT schools 36 
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Text A Text B 
Page Page 
B. Mang : phen pa'i lugs d-gagg pa 243 192 
C gLangs can pa'i lugs la shes pa gcig bden m 
srid par bstan pa 245 194 
a. dgag pa býod pa 246 194 
b. nyes spong gi Ian dgag pa 249 197 
D. gsang ba 12ai lugs d -gag 12 250 198 
(2) than mong da mjug bsdu ba 259 206 
(a) phyi rol la gcig bden du zhen pa dgag pa 259 206 
(b) shes pa la gcig bden dgag pa 261 207 
(c) de gnyis kyi don bsdu ba 262 208 
2. ph yi don mi 'dod pa rn am rig pa'i luggs dgag pa 262 209 
(1) phyogs snga brjod pa 262 209 
(2) tshul de la brtag5 pa 267 213 
(a) de dag gi skyon yon la brtagý pa 267 213 
(b) skyon kyi cha mam shes bden grub dgag pa 268 214 
i) rnam Men pa'i lugs dgag pa 268 214 
A. sgo nga phyed tshal ba7 lugs dgag pa 268 214 
a. 'gal ba ston pa 269 214 
b. 'gal spong mi nus pa'i tshul bshad pa 271 217 
1. thal ba 'god pa 272 217 
2. skyon de phyi don khas len pa'i mam 
bcas pa Wang mtshungs par bstan pa 273 218 
B. rnam shes grangs mnyam pa'i lugs dgagpa 
C. sna tshogs gnyis medpa dgagpa 
a. sun 'byin gyi dam bca'a 'god pa 
b. de'i 'thad pa sgrub pa 






1. 'dod pa býod pa 280 224 
2. de dgag pa 281 225 
a. dgag pa mdor bstan 281 225 
b. de'i don rgyas par bshad pa 285 228 
(i) mam pa med pa mi 'thad pa 285 228 
(a) yul shes tshul la brtags na mi 'thad pa 285 228 
5Variant spellings are noted here: brtags pa in the Chengdu edition for this and the following fine, but briag pa 
in the Varanasi edition in both cases. 
6See note 2 above. 
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R Refuting the Carvdka school 37 
C Showing that a single (unitaa) consciousness does not 
truly exist as the Sdmkhya school claims 
a. Presenting the refutation 38 
b. Refuting the response of those who deny this mistake 39 
A Refuting the Advaita Veddnta school 40 
(2) Summary of what has been established in relative truth 
(a) Refuting the belief that external objects truly exist as unitary 41 
(b) Refuting that consciousness truly exists as unitary 42 
(c) Summarizing the meaning of these two [sections] 43 
2. Refutine the view that verception fisl endowed with an asigect. Meld 
by/ those who do not assert [the existence o17 external phenomena 
fi. e. Cittamitra I 
(1) Explaining their view 44 
(2) Analysing this approach 
(a) Analysing the strengths and weaknesses [shown by] the 
proponents of this view 45 
(b) Considering its defects and refuting that consciousness and 
aspects truly exist 
1) Refuting the [Cittam5trin] view that aspects are truly existent 
A. Refuting the view of the half-eggists 
a. Exposing the contradiction 46 
b. Explaining [their] inability to reject this contradiction 
1. Establishing the consequences 47 
2. Showing that this defect is similar to that [which one 
finds] in those who believe in external objects [linked 
to consciousness via] aspects 48 
B. Refuting the view of the equalists 49 
C. Refuting the non-pluralists 
a. Presenting the thesis that refutes [them] 50 
b. Proving the validity of this [argument] 51 
ii) Refuting the [CittamAtrin] view that aspects are an illusion 
1. Explaining their view 52 
2. Refuting this [view] 
a. Briefly presenting the refutation 53 
b. Detailed explanation of the meaning of this 
[refutation] 
(i) It is not valid [to assert] there are no aspects 
(a) Non-validity [arising] from the analysis of the 
way an object is perceived by] consciousness 
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(b) 'brel ba mi 'thad pa 
(c) rgyu la brtags na mi Ihad pa 
(ii) 'dzin mam rkyang pa mi 'thad par 
bstan pa 
c. skyon spong gi Ian dgag pa 
(2) bden pal du bral sgrub pa 
i) khyab pa sgrub pa 












2. kun rdzob tu dneos vo YOd var bstan va 309 249 
a) snang tsam bden stong gi kun rdzob ngos bzung ba 309 249 
b) kun rdzob de'i rang bzhin phye ste bshad pa 316 255 
i) snang tsam bslu med du yod pa 316 255 
(1) tshul ji Itar snang ba 316 255 
(2) rgyu gang gis snang ba'i tshul 341 277 
ii) snang gzhi bden stong du nges par bstan pa 351 286 
B. de la rtsod pa spong ba 354 289 
1. klan ka med pa'i tshul mdor bstan pa 354 289 
a) phas rgol 'joms nus pa'i tshul 354 289 
b) tshur la gang gis mi tshugs pa'i tshul 355 290 
2. dei don rgyas par bshad pa 356 291 
a) don dam la rtsod sponW 356 291 
i) mtha'a bzbi'i spros bral gyi don dam la khas len med tshul 357 291 
(1) khas len dang bcas pa mam grangs pa'i don dam bshad pa 357 291 
(a) rigs pa dang lung gis grub tshul 357 291 
(b) de'i sgra don 359 293 
(2) mam grangs min pa'i don dam pa bshad pa 362 295 
(a) mdor bstan pa 362 295 
(b) de'i tshul rgyas par bshad pa 362 295 
(i) don dam sgra rtog gi yul las 'das par bstan pa 363 296 
7Variant spelling of spang in the Chengdu table of contents, but spong is found in the body of the text in both 
the Chengdu and Varanasi editions. 
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In general 54 
In particular 
" It is invalid [to speak of] a truly existent 
consciousness 55 
" It is invalid [to speak of] consciousness 
in terms of mere imputation 56 
(b) Non-validity [arising] from the connection 
between these two 57 
(c) Non-validity [arising] from the analysis of the 
cause 58 
(ii) Showing that it is not valid [to assert] the existence 
of a [single] perceiver of aspects 59 
c. Refuting the response of those who deny these faults 60 
(2) Proving that entities with a complex nature do not truly exist 61 
ii) Proving the pervasion [i. e. that these two alternatives cover all 
possibilities] 62 
2. Showing the existence of entities on the relative level 
a) Identifying relative entities as mere appearance and as empty of true existence 63 
b) Explaining how to distinguish the nature of relative truth 
i) Infallibility of the existence of mere appearances 
(1) [Explaining] how they appear 64 
(2) [Explaining] the cause of their appearance 65 
ii) Ile basis of [these] appearances is shown with certaintyto be empty 
of true existence 66 
B. Eliminating all objections to these [two truths] 
1. Brief presentation of the way to avoid being prone to attack [on this point] 
a) Ile way to vanquish opponents 67 
b) Ile way to withstand any criticisms on this point 68 
2. Detailed explanation of the meaning [of the two truths] 
a) Elin-dnating all objections regarding the ultimate truth 
i)'I'he way of [describing and] not describing the ultimate truth which 
is free from the four extremes 
(1) Explaining the ultimate meaning that can be spoken of by those who 
accept this view 
(a) The way of establishing [it] according to logic and scriptural 
authority 69 
(b) Explaining the meaning of the term [i. e. discursive ultimate] 70 
(2) Explaining the non-discursive ultimate truth 
(a) Brief presentation 70 
(b) Detailed presentation of this approach 
(i) Showing that ultimate truth cannot be a referrent of words or 0) 
concepts 71 
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Pape Page 
(ii) sgra rtog kun rdzob kyi spyod yul yin par bstan pa 379 310 
ii) de la, rtsod pa spong ba 381 312 
(1) rang bzhin stong pa yin na kun gyis nmgon sum rtogs par thal ba 382 312 
(a) rtsod pa 382 312 
(b) de'i Ian 383 313 
(2) stong yang mi snang na de sus kyang mi rtogs pas gtan tshigs don 
med du thal ba 385 315 
(3) rang bzhin med pa la, phyogs chos sogs mi 'grub pas sgrub bya 
dang gtan tshigs kyi tha snyad rni srid par rtsod pa 403 331 
(a) Ian dngos 403 331 
(b) de Ita min na mi 'thad pa 405 332 
b) kun rdzob rts0d spone 406 333 
i) sgrub dang bsgrub bya'i mam gzhag spyir 'thad par bshad pa 406 333 
ii) tshe snga phyi'i rgyu 'bras rten 'brel gyi mam gzhag 'thad tshul 
bye brag tu bshad pa 410 337 
(1) dam bca'a mdor bstan pa 410 337 
(2) de rigs pas rgyas par sgrub pa 411 338 
(a) mi 'thad pa, dgag pa 412 338 
(b) 'thad pa sgrub pa 414 340 
ifi) bsngags pa'i tshul gyis mjug bsdu ba 417 343 
C. de Itar rtogs pai phan yon 421 346 
1. don dam rang bzhin med rtogs kyi phan yon 421 346 
2. kun rdzob don byed nus snang gi phan yon9 446 369 
3. de gnyis zung 'jug tu goms pa'i phan yon 449 371 
a) tshogs mam dag 'byung bar mdor bstan pa 449 371 
b) de'i tshul rgyas par bshad pa 451 373 
i) rgyu 'bras rjes su 'gro Idog yin pa'i dpe spyir bstan pa 451 373 
ii) Ita ba marn dag gis zin ma zin gyi rgyu 'bras bye brag tu bshad pa 453 374 
2. BDEN GNYIS DETRA BA'l TSHUL LA BSNGAGS PASlo DON 
BSDU BA 456 377 
A. tshul gnyis shing rta'i srol rnam par gzhag pa 457 377 
1. tha snyad kyi de kho na nyid mam par gzhag pa 457 378 
2. tshul pyis zung dubrel ba'i lam main par gzhag pa 459 380 
8The Varanasi edition has kun rdzob tu rtsod spong. 
9Variant heading in the Varanasi edition reads: kun rdzob don byed nus snang du khas blangs pai phan yonl 
IOVariant term in Varanasi edition is bsngags pa 7. 
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(ii) Showing that words and concepts are the sphere of relative truth 72 
ii) Eliminating all objections to these [points] 
(1) T'he consequence that if things are empty of true existence, they should be 
perceived as such by everyone 
(a) Ile objection 73 
(b) Response to this 74 
(2) The consequence that if the emptiness of phenomena is not manifest, 
nobody can conceive it, so the reasoning given is meaningless 75 
(3) Objection arising from [the idea that] if phenomena have no true nature, 
their directions, properties, etc cannot be established, so [even] in relative 
truth there can be no phenomena to be established and no argument 
(a) The actual response 76 
(b) If this were not the case, it would be invalid 77 
b) Eliminating obiections [regardingl relative truth 
i) Explaining that it is generally valid to speak of the means of proof and that 
which is to be proven 78 
ii) Specifically explaining the valid way of speaking of interdependent arising 
as cause and effect related to past and future lives 
(1) Brief presentation of the thesis 79 
(2) Establishing it in detail through the use of logic 
(a) Refuting what is invalid 80-81 
(b) Proving what is valid 81 
3. Conclusion by way of praising this approach 82 
C. Benefits of holding this view 
1. Benefit of realizing that there is no true existence on the ultimate level 83 
2. Benefit of realizing that on the relative level that which appears is able to function 
with a purpose [i. e. causally] 84 
3. Benefit of getting used to the co-emergence of the two 
a) Brief presentation [of the idea that] these various aspects can be purified 85 
b) Detailed explanation of this point 
i) General presentation [using] the example of a cause and its ensuing 
effect 86-87 
ii) Specific explanation of the cause and the fruit which may or may not 
be accomplished through having a correct view 88-90 
2. SUMMARIZING THE MEANING OF PRAISING THIS APPROACH TO THE TWO 
TRUTHS 
A. Thoroughly establishing the practice of these two paths [Cittam5tra and 
Madhyamakal of the chariot [of Mah5y5nal 
1. Thoroughly establishing precisely what the relative truth is 91 
2. Thoroughly establishing the path that is the inseparable union of the two truths 92 
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B. de la bsngags pa 460 381 
1. mdor btsan pa 461 381 
2. rgyas par bshad pa 465 385 
a) kun gyi thun mong min pa'i yon tan 465 385 
b) de la brten nas dkar chos gzhan skye ba'i yon tan 476 394 
i) sems can la snying ýe skye ba'i phan yon 476 394 
ii) ston pa la gus pa skye ba'i phan yon 479 397 
4. mjug don 483 401 
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2. lo pan gang gis bsgyur ba'i 'gyur byang 484 401 
PART 11 - de Itar phve ba'i dp-os Da bstan ina 
dam chos togs sel bzhugs" 
485 402 
498 
"'Mis final section is not included in the Varanasi edition. It is not by Mi pharn, but by rDo grub chen 
Rin po che, a rNying ma lama living in Sikkim, northern India. 
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B. Praising this [approach] 
1. Brief presentation 93 
2. Detailed explanation 
a) Qualities of this extraordinary [approach] to everything 94-95 
b) Relying on this [view], the benefit of bringing about other pure qualities 
i) Ile benefit of generating compassion for [all] sentient beings 96 
ii) Ile benefit of generating devotion to the teacher [i. e. Buddha] 97 
4. Conclusion 
1. Some points on the author of this text 
2. Concerning the scholars who translated it 
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APPENDIEK III 
TIBETAN TEXT OF THE MADHYAMAKiLAMXiRAl 
with a new English translation on facing pages 
1. bdag dang gzhan smra'i dngos'di dag// yang dag tu na geig pa dang// 
du mal rang bzhin bral bal phyir// rang bzhin med de gzugs bmyan bzhin// 
2. 'bras bu rim can nyer sbyor basH rtag mams gcig pu'i bdag nyid min// 
'bras bu re re tha dad na. // de dag rtag las nyams par'gyur// 
3. bsgoms las byung ba'i shes pa yis// shes bya'dus ma byas smra ba'iH 
lugs la'ang gcig min de dag niH rim can shes dang 'brel phyir roH 
4. mamshessngamasshesbyabai//rangbzhindessubrangnani// 
shes pa snga ma'ang phyi mar'gyur// phyi ma'ang de bzhin snga mar'gyur// 
5. sngondangphyima'ignasmamssu//deyingobomibyungna// 
'dus ma byas de shes pa bzhin// skad cig'byung bar shes par bya// 
6. sngamasngama'iskadeiggi//mthuyisbyungsbar'gyurbana// 
'dus ma byas su'di migyur// sems dang sems las byung ba bzhin// 
7. skadcigpamams'didagtu/Irangdbang'byungbardodnani// 
gzhan la bltos pa med pa'i phyir// rtag tu yod pa'am med par'gyur// 
8. don byed nus pa ma yin la//de'dodbrtags pas ci zhig bya// 
ma ning gzugs bzang mi bzang zhesH'dod Man marns kyis brtags ci phan// 
9. skad cig skad cig ma yin par// gang zag bstan du mi rung basH 
gcig dang du ma'i rang bzhin dang// bral bar gsal bar rab tu shes// 
10. tha dad phyogs can dang 'brel phyir// khyab marns gcig pur ga. la 'gyur// 
bsgribs dang ma bsgribs dngos sogs phyir// rags pa marns khyang gcig pu min// 
I This text is based on the Peking edition. For a critical edition of the text see Ichig6 (1985 and 1989). 
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Those entities asserted [as real] by ourselves [i. e. Buddhists] and others have 
in reality no intrinsic nature because they have neither a unitary nor a multiple 
nature, like a reflection. 
2. Since effects are produced in succession, permanent [causes] cannot have a 
unitary nature. If effects [arise] at different points in time this contradicts the 
permanence of [the cause]. 
3. According to the [Vaibhdýika] view, the unconditioned are objects of the cog- 
nition that arises through meditation; so the unconditioned are not [in fact] 
unitary entities since they are related to successively arising [moments of] 
cognition. 
4. If the intrinsic nature of an [object] known by a former cognition continues to 
exist [in the object of a] later [cognition], the former cognition becomes the 
succeeding one, and the latter becomes the same as the former. 
5. [On the other hand] if the essence of that [object] does not occur at all pre- 
vious and subsequent occasions, it should be understood that the uncondi- 
tioned is a momentary occurrence, just Eke a cognition. 
6. If it arises by the force of successive moments, the unconditioned is not 
[really] unconditioned, just like mind and mental states. 
7. If it is asserted that these momentary entities have arisen independently, they 
would remain permanently existent or non-existent, since they are not reliant 
on anything else. 
8. [Finally, ] since these propounded entities cannot perform any function, what is 
the point of investigating them? Lustful [women] may wonder whether a 
eunich is handsome or not, but what purpose will their examination serve? 
9. Other than as momentary or non-momentary the person cannot be demonstra- 
ted. That its nature is neither unitary nor multiple is therefore clearly and 
thoroughly recognized. 
10. Since they are related to that which has various directions, how can pervasives 
be unitary? And since gross entities are obscured, unobscured and so on, they 
are not unitary either. 
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1. I)yar ba dang ni bskor ba 'am// bar med mam par gnas kyang rungH 
dbus gnas rdul phran rdul gcig la// b1tas pa'i rang bzhin gang yin pa// 
12. rdul phran gzhan la blta ba yang// de nyid gal te yin bjod na// 
de Ita yin na de Ita bu// sa chu la sogs rgyas 'gyur ram// 
13. rdul phran gzhan la Ita ba'i ngos// gal te gzhan du'dod na ni// 
rab tu phra rdul ji Ita bur// gcig pu cha shas med par 'gyur// 
14. rdul phran rang bzhin med grub pa// de phyir mig dang rdzas la sogs// 
bdag dang gzhan sniras mang po dag// rang bzhin med par mngon pa yin// 
15. de yi rang bzhin des brtsams dang// de yi yon tan de las bdag// 
de yi spyi dang khyad par yang// de dag de dang 'du ba can// 
16. mam shes bems po'i rang bzhin las// bzlog pa rab tu skye ba ste// 
berns min rang bzhin gang yin pa// de 'di'i bdag nyid shes pa yin// 
17. gcig pa cha med rang bzhin la// gsum gyi rang bzhin mi'thad phyir// 
de yi rang gi rig pa ni// bya dang byed pa'i dngos por min// 
18. dei phyir'di ni shes pa yi// rang bzhin yin pas bdag shes rung// 
don gyi rang bzhin gzhan dag la// de yis ji Itar shes par'gyur// 
19. de yi rang bzhin gzhan la medH gang gis de shes gzhan yang shes// 
shes dang shes par bya ba'i don// tha dad par ni'dod phyir ro// 
20. shes pa marn bcas phyogs la ni// dngos su de gnyis tha dad kyang// 
de dang gzugs bmyan'dra bas na// gdags pa tsam gyi tshor bar rung// 
2 1. don gyi marn pas bsgyur Idan pa'i// marn shes su zhig mi 'dod pa// 
de la phyi rol rig pa yiH marn pa'di yang yod ma yin// 
22. shes gcig tha dad ma yin pas// marn pa mang por mi 'gyur te// 
de phyir de yi mthu yis ni// don shesgyur bar bzhag pa med// 
23. mam pa mams dang ma bral bas// mam shes gcig pur mi 'gyur ro// 
de Ita min na'di gnyis la// geig ces ji skad bjod par bya// 
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11,12. Whether particles exist conjoined [with others], surrounded [by others] with 
intervals in-between, or immediately contiguous [with others], if it is claimed 
that the nature of the central particle that faces a [second] particle is the very 
same as the nature that faces a [third or fourth] particle, then earth, water and 
so on could not develop, could they? 
13 If one asserts that the side facing [a second] particle is different from the side 
facing a [third] particle, how then can the most subtle particles be unitary and 
partless? 
14 It has been proved that particles have no intrinsic nature. Tberefore the eye, 
substance, and so on, and the numerous [other entities] that are postulated as 
real by ourselves and others, are clearly devoid of intrinsic nature [too]. 
15 They are compounds composed of [particles]. Moreover, the nature of these 
entities, their composition, their qualities and type of function, and their 
general and particular characteristics, [all] come from these [particles]. 
16 Consciousness arises as [that which is] instrinsically opposed to the nature of 
matter. The nature of that which is immaterial is self-awareness. 
17 The self-aware nature of the mind should not be analysed into action and agent 
since it is unitary and without parts, and cannot be divided into three [i. e. the 
knower, the known and the knowing]. 
18 Therefore, since this is the nature of consciousness, [the mind] is able to cog- 
nize itself. But how can it cognize objects whose nature is different? 
19 Its nature [i. e. that of consciousness] is not the same as that of [the object, 
which is] other. Since you [the opponent, i. e. the NirakarajOnavadins) assert 
that cognition and the object of cognition are different [in nature], how can the 
mind cognize both itself and other things? 
20 As for those who assert that cognition is endowed with aspects (the Sdkdm- 
jfidnavddins), these two [cognition and aspects] are in actuality different; yet 
as this is similar to [the case of] a reflection, it is acceptable merely as a 
designation. 
21 [On the other hand], for those [i. e. the NirdkaraJfi5nav5dins] who do not accept 
that consciousness is transfonned by the aspect of the object, there is no aspect 
through which it can be aware of outer objects. 
22 Since a unitary consciousness does not have different [parts], it cannot have 
many different aspects. Therefore one cannot assert that cognition of an object 
takes place through the power of a unitary consciousness. 
23 Consciousness should not be unitary since it is related to a plurality of aspects. 
Otherwise how can the identity of the two be explained? 
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24. dkar po dag la sogs pa la// shes pa de ni rim'byung ste// 
rngyogs parbyung phyir blun po dag// cig car snyam du shes pa yin// 
25. Icug ma'i sgra la sogs pa'i blo// rab tu mgyogs par'byung yin na// 
de phyir cig car'byung ba'i blo//'dir yang ci phyirbyung mi'gyur// 
26. yid kyi rtog pa 'ba zhig la'angH rim du shes par mi 'gyur roH 
ring du gnas pa ma yin pasH blo mams kun kyang mgyogs 'byung 'dra// 
27. de phyir yul mams thams cad la// rim gyis'dzin par mi'gyur gyiH 
mam pa dag ni tha dad Itar// cig car'dzin par snang bar'gyur// 
28. mgal me la yang cig car duHkhor lor snang ba'i Tl=l ba'byung// 
gsal bar rab tu snang ba'i phyir// mthong ba'i mtshams sbyor ma yin no// 
29. 'di Itar mtshams mams sbyor ba ni// dran pas byed pa nyid yin gyi// 
mthong bas ma yin 'das pa yi// yul la 'dzin pa min phyir ro// 
30. de yi yul tu gang 'gyur ba// de ni zhig pas gsal ma yin// 
de phyir'khor lor snang ba'di// gsal ba ma yin'gyur ba'i rigsH 
3 1. ri mo'i gzhi mams mthong ba'i tshe// de la de bzhin sems mang po// 
ci ste cig ca'i tshul gyis suH'byung bar'gyur bar'dod na goH 
32. de Ita yin na dkar la sogsH mam pa sna gcig shes pa yangH 
thog ma dbus mtha' tha dad pasH dmigs pa sna tshogs nyid du 'gyur// 
33. rdul phran bdag nyid dkar la sogs// gcig pu'i bdag nyid cha med pa// 
shes pa gang la'ang snang gyur par// bdag gis rab tu tshor ba med// 
34. mam shes Inga yi khams mams ni// bsags la dmigs pa'i mam pa yin// 
sems dang sems byung dmigs pa ni// drug par bzhag pa byas pa yin// 
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24 Cognitions of 'white' and so forth arise successively, yet because they occur 
[so] rapidly ordinary people [believe that they] cognize them all at once. 
25 [But] when one hears [the words] 'lata' [and 'talah', i. e. a tongue twister] 
spoken very quickly, why are they not heard simultaneously in this case? 
26 Even if we consider only conceptual cognitions, they do not cognize [aspects] 
sequentially. Since they do not last long they are like all cognitions, occurring 
rapidly [in succession]. 
27 Therefore objects are not apprehended sequentially, even though it appears as 
if [a series of] separate aspects are apprehended all at once. 
28 Even with the example of a whirled firebrand [the opponent maintains that] 
the circle of fire that appears to arise is an illusion [produced by memory per- 
ceiving] all at once [discrete perceptions of the firebrand]. It is not created by 
visual perception joining together [individual] cognitions [of the torch] 
because the circle is seen very clearly. 
29 Connecting up in this manner is done by memory, not by visual perception, 
because a past object cannot be perceived [in the present]. 
30 An object of memory is not clear since it has ceased to exist. Therefore it is 
logical that the appearance of the wheel would not be perceived clearly. 
31 Understand that if the author agreed [with the Sautriintikas, who hold] that 
[many of the same kinds of perception] occur simultaneously, then when you 
look at a multicoloured picture [as] many consciousnesses [as there are 
colours] would arise at the same time. 
32 If this were so, then even the apprehension of [a single aspect like] white and 
so forth would be multiple, since different parts [of the white object] such as 
top, middle or edge would be perceived as separate. 
33 1 have never perceived particles [such as] white and so forth, unitary and with- 
out parts, that appear to [a first-instant] cognition. 2 
34 It is established [by the Sautriintikas] that the five kinds of sense conscious- 
ness have aggregates [of atoms] as their object, while the sixth [i. e. the mental 
consciousness] has cognition and mental states (or minds and mental events: 
cittacaitta) as its objects. 
21chig6's translation is different: "To what object would the [instantaneous] cognitions [proposed by 
Sautrantikal refer, since [the objects] 'white' and the like are of the nature of atoms which have no parts? 
The [cognition] does not [merely] perceive itself. " 
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35. phyi gzung marns la'ang marn shes ni// gcig tu snang bar mi rigs te// 
yon tan la sogs Man pa yi// rdzas la sogs pa dmigs phyir ro// 
36. nor bu gzhi yi bdag nyid Itar// dngos po kun zhes Ita ba la// 
de la'dzin pa'i sems kyang ni// gcig pu'i ngo bor snang mi rigs// 
37. sa la sogs pa 'dus pa la// yul dang dbang por kun 'jog par// 
su'dod de yi lugs la yangH dngos po, gcig dang mthun 'jug med// 
38. snying stobs la sogs bdag sgra sogs// phyogs la'ang don gcig snang ba can// 
shes pa rigs pa ma yin te// gsum gyi bdag nyid yul snang phyir// 
39. dngos po'i ngo bo mam gsum la// de ni gal te mam gcig ste// 
de dang mi mthun snang na go// de ni der'dzin ji Itardod// 
40. phyi rol yul marns med par yangH sna tshogs snang la rtag pa steH 
cig ca'am ji ste rim'byung balH mam shes rung bar shin tu dka'H 
4 1. mam mkha' la sogs shes pa dag// min tsam du ni snang ba mams// 
yi ge du ma snang ba'i phyir// sna tshogs snang bar gsal ba yin// 
42. marn shes sna tshogs min snang ba//'ga zhig yod par gzhug na yang// 
'on kyang yang dag gzhag ni rung// mtshan nyid bcas la gnod mthong phyir// 
43. de phyir sna tshogs snang ba yiH mam shes mam pa kun tu gnasH 
de ni mam pa tha dad Itar// gcig pu'i rang bzhin mi rigs sog 
44. ci ste thog ma med rgyud kyi// bag chags smin pas sprul pa yi// 
mam pa. dag ni snang ba. yangH nor bas sgyu ma'i rang bzhin 'dra// 
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35 Even according to the treatises of non-Buddhists [i. e. the Vai9qikas] it is not 
reasonable [to maintain] that consciousness is unitary, since it cognizes 
[objects] such as substance (dravya) and so on as being endowed with qua- 
lities (guýza) and so forth. 
36 On the view that the inherent nature of all entities is like that of onyx/agate 
[i. e. the view of the Jaina and M-imgrpsA schools), it is not logical that the con- 
sciousness that apprehends them has a unitary nature either. 
37 Even according to the theory [of the Materialists, the Lok5yata) which holds 
that the object and the sense organs consist of [the four elementsJ earth etc., 
cognition still does not occur as unitary. 
38 And according to the view [of the Sdqikhya] which holds that sounds and the 
like are in essence [nothing but the three gukias], sattva etc., it is not reasonable 
[to maintain] that there is cognition of unitary objects, because objects 
manifest as threefold in nature. 
39 How can you [the SZiqikhya] argue that cognition actually apprehends the 
object? Cognition which [is said to have] a unitary nature would arise without 
corresponding to its object, whose essence would be the three guiýas. 
40 [The Vedantin argues that] external objects [are illusory and] do not exist, yet 
[the consciousness] to which the various [objects) manifest is permanent. It is 
extremely hard to maintain [the unitariness ofl this consciousness, whether it 
occurs simultaneously or successively in relation to appearances. 
41 Cognition of [unconditioned] entities such as space and so on is [based on] 
appearances of mere names. Since multiple syllables/letters appear [in these 
names], it is clear that such [cognitions] are multiple. 
42 Although according to some people consciousness appears to be unitary, it is 
impossible to establish this in ultimate truth because it has been proved that 
any entity which is endowed with the characteristic [of existence, i. e. causal 
efficiency] is refuted [in ultimate truth]. 
43 Therefore it is established from every point of view that cognition [occurs] 
with the appearance of various [aspects]. It cannot have a unitary nature 
because there is a plurality of aspects. 
44. [The Yogacifins hold that] the aspects of deluded [cognition] appear [in our 
consciousness] produced by the ripening of latencies in the individual conti- 
nuum from the beginningless past. Yet their intrinsic nature is like an illusion 
since they are the result of error. 
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45. de dge'on kyang de dag gi// dngos de yang dag nyid dam ci// 
lon te ma brtags gcig pu na// dga' bar khas len 'di bsam mo// 
46. gal te yang dag mam par shesH du mar'gyur ro yang na niH 
de dag gcig 'gyur 'gal Idan pasH gdon mi za bar so sor 'gyur// 
47. marn pa tha dad ma yin na// g. yo dang mi g. yo la sogs pa// 
gcig gis tharns cad g. yo la sogsH thal bar'gyur te Ian gdab dka'H 
48. phyi rol don 9yi tshul la yang// de Itar marn par ma bral na// 
gcig gi chos su tharns cad kyangHjug par'gyur te bzlog pa med// 
49. ci ste mam pa'i grangs bzhin du// rnam par shes pa khas len na// 
de tshe rdul phran'drar'gyur ba// dpyad pa'di las bzlog par dka'// 
50. gal te sna tshogs de gcig na// nam mkha'i gos can lugs sam ci// 
sna tshogs gcig pa'i rang bzhin niin// rin chen sna tshogs la sogs 'drall 
5 1. sna. tshogs gcig pu'i rang bzhin na// sna tshogs ngo bor snang ba dangH 
bsgribs dang ma bsgribs la sogs paH tha dad 'di ni ji Itar 'gyur// 
52. ci 
Ite 
ngo bo nyid du de'i// mam pa'di dag med pa ste// 
yang dag tu na rnam med pa'i// mam par shes la nor bas snang// 
53. gal te med na ji Itar bur// de dag 'di Itar gsal bar tshor// 
de yi dngos las tha dad pa'i// shes pa de'dra ma yin noH 
54. 'di Itar gang la dngos gang med// de la de shes yod ma yin// 
bde ba min la bde sogs dang// dkar ba mams la'ang mi dkar bzhin// 
55. mam pa'di la shes pa'i don// dngos su'thad pa ma yin te// 
shes pa'i bdag dang bral ba'i phyir// mam mkha'i me tog la sogs bzhin// 
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45 Even though we appreciate this [doctrine], let us consider whether these 
entities [i. e. the aspects] exist ultimately or are agreeable and acceptable only 
as long as they are not investigated critically. 
46 If [the aspects were] ultimately real, either consciousness would be multiple or 
the aspects would be unitary. If consciousness and its aspects had contra- 
dictory natures they would definitely be distinct. 
47 If aspects are not distinct it is difficult to refute consequences such as with 
[aspects of] movement and rest, etc., where a single [aspect of] movement 
would cause everything to move, and so on. 
48 Even in a theory that maintains the true existence of external objects, the same 
applies. If the aspects are inseparable [from consciousness], one cannot escape 
[the fact that] everything would be reduced to a single phenomenon. 
49 If consciousness were admitted [to consist of as many parts] as the number of 
[its various] aspects, then it would be difficult to avoid the kind of criticism 
that is made regarding [the reality of] particles. 
50 If [you maintain that] several entities are in nature one, is your theory any 
different from that of the Jaina? Plurality cannot have a singular intrinsic 
nature, just as various precious stones cannot be a single jewel. 
51 If a plural number [of things] had a single intrinsic nature, how could they 
manifest as plural? And how could there be a difference between [those parts 
of the object that are] obscured, unobscured and so on? 
52 [The Andk5ravddins hold that consciousness] does not intrinsically possess 
aspects, but by dint of an error they appear to consciousness even though con- 
sciousness is not endowed with aspects ultimately. 
53 If [aspects] do not [ultimately] exist, how can they be perceived so clearly? 
Cognition, if different from the entity of aspects, would not be like that. 3 
54 Thus, when there is no aspect present in the knowledge [of something], there 
will be no cognition of it. Just as [we do not feel] pleasure when there is no 
pleasure, or [see] white in [that which is] not white, and so forth. 
55. The term 'cognition' is not appropriate to [perception of an unreal] aspect 
because this is contrary to [the nature of] cognition, like a sky-flower etc. 
3The translation given by Ichig6: "If [images] are unreal, how can they be perceived so, clearly [even by an 
ordinary man]? His knowledge is not the same [as non-dual or supramundanel knowledge. The latter is 
distinct from [the knowledge that cognizes] the appearing images. " 
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56. med pa nus pa med pas na. /I gdags pa'ang mi rung rta ru bzhin// 
bdag snang shes pa mi skyed la// nus pa rung ba ma yin noH 
57. gang phyir de yod nyes tshor ba// shes dang 'brel ba ci zhig yod// 
bdag med de yi bdag nyid dang// de las byung ba ma yin no// 
5 8. rgyu med na ni gang zhig gis// res 'ga"byung ba 'di rung 'gyur// 
rgyu dang Idan na gang zhig gis// gzhan gyi dbang las bzlog par'gyur// 
59. de med na ni shes de yang// mam pa med pa nyid kyis'gyur// 
shel sgong dag pa 'dra ba yin// shes pa rab tu tshor ba med// 
60. 'di ni Ihrul bas shes she na// de ci UM la rag las sam// 
de yi mthu yis byung na ni// de yang gzhan gyi dbang nyid do// 
61. dngos po gang gang mam dpyad pa// de dang de la gcig nyid med// 
gang la gcig nyid yod min pa// de la du ma nyid kyang med// 
62. gcig dang du ma ma gtogs par// marn pa gzhan dang Man pa yi// 
dngos po mi rung 'di gnyis ni// phan tshun spangs te gnas phyir ro// 
63. de phyir dngos po 'di dag niH kun rdzob kho nai mtshan nyid 'dzin// 
gal te 'di dag don 'dod na// de la. kho bos ci zhig bya// 
64. ma brtags gcig pu nyarns dga' zhing// skye dang 'jig pa'i chos can pa// 
don byed pa dag nus marns kyi// rang bzhin kun rdzob pa yin rtogs// 
65. brtags pa ma byas nyams dga'baang/ bdag rgyu snga ma snga ma la// 
brten nas phyi ma phyi ma yiHbras bu de'drabyung ba yin// 
66. de phyir kun rdzob rgyu med naH rung min zhes pa'ang legs ma yin// 
gal te 'di yi nyer len pa// yang dag yin na de smros shigH 
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56 Since that which is non-existent has no causal efficiency, like the homs of a 
horse, [an aspect that is non-existent] is not efficient even figuratively because 
it cannot produce knowledge of its own appearance. 
57 So how is it that that which is definitely felt to be existent is related to cogni- 
tion? [Being] non-existent [the aspect] is not of the nature [of cognition] nor is 
it produced from it. 
58 If [an aspect] has no cause, why does it arise at different times? If it is 
endowed with a cause, how can its dependent nature (paratantra svabhava) be 
avoided? 
59 If [the aspect] did not [truly] exist, cognition would still occur in the absence 
of aspects. [Yet] a consciousness like a pure crystal sphere has never been 
experienced (or can never perceive anything). 
60 If it is said that [the aspect] is cognized on account of delusion, is it different 
from that which is contingent upon delusion? If it arises by the power of that 
[delusion] then it does indeed have a dependent nature. 
61 Whichever entity one examines, it is not unitary. Where there is no unitariness 
there can be no multiplicity either. 
62 An entity must be either unitary or multiple [in nature], since these [cate- 
gories] are mutually exclusive. It cannot be both [at once]. 
63 Therefore these entities are held to be characterized only by relative [truth]. If 
you [still] maintain that they are actual selves then what can I say? 
64 One should understand that the nature of relative [truth] is (1) that which is 
delightfut only as long as it is not investigated critically; (2) that which is 
subject to arising and decay; and (3) that which has causal efficiency. 
65 Even that which is agreeable and acceptable as long as it is not investigated 
critically implies the production of similar successive effects conditioned by 
their own successive causes. 
66 Therefore, [for an opponent to say] "if relative [existence] has no [truly 
existing] cause, it could not exist [at all]"-that won't do. If there is a truly 
existing [cause] that expropriates [the relative], tell [me] what it iS! 5 
4Mi pham points out that when gantaraksita defines the relative as 'delightfur, he does not intend to exclude 
those things which frighten or horrify us. He is referring to all those phenomena that 'delight! the conscious- 
ness by seducing it and eliciting attachment. Delight is broader than pleasurable sensation. 
5 Ichig? 5's translation omits the negative. For the translation of this verse I am indebted to John Pettit. 
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67. dngos po kun gyi rang bzhin niH rigs pa'i lam gyi rjes'brang baH 
gzhan dag 'dod pa sel bar byed// de phyir rgol ba'i gnas med do// 
68. yod dang med dang yod med ces// khas mi len pa gang yin pa// 
de la nan tan Man pas kyang// cir yang klan ka bya mi nusH 
69. de phyir yang dag nyid du na// dngos po gang yang grub pa med// 
de phyir de bzhin gshegs mams kyis// chos mams thams ead ma skyes gsungs// 
70. dam pai don dang'thun pa'i phyir//'di ni dam pa'i don zhes byaH 
yang dag tu na spros pa yiH tshogs mams kun las de grol yin// 
7 1. skye ba la sogs med pa'i phyir// skye ba med la sogs mi srid// 
de yi ngo bo bkag pa'i phyir// de yi tshig gi sgra mi srid// 
72. yul med pa la dgag pa yi// sbyor ba legs pa yod ma yin// 
mam par rtog la brten na yangH kun rdzob par'gyur yang dag min// 
73. 'o na de ni rtogs gyur pas// de yi rang bzhin mngon sum phyir// 
mi khas mams kyang dngos mams kyiH dngos po'di'dra cis mi rtogsH 
74. ma yin thog med rgyud Ici bar// dngos por sgro btags dbang byas pasH 
de phyir srog chags thams cad kyisH mngon sum rtogs par mi'gyur roH 
75. de la sgro btags gcog byed pa// shes par byed pa'i gtan tshigs kyis// 
des su dpog mams shes par byed// mal'byor dbang mams mngon sum gsal// 
76. gzhung gis bskyed pa'i bye brag gi// chos can spangs nas mkhas pa dang// 
bud med byis pa'i bar dag la// grags par gyur pa'i dngos marns la// 
77. bsgrub dang sgrub pa'i dngos po 'di// ma lus yang dag 'jug par'gyur// 
de Ita min na gzhi ma grub// la sogs Ian ni ji skad gdab// 
78. bdag ni snang ba'i ngang can gyi// dngos po dgag par mi byed de// 
de Ita bas na sgrub pa dang// bsgrub bya gzhag pa Tlu-ugs pa med// 
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67. We reject the intrinsic nature of all entities postulated by those among our 
opponents who follow the way of logic. Therefore there is nothing to be 
refuted [in our system]. 
68 Even with the greatest effort, it is not possible to criticize in any way someone 
[like myself] who admits neither existence, nor non-existence, nor both 
existence and non-existence. 
69 Therefore, ultimately there is no entity that can be established in reality. 
Because of that, the Tathagatas taught the non-production of all dharma-s. 
70 Some say that [non-production] is the highest truth since it is in accord with 
the highest truth. But in my view, the highest truth is that which is completely 
free of all [conceptual] elaboration. 
71 Since there is no production and the like, there can be no non-production and 
so on in ultimate truth. And since the essence [of production and non-produc- 
tion] has been refuted, there cannot [properly] be words to express it. 
72 When an object does not exist, you cannot properly apply a negative to it. 
Even if [non-production arises] as a concept or idea, it is [acceptable only] in 
relative truth, not in ultimate truth. 
73 If the nature of entities can be realized directly by understanding them [con- 
ceptually], why is it that uneducated people do not understand the nature of 
entities in this way? 
74 [Yet] they do not. They cannot realize directly because every sentient being is 
subject to [the habit of] imagining things as real, which from beginningless 
time exists in each burdensome individual series. 
75 Powerful yogins realize [the ultimate] directly and clearly [because] they have 
cut off [the habit of] imagining. Since logical arguments produce under- 
standing those who use inference understand. 
76,77 Leaving aside certain subjects occurring in scriptural treatises, [our] theses 
and reasoning can be applied without exception to all [conventional] things 
known to everyone, from scholars to women and children. Otherwise, how 
could we reply to [those who have] claimed that [we are guilty of fallacies 
such as] having a logical mark whose locus is unreal (dfraydsiddhahetu). 
78 1 have not refuted entities insofar as they are of the nature of appearance. 
Therefore there is no confusion regarding the establishment of the probandurn 
and the probans. 
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79. de phyir thog med srid rgyud nasH dngos dang dngos med rtog sogs kyi// 
rigs mthun sa bon yod par ni// rjes su dpag par bya ba yin// 
80. 'di ni dngos pol mthu stobs kyis//'byung ba ma yin de med phyir// 
dngos po mams kyi bdag nyid de// rgya cher rab tu bkag pa yin// 
81. rim gyisbyung phyir glo bur min// rtag'byung ma yin rtag ma yin// 
de bas goms 'dra de nyid phyir// dang po rang gi rigs las skyes// 
82. de phyir rtag chad Ita ba mamsH gzhung'di la ni ring du gnasH 
Idog dang des su 'jug pa yangH sa bon myu yu leug sogs bzhin// 
83. chos la bdag med mkhas pa niH rang bzhin med pa goms byas pasH 
phyin ci log las byung ba yiH nyon mongs sgrim pa med par spongH 
84. rgyu dang 'bras bu'i dngos po, ni// kun rdzob tu ni mi bzlog pas// 
kun nas nyon mongs mam byang sogs// marn par gzhag pa'khrugs pa med// 
85. 'di Itar rgyu dang 'bras bu yi// chos 'di marn par gzhag pas na// 
tshogs marns dri ma med pa yang// gzhung'di nyid la. rung ba yin// 
86. marn par dag pa'i rgyu las ni//'bras bu marn par dag pa'byung// 
yang dag Itas byung tshul khrims kyi// yan lag la sogs mam dag bzhin// 
87. de bzhin mam dag ma yin las//'bras bu marn dag ma yin'byung// 
log Ita'i stobs las byung ba yi// log par g. yem la sogs pa bzhin// 
88. tshad ma'i gnod pa yod pas na// dngos por dmigs pa yod pa ni// 
smig rgyu la sogs shes pa bzhin// phyin ci log par yongs su rtogsH 
89. de phyir de mthus byung ba yi// pha rol phyin pa sgrub pa kun// 
bdag dang bdag gir log pa las// byung ba bzhin du stobs chung ngo// 
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79 Therefore [having established the non-substantiality of an things, and since 
things do nevertheless appear as mere experience] one must infer that there ar 
seeds corresponding to the ideas of existence, non-existence and the Re, 
[which] arise from the beginningless continuum of existence. 
80 These [ideas] do not arise by the force of [external] entities since the [latter] 
do not [truly] exist, the inherent nature of such entities having been refuted in 
detail. 
81 Because they occur serially, [ideas] do not arise without cause, or from an 
eternal [cause], nor are they themselves eternal. Therefore, the first [moment 
of mind] arises from [a preceding moment] of its own kind, because [ideas/ 
appearances arise] in the manner of being habituated to something. 6 
82 Therefore both eternalism and nihilism are completely rejected in our treatise. 
[All entities] continue to decay and to arise [successively from causes], just as 
seeds give rise to sprouts, shoots and so forth. 
83 Those who are skilled in [understanding] the selflessness of phenomena, 
through becoming accustomed to the absence of inherent nature, easily avoid 
the emotional afflictions that arise from mistaken views. 
84 Since causal relation is not denied in relative truth, there is no confusion as to 
the distinction between defilement and purification, and so on. 
85 Indeed, since the law of causation has been established, it is also possible in 
our system to gather the pure accumulations [of merit and wisdom]. 
86 From pure causes arise pure effects, as with the branches of pure discipline 
and so forth that arise from right view. 
87 Likewise, from impure causes arise impure effects, as with sexual misconduct 
and so forth which occur as a result of wrong view. 
88 Clinging to an entity [as real] is understood to be a mistaken concept because 
it goes against valid cognition [that those entities possess neither a unitary nor 
a multiple nature]. It is like the cognition of a mirage and so on. 
89 Therefore, if the practice of the pdramitd-s arises through the force of this 
[clinging] it will be weak, just like the practice that results from the false 
views of 'me'and'mine'. 
6Ichig6 interprets 'gom` as referring to meditation, but it is not clear why meditation is relevant in the con- 
text. He writes: "Therefore, the [notions of production and non-production, which we have discussed] pre- 
viously, arise from their own species, because they are indeed [ideas of existence and non-existence], as in 
meditation practice. " 
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90. dngos por dmigs pa med pa las// byung ba'bras bu chen po ste// 
rgyas pa'i rgyu las byung bai phyir// sa bon grung po'i myug sogs bzhin// 
9 1. rgyu dang 'bras bur gyur pa yangH shes pa 'ba' zhig kho na steH 
rang gis grub pa gang yin pa// de ni shes par gnas pa yin// 
92. sems tsam la ni brten nas su// phyi rol dngos med shes par bya// 
tshul 'dir brten nas de la yang// shin tu bdag med shes par bya// 
93. tshul gnyis shin rta zhon nas suH rigs pa'i srab skyogsju byed pa// 
de dag de phyirji bzhin don// theg pa chen po pa nyid'thobH 
94. khyab dang dbang la sogs ma myongH dpag tu med par gnas pa'i rgyuH 
'jig rten spyi bor gyur pas kyangH shin tu myong ba, ma yin pa// 
95. yang dag bdud rsti dag pa'diH thugs de dag pa'i rgyu can gyi// 
de bzhin gshegs pa ma gtogs par// gzhan gyi longs spyod ma yin noH 
96. de phyir log par bstan pa yi// grub mthar'chel ba'i blo can IaH 
de lugs des 'jug blo can mams// snying de nyid ni rab tu skyeH 
97. blo nor Man pas lugs gzhan la//ji Itar snying po, med mthong ba// 
de Itar de dag skyob pa la// gus pa shin tu skye bar 'gyur// 
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90 [On the other hand] the result that comes from not clinging to [the existence 
ofl an entity is tremendous, since it results from a powerful cause [i. e. a cause 
that is able to bring about its ripened result] like a shoot from a sound seed, etc. 
91 That which is cause and effect is nothing but mind-only. It is established that 
knowledge is that which is self-validated. 
92 Based on the standpoint of Cittamatra, one must know that external entities do 
not [truly] exist. Based on this standpoint [i. e. of the non-intrinsic nature of an 
dhanna-s] one must know that there is no self at all even in that [i. e. in Mind 
Only]. 
93 Therefore those who hold the reins of logic while riding the chariot of these 
two systems [Madhyamaka and YogZicdra] become true [followers of] MAd- 
ydna. 
94 Even Visnu, 19vara. and so forth do not experience this. Even [those beings 
who arej ihe cause of limitless qualities and held in the highest esteem by 
mundane people [ýr5vakas and Pratyekabuddhas] do not experience this at all. 
95 This pure and true ambrosia is enjoyed by no one but the Tath5gata, who is 
motivated by pure compassion. 
96 Therefore the wise who follow this approach will feel intense compassion for 
those who, in spite of their intelligence, give credit to systems that teach 
wrong views. 
97 Those who are endowed with the treasure of wisdom see how meaningless or 
pointless other systems are, and instead they develop tremendous devotion to 
the [ultimate] Protector, [the Buddha]. 
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